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Abstract
In the 1990s a consensus has emerged in international relations and foreign policy analysis 
according to which it has become necessary to move from single-level approaches towards 
multilevel theorising. The thesis suggests that the network approach is especially suited 
for the development of a multilevel theory of foreign policy decision-making because it has 
already been successfully applied to national, transnational and international levels of 
analysis. The thesis expands the scope of the network approach by proposing a ‘multilevel 
network theory’ that combines all three levels. Moreover, the thesis addresses the 
widespread criticism that network models fail to explain the process of decision-making 
by putting forward testable hypotheses regarding the exercise of pressure and the changing 
preferences among political actors. The aim of the approach is to examine how networks 
among national, transnational and international actors influence foreign policy making. The 
thesis suggests that the outcome of the decision-making process can be explained by the 
formation of a majority coalition in favour of a particular policy. In order to test the 
proposed multilevel network theory, the thesis examines four cases of foreign policy 
decision-making after the end of the Cold War. The case studies include: (1) the decision 
of the British government to support air strikes in Bosnia, (2) the abolition of the tactical 
air-to-surface missile project by the British government in 1993, (3) the first despatch of 
German Tornados to Bosnia, and (4) the reduction of German export controls on goods 
with civil and military applications (‘dual-use’). By analysing cases in which two Western 
European governments had the final decision-making authority, the thesis illustrates how 
‘national’ foreign policy decisions can be the consequences of domestic, transnational and 
international pressure.
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1. From National Foreign Policy to Multilevel Networks
1.1 Introduction
In the 1990s a ‘growing consensus’ has emerged in the empiricist analysis of foreign policy 
decision-making.1 According to this consensus, it has become necessary to move from 
single-level approaches in international relations and foreign policy analysis towards a 
theoretical integration of the domestic, transnational and international levels of analysis. 
While historical or constructivist approaches have traditionally crossed levels of analysis, 
this thesis attempts to respond to the above theoretical challenge within the ‘empiricist’ 
paradigm.2 As such, its aim is the search for theoretical generalizations across countries 
and issues, and its primary standard of evaluation is empirical validation.3 Following a 
critique of the three most broadly used existing approaches, which have proposed the 
theoretical integration of multiple levels within the empiricist study of international 
relations in the United States and Western Europe, namely transnationalism, the ‘two-level 
game’ and network analysis, this thesis contends that the latter approach provides a fruitful 
basis for the analysis of contemporary foreign policy decision-making. However, it argues 
that the explanatory value of the network approach can be improved by several 
modifications which are developed in the form of a new ‘multilevel network theory’. 
Multilevel network theory combines network analysis with rational choice assumptions to 
illustrate how f3rdgn policy actors strategically use their national, transnational and 
international relations in order to influence the foreign policy decision-making process.
1 Harald Muller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘From the Outside In and from the Inside Out. International 
Relations, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy’, in David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., The 
Limits o f  State Autonomy. Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder, Col.: Westview 
Press, 1993), pp.25-48, p.47.
2 On the respective critique of the empiricist (or ‘scientific’), traditional and post-positivist approaches 
in International Relations see Hedley Bull, ‘International Theory. The Case for a Classical Approach’, 
in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1969), pp.20-37; Morton A. Kaplan, ‘The New Great Debate. Traditionalism 
vs. Science in International Relations’, in ibid., pp.39-61; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and  
Understanding in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Thomas J. Biersteker, 
‘Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly 33:3, 
1989, pp.263-267.
3 For a summary o f other criteria for the evaluation of theories within the empiricist paradigm see John 
A. Vasquez, ‘The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations 
Theory After Enlightenment’s Fall’, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., International Political Theory 
Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp.217-240, p.230. Taking an empiricist perspective this thesis 
is located in what Steve Smith identifies as the ‘Comparative Foreign Policy Theoiy ’ approach to Foreign 
Policy Analysis. See Steve Smith, ‘ForeignPolicy Analysis and International Relations’, Millennium  16:2, 
1987, pp.345-348.
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The call for multilevel approaches in international relations and foreign policy 
analysis originates from the observation that foreign policy decision-making within 
Western Europe and the transatlantic community in particular, has become more integrated 
since the last World War. As a consequence, it has been suggested that Western 
governments are unable to unilaterally control their foreign or even domestic affairs, as 
presumed by single level models of foreign policy decision-making. Conversely, foreign 
policy making in Western democracies appears to be influenced by a broad variety of 
public and private actors at the national, transnational and international levels of analysis. 
In reaction to this development, a range of authors have proclaimed a crisis of the nation­
state and the emergence of regional or global structures of governance.4
Moreover, several analytical frameworks have been proposed which combine 
different levels of analysis. Specifically in Western Europe, where the trend towards a 
fusion of decision-making processes has been recognised in the context of the European 
Union (EU), multilevel approaches have become increasingly popular.5 However, many 
of these models apply only to the specific context of EU institutions and relations. Indeed, 
some authors have argued that the integrated foreign policy making process among EU 
member states differs from transnational and international decision-making in other arenas 
and, therefore, requires distinct theoretical approaches.6 While this thesis accepts the claim 
that relations among EU states might be unique, the following section seeks to show that 
increasing integration is not merely a European phenomenon, but applies to the broader 
transatlantic community. Moreover, it argues that Western European foreign and security 
policy making is crucially influenced by actors in the United States (US) and international 
institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation of 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN). As a 
consequence, this thesis contends that a multilevel theory which seeks to analyse 
contemporary foreign policy processes in Western Europe and the transatlantic community
4 Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End o f  Sovereignty (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992); Emst-Otto 
Czempiel, ed., Die anachronistische SouveMnittit (Ktiln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969); Fritz W. Scharpf, 
‘Die Handlungsf&higkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts’, Politische 
Vierteljahresschrifl 32:4,1991, pp.621-634. For the counter argument see Paul Hirst and G. Thompson, 
‘Globalization and the Future of the Nation State’, Economy and Society 24:3, 1995, pp.408-442.
5 Wolfgang Wessels, ‘An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration Processes’, 
Journal o f  Common M arket Studies 35:2, 1997, pp.267-297.
6 Christopher Hill and William Wallace, ‘Introduction. Actors and Actions’, in Christopher Hill, cd., The 
Actors in E urope’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-16.
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should integrate not only a variety of actors across levels of analysis, but also be able to 
model differences in the relations among these actors.
Three sets of multilevel approaches can be identified which seek such general 
applicability in foreign policy analysis: transnationalism7, two-level games8 and network 
models9. Each of these models seeks to answer the key question of this thesis: who is able 
to influence foreign policy decision-making and how? However, the success of these 
multilevel approaches in modelling and explaining contemporary foreign policy processes 
has been limited. Transnationalism, two-level games and network approaches can be 
criticised for two main shortcomings.10 First, although the three approaches have moved 
away from single-level analysis to the examination of how actors and decisions are linked 
across the domestic-international divide, most of them fail to integrate sufficiently all three 
levels of analysis. The theoretical focus of network models has so far been decision­
making at single levels.11 Transnationalism has focussed exclusively on transnational 
relations, whereas the two-level game has failed to take transnational relations into 
account, but reduced multilevel decision-making to domestic and international influences 
on governmental decision-makers. Second, neither transnationalism nor two-level games 
or network models provide testable hypotheses which help to explain the process of
See for instance Matthew Evangelista, ‘The Paradox of State Strength - Transnational Relations, 
Domestic Structures and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet-Union’, International Organization 
49:1, 1995, pp. 1-38; Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State 
Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995); James N. Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and  
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
8 The model was first proposed by Robert Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two- 
Level Games’, International Organization 42:3, 1988, pp.427-460.
See for example David Marsh, ed., Comparing Policy Networks (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1998); R.A.W. Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments o f  Britain 
(London: Routledge, Allen & Unwin, 1992); Bemd Marin and Renate Mayntz, ‘Introduction’, in ibid., 
eds., Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 
1991), pp. 11-23; Fritz W. Scharpf, ed., Games in Hierarchies and Networks (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 
1988).
10 Keith Dowding, ‘Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach’, Political 
Studies XLIII: 1, 1995, pp. 136-158; Keith Dowding, ‘Policy Networks: Don’t Stretch a Good Idea Too 
Far’, in Patrick Dunleavy and Jeffrey Stanyer, eds., Contemporary Political Studies 1994: Proceedings 
o f  the Annual Conference Held at the University o f  Wales (Belfast: Political Studies Association of the 
United Kingdom, 1994); Hussein Kassim, ‘Policy Networks, Networks and European Union Policy- 
Making: A Sceptical View’, West European Politics 17:4, 1994, pp. 15-27; Robert Keohane and Stanley 
Hoffmann. ‘Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s’, in ibid., eds., The New European Community: 
Decision M aking and Institutional Change (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 1-40.
11 David Marsh, ‘The Utility and Future of Policy Network Analysis’, in ibid., ed., Comparing Policy 
Networks (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp. 185-197, p. 186. For an attempt at theory 
building with regard to transnational networks see John Benington and Janet Harvey, ‘Transnational 
Local Authority Networking within the European Union: Passing Fashion or New Paradigm?’ in David 
Marsh, ed., Comparing Policy Networks (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp. 149-166.
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decision-making. While these models deal with the question who is able to influence 
foreign policies, they fail to address how various actors participate in foreign policy 
decision-making.12 Specifically, few models illustrate how actors form domestic, 
transnational and international coalitions which are regarded by all three approaches as 
critical for explaining the actors’ ability to influence the ‘ultimate decision unit’13, i.e. the 
final political authority in the decision-making process.
In response to these criticisms, this thesis proposes and tests a multilevel network 
theory which seeks to address these two shortcomings. To achieve its twofold objective, 
this thesis is structured in a theoretical and an empirical part. The first theoretical part, 
develops a multilevel network theory of foreign policy decision-making. In order to do so, 
it builds upon various network approaches which have proved their ability to map relations 
among a broad variety of actors at different levels in a number of studies which examine 
decision-making in the European Union, in transnational networks and domestic policy 
sectors.14 However, it suggests four modifications.
First, this thesis proposes a theoretical definition of networks which explicitly 
includes national, transnational and international actors. In order to do so, it reexamines 
the basic concepts and dimensions of network analysis with regard to the question whether 
and how they can be consistently applied to multiple levels. Its propositions are based on 
the contention that the distinction between domestic, transnational and international policy 
networks, which has so far been predominant in network analysis, has been superceded by 
changes in the decision-making process in Western Europe and the transatlantic area. Not 
only are actors linked across levels of analysis, the structure of their relations in the 
domestic and international arena has also become increasingly similar. The traditional 
ideal-typical distinction between hierarchical, institutionalised relations in the national 
system, and anarchic, informal linkages in the international system which underpinned the 
division between theories of international relations and foreign policy analysis meets
12 Marsh, ‘The Utility and Future of Policy Network Analysis’, pp.l86f.
13 Margaret Hermann, Charles F. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy 
Behavior’, in Charles F. Hermann, James N. Rosenau and Charles Kegley, eds.. New Directions in the 
Study o f  Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp.309-336.
14 John Peterson, ‘Decision-Making in the European Union: Towards a Framework for Analysis’, Journal 
o f  European Public Policy 2:1, 1995, pp.69-93; Philip Gummett and Judith Reppy, ‘Military Industrial 
Networks and Technical Change in the New Strategic Environment’, Government and Opposition 25:3, 
1990, pp.287-303; Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall.
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empirical observations less and less. Both in the domestic and the international arena, we 
find today a mixture of formal and informal relations between the public and private actors 
engaged in foreign policy decision-making. Moreover, multilevel network theory suggests 
that these formal and informal relations can be defined by a single concept of power based 
on a combination of resource-dependencies and institutional authority.
Second, this thesis seeks to strengthen the argument that network analysis can be 
fruitfully applied to the study of foreign and security policy.15 However, rather than 
because of changes in the concept of networks, the following section illustrates that recent 
developments in foreign policy decision-making have made it more accessible to network 
analysis. In particular, network analysis is able to accommodate the increasing number and 
diversity of public and private actors which are engaged in contemporary foreign policy 
processes. Foreign policy is no longer the domain of ‘high’ politics characterised by a 
limited number of, mostly governmental, actors. It has come to embrace a plurality of 
actors, as in other issue areas such as health, agriculture, or economics where network 
analysis has its origins. The advantages of network analysis for the study of foreign policy, 
however, go further than its ability to integrate a multiplicity of public and private actors. 
Its capacity to map a mixture of relations enables the theory to model the increasing 
institutionalisation of transnational and international relations, while also taking into 
account the remaining anarchical elements of the international system.
Third, this thesis proposes to synthesise the analysis of network structures with a 
concept of agency as suggested by rational choice theory in order to hypothesise about the 
decision-making process as an intermediate variable between structures and outcomes.16 
The utility of rational choice theory for network analysis derives from its ability to 
hypothesise about how actors may use their relations in a network to exert pressure on 
each other and the ultimate decision unit. Specifically, the concept of bounded rationality 
conforms with network analysis in that the members of a network by definition interact 
regularly with each other. It can, therefore, be presumed that actors have clear
15 So far the application of network theory to the analysis of foreign and defence policy has been rather 
limited. See for instance Gummett and Reppy, ‘Military Industrial Networks’.
16 Dowding, ‘Policy Networks: Don’t Stretch a Good Idea Too Far’, p.60; Carsten Daugbjerg and David 
Marsh, ‘Explaining Policy Outcomes: Integrating the Policy Network Approach with Macro-level and 
Micro-level Analysis’, in David Marsh, ed., Comparing Policy Networks (Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 1998), pp.52-71, pp.67f.
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expectations regarding the cost and utility of exerting pressure on other actors in order to 
change their policy preferences within their network. In short, the structure of a network 
sets the boundaries in which actors rationally seek to influence the decision-making 
process.
Moreover, the rational use of network relations, if defined by resource-dependence 
and institutional authority, has been indirectly pointed out by studies which have 
investigated the compatibility of rational choice theory with new institutionalism or 
behaviouralist analyses.17 The advantage of rational choice assumptions for the study of 
political decision-making processes is that they provide general hypotheses about the ways 
in which actors use their relations to influence each other and the decision-making process. 
By doing so, rational choice assumptions cannot only be utilised to illustrate some 
common features in the actions of a variety of actors, but also to generalise interactions 
across cases and issues. While the focus on the commonalities of the decision-making 
process regarding different issues necessarily limits the understanding of a particular 
historic foreign policy decision, it permits comparisons and the development of general 
propositions which might help to explain other cases.
Finally, this thesis proposes a quantitative measurement for the ability of actors to 
influence each other in terms of the number of actors in the network who exert pressure 
on a single actor at any moment of the decision-making process. Multilevel network 
theory, thus, addresses another criticism of network models, namely that they are able to 
observe and describe actors’ influence over policy outcomes, but do not offer testable 
hypotheses which help to explain the process and dynamics of influencing policy 
outcomes.18 The proposed quantitative measurement reflects the notion advanced by, 
amongst others, pluralist and corporatist approaches, that political actors, such as 
ministers or even civil servants, are responsive to the policy preferences of their 
‘constituencies’, understood here in the wider sense as the actors on whom they depend
17 Keith Dowding, ‘The Compatibility of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice and New Institutionalism’, 
Journal o f  Theoretical Politics 6:1, 1994, pp. 105-117; Asbjom Sonne Norgaard, ‘Rediscovering 
Reasonable Rationality in Institutional Analysis’, European Journal o f  Political Research 29:1, 1996, 
pp.31-57; Donald D. Searing, ‘Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism’, American 
Political Science Review  85:4, 1991, pp. 1249-1260; Aaron Wildavsky, ‘Why Self-interest Means Less 
Outside of a Social Context - Cultural Contributions to a Theory of Rational Choices’, Journal o f  
Theoretical Politics 6:2, 1994, pp.131-159.
18Dowding, ‘Model or Metaphor?’; Guy Peters, ‘Policy Networks: Myth, Metaphor and Reality’, in David 
Marsh, ed., Comparing Policy Networks (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.21-32, p.24.
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and with whom they regularly interact. Moreover, analysing the number of actors who 
support a policy is implicitly linked to the ideal notion of democratic decision-making in 
that both elections and parliamentary decisions are commonly based on the preferences of 
a majority.
The reason for adopting a quantitative rather than a qualitative measurement of 
influence for multilevel network theory lies in the aim of this thesis to make its findings 
replicable and encourage further theory building and testing. While the evaluation of 
qualitative-descriptive network models has often been impeded by the complexity and 
ambiguity of their measures for influence, the quantitative approach adopted here provides 
a clear and consistent standard.19 This standard not only allows the direct comparison of 
pressure and influence between different sectoral networks, actors or cases, it also 
provides a rigorous criterion for the assessment of the hypotheses proposed by multilevel 
network theory in the conclusion of this thesis.
The second empirical part of this thesis proceeds to test multilevel network theory 
in four case studies which examine how multilevel networks can help to explain foreign 
policy making in the transatlantic community in the 1990s. Specifically, the case studies 
focus on the national, transnational and international influence on the governments of 
Britain and Germany. By selecting cases in which two Western European governments 
were the ultimate decision units, this thesis seeks to provide some insights into the 
question whethe? national governments have indeed lost their control of foreign policy 
decision-making. Moreover, by analysing the distinct, but overlapping multilevel foreign 
policy networks surrounding the British and German governments, the case studies further 
provide a test as to whether the hypotheses of multilevel network theory hold 
independently from differences in national cultures or styles of decision-making.20 In 
addition, the cases were selected from an issue area which has until recently been regarded 
as under the exclusive authority of national governments, namely foreign and security 
policy, to serve as a ‘crucial’ test of the theory.21 The cases include: (1) the decision of the 
British government to support a United Nations Security Council resolution in favour of
19 Dowding, ‘Policy Networks: Don’t Stretch a Good Idea Too Far’.
20 Richard Rose, ‘Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis’, Political Studies 39:3,1991, pp.446-462.
21 Alexander L. George, ‘Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused 
Comparison’, in Paul G. Lauren, ed., Diplomacy - New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy 
(London: The Free Press, 1979), pp.43-68, p.53
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air strikes in Bosnia in 1993, (2) the British abandonment of its tactical air-to-surface 
missile (TASM) programme, (3) the first out-of-area despatch of German Tornados to 
Bosnia in the summer of 1995 and (4) the reduction of export restrictions on technology 
with civil and military applications (‘dual-use’) by the German government between 1992 
and 1995.
Based on the two objectives outlined above, this chapter is structured in three 
parts. The first section examines the characteristics of foreign policy processes in Western 
Europe and the broader transatlantic community in the 1990s. It thereby sets the 
parameters for a contemporary theory of foreign policy decision-making in this area. In 
particular, it investigates the increasing integration of the domestic and the international. 
The second part discusses the merits and limitations of the three multilevel approaches 
mentioned above: transnationalism, two-level games and network models. It argues that, 
in spite of its shortcomings, the network approach is particularly suited for modelling 
contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes. The final section discusses the 
criteria for the selection of the four case studies and the requirements for the testing of 
multilevel network theory.
1.2 Foreign Policy Decision-Making in the 1990s
Before the question how foreign policy decisions are made in the contemporary 
transatlantic community can be examined, it is necessary to define foreign policy. If 
contemporary foreign policy making is influenced by public and private actors at various 
levels of analysis, traditional notions of foreign policy as ‘high’ politics, i.e. decisions 
involving the head of state, the foreign secretary and the foreign office, are not sufficient 
to define foreign policy. Not only do a variety of actors participate in the decision-making 
process, also the authority over the affairs among states has been increasingly transferred 
to organisations beyond national governments. In this respect, it is helpful to distinguish 
between ‘foreign affairs’ and ‘foreign policy decisions’. While the former can be defined 
as the political deliberations and actions of public and private actors across national 
boundaries, the latter will be reserved to denote authoritative political choices of action 
or legislative regulation which are directed to some actual or potential sphere outside the
18
jurisdiction of the state polity.22
The focus of this thesis on the foreign policy decision-making processes can be 
justified on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Empirically, the concern about political 
decision-making derives from the fact that governments continue to hold a unique position 
with regard to the legitimate control over transnational and international affairs. In so far 
as international organisations have replaced them in determining authoritative political 
choices, they have done so on the basis of national policies - or the lack thereof.23 Indeed, 
most international organisations continue to subject themselves to the authority of national 
governments by providing member states with a veto. Theoretically, the normative 
implications of the question to what degree and how national foreign policies are 
determined by national or international influences, places the government at the centre of 
this study. The aim of multilevel analysis is not only to provide a better understanding of 
contemporary decision-making processes, but also to give an answer to the question of 
who governs foreign policy decision-making.
The consensus that foreign policy decision-making cannot be adequately grasped 
by single-level analysis has built on a broad range of studies observing changes in the 
nature of the political process over the past decades. These studies widely agree that 
contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes in Western Europe and in the 
transatlantic community are characterised by three features: multiplicity, diversity and 
interdependence among foreign policy actors.24 It is difficult to assess the degree to which 
these three aspects have changed over the past decades. Increasing interdependence 
among industrialised nations has been observed since the 1960s. Initially, academics 
argued that the ability of governments to control their relations with other states had been 
curtailed by the economic integration associated with the emergence of multinational 
corporations and the European Economic Community.25 However, most scholars 
concluded that national governments maintained their decision-making power in the area
22 Compare John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1984).
23 Michael Mann, ‘Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, not Dying’, 
Daedalus 122:3, 1993, pp. 115-140.
24 Compare Scharpf, ‘Die Handlungsfahigkeit des Staates’.
25 Richard N. Cooper, ‘Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies’, World Politics, 
24:2, 1972, pp. 161-181; Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb, Policy Making in the 
European Communities (London: Wiley, 1977).
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of foreign and defence policy.26
In the 1990s, the development towards greater multiplicity, diversity and 
interdependence of foreign policy actors appears to have deepened and accelerated. In 
addition to economic developments, the end of the Cold War has led to greater integration 
in foreign and security policy from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Expectations that in the 
absence of the constraints of bipolarity, foreign policies would be ‘re-nationalised’27, have 
so far been disconfirmed. Contrary to arguments that the closeness of transatlantic 
relations relied on the specific conditions of the superpower competition, the 
transformation of foreign policy decision-making seems to be progressive in nature. 
Examining each aspect in turn, it can be argued that the trend towards greater multiplicity, 
diversity and interdependence among foreign policy actors at various levels appears to 
have been strengthened rather than reversed in the 1990s.
Multiplicity
The notion of multiplicity commonly refers to the observation that the number of actors 
which are able to influence the foreign political process and its outcomes has steadily 
grown over the past 50 years.28 Traditionally foreign and security policy has appeared to 
be a distinct area of decision-making which predominantly involved heads of state, foreign 
and defence ministers and their respective ministries. Where the necessity arose to regulate 
transnational and international dealings, they were channelled through these ministries. 
Today most governmental agencies within Western Europe conduct their daily foreign 
affairs directly with their counterparts in other countries. In the area of security policy in
James Barber, Who makes British Foreign Policy (Milton Keynes: The Open University Press, 1976), 
p.5; Joseph Frankel, The Making o f  Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. I f ,  p. 12, 
p.54; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p. 25. Few analysts regarded the integration of both spheres as sufficient 
to merit a new theory. See for example Czempiel, Die anachronistische Souverdnitdf, Robert O. Keohane 
and Joseph S. Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics, (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard 
University Press, 1971). Indeed, even today some scholars argue that national governments have preserved 
their control over foreign policy decision-making in the area of military security. See for instance Mann, 
‘Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents’.
27 John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, International 
Security 15:1, 1990, pp.5-56; Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, 
International Security 18:2, 1993, pp.44-79.
y o
See for instance Simon Webb, NATO and 1992. Defence Acquisition and Free M arkets (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1989, R-3758-FF); Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: 
Introduction’, in ibid., ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp.3-33, pp.lOf.
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particular they are complemented by close formal and informal relations with the US 
through the UN Security Council, NATO and the OSCE and bilateral contacts.
However, the dispersion of influence in international relations has not been limited 
to administrative departments. Private actors directly participate in foreign policy decision­
making because of transnational business interests or international causes, such as the 
protection of the environment and human rights. Transnational mergers have created an 
increasing number of multinational corporations which by means of their internal structure 
engage in international relations. Even in the armaments sector, national industries are 
increasingly the exception.29 In addition to industries, non-governmental organisations 
have become regular actors in international relations. Valued as providers of information 
and services, as in the case of the International Red Cross, or feared as critics of 
governmental action, as in the case of Greenpeace or Amnesty International, non­
governmental organisations have gained access to foreign policy making processes.
Furthermore, a range of international organisations has been created which 
function not only as forums for intergovernmental coordination, but due to their authority 
and staff, have often developed independent means and interests in international affairs. 
The density of these organisations in foreign and security policy in Western Europe and 
the transatlantic community has increased steadily since the Second World War. It gained 
new impetus in the 1990s with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations 
in response to the perceived volatility generated by the end of the bipolar structure. 
Specifically, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)30, its successor the Euro- 
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)31 and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)32 were set up 
in order to establish security cooperation with Central and Eastern European states after 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Moreover, the functional and
Margaret Blunden, ‘Armaments Collaboration: WhatForin and WhatFor?’, Science and Public Policy 
17:3,1990, pp. 132-141; W. Walker and S. Willett, ‘Restructuring the European Defense Industrial Base’, 
Defence Economics 4:2, 1993, pp. 141-160. See also presentations at the Royal United Services Institute 
conferences ‘Defence Equipment Acquisition. The Atlantic Dimension’, 28-29 May 1997 and ‘Defence 
Equipment Acquisition. The European Dimension’, 10-11 July 1997.
30 North Atlantic Council, North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and 
Cooperation, Brussels, 20 December 1991, at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911220a.htm.
31 North Atlantic Council, Ministerial Communique, Sintra, Portugal, 29 May 1997, at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-065e.htm.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership fo r  Peace: Framework Document, Brussels, 10-11 
January 1994, at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm. See also NATO Fact Sheet, The 
Enhanced Partnership fo r  Peace Programme (PfP), at http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/pfp-enh.htm.
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geographical scope of existing international organisations has been enlarged. NATO has 
been transformed from a collective defence organisation into one of cooperative security. 
The new NATO is able to conduct peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions with or 
without the explicit mandate of the UN or the OSCE.33 Moreover, at the 50th Anniversary 
of NATO on 16 March 1999, three former Warsaw Pact members, the Czech Republic,
$
Hungary and Poland, joined NATO. Further applications for accession have been 
submitted by Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.34 Similar developments have 
characterised the Western European Union (WEU). Shortly after the NATO decision, the 
WEU too offered its resources for UN and OSCE missions out-of-area.35 And, while many 
former Warsaw Pact members have preferred to seek membership of NATO, most have 
also accepted associate partnerships with the WEU.36 At the same time, the Conference 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe has developed from a forum for security 
negotiations, the OSCE, into a regional organisation under the UN charter. Its new tasks 
include the legitimisation and monitoring of peace missions in the Euro-Atlantic area.37
Diversity
The above enumeration leads us to the second feature of contemporary foreign policy 
making: the actors involved are highly diverse. They not only cross the public-private 
divide, but also levels of analysis. The actors which participate in contemporary foreign 
policy decision processes are located at the national, transnational as well as international 
arena. Although it can be argued that diverse actors have been affected by foreign affairs 
at all times, the nature of their involvement appears to have changed by the 1990s. As a 
consequence of functional differentiation within and across national borders, abroad range
33 N orth A tla n tic  C ou n cil, F in a l C o m m u n iq u e , O slo , 4 June 1992, at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm.
34 See NATO Fact Sheets, The Accession o f  the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/access.htm , and N A TO 's Open D oor Policy, at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/opendoor.htm.
35 WEU Council o f Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at 
http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html.
36 See NATO Fact Sheet, Development o f  the European Security and Defence Identity  (ESDI) within 
NATO, at http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-esdi.htm.
37 CSCE, Helsinki Document 1992 'The Challenges o f  Change Helsinki, 9-10 July 1992, at 
http://www.osce.org/indexe-da.htm.
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of actors have become affected by, and able to influence, authoritative decision-making 
with regard to foreign relations.
In particular, the taking on of governmental functions by private actors has 
increased their ability to influence foreign policies not only in the area of trade, but also 
national and international security. Since the latter has been, until recently, a preserve of 
national governments, it shows specifically the new degree to which actors in foreign 
policy making have diversified. In the conflict in the former Yugoslavia which is related 
to two of the following case studies, private actors participated on the side of the warring 
factions, e.g. arms suppliers, as well as in the international intervention, such as charities 
which delivered humanitarian support while safeguarded by NATO troops. With their 
increased involvement in foreign relations, these actors also have growing influence over 
the foreign policy decision-making process.
A similar transfer of functions to the international level has increased diversity of 
foreign policy actors among international organisations. Thus, the Post-Cold War era has 
seen a proliferation of new institutions which has enhanced the role of existing actors in 
foreign policy decision-making and introduced new ones. The transformation of the 
Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe into an organisation with a secretariat 
and permanent staff is one case; PfP and NACC are other examples. Moreover, after a 
period of perceived stagnation, the Maastricht Treaty has significantly enlarged the 
authority of the E?J dot only in economic and monetary policy, but also in foreign relations 
with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework.38
The deepening of international institutions has been matched by a trend towards 
the widening of memberships, not only in the EU, but also within NATO and the WEU. 
Although the first candidates for EU accession have been Western European states, 
namely Austria, Finland and Sweden, many Central and Eastern European states have 
applied for accession.39 NATO has already accepted new members in Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Flungary. Increasing diversity of foreign policy actors, therefore, can be 
noted within and without international organisations. Internally, widening in particular 
towards Eastern Europe, has led to greater differences among the member states, and thus,
38 T r e a t y  on  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n ,  M a a s t r i c h t ,  7 F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 2 ,  at  
http://europa.eu.int/cur-lex/cii/treaties/dat/cu_cons_treaty_en.pdf.
39 Sec Agenda 2000, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm.
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regular actors in European foreign policy making, in economic, political, social and 
military terms. Externally, the institutionalisation of international relations has created new 
organisational actors.
Interdependence
The result of the functional differentiation between governmental departments, public and 
private actors and international organisations described above has been increasing 
interdependence among a broad variety of foreign policy actors in the 1990s. Due to 
functional specialization, actors within and across national boundaries depend to a larger 
degree on each other’s resources for the fulfilment of their needs and functions. Moreover, 
foreign policy decision-making and implementation has come to rely on contributions from 
a large number of actors.
In the private sector, increasing interdependence has been the result of 
specialisation in production on one hand and global marketing on the other. In the public 
sector, governments have increasingly been willing to accept the interdependence that 
comes with multinational economic and political collaboration. A particular example has 
been the growing cooperation in armaments research and development which has often 
been identified with national sovereignty. Not only have national armaments industries lost 
their military rationale if national defence and international interventions depend on the 
cooperation of allies. It has also become more difficult to defend high military spending 
politically and economically if it is less costly to buy weapons ‘off the shelf from allied 
countries or to collaborate in arms production. However, as governments sell national 
armaments industries to private actors, accept transnational mergers of procurement 
companies and favour international cooperation in the development and production of 
weapons, national defence policy becomes vulnerable to transnational and domestic 
influence.40
In addition, transnational and international interdependence has increased as a 
result of the functional and regional enlargement of international organisations. In
40 See for instance Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘The Globalization of the Arms Industry. The Next Proliferation 
Challenge’, International Security 19:2, 1994, pp. 170-198; Terence R. Guay, A t A rm ’s Length: the 
European Union and E urope’s Defence Industry (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Elisabeth Skoens and 
Herbert Wulf, ‘The Internationalization of the Arms Industry’, Annals o f  the American Academy o f  
Political and Social Science 535, 1994, pp.43-57; Webb, NATO and I992\ Herbert Wulf, ed. Arms 
Industry Limited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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particular in the area of security policy, interdependence has reached new levels in recent 
years. One reason for this has been the progressive decline in national defence budgets 
since the 1980s. After the end of the Cold War, popular demands for a ‘peace dividend’ 
have further reduced national defence capabilities to the degree that large scale 
interventions and national defence rely on multilateral cooperation.41
1.3 Multilevel Approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis
In recent years, several attempts have been made to synthesise different levels of analysis 
in order to arrive at more comprehensive theories in response to the changes of the foreign 
policy decision-making process pointed out above. In particular, three multilevel 
approaches can be discerned which suggest general explanations of decision-making across 
countries and issues: transnationalism42, the two-level game43 and network models44. This 
section argues that the network approach provides the best basis for a multilevel theory 
of foreign policy making.
Transnationalism
Transnationalism is perhaps the oldest multilevel approach to international relations and 
foreign policy analysis. It originated in the 1970s from the theoretical work of, among 
others, Ernst-Otto Czempiel, James N. Rosenau, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye45. 
At the beginning of the' 1990s, Thomas Risse-Kappen sought to revive the interest in 
transnationalism in an edited volume 1Bringing Transnationalism Backin'. In spite of its 
history, however, transnationalism has not evolved into a unified theory. It comprises a 
range of different theoretical frameworks which often only share their focus on interactions
David Greenwood, ‘Expenditure and Management1, in Peter Byrd, ed., British Defence Policy: 
Thatcher and Beyond  (New York: Philip Allan, 1991), pp.36-66; Ron Smith, ‘Resources, Commitments 
and the Defence Industry’, in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds., British Defence Choices fo r  the 
Twenty-First Century (London: Brassey’s, 1993), pp.73-89.
42 Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In.
43 Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’.
44 See for example John Peterson, ‘The European Technology Community’, in R. A. W. Rhodes and David 
Marsh, eds., Policy Networks in British Government (Ojdord: Clarendon, 1992), pp.226-248; Boelie 
Elzen, Bert Enserink and Wim Sinit, ‘Weapons Innovation - Networks and Guiding Principles’, Science 
and Public Policy 17:3, 1990, pp. 171-193.
45 Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics.
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and influences across national boundaries.46 It is, therefore, difficult to develop a general 
critique. The following takes the approach proposed by Risse-Kappen in his volume as an 
illustrative example of some of the problems associated with transnationalism.47
The theoretical framework proposed by Risse-Kappen analyses the ability of 
transnational actors to gain access to and influence domestic decision-making. Three state 
structures act as constraints to transnational accessibility on the domestic level: the 
‘political’, the ‘social’ and the ‘network’ structure.48 Each can take two forms, the first 
limiting transnational influence, the second permitting it. Specifically, the ‘political 
structure’ of a state, which denotes the dispersion of executive authority within the 
administration, is described as either centralised or fragmented. The societal structure 
which describes societal polarization along ideological or class lines can be either strong 
or weak. The network structure, defined as the institutions which link state and society and 
the ‘norms regulating the coalition-building processes in these networks’, can be 
consensual or polarised.49 In addition, the degree of institutionalisation within a particular 
issue area acts as another filter for transnational influence on the international level. The 
resulting typology of state structures is linked to hypotheses about the impact of 
transnational actors on domestic decisions. Thus, Risse-Kappen suggests that the ability 
of transnational actors to access the decision-making process is inversely related to the 
strength of their influence on political decisions.
One of the main values of the model lies in pointing out the compatibility of 
structural theories at the domestic and international level. Rather than devising a new 
theoretical framework, Risse-Kappen attempts to integrate different middle-range models. 
Crucially, he suggests that such theoretical integration can proceed across levels of 
analysis, namely between theories of state structures and international institutions. Since 
both models are based on the same theoretical concepts, i.e. institutional and social
See for instance Philip D. Stewart, Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, ‘Modelling the 
1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt', American Political Science Review  83:1,1989, pp.35-59; Daniel 
Duedney and John G. Ikenberry, ‘The International Sources o f Soviet Change’, International Security 
16.3, 1991-92, pp.74-118.
47 Risse-Kappen, ‘Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction’.
48 Risse-Kappen uses the term ‘networks’ not as defined by network theorists. Networks, for him, denote 
the ‘institutions ... linking state and society and the nonns regulating the coalition-building processes’. 
See Risse-Kappen, ‘Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction’, p.22.
49 Ibid., pp.20-22.
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structures, the proposed approach to transnational analysis avoids the pitfalls of 
conceptual inconsistency. Nevertheless, a number of criticisms can be put forward 
regarding the approach and its ability to model the three characteristics of contemporary 
foreign policy decision-making processes as outlined in the previous section. Some of 
these limitations are self-imposed, but others are typical for the problems encountered by 
attempts to synthesise middle-range theories across levels of analysis.
The main (self)restriction of the model lies in its exclusive focus on transnational 
relations defined as ‘regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor 
is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an 
international organisation’.50 While responding to the call for a theoretical synthesis across 
levels of analysis, the model thus offers explanations for only part of contemporary 
multilevel foreign decision-making processes. Although a model can hardly be criticised 
for its explicit theoretical focus, in terms of the aim of this thesis to contribute to the 
development of a multilevel theory of foreign policy decision-making which is able to 
model the changes in the decision-making process pointed out above, it is therefore of 
limited utility.
Moreover, further problems arise from the failure to examine sufficiently how 
distinct middle-range models can be combined within the approach. Thus, while the model 
suggests that both international and domestic structures serve as a ‘filter’ for transnational 
influence, the combination of both filters is not fully elaborated in the proposed typology.51 
In particular, the countervailing effect of specific types of domestic and international 
structures in limiting or permitting transnational influence calls for further explanations.52 
Thus, the question arises whether the effect of the two structures can cancel each other 
out or whether it is modified to various degrees.
Similarly, the decision-making process which the approach identifies as ‘coalition 
building’ could be developed in greater detail.53 The rejection of the concept of ‘tacit’ 
alliances suggests that national and international actors have to be linked to each other in
50 Risse-Kappen, ‘Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction’, p.3.
51 Ibid., p.28.
52 Ibid., p.30.
53 Ibid., p.22, p.26, p.27.
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order to build a coalition.54 However, based on the sixfold typology of state structures 
proposed by the model, it cannot be established which transnational and domestic actors 
are in fact connected. In fact, the nature of the coalition building process across national 
boundaries remains rather elusive. Do transnational actors only seek to influence 
governmental actors directly or do they also influence other domestic actors in order to 
expand their coalition? How do transnational actors influence other actors? Do strategies 
play a role?
In summary, while the model shows how different middle-range approaches can 
potentially be combined, it only partly models the increasing multiplicity, diversity and 
interdependence of actors which participate in foreign policy decision-making today. 
Moreover, the model leaves a range of theoretical questions unanswered. In particular, it 
does not sufficiently illustrate how state and international structures can help to explain 
the coalition building processes which influence policy outcomes.
Two-Level Games
A second approach which combines the domestic and international into a more 
comprehensive model rather than limiting itself to the analysis of transnational relations 
is the two-level game developed by Robert Putnam in 1988.55 Next to transnationalism 
Robert Putnam’s two-level game has perhaps gained the most widespread recognition in 
the empiricist multilevel analysis of international relations. Since its publication, it has been 
employed in a wide range of studies, including an edition published by Putnam et al. which 
has sought to refine the approach.56 The model explains intergovernmental negotiations 
in terms of a two-stage game in which diplomats simultaneously seek to accommodate 
domestic and international demands. These demands are analysed on one hand in the form 
of domestic coalitions, termed ‘win-sets’, which support a certain political outcome, and 
on the other by the preferences of the second party in the international negotiations.
The strength of the two-level game lies in its recognition that actions on the 
domestic level influence the negotiator’s position on the international level. Rather than
54 Risse-Kappen, ‘Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction’, p. 10.
55 Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’.
56 Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy. 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
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simply combining domestic and international explanatory factors, it focuses on their 
interaction. Thus, the two-level game hypothesises that the negotiator, who holds a 
gatekeeper position between the national and the international arena, can coax the 
domestic audience into accepting an agreement by pretending that the constraints of the 
opposing side will not allow for any compromises. The negotiator can also extract higher 
international concessions by alleging strong domestic pressures.
Nevertheless, several criticisms can be made with regard to the synthesis of 
multiple levels and its analysis of the decision-making process. First, although the two- 
level game realises that a multiplicity of public and private actors is directly and indirectly 
involved in international negotiation processes, its analysis is limited to domestic and 
governmental actors. The governmental level embraces exclusively the negotiators of each 
state and their staff. Representatives of domestic actors may be present at the international 
negotiations, but are not considered to become actively involved. Although Putnam 
mentions the impact of transnational interactions in his case study of the Bonn summit in 
1978, he fails to conceptualise transnational relations in his original model. The original 
two-level game merely accounts for tacit transnational alliances between domestic 
constituents of both countries or between internal actors and the foreign negotiator. 
However, they seem to originate in a coincidental convergence of interests, rather than the 
formation of a transnational ‘win-set’ through direct interaction. Although this 
shortcoming has be£n addressed by Jeffrey Knopfs ‘Three-Level Game’, the diversity of 
actors in the modified approach is still limited.57 In particular, the staff of international 
organisations, such as the EU or the OSCE, who frequently mediate in intergovernmental 
negotiations, do not feature within either model. Nor do the two approaches illustrate how 
third states can directly or indirectly influence the bargaining process.
Similar to the transnationalist model discussed above, the main weakness of the 
two-level game lies in its conceptualisation of the decision-making process. In particular, 
the concept of win-sets obscures the relationship between agency and structure, since it 
can be interpreted as three distinct, but interrelated, variables. First, the win-set is defined 
as ‘all possible Level I [i.e. international] agreements that could ‘win’ - that is, gain the
57 Jeffrey Knopf, ‘Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate- 
Nuclear Forces Negotiations’, International Organization 47:3, 1993, pp.599-628, p.599.
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necessary majority among the constituents - when simply voted up or down’58. Thus, win- 
sets appear to refer to the policy preferences which are the basis of a negotiation. Second, 
the term win-set is employed with reference to the distinctive constituencies, i.e. the sets 
of agents who support specific policies. Third, possible win-sets are said to be determined 
by the distribution of power among domestic actors.59
As a consequence of these three interpretations, the two-level game fails to address 
the relationships among these variables. In particular, the ability of actors within a win-set 
to use their power in order to influence the preferences of the negotiator or actors in other 
win-sets is not considered. Conversely, the negotiator appears to be the only agent in the 
model in that he or she can influence and change policy preferences. The negotiator alone 
can rally and restructure win-sets in support for a certain negotiation agreement. In order 
to do so, the negotiator can use his institutional position, the information available to him 
and payoffs to different actors, i.e. variables which determine the power of the negotiator 
vis-a-vis domestic actors. The actors who are part of a domestic win-set are entirely 
passive. They seek neither to influence the negotiator nor to enlarge their win-set by 
persuading other domestic actors to join. Finally, the government representative is in the 
position to ‘select’ one of the win-sets as the basis for an international agreement rather 
than being influenced by domestic pressure in favour of a particular policy.
In evaluation, the two-level game and its extension, the three-level game, appear 
more suited to the analysis of contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes than 
the transnationalist model discussed above. The two-level game not only integrates 
theoretically the domestic and international system, but also presents testable hypotheses 
as to how both levels of analysis interdependently determine foreign policy outcomes. 
However, while the two-level game reflects the increasing multiplicity and diversity of 
actors in Western European and transatlantic foreign policy making, it offers few insights 
into the decision-making process beyond the influence of the government which is still 
perceived as the gatekeeper between the national and the international arena. The network 
approach which will be discussed in the following has traditionally focussed on the analysis 
of the relations among political actors at different levels of analysis.
58
Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, p.439.
59 Ibid., p.443.
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Network Models
Network models have originally been used to examine the relations between public and 
private actors in domestic decision-making processes. The models emerged as a reaction 
to the observation that traditional models of hierarchical decision-making structures within 
the intrastate system were decreasingly met by empirical observations.60 In particular in 
Britain, the trend towards privatisation and deregulation in various policy sectors such as 
housing, transport and telecommunications had increased the number, diversity and 
interdependence of public and private actors who are engaged in political decision-making. 
Thus, in the 1980s the term ‘networks’ was increasingly employed to denote a specific 
theoretical concept in models of the domestic decision-making process. It described the 
non-hierarchical relations among a set of public and private actors who participated 
regularly in the decision-making process within a particular policy sector. In this tradition, 
networks were defined as ‘policy arrangements characterized by the predominance of 
informal, decentralized and horizontal relations’ ,61 Further research, however, showed that 
informal policy structures displayed a mixture of relations ranging from hierarchical to 
pluralist or horizontal arrangements. In the ensuing debate, most proponents of the 
network approach came to embrace a different definition of networks which 
acknowledged their flexible and multifaceted structure.62 The new consensus was 
summarised by Kenis and Schneider who observed:
> s'-
The networks ‘integrative logic cannot be reduced to any single logic such as 
bureaucracy, market, community, or corporatist association, for example, but is 
characterized by the capacity for mixing different combinations of them’.63
It is this definition which makes the network concept especially suited for theorizing about
Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, ‘Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks 
in Advanced Capitalist Economies’, British Journal o f  Political Science 19:1, 1989, pp.47-67; Grant 
Jordan, ‘Iron Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process’, Journal o f  
Public Policy 1:1, 1981, pp.95-123; Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall.
61 Marin and Mayntz, ‘Introduction’, p. 16.
62 Hans Bressers, Laurence J. O’Toole and Jeremy Richardson, ‘Networks as Models of Analysis: Water 
Policy in Comparative Perspective’, Environmental Politics 3:4, 1994, pp. 1-23, p.5.
63 Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider, ‘Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New 
Analytical Toolbox’, in Bemd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and  
Theoretical Considerations (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), pp.25-59, p.42.
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contemporary foreign policy decision-making which crosses different levels of analysis.
Although a broad variety of models have been developed on the basis of this 
definition, most authors agree on the central features of the network approach as an 
analytical framework. According to this common ground, networks can be defined as all 
public and private actors who share an interest in a specific policy area and who are linked 
to each other through stable formal or informal relations. The key hypothesis of the 
network approach is that the distribution of these relations, i.e. the ‘structure’ of the 
network, determines the ability of its members to influence decision-making processes.64 
Specifically, various network models suggest typologies of different network structures 
defined by the dominance of certain actors or coalitions of actors who typically determine 
the outcomes of the decision-making processes within the network.
The advantage of the network approach is that it seems best to reflect the 
multiplicity and diversity of agents in contemporary decision-making. The application of 
the framework at different levels of analysis and across various issue areas has proved the 
ability of the approach to model political networks among public and private agents in the 
domestic, transnational and international arenas. Moreover, the network approach 
proposes a general model of political decision-making which is not confined to a specific 
type of decision-making, such as international negotiations or transnational influence. The 
network approach achieves its parsimony by focussing on distinct policy sectors or 
domains. Most crucially, however, the network approach does not presume the dominance 
of specific positions within the network or a gatekeeper role of governments, but treats 
the distribution of linkages within and across national boundaries as an open question 
'which has to be answered by empirical analysis.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of analysing foreign policy decision-making in 
contemporary Western Europe and North America, existing network models are 
challenged in two ways. First, although network models have been employed in empirical 
studies of decision-making at the national, transnational and international level, few 
attempts have been made to theorise about the synthesis of multiple levels within the 
network approach. In particular, the question how networks, actors and their relations 
have to be defined in order to be consistently applicable across levels of analysis has rarely
64 Frans van Waarden, ‘Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks’, European Journal o f  Political 
Research 21:1-2, 1992, pp.29-52.
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been addressed. Second, like transnationalism and the two-level game, few network 
models provide testable hypotheses which could help to explain the interactions and 
coalition building processes among public and private actors. In fact, due to the 
predominant concern of the network approach with the link between network structures 
and policy outcomes, most models neglect the role of decision-making processes as an 
intermediate variable. Typically, network models link network structures and outcomes 
in typologies which assume the form of quasi-causal propositions. However, since network 
types are usually defined according to a broad number of variable dimensions, the number 
of possible network structures often exceeds the number of the proposed ideal-types thus 
making it difficult to test these propositions. As Maurice Wright observes, policy 
outcomes are more often ‘read off a type of network than ‘explained’.65
Moreover, because of their failure to hypothesise about interactions, many network 
models have problems explaining changes in policy preferences and coalitions during the 
decision-making process. In particular, network models which define network types 
according to ‘dominant’ coalitions only allow change as a result of transformations in a 
network’s structure. In doing so, these network approaches fail to recognise that policy 
preferences and coalitions can be influenced by the decision-making process as well as 
network structures.
Crucially for the argument presented here, that the network approach is the most 
appropriate framework for the development of a multilevel theory of foreign policy 
decision-making, several suggestions have been made to improve the network approach. 
Specifically, the limitations of network typologies for the explanation rather than the 
understanding of decision-making have been widely recognised. In response, networks are 
increasingly treated as unique, and analysis has focussed on the mapping of individual 
networks rather than the categorization into ideal types. Most important, it has been 
suggested that network analysis can be fruitfully combined with rational choice 
assumptions in order to hypothesise about changing policy preferences and coalitions. 
Taking on board these suggestions, this thesis proposes a definition of networks which 
moves away from typologies and suggests testable hypotheses regarding the decision­
Maurice Wright. ‘Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies’, Political 
Studies XXXVI:4,1988, pp.593-612, p.595. On the difference between ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ 
as used in this thesis see Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding in International Relations.
making process as an intermediate variable between network structures and outcomes on 
the basis of rational choice. Furthermore, this thesis proceeds to test whether the derived 
propositions have empirical value for the explanation of foreign policy decision-making 
in Western Europe and the broader transatlantic community.
1.4 Method
In order to assess the explanatory value of multilevel network theory, this thesis tests the 
model in a number of case studies. Its evaluation rests on a critical realist epistemology 
and empiricist method which offers, if not undebated, at least clear standards. 
Nevertheless, this thesis pays heed to some of the criticism which has been raised against 
empiricism during the ‘Third Debate’. Specifically, it acknowledges the necessity to take 
the spatio-temporal and cultural limitations of empirical evidence and theories into 
account.66 In the final instance, however, it recognises that the validity of empirical 
evidence and the explanatory value of the theoretical approach presented in the following 
can only be assessed in the academic debate.
Case Selection
The context and area of application and the criteria for the selection of suitable test cases 
directly derive from the preceding sections. Multilevel network theory seeks to contribute 
to the theoretical modelling of the changed nature of foreign policy decision-making 
processes in the 1990s. It recognises that decision-making structures are subject to change, 
as indeed they have significantly after the end of the Cold War. Network analysis can only 
provide a ‘snapshot’ of the relations among the relevant actors during a particular period 
of time. While many structures, such as the distribution of authority within the democratic 
systems in the transatlantic area are relatively permanent, others, such as international 
regimes can be subject to considerable change and require regular updates.
In addition, multilevel network theory has a clear geographical focus. Although the 
observed transformation of foreign policy decision-making has not been limited to Western 
Europe and North America, it has both its origins and its centre here. Multilevel network
See for instance Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, ‘Between Celebration and Despair: 
Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory’, International Studies Quarterly 35:4, 1991, 
pp.363-386.
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theory should, therefore, first and foremostly by applied to and assessed with regard to its 
ability to examine and illustrate foreign policy decision-making in this region. Moreover, 
multilevel network theory is an integral part of the academic and political debate in the 
Western community. It is directly related to the normative values underlying the question 
of multilevel influences on national governments raised in the literature regarding the 
‘crisis’ of the nation-state. Its underlying concern is the question of democratic 
accountability. By examining the influence of public and private actors at the domestic, 
transnational and international levels as compared to the legitimate authority of national 
governments, multilevel network theory contributes to identifying the challenges which 
confront democratic decision-making in a changing environment.
The focus of the following case studies is a consequence of these contextual 
limitations. By choosing the governments of two Western European countries, namely 
Britain and Germany, it not only conforms with the geographical confines of network 
theory, it also reacts to the normative debate in Britain and Germany over the loss of 
national sovereignty. The choice of cases in which the democratically elected governments 
of two Western European countries had the ultimate decision-making authority should 
illuminate which and how national, transnational and international actors were able to 
influence ‘national’ foreign policies. Since the increased multiplicity, diversity and 
interdependence of political actors at different levels of analysis coincided with theoretical 
developments inlhd early 1990s, the cases were selected from the period between 1990 
and 1995. The restriction of the research period to five years also helped to maintain the 
stability of the network structures. Some changes due to the transformation of 
international institutions or as the result of national elections, however, could not be 
avoided. They were mapped accordingly and reflected by changes in the associated 
hypotheses.67
While these epistemological concerns defined the range of possible cases, further 
criteria were chosen to explore the scope for the application of multilevel network theory 
within these limits. In particular, the four cases were selected for their variance in two
67 See Appendix 1 ‘British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95’ and Appendix 2 ‘German Foreign Policy 
Network, 1990-95’.
areas: the structure of the network and the nature of the policy issue.68 Thus, in order to 
test whether the hypotheses of multilevel network theory can help to explain the foreign 
policy decision-making of different Western European governments, two cases each 
involved the distinct, but overlapping networks of Britain and Germany. Second, one case 
study for each country explored the decision-making process regarding a security policy 
issue, while the other applied to a policy decision in the area of defence economics. Since 
the area of security and defence policy has traditionally been perceived as dominated by 
governmental decision-making, the four cases essentially presented a ‘crucial’ test for 
multilevel network theory. Most importantly for the testing of the proposed theory, all 
cases were characterised by a change of policy by the government as the ultimate decision 
unit. If the hypotheses of multilevel network theory are correct, this policy change should 
have been preceded by a series of preference changes within the network which eventually 
led to the formation of a ‘winning coalition’ in favour of the final policy outcome. In order 
to assure that the governmental policy reversal was the result of interactions within and 
not due to factors outside the network, the cases were also controlled for changes in the 
situation or broader international context.
Table 1.1 Case Studies
BRITAIN GERMANY
SECURITY Case 1: Air strikes in Bosnia Case III: Tornados to Bosnia
DEFENCE ECONOMICS Case II: Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile Case IV: Dual-use Export Regulations
The four cases which were selected on the ground of these criteria included, first, the 
British endorsement of air strikes in Bosnia in 1993 following a year in which the British 
administration had vehemently opposed military action; second, the progressive 
abandonment of the British tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) programme between 
1990 and 1993; third, the first out-of-area despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia in the 
summer of 1995 in spite of earlier assertions by the German government that the
68 Andrew Murray Faure, ‘Some Methodological Problems in Comparative Politics’, Journal o f  
Theoretical Politics 6:3, 1994, pp.307-322., p.316; Tom Mackie and David Marsh, ‘The Comparative 
Method’, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., Theory and M ethods in Political Science (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1995), pp. 173-188, pp. 178f.
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Bundeswehr would not intervene in the former Yugoslavia because of historical reasons; 
and finally, the reduction of export restrictions on technology with civil and military 
applications (‘dual-use’ goods) by the German government in 1995 although the law had 
only been introduced in 1992.
Theory Testing
The testing of any theory has to address two questions as to the conditions under which 
a hypothesis or theory can be empirically evaluated: First, how many case studies have to 
be conducted in order to arrive at a valid assessment? Second, is a hypothesis ‘falsified’ 
by one discontinuing instance?69
The first question is associated with the problem of ‘many variables, small N’ 
which means that the number of explanatory variables exceeds the number of cases. In 
these circumstances, the test of the theory will always be inconclusive.70 Within the context 
of this thesis, the problem could be avoided, however, since the hypotheses of multilevel 
network theory concern the preference changes of the actors in the network rather than 
the outcome of a case. Within the analytical framework of multilevel network theory, the 
outcome of the decision-making process is merely the preference change of the ultimate 
decision unit. It is preceded by a series of preference changes among the actors within the 
network which leads to the formation of a ‘winning coalition’ in favour of a particular 
policy. Instead of case studies, the number of preference changes was the object of the 
test. The change or maintenance of their policy preference by each of the network actors 
represented a ‘case’ for a plausibility probe of the hypotheses.71
More serious was the second problem for the testing of multilevel network theory, 
since its hypotheses are necessarily probabilistic. As such, they prevent their testing 
through simple falsification.72 Deterministic causal relations which are the basis for 
falsifiable hypotheses, however, can only be rejected in social science. Not only is it
69 Karl Popper, The Logic o f  Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper & Collins, 1959).
70 Arend Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, American Political Science 
Review 65:3, 1971, pp.682-695.
71 On the measurement and observation of preference changes see chapter 2.
72 Donald A. Gillies, ‘A Falsifying Rule for Probability Statements’, British Journal fo r  the Philosophy 
o f  Science 22:3, 1971, pp.231-261; Imre Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes’, in Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth o f  Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp.91-195.
37
impossible to control for the full range of environmental factors which affect a single case 
study, the nature of social interaction itself prohibits a deterministic conception of causality 
since the social world is inter-subjectively constructed. The empiricist paradigm, 
nevertheless, asserts that theoretical explanations of social phenomena can be inter- 
subjectively assessed. Several criteria have been agreed upon as evaluative standards for 
theoretical models within this methodological framework, such as explanatory power, 
progressive research programmes, consistency, parsimony and their correspondence with 
empirical findings.73 These criteria imply that theories and alternative hypotheses have to 
be evaluated in comparison to each other. Moreover, this study offers clear evidence for 
the assessment of the hypotheses by measuring the number of instances in which they were 
corroborated. Whether the degree to which the hypotheses meet empirical observation is 
acceptable will have to be decided in the academic debate. Although this methodology 
prohibits the immediate corroboration or falsification of the hypotheses, it allows an 
assessment of the theory according to the above-mentioned standards. Moreover, it 
encourages the identification of variables or conditions which help to explain unusual 
variations in the findings and to increase the degree to which the hypotheses meet 
empirical observation.
In the following this thesis is structured in six chapters. The second chapter 
develops multilevel network theory by examining the key concepts of existing network 
approaches and modifying them for the purpose of multilevel analysis. The third and fourth 
chapters deal with the British decision-making process regarding air strikes in Bosnia and 
the abolition of the tactical air-to-surface missile project, and the fifth and sixth chapters 
analyse the German decisions to despatch Tornados to Bosnia and reduce national dual- 
use export controls. Each case includes a separate assessment of the explanatory value of 
the hypotheses suggested by the theory. Finally, the conclusion draws together the findings 
from all cases in order to arrive at a general evaluation of multilevel network theory. 
Furthermore, it seeks to refine the hypotheses where the empirical evidence suggests 
additional variables or conditions. The final section examines multilevel network theory
73 Oran R. Young, ‘The Perils of Odysseus: On Constructing Theories of International Relations’, in 
Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 179-203, p. 181; Vasquez, ‘The Post-Positivist Debate’, p.230. See 
also Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic and International Politics (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1989).
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in comparison with the three multilevel approaches criticised in this chapter and proposes 
additional case studies and new areas of application.
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2. Multilevel Network Theory
2.1 Introduction
Multilevel network theory builds on and modifies existing network approaches in several 
ways in order to model contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes in Europe 
and North America and to enhance the explanatory capabilities of the approach. This 
chapter proceeds to discuss these modifications in four sections. The first section 
reexamines the concept of networks in the context of the increasing multiplicity of actors 
engaged in foreign policy making. It asks how the boundaries of networks can be defined 
if contemporary foreign policy decision-making involves a variety of public and private 
actors across levels of analysis. The second part deals with the consequences of the 
growing diversity and interdependence of network actors for the analysis of power 
relations in networks. The third part examines the concept of actors in the light of their 
increasing variety. It argues that the notion of individual role actors cannot only be 
consistently applied to public as well as private agents, but also to multiple levels of 
analysis. While the policy preferences of role actors differ widely and can only be 
established inductively, this section proposes that rational choice theory can suggest 
suitable hypotheses which may help to explain changes in the policy preferences of the 
actors and the formation of coalitions in favour of particular policies during the foreign 
policy decision-making process. Finally, the last section of this chapter illustrates the 
operationalisation of multilevel network theory in the following four case studies.
2.2 Concept and Boundaries of Multilevel Networks
It has been argued in the introduction of this thesis that the concept of policy networks is 
especially suited for the analysis of contemporary multilevel decision-making because it 
is able to model a variety of actors engaged in the modem policy process as well as the 
flexible and multifaceted relations among them.1 This ability is based on a definition of 
policy networks as a set of public and private actors who share an interest in a particular
Hans Bressers, Laurence O’Toole and Jeremy Richardson, ‘Networks as Models of Analysis: Water 
Policy in Comparative Perspective’, Environmental Politics 3:4, 1994, pp. 1-23, p.5; Patrick Kenis and 
Volker Schneider, ‘Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox’, in 
Bemd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical 
Considerations (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), pp.25-59, p.42
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issue area, who routinely interact with each other and who are connected to each other 
through stable formal and informal relations of various kinds.2 The problem which arises 
from this definition, however, is that it provides no clear criteria for delineating the 
boundaries of distinct networks. The attempt to define the boundaries of networks has 
therefore led to various approaches in network analysis. Most network theorists have 
attempted to distinguish separate networks by their internal features. Thus, according to 
R.A.W. Rhodes, different networks are determined by their membership, degree of 
integration, distribution of resource dependence and distribution of power.3 In a more 
recent review of network models, Frans van Waarden observes that networks are 
commonly distinguished along seven dimensions. They include the number and type of 
actors, function and structure of the networks, the degree of institutionalisation, rules of 
conduct, power relations and actors’ strategies.4
A close scrutiny of these dimensions shows that distinct networks are defined by 
two aspects: their agents and their structure. In addition to the above mentioned 
disagreements over which specific dimensions should be taken into account in delineating 
different networks, this poses a particular problem. According to the definition of 
networks presented in the previous chapter, the characteristic feature of networks is that 
they include a diversity of agents and different types of relations. Moreover, each network 
combines a different mixture of them. It follows that attempts to delineate the boundaries 
of networks on tlie tasis of a distinction, for instance, between public and private actors 
or hierarchical and horizontal structures are inherently inconsistent with the notion of 
networks. Returning to the definition of networks, it emerges that the only characteristic 
which distinguishes one network from another is the stability of the relations among the 
actors and the regularity with which they interact. It follows that the boundaries of 
networks can only be identified as disconnections among sets of political actors. Benson 
has pointed this out in an early sociological definition of a network as a ‘complex of 
organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from
2 Compare Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, ‘Policy Networks, Policy Communities and 
the Problems of Governance’, Governance 5:2, 1992, pp. 154-180.
3 R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, ‘Policy Networks in British Politics. A Critique of Existing 
Approaches’, in R. A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, eds., Policy Networks in Britsh Government (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 1-26.
4 Frans van Waarden, ‘Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks’, European Journal o f  Political 
Research 21:1-2, 1992, pp.29-52.
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other ... complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies’.5
Two lines of reasoning support the proposition that these breaks generally comply 
with ‘policy sectors’ or ‘issue areas’, such as education, health, agriculture, transportation, 
monetary policy, energy or labour.6 The first argument contends that networks conform 
with the sectoral division of policy sectors because of functional differentiation among 
political actors.7 It proceeds from the observation that political decision-making in 
Western industrialised democracies is structured along the divisions of labour between 
sectoral ministries. Separate departments deal with policy making and implementation in 
the agriculture, health or defence sectors, for instance. Moreover, the sectoral division of 
public institutions shapes the relations through which private actors can seek to influence 
the political decision-making process. Thus, large armaments companies will usually have 
strong and stable ties with ministries of defence, while farming associations are typically 
linked to ministries for agriculture.
The second argument in favour of the sectoral boundaries of networks is that stable 
relationships evolve among actors who depend on each other for the exchange of material 
or ideational resources, such as money or expertise. Since political influence and 
information are ideational resources, the second argument supports the first. In addition, 
it points out the role of resource-dependencies in defining relations which are not
institutionalised, but informal and flexible. Expressions of such relations in the private
\
sphere include the subcontracting of production as well as collaboration in research and 
development among companies in the same sector. In the following case studies, such 
informal relations can be found in particular in Britain where industry relations were 
deregulated in the 1980s.8 In Germany, conversely, existing resource-dependencies and 
commonalties of interest have produced strong industry associations which institutionalise
5 J.K. Benson, ‘A Framework for Policy Analysis’, in D. Rogers et al., eds., Interorganizational Co­
ordination (Aines: Iowa State University Press, 1982) cited in R. A.W. Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and 
Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments o f  Britain (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p.77. Compare John 
Peterson, ‘Policy Networks and European Union Policy Making: A Reply to KassinT, West European 
Poltics 18:2, 1995, pp.389-407, p.402.
6 See Maurice Wright, ‘Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies’, 
Political Studies XXXVI, 1988, pp.593-614, p.596; Atkinson and Coleman, ‘Policy Networks, Policy 
Communities and the Problems of Governance’, p. 157; John P. Heinz et al., ‘Inner Circles or Hollow 
Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems’, Journal o f  Politics 52:2, 1990, pp.356-390.
7 Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, ‘Introduction’, in ibid., eds.. Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence 
and Theoretical Considerations (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), p. 17.
8 However, in the mid-1990s the British Department of Trade and Industry has actively encouraged the 
reestablishment of industry associations in order to structure and simplify public-private relations.
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the relations within sectors and represent their members vis-a-vis governmental actors.
Foreign policy analysis has traditionally posed a problem for the delineation of 
network boundaries because it did not conform with the sectoral divisions of domestic 
policy processes. On the one hand foreign policy making transgressed national boundaries 
because it routinely involved transnational and international actors, on the other hand it 
crossed sectoral lines because each ministry conducted its foreign relations through the 
Foreign Office. The transformations of the foreign policy decision-making process in 
Western Europe and the transatlantic community described in the introduction have 
changed both conditions.9 Transgovernmental relations today conform with issue areas 
since departmental ministries increasingly cooperate directly with their counterparts in 
other Western European countries and across the Atlantic. In fact, sectoral departments 
such as the Economic Ministries now often take the prime responsibility for leading EU 
negotiations in their issue area, as will be shown in the case study regarding the German 
dual-use goods export regulations. Functional divisions also dominate among international 
organisations which channel transnational and international cooperation between states. 
Moreover, where international organisations have attained some authority over foreign 
relations, these have been structured along functional lines. In particular, this can be 
observed in the continuing distinction between predominantly economic institutions such 
as the European Union (EU) and security organisations like the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN). Indeed, the 
European Union itself is structured according to issue areas which are represented by the 
divisions within the Commission, sectoral councils and their hierarchies of committees. It 
follows that rather than adapting the network concept for the analysis of multilevel foreign 
policy decision-making, recent changes of the process have increased its similarity with 
domestic decision-making processes and thus made it more susceptible to network 
analysis.
David Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, ‘Policy Communities and Issue Networks. Beyond Typology’, in ibid., 
eds., Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp.249-268, p.258; John 
Peterson, ‘The European Technology Community’, in R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, eds., Policy 
Networks in British Government (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 226-248; Philip Gummctt and Judith 
Reppy, ‘Military Industrial Networks and Technical Change in the New Strategic Environment’, 
Government and Opposition 25:3, 1990, pp.287-303; Atkinson and Coleman, ‘Policy Networks, Policy 
Communities and Problems of Governance’, p. 163.
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The consequence of the expansion of sectoral decision-making structures in 
virtually all issue areas across national boundaries, however, raises the question whether 
a distinct ‘foreign policy’ network exists. If most sectoral policy networks in contemporary 
Western democracies cross levels of analysis, they all are potentially foreign policy 
networks in that some of the decisions made within them would be ‘directed to some 
actual or potential sphere outside the jurisdiction of the state polity’10. Nevertheless, it can 
be argued that a foreign policy network can be found alongside increasingly transnational 
sectoral networks such as agriculture, industry or telecommunications. Although the latter 
are characterised by transnational and transgovemmental interaction in political decision­
making, the decisions taken within these networks typically apply to and are implemented 
at the domestic level. As such, these decisions are not foreign policies as defined above. 
Furthermore, based on the definition of networks as sets of actors who share a specific 
interest in a particular issue area and who are linked to each other through stable relations, 
a range of actors networks can be identified which are predominantly concerned with 
policies directed to and implemented at the international arena. They subsume all public 
and private actors whose primary interests lie beyond the national boundaries of their 
countries. Actors concerned with national security and defence policy certainly fall into 
this category as their only interests are matters beyond their national boundaries. However, 
foreign policy networks also include export industries because they are mainly affected by 
the political regulation of transnational relations.
Finally, the question emerges how networks in general, and foreign policy 
networks in particular, change and how this affects their delineation. The introduction of 
this thesis has suggested that the foreign policy decision-making process has been 
considerably transformed over the past 40 years. This transformation has not only included 
the emergence of new actors in decision-making processes, but also the increasing 
interdependence between public and private actors at the national and international level. 
Analytically two causes can be distinguished which may lead to changes in networks: 
external and internal causes. External causes might involve the advent of new actors who 
share an interest in an issue area and seek to gain access to the decision-making process. 
Internal causes may be self-induced changes, e.g. political decisions which redefine the
10 See definition o f ‘foreign policy’ in chapter 1, p. 19.
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formal relations among sets of actors in a sector, material changes in the resources of 
actors, or routine and institutionalised changes, such as elections which bring new parties 
into government. All impact directly on the delineation of networks and, therefore, any 
map of a network can only provide a temporary ‘snapshot’ of the actors and relations 
involved. However, since a network by definition consists of a stable set of agents who 
regularly interact, only long-term changes which apply not only to a single case, but 
indicate a more permanent transformation of the network across a range of issues, are 
considered relevant. Within the five-year range of the case studies the institutional changes 
in a number of international organisations, such as NATO and the OSCE, certainly 
belonged to this category. But elections, such as the coming to power of Bill Clinton in 
the United States (US), also changed some relations within the British and German foreign 
policy networks. The following section examines how these relations are defined.
2.3 Network Structures as Dyadic Power Relations
While the actors and their relations cannot distinguish between networks, the two are 
essential for the analysis of network structures and the ways in which they affect the 
decision-making process. Since multilevel network theory seeks to explain how political 
actors influence each other’s policy preferences, this structure has to be analysed in terms 
of how it affects the ability of actors to exert influence. The ability to influence is grasped 
in the concept of power. However, the notion of power has been regarded as an essentially 
contested concept.11 In particular, different conceptions and measures of power have been 
employed in the analysis of the domestic on one hand and the international policy making 
on the other. This section develops a definition of power which can be applied to actors 
across multiple levels of analysis.
Any theory which seeks to analyse the ability of political actors to influence each 
other is per definitionem based on a concept of power. Power can be defined as the 
potential or actual ability of an actor A to deliberately change the preferences or the 
behaviour of another actor B with respect to an issue X.12 It can be differentiated from the
11 William E. Connolly, The Terms o f  Political Discourse, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
12 Compare Keith Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), p.68; 
Connolly, Terms o f  Political Discourse; David Baldwin, Paradoxes o f  Power (New York: Blackwell, 
1989).
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concept of influence in that power can be both the potential and actual capacity to modify 
another actor’s beliefs or actions, while influence only applies to actual, observable 
changes. Two key features characterise this definition of power. First, it describes a dyadic 
relationship, namely the relation between two actors A and B 13 It follows that the analysis 
of networks which utilises the concept of power should describe a network as a set of 
dyadic relationships. Following from this definition of power, the structure of a network 
is best described in terms of the relations between any two actors expressed in the form 
of a matrix, such as Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Matrix o f Dyadic Relations
Actor A 
Actor B 
Actor C 
Actor D
The second feature of this definition of power is that, unlike influence, it cannot be directly 
observed or measured because it also denotes the potential to influence. Power has to be 
analysed either deductively or inductively, i.e. it can be inferred from A’s capabilities in 
advance of its exertion or it can be measured a posteriori by changes in B’s behaviour or 
preferences.14 While the former relies on the study of material and ideational properties, 
the latter investigates behaviour. Both methods have been used in the study of domestic 
policy networks. However, only the deductive approach suggests an explanation as to why 
the actor A can influence actor B. Conversely, the inductive approach concludes that 
power is the result of influence. Where an actor A has the observed ability to influence B, 
it is presumed that he or she has also the capability to do so in future. The question what 
enables A to modify B’s behaviour is not addressed.
The difference between the two approaches is based on their understanding of the
13 Richard M. Emerson, Tower-Dependcnce Relations', A meri can Sociological Review  27:1,1962, pp. 31- 
40; Baldwin, Paradoxes o f  Power.
14 Connolly, Terms o f  Political Discourse.
relation A to B relation A to C relation A to D
relation B to A relation B to C relation B to D
relation C to A relation C to B relation C to D
relation D to A relation D to B relation D to C
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nature of power. The inductive approach treats power as a type of relationship, while the 
deductive approach conceives of power as a causal hypothesis.15 Specifically, the 
deductive approach suggests that a causal relationship exists between the preferences and 
actions of actor A and the preferences and actions of actor B. However, in order to denote 
a causal relation and not merely a correlation, the deductive approach has to distinguish 
between cause and effect. Stating that A’s and B ’s preferences and actions correlate would 
not describe a genuine causal relationship between both actors. A causal relationship has 
to identify the direction of the causality, i.e. it has to differentiate whether A influences B 
or vice versa. Analytically, four types of power relations can be distinguished with regard 
to causation, i.e. the direction in which power can be exerted:
(1) A has power over B [A > B, ‘hierarchical’],
(2) B has power over A [A < B, ‘pluralistic’],
(3) A and B have power over each other [A o  B, ‘interdependent’] and
(4) neither A nor B has power over the other [A|B or A B, ‘autonomous’].
The structure of a network can then be described as the distribution of these four types of
relations among all members of the network. They can best be displayed in the form of a
two-dimensional matrix as in Table 2.2.
*1 *
Table 2.2 Types o f Power Relations
A
no power power
no power A | B 
(autonomous)
A> B 
(hierarchical)
power A < B 
(pluralistic)
A <> B 
(interdependent)
In addition to distinguishing between the direction of a causal power relationship, the
15 Jack H. Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis o f  Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).
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distinction between cause and effect has to be justified in order to meet the definition of 
causality. Such justification is provided by an explanation as to why A has the actual or 
potential ability to influence the behaviour and preferences of B. In political theory such 
an explanation is referred to as the ‘bases’ of a power relation.16 Two alternative 
explanations have dominated the analysis of domestic policy analysis on one hand and 
international relations on the other until the 1980s. In international relations, power was 
traditionally associated with material resources, while in the domestic system power was 
predominantly explained by institutional structures.17 The different explanations were a 
result of the perceived structural differences between the national and the international 
system. Thus, in the domestic arena, institutional analysis traditionally featured strongly 
because of the perceived dominance of formal, institutionalised decision-making 
structures. The international arena, which was viewed by neo-realists as the realm of 
anarchy characterised by the absence or limited influence of formal institutions, material 
resources were favoured as indicators of power.18
Although the distinction between institutionalised domestic structures and 
international anarchy has never been clear-cut, the transformation of decision-making 
processes in the transatlantic community has led to an increasing convergence of domestic 
and international structures. While domestic public-private relations have been 
characterised by deregulation since in the 1980s and privatisation continues in sectors such 
as telecommunication, transport and health, international institutions have proliferated due 
to the expansion of the functional scope of the EU, NATO or the OSCE for instance. As 
a consequence of these changes and due to the extension of decision-making networks 
across systemic boundaries, it has become necessary to integrate the analysis of resources 
and institutions for the study of power in multilevel networks. The following investigates 
how the analysis of institutions and resources can be combined across levels of analysis in 
order to deduce power relations in multilevel networks.
16 Connolly, Terms o f  Political Discourse.
17 R. A.W. Rhodes, The National World o f  Local Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 17.
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); RobertO. 
Keohane, A fter Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984).
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Relational Bases o f Power
Since this thesis defines power as a causal relation, its analysis requires relational 
indicators. This does not pose a problem with regard to institutions. Institutions denote 
social relations in their definition as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules (informal and 
formal) that prescribe roles, constrain activities and shape expectations’.19 They attribute 
competence and legitimate authority to certain political actors within the decision-making 
process by describing their relations with other actors and by prescribing legitimate modes 
of action between actors. In Western democracies, most formal institutional relations are 
codified in national constitutions, laws and regulations. In addition, informal institutional 
relations have emerged through convention and can be observed in the regular interactions 
between public and private actors. Britain holds a special position in this respect because 
it does not have a written constitution, but relies primarily on conventions for the 
definition of its institutional relations in the political realm. However, as has been argued 
above, formal institutional relations are not confined to the domestic level. In the 
international arena, formal institutional relations have been set up by treaties, regimes and 
documents of the main international organisations. They not only define legitimate 
relations and modes of interaction among state governments, but also between private 
actors, such as firms, interest groups or even individuals.
Contrary to institutions, the distribution of resources among actors at different 
levels of analysis may be coined in relative terms, but it is not a relational concept. An 
actor’s possession of specific resources does not per se reveal anything about his or her 
power relations with other actors. Although an actor might attempt to use his or her 
resources in bargaining situations or to force other actors to modify their behaviour, these 
efforts are likely to be unsuccessful if the targeted actors have control over similar 
resources. In order to provide A with power over B, A’s resources have to meet the needs 
and/or lack of resources by B.20 Specifically, resources can be the basis of two forms of 
power relations. First, resources can be used in exchanges as described by the relational 
concept of ‘resource-dependence’ among actors. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye 
define such (inter)dependence as situations ‘where there are reciprocal (although not
19 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1989), 
p.3.
20 Emerson, ‘Power-Dependence Relations’; Keohane, International Institutions and State Power.
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necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions’.21 Second, resources can be 
employed to force or threaten to force actors to change their behaviour if they lack 
matching resources.
Since multilevel networks are based on a stable set of actors who regularly interact 
with each other, it can be argued that physical force or the threat of force plays a negligible 
role in the analysis of multilevel networks. As will be argued in more detail below, all 
network actors potentially depend on each other for the formation of coalitions in the 
political decision-making process. The use or threat of force would endanger future 
cooperation in such coalitions and, therefore, is believed to entail greater long-term risks 
than short-term benefits. As a consequence, resource-dependence has been regarded as 
the primary basis of material relations within networks. They require the examination of 
two variables: the distribution of resources and the respective needs of each actor. Given 
the variety of actors in multilevel networks, multilevel network theory practically rules out 
the possibility of arriving at a conclusive list of power resources.22 Conversely, multilevel 
network theory requires a flexible approach to power resources which essentially includes 
all tangible and intangible assets which may determine resource-dependence relations 
between any two particular actors. Due to the infinite range of resources which may be the 
basis of resource-dependence relations, the analysis of the exchange relations among 
network actors best begins with an examination of the specific needs of each actor and by 
whom these needs can be met.
In multilevel network analysis ‘needs’ can best be defined as the ‘objective welfare 
demands’ of actors because they allow needs to be deduced from the basic functions of 
the actors.23 According to this definition, needs stem from basic physical requirements 
necessary to ensure survival and prosperity. Commonly, physical needs of individuals are 
listed as food, shelter, safety and employment.24 They also include all resources which are 
required for the fulfilment of the specific functions of public and private actors, such as the
21 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1989), p.9.
22 Thus, Rhodes suggests that five resources are central to networks: authority, money, legitimacy, 
information and organisational resources. See R. A. W. Rhodes, The National World o f  Local Government 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 17.
23 Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power, p.35.
24 Felix E. Oppenheiin, Political Concepts (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), p. 128, p. 141.
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development and implementation of policies by ministerial departments and the provision 
of goods and services by private companies. Most of the functions of public actors are laid 
down in the documents which define their institutional relations with other actors within 
the network, while the functions of private actors arise from the objective demands of 
organisational welfare, i.e. the survival of a firm in a competitive market, and the need for 
resources for production and service. Once an actor’s functional need for a specific set of 
resources has been established, it can be analysed which actors in the network are able to 
meet these needs and stand in a resource-exchange relation with the actor.
While the above asserts that institutional and resource-dependence relations are 
defined by different variables, both simultaneously define the type of power relation 
between any two actors in the network. However, the type and direction of power as 
determined by the two dimensions can differ. Thus, the resource-dependence relationship 
between an actor A and another actor B may give B power over A, while the institutional 
relationship between both might give A power over B. An example would be the 
relationship between a minister and his or her civil servants. Although the minister depends 
on information and expertise from the civil servants, he or she has institutional authority 
over their actions. In order to understand the power relations between any two actors in 
a multilevel network, therefore, the combined effect of both dimensions on the ability of 
actors to influence another has to be analysed.
Table 2.3 Combined Power Relations
Resource-Dependence
Institutional
Authority
A> B A< B A<>B A| B
A> B A> B A <> B A <> B A> B
A< B A <> B A< B A o B A< B
A o B A<> B A <> B A <> B A o B
A | B A |> B A J< B A <|> B A | B
The cumulative influence of institutions and resource-dependencies on power relations can 
be perceived as a two-dimensional space which is displayed in Table 2.3. In each 
dimension, the power relation can take one of the four types of causal direction identified
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above, namely hierarchical [A > B], pluralistic [B > A], interdependent [A o  B] and 
autonomous [A | B]. However, in so far as resources and institutions determine the 
relationship between two specific actors in a single network, they generate one power 
relation between them which combines both.
The cumulative definition of the power relation between any two actors by the two 
dimensions can be understood by three logical axioms. First, if one dimension is 
characterised by interdependence, the combined power relation is also interdependent. 
This proposition can be justified because the mutual dependence of the actors on each 
other cannot be terminated by any other type of relationship in the other dimension. To 
illustrate: If two ministries depend on each other for the exchange of information and 
expertise, a higher institutional authority of one ministry over the other in some issues does 
not change the fact that they are mutually dependent. From this axiom follows, second, 
hierarchical or pluralist types of power relations can only exist where the institutional and 
resource-dependence dimensions are characterised by either the same type or if the other 
relation is marked as autonomy. Thus to stay with the above example, the power relation 
between two ministries would be hierarchical if ministry B was dependent upon resources 
from ministry A as well as institutionally subordinate or autonomous from it. Third, if at 
least one dimension is hierarchical and at least one other pluralistic, the resulting power 
relation can be defined as interdependent. For instance, it can be argued that if actor A 
depends upon the resources of B, but can influence B because of his or her institutional 
authority, both actors will have the capability to exert power over another. To take 
another example from ministerial relations, such a combination is represented by the 
relationship between ministers and their civil servants. Typically, ministers would have the 
superior institutional control over the bureaucratic apparatus, but they require expertise 
and information which are provided by the civil servants. As a consequence both can exert 
some influence over each other.
Degrees o f  Power
The additive axioms presented above neglect that interdependence can be symmetrical as 
well as asymmetrical.25 The analogy of resource-dependence with supply and demand
25 Oppenheim, Political Concepts, p.34.
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relations points to the fact that the power relation between any two actors A and B cannot 
be accurately understood outside the context of their respective relations with other 
network actors. A’s power over B might be diminished, if B is able to satisfy his or her 
needs from alternative sources, such as actors C or D. Viewed from this contextual 
perspective, power relations are not absolute as implied by the four types of power 
relations identified above. Depending on the availability of resources, power should rather 
be conceptualised as a continuum which allows for different degrees. The same argument 
can be made with regard to institutions. Some actors have higher institutional authority 
over another actor than others. For instance, although both a parliamentary political party 
and a minister have the ability to influence the prime minister, the institutional influence 
of the minister will commonly be regarded as stronger than that of the parliamentary party.
In spite of the apparent reductionism of distinguishing merely four types of power 
relations in terms of their causal direction, several arguments support the usage of this 
approach for multilevel network theory. They show that a directional typology of power 
relations is not only empirically more rigorous than degrees of power, but also more 
conducive to the network approach. The main problem of degrees of power lie in their 
theoretical conceptualization and empirical measurement if power is defined in relational 
terms. Unlike the power as currency approach, it is not sufficient to measure the amount 
of power of each actor as indicated by his or her possession of selected variables, such as 
weapons, financial resources or personnel.26 The relational definition of power also 
requires the measurement of the degree of need among other actors. To assess different 
degrees of power consistent criteria not only have to be developed for the evaluation of 
the degree of power provided by resource-dependence and institutions, but also for their 
combined effect. Contrary to the directional approach to power relations, the simple 
additive combination of the two dimensions is prohibited by such questions as whether 
resource-dependencies or institutions can overrule each other or whether and to what 
degree they enhance each other. The selection of consistent criteria for measuring and 
comparing degrees of resource-dependence and institutional power is obviously very 
problematic.
See for instance Richard L. Merritt and Diana A. Zinnes, ‘Alternative Indexes of National Power’, in 
Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, eds.. Power in World Politics (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 
1989), pp. 11-28.
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Existing network models have tended to circumvent the theoretical and practical 
difficulties of measuring different degrees of power in favour of subjective-descriptive 
evaluations of power relations.27 Thus, some inductive network approaches have resorted 
to questioning the members of the networks about perceived differences in their power. 
Other deductive network analyses have been based on the subjective assessment of power 
by academics. While these approaches allow for a rfiore differentiated depiction of power 
relations in networks, they have been one of the main obstacles for the development of a 
network theory due to the problem of arriving at inter-subjectively agreed criteria. 
Network analysis has been hampered by a profusion of typologies of networks each based 
on different and rather vague criteria. Moreover, the preoccupation with the power 
structure of networks has led to the under-theorization of the concepts of agency and 
process in network models as has been criticised by both the advocates of the approach 
and its critics.
The definition of power relations in terms of their causal direction not only avoids 
these problems, it also returns to the origins of network analysis which focussed on the 
position of actors within the structure of their network. While a number of sociologists 
have continued to develop this approach with highly theoretical models, political science 
has proceeded towards greater descriptive detail in the analysis of the individual relations 
in networks. As an example of the former, Karen S. Cook, Richard M. Emerson, Mary R. 
Gillmore and Toshio Yamagishi, have examined how the simple presence or absence of 
relations among network actors bestows power upon those actors who have a high 
number of linkages and who are centrally placed to bridge sections of the network.28 
Conversely, the latter is represented by policy network models which emulate pluralist or 
bureaucratic decision-making models in seeking to explain the influence of network actors 
by descriptive accounts of the variegated characteristics of their relations.29 Choosing a 
simple fourfold typology of causally directed network relations, multilevel network theory
27 Rhodes, National World o f  Local Government, p. 17.
28 See for example Karen S. Cook, Richard M. Emerson, Mary R. Gillmore and Toshio Yamagishi, ‘The 
Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results’, American Journal o f  
Sociology 89:2,1983, pp.275-305; John Skvoretz and David Wilier, ‘Exclusion and Power: ATestofFour 
Theories of Power in Exchange Networks’,^ merican Sociological Review  58:6,1993, pp.801-818; Toshio 
Yamagishi, Mary R. Gillmore and Karen S. Cook, ‘Network Connections and the Distribution of Power 
in Exchange Networks’, American Journal o f  Sociology 93:4, 1988, pp.833-851.
29 For a review of various approaches see Waarden, ‘Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks’.
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returns to the origins of network analysis. It redirects the focus of network analysis on 
how the position of actors within a network affects their interactions and their ability to 
influence the decision-making process.30
2.4 Actors, Preferences and Rational Choices
The preceding analysis of the power relations in networks takes the central place in 
network analysis because it is presumed that the actors will use their power in order to 
influence the decision-making process in their favour.31 The power structure of the 
network determines the ability of different actors to change each other’s preferences 
regarding particular policies. However, in order to explain the resulting decision-making 
process, multilevel network theory has to make theoretically guided assumptions about the 
ways in which actors use their power relations within the network to exert pressure and 
when actors modify their policy preferences in response to pressure from other actors.32 
In short, multilevel network theory has to illustrate the relationship between network 
structures and behaviour of political actors in the decision-making process.
Three connected variables determine the decision-making process: the actors, their 
preferences and the calculations which guide their actions. In existing network models 
various ways have been proposed to conceptualise them. The following section examines 
which is best suited for analysing the foreign policy decision-making process across levels 
of analysis. Moreover, this section proposes that multilevel network theory can fruitfully 
draw on rational choice theory which has been utilised by theories at both levels of analysis 
to arrive at general hypotheses regarding the behaviour of political actors in the national 
as well as international domain.
Collective Actors, Human Agents or Political Roles
The concept of actors in networks is crucial for an analysis of decision-making processes 
in two respects. First, the conceptualisation of network actors determines their resources
30 Compare Keith Dowding, ‘Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach’, 
Political Studies XLIII: 1, 1995, pp. 136-158, pp. 152f.
31 Edward O. Lauinann et al., ‘Organisations in Political Action: Representing Interests in National Policy 
Making’, in Bemd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical 
Considerations (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), p.63.
32 Most and Starr, Inquiry, Logic and International Politics.
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and needs in the analysis of a network’s structure. Second, the concept of network actors 
influences our understanding of their political preferences and their behaviour in the 
decision-making process. Three competing concepts of actors can be distinguished in 
various network models: collective actors, individual agents and role actors. Each poses 
different problems for the analysis of multilevel decision-making.
The concept of collective actors presumes that decision-making networks consist 
of relations among collective organisations, such as parties, interest groups, large firms, 
unions or governmental agencies.33 The advantage of this approach is that the assumptions 
and conclusions regarding the power and interests of collective actors can be generalised. 
Although the membership of collective actors is subject to constant or periodical changes, 
the power relations and functions which refer to the organisations rather than their 
individual members are relatively stable. Moreover, institutionalised collective actors hold 
resources independent from the contributions of their membership. These resources can 
be employed for purposes which lie outside the immediate interests of their members. 
Among these interests, the most important goal is that of organisational welfare. The 
interest of organisations in their continued existence regardless of the necessity to fulfil 
certain functions within the political, social or economic system can be explained by the 
division between membership and consumers on one hand and leadership and employees 
on the other. Since the human agents who are employed by an organisation have a stake 
in its maintenance, i.e. their personal welfare, organisational survival is not merely an 
intermediate goal, but a primary objective in itself. Thus, collective actors do not only hold 
a stable position within a network as determined by their resources and institutional 
attributes, but also have a range of stable needs which derive from the independent and 
often prevalent goal of organisational survival and welfare.
For the development of a multilevel network theory of foreign policy decision­
making in the 1990s, however, the utility of the collective actor approach is limited. 
Specifically, it poses a problem for the consistent conceptualization of diverse actors at the 
national and international level within a single theoretical framework. Most crucially, the
33' See Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, ‘Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks 
in Advanced Capitalist Economies’, British Journal o f  Political Science 19:1,1989, pp.47-67; Kenis and 
Schneider, ‘Policy Networks and Policy Analysis’, p.41; Rhodes and Marsh, ‘Policy Networks in British 
Politics’, p.9; Renate Mayntz, ‘Networks, Issues and Games’, in Fritz W. Scharpf, cd., Games in 
Hierarchies and Networks. Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the Study o f  Governance Institutions 
(Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1988), pp. 189-209, p. 192.
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membership of collective actors at different levels of analysis varies between individuals, 
organisations and even states. As a consequence it is not possible to provide a consistent 
definition of collective actors for multilevel analysis. Additional disadvantages of the 
approach concern our definition of power which requires actors to use their relations with 
other actors intentionally. Rational choice theory has shown that collective actors fail to 
meet the requirement of intentional action since, as non-unitary actors, they do not 
necessarily have consistent preference hierarchies.34
An alternative to the collective actor concept is presented by the individualist 
approach. The individual actor concept models networks as linkages and communication 
lines between individual human agents.35 In fact, any empirical study of decision-making 
in networks will deal with the interactions of individuals, not impersonal organisations. 
The individualist perspective avoids the problem of intentional action since goal directed 
behaviour is a distinctive feature of human agency. In addition, the individualist 
perspective recognises that the ability to wield power also depends on personal capacities 
and characteristics. Similarly, the preferences of an actor may be determined by their 
organisational environment, but also by their personal desires. The descriptive and 
explanatory capacity of an individualist perspective, thus, is much higher than that of the 
collective actor approach.
By introducing additional variables related to the individual character of actors in 
decision-making networks, the analysis of specific cases is more comprehensive. 
Nevertheless, for the construction of a multilevel network theory the individual actor 
concept can only be rejected because it eventually inhibits theoretical generalisation. If 
personal characteristics play a dominant role in defining the relations among network 
actors and their interactions, no general statements can be made about them. The usage 
of the individual actor concept by network models has, therefore, contributed to its 
limitation to empirical-descriptive analysis which has been criticised in the introduction of
34 See Donal P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies o f  Rational Choice Theory. A Critique o f  
Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 15; James Buchanan and 
Gordon Tullock, The Calculus o f  Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 13.
35 See for instance Hugh Hcclo, ‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment’, in Anthony King, ed., 
The New American Political System (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1978), pp.87-124; J.J. Richardson and A.G. Jordan, Governing under Pressure (Oxford: Martin 
Robinson, 1979); Hans Bressers, Laurence O ’Toole and Jeremy Richardson, ‘Networks as Models of 
Analysis: Water Policy in Comparative Perspective’, Environmental Politics 3:4, 1994, pp. 1-23, p.6; 
Wright, ‘Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies’; Steven Wilks and 
Maurice Wright, eds., Comparative Government - Industry Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987).
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this thesis.
The preceding argument suggests that in the conceptualization of network actors 
a choice has to be made between theoretical generalisation and descriptive detail. Although 
this is ultimately true for the empirical analysis, both can be accommodated within the 
framework of multilevel network theory. The two perspectives can be reconciled by the 
concept of actors as individuals who play political, social, or economic roles.36 A role is 
defined by the rights and obligations attributed to it by formal and informal institutions, 
its command over resources and the expectations which the role player and other members 
of a system or organisation hold with regard to it. Roles can only be understood in their 
institutional and social context. However, roles are held by individuals. They provide a 
conceptual bridge between the individual who bears a role and the social collective which 
shapes it. Moreover, the concept of roles can be employed in general theoretical accounts 
as well as in detailed empirical analyses.
On the level of a general network theory, roles are sufficiently defined by their 
enduring features. These are the aspects by which any individual who impersonates a role 
will be affected. Ranking in order of stability, formal institutions prescribe the most 
enduring attributes of roles. Informal institutions, resources, perceptions and expectations 
complement them. In all these respects, roles are crucially related to collective 
organisations and hence to the collective actor approach. In modem societies, 
organisations prescribe the institutional setting for roles, provide resources to enable them 
to fulfil their functions and shape the expectations regarding roles as captured in the notion 
of organisational cultures.37 These variables not only define general features of actors in 
decision-making networks, empirical studies also suggest that they dominate individual 
preferences and behaviour. Thus, it can be argued that individuals have to fulfil their role — 
in order to obtain personal objectives.38 In fact, individuals are commonly appointed to a 
certain position because they meet the cultural expectations connected with it. For 
instance, bureaucrats, politicians as well as managers often share not only similar norms,
36 Keith Dowding and Desmond King, cds., Preferences, Institutions and Rational Choice (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995), p .ll;  Waarden’,Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks’, p.33; David Knoke, 
Political Networks. The Structural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.7.
37 Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power, p. 147; Donald D. Searing, ‘Roles, Rules and 
Rationality in the New Institutionalism’, American Political Science Review  85:4, 1991, pp. 1249-1260, 
p.1245.
38 Searing’,Roles, Rules and Rationality’, p. 1254.
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cultures and preferences, but also aspects in their personal history, such as a university 
education. Moreover, roles shape the behaviour and preferences of human agents through 
internalisation as they learn to meet the standards and expectations which constantly 
confront them.39 In sum, the concept of actors as role players can accommodate both 
theoretical generality and descriptive accuracy.
The conceptualisation of network actors as individuals playing roles, however, has 
to deal with the question of multiple roles. It arises from the fact that human agents 
typically hold a multiplicity of roles.40 With regard to network relations, multiple roles 
increase the number of network relations which individual human agents can wield. A 
specific case is the so-called ‘boundary role’ which bridges levels of analysis or policy 
sectors. Here actors with boundary positions are defined as holding several, separate roles 
within different policy sectors or at the domestic and international level.41 Usually, 
boundary roles are held by high-ranking politicians, civil servants and the military who not 
only have national political and bureaucratic roles, but also have institutional roles in 
international organisations, such as the EU or NATO and the WEU. Among the latter two, 
the concept o f ‘double-hatting’, which denotes individuals who serve as representatives 
in two organisations simultaneously, has added another international dimension to the 
concept of boundary roles which links international organisations.
Each of the roles held by an actor in a boundary position is typically linked to a 
'I .•
number of actors. Therefore, actors with boundary roles are distinct from agents who hold 
only a single role, but have transnational or trans-sectoral linkages with other actors. 
Boundary roles are also distinct from the ‘gatekeeper’ concept employed in the two-level 
game. While actors with boundary roles may have an advantage in the decision-making 
process because they can influence abroad range of national and international actors, they 
are not the only actors who can do so. Actors with transnational linkages can also exert 
pressure across national borders. Moreover, actors with boundary roles cannot prevent 
transnational contacts and interactions among other actors and can therefore hardly be
39 Bressers, O’Toole and Richardson, ‘Networks as Models of Analysis’, p.6.
40 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, British 
Journal o f  Political Science 16:3, 1986, pp. 269-286, p.276.
41 In this sense the term boundary ‘role’ which has been used in the literature on transnational relations 
is misleading since it is not the role that crosses national boundaries, but the agents who hold multiple 
roles at different levels or in distinct sectors.
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understood as ‘gates’ between the national and the international arena.
For the theoretical and empirical analysis multiple roles such as boundary roles, 
nevertheless, do not pose a problem. In the analysis of the British and German foreign 
policy networks each role is treated separately. In the case studies, individuals who hold 
multiple roles combine the features of each. In doing so, the analysis follows the axioms 
which defined the synthesis of resource-dependence relations and institutional authority 
in Table 2.3. Similarly, the needs of actors with multiple roles can be identified through 
an analysis of the needs of each role which either complement or reinforce each other. The 
question of the interests and preferences of individuals who represent multiple roles will 
be discussed in more detail below.
Interests and Preferences
The key question which multilevel network theory seeks to answer is how actors are able 
to influence each other’s policy preferences and ultimately the outcome of the decision­
making process. In order to do so, it has to distinguish between the political preferences 
of actors in the absence of external influence and those which result from changes due to 
intentional pressure from other members of the network. The former is usually referred to 
as interests, while the latter will here be termed preferences.42 While preferences and their 
changes can only by examined empirically, the interests of network actors can be 
established either inductively or deductively within the empiricist paradigm.43 The 
following argues that the inductive approach is preferable because of the problems 
associated with the identification o f ‘objective’ interests.
The deductive analysis of interests is commonly based on an examination of the 
needs of actors. It presumes that the policies which enable actors to ensure their welfare 
and fulfil their functions define their ‘objective’ interests. While such assumptions underlie 
a number of theories in international relations - in particular models which treat states as 
unitary actors - it conflicts with the basic concepts of multilevel network theory. 
Specifically, it encounters the problem of multiple roles mentioned above. Different roles 
often have conflicting objective interests. Since individual human agents typically hold
42 Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power, p.30.
43 In accordance with the empiricist paradigm embraced in this thesis, alternative notions of interest 
formation as suggested by constructivist approaches are not discussed.
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multiple roles, the deductive determination of interests would require additional 
hypotheses about the way in which agents resolve the conflicting interests of their diverse 
roles. More critical in terms of network analysis is the problem which arises from the 
notion o f‘mistaken’ interests.44 The deduction of interests from needs allows actors to be 
mistaken about their objective interests, i.e. if they do not recognise their need for 
specified tangible and intangible commodities.45 This concept fundamentally contradicts 
network analysis which requires that actors are aware of their interests. Only if actors are, 
can they influence the decision-making process intentionally as required by the definition 
of power in the previous section.
As a consequence, it can be contended that an inductive approach to the analysis 
of interests is more appropriate for multilevel network theory. According to this method 
the interests of actors can be inferred from their publicly expressed preferences. This 
approach avoids the concepts of original or mistaken interests. It proceeds from the 
premise that interests can only be truly known to individuals themselves. The analyst has 
to contend with whatever preferences actors chose to make public. Obviously, these 
preferences may change. Moreover, actors might adjust their public preferences in order 
to pre-empt a controversy.46 Since multilevel network theory seeks to establish the effects 
of intentional influence on the decision-making process, however, it is not relevant 
whether the observed preferences at the beginning of a research period are the original 
interests of political actors. Multilevel network theory should be able to explain the actions 
and preference changes at any possible (starting) point of the decision-making process. 
While it would be generally desirable to trace the decision-making process from its 
perceived ‘beginning’ as marked by the emergence of a particular issue or problem 
perhaps, the hypotheses of multilevel network theory which concern the actions and 
preference changes of network actors should be valid at any stage of the political 
process.47 The basis for these hypotheses is rational choice.
44 Brian Barry, Political Argument (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1965/1990), p. 179.
45 Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power, p.36.
46 Connolly, Terms o f  Political Discourse, pp.49f.
47 The ‘beginning’ of a political debate has of course always to be treated with caution because of the 
problem of infinite regress. See for instance John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p.77.
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Rational Choice in Multilevel Networks
It has been stated above that multilevel network theory proceeds from the premise that 
political actors seek to ensure that their political preferences will be served by the outcome 
of the decision-making process. In order to do so, actors attempt to influence each other 
and, finally, the ultimate decision maker. The interactions which evolve due to these 
attempts are a result of the structure of the network on one hand, and the distribution of 
preferences with regard to a political issue on the other. However, neither does pressure 
always lead to preference changes, nor do network structures prescribe a single course of 
action in order to influence the decision-making process. Actors can choose among their 
network linkages. Most crucially, actors choose whether to change their preferences and 
join a group of actors or ‘coalition’ in favour of a particular policy. These choices are 
strategic choices since they depend on the choices and behaviour of other actors within 
the network. By hypothesising about the choices of network actors, multilevel network 
theory proposes a causal link between the structure of the network and the behaviour of 
political agents in the decision-making process. The following examines the axioms on 
which hypothesis regarding the choices of preferences and actions can be based. It 
suggests that cost-utility calculations derived from rational choice theory can provide a 
range of hypotheses which illustrate how actors may utilise their position in multilevel 
networks in order to influence the decision-making process.
Rational choice theory posits that human agents can be modelled as calculating 
actors who pursue cost-utility optimising behaviour.48 That is actors choose rationally if 
they select the behaviour or preferences which they believe will yield their desired outcome 
at the lowest cost.49 The problem of analysing the expectations of different actors 
regarding the rationality of different options ‘under due consideration of the 
circumstances’50 has led to the introduction of the concept of bounded rationality.51 Actors 
assess the costs of only those options of which they are immediately aware since the 
investigation of all possible alternatives is too costly. As such, the concept of bounded
48 Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice (London: Harvester, 1991), p.3; Green 
and Shapiro, Pathologies o f  Rational Choice Theory, pp.l4f.
49 Hollis and Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons’, p.272.
50 Oppenhcim, Political Concepts, p. 126.
51 Jon Elster, ‘Introduction’, in JonElster, ed., Rational Choice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 1-33, p.5.
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rationality is closely related to network analysis. By definition networks are described as 
stable and routinely used linkages among a set of actors. As a consequence, the members 
of a network have a clear understanding of the nature of their power relations with others 
and whether they have the potential to influence other actors.
The value of the rational choice approach for network analysis has been pointed 
out in various studies.52 It lies in the fact that rational choice proposes a general principle 
for choosing strategies and preferences. It fulfils on one hand the requirement of 
generalisation which is the basis for a theory of choice, on the other it is characterised by 
variability and specificity. Moreover, if rational choice is defined in terms of cost-utility 
calculations, it enters any theory which acknowledges that actors choose among various 
options for action by considering the required resources and the likelihood of succeeding 
to obtain their objective. Many international relations theories and models of decision­
making implicitly or explicitly refer to such calculations to explain the behaviour of 
political actors. One reason for its wide usage seems to be that rational choice is inherent 
in the concept of power as it has been defined at the beginning of this chapter. The 
assumption that power can be deduced from bases such as resource-dependencies and 
institutional relations is grounded on the notion that A can and presumably will impose 
costs on B, if B does not comply with his or her wishes.53 An analysis of decision-making 
networks in terms of power relations, therefore, suggests a theory of agency based on 
rational choice.
In order to employ the concept of rational choice to explain the behaviour of actors 
in multilevel decision-making processes, network theory has to specify two factors: the 
utility of different behavioural strategies to an actor and their relative cost. In a network 
of power relations, the utility of a network linkage is defined by the location of the 
ultimate decision unit, i.e. the role actor or actors who have the formal institutional 
authority to make legitimate and binding political decisions regarding a particular issue.
Arthur Benz, ‘Commentaiy of O’Toole and Scharpf: The Network Concept as a Theoretical Approach’, 
inFritz W. Scharpf, ed., Games in Hierarchies and Networks (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1993), pp. 167-175; 
Dowding, ‘Model of Metaphor?’; Carsten Daugbjerg and David Marsh, ‘Explaining Policy Outcomes: 
Integrating the Policy Network Approach with Macro-Level and Micro-Level Analysis’, in David Marsh, 
ed., Comparing Policy Networks (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.52-71.
53 See for instance Connolly, Terms o f  Political Discourse, p. 102; John C. Harsanyi, ‘Measurement of 
Social Power, Opportunity Costs and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games’, Behavioral Science 
7:1, 1962, pp.67-80.
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The further the ultimate decision unit is removed from an actor, that is the more actors 
serve as intermediates, the weaker is his or her power and the smaller the utility of 
pressure exerted through these relations. Although the network position of the actors 
themselves is stable, the utility of an actor’s linkages can vary because of changes in the 
ultimate decision unit. The location of the ultimate decision unit not only changes from 
issue to issue, but can also shift as a result of the interactions among network actors during 
the decision-making process. Typical ultimate decision units are ministers for routine 
issues, cabinets and parliaments for important or controversial decisions and international 
organisations for multilateral actions. Most issues start at lower levels such as ministries, 
but some might move up to the cabinet or even international organisations because of 
internal dissent or the inability to provide adequate solutions at a sub-national or national 
level.
The cost of an action is determined by the type of power relationship with each 
actor. Several premises regarding the relative costs of each type of power relation can be 
derived from rational choice theory. First, the exercise of pressure is always costly.54 Not 
only do actors have to invest in communication, they also have to consider the costs of 
using their resources or institutional authority in order to exert pressure on another actor. 
From this follows the basic premise that actors will only seek to influence the decision­
making process if their preferences are affected and the cost of an adverse policy outcome 
is higher than that of interaction.55 The costly initiative lies, therefore, with the actors who 
perceive their policy preference to be threatened or in a minority. They have to engage in 
the decision-making process in order to increase the support for their preferred policy 
outcome. Conversely, actors who are part of the majority view will refrain from pressing 
other actors to support them until their preferred policy outcome is seriously threatened. 
As a result, the number of network actors engaged in the decision-making process should 
rise over time as more and more actors are pressed to take a stance for or against a
Compare the concept of ‘transaction costs’ by Keohane, After Hegemony, p.89-92; and more generally 
on the cost o f interaction and cooperation Heinz-Jurgen Axt, ‘Koopcration unter Konkurrenten: Das 
Regime als Thcoric der auiienpolitischen Zusammenarbeit der EG-Staaten’, Zeitschrift fiir  Politik 40:3, 
1993, pp.242-245.
55 See for instance Mayntz, ‘Networks, Issues and Games’, pp. 189f.; Boelie Elzen, Bert Enserink and 
Wim Smit, ‘Weapon Innovation - Networks and Guiding Principles’, Science and Public Policy 17:3, 
1990, pp. 171-193, pp .l86f; Wright, ‘Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial 
Policies’, p.596.
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policy.56 Thus, the first premise states:
Premise 1: Actorswill only seek to influence the policy preferences o f other actors 
in the network if they perceive their preferred policy to he in a minority.
Second, the costs for exercising pressure are lower for hierarchical or interdependent 
power relations than for pluralistic and autonomous types. The usage of pluralistic 
relations to exercise pressure is prohibitive because no cost can be inflicted upon the 
superior actor to support the demands. Autonomous relations prevent the exertion of 
influence due to the absence of an established institutional or resource exchange relation. 
Although a coalition cannot be ruled out in the case of similar interests, the cost of 
establishing a new relationship can be regarded as higher than the usage of already existing 
network linkages. The costs of each power relation can be summarised in form of a simple 
hierarchy: Low costs for A are associated with hierarchical [A > B] and interdependent 
power relations [A o  B], while high costs are linked to pluralistic relations [A < B] and 
autonomy [A | B].57 Accordingly, it follows:
Premise 2: Actors whose policy preference is in a minority will use their
hierarchical [A > B] or interdependent [A <> B] relations in order to exert 
'I j
pressure on actors who hold different policy preferences or who are undecided.
Finally, choice theories at all levels of analysis have recognised that legitimised pressure 
is less costly than not legitimised.58 That is, actors who have recognised institutional 
authority over another’s actions have lower costs in trying to influence them than actors 
without legitimate control. For instance, ministers have lower costs influencing their staff 
than representatives of interest groups. The difference is of particular interest in collective 
decision-making units, i.e. collective political bodies with institutionalised legitimate 
decision-making rules, such as majority voting or consensus. In collective decision-making
56 Compare Mayntz, ‘Networks, Issues and Games’, p.207; Atkinson and Coleman, ‘Policy Networks, 
Policy Communities and Problems of Governance’, p. 160.
57 Compare the notion of ‘opportunity costs’ in Keohane, After Hegemony, pp.70-73.
co
See Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, pp.5f.; Oran Young, ‘International Regimes: 
Problems of Concept Formation’, World Politics 32:3, 1980, pp.331-356, pp.338ff.
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units, most of which are national parliaments or the ministerial councils of international 
organisations, the formal institutional influence of members can thus be differentiated from 
the informal, and non-legitimate, influence of actors who are merely linked to the 
collective decision-making unit. Members with a voice or veto in a collective decision­
making unit have lower costs in influencing decisions within the body than nonmembers.
Premise 3: The legitimate pressure o f members with a simple majority or veto 
position in a collective decision-making unit is less costly than the pressure from 
actors who are only linked to the organisation.
The above premises postulate how actors use their power relations within the network in 
order to influence each other and the decision-making process according to Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Rational Action
Type of Power Relation
A> B A< B A o B A |B
A = B 
(same)
builds coalition builds coalition builds coalition -
A *  B
(different)
exerts pressure - exerts pressure 
or veto
-
Based on these assumptions multilevel network theory proposes two hypotheses which 
specify when actors are likely to succeed in changing each other’s policy preferences and 
influencing the policy outcome. By stating its hypotheses in probabilistic rather than 
deterministic terms, multilevel network theory acknowledges the range of possible factors 
which may contribute to policy changes. However, the following suggests that rational 
choice can help to identify some general tendencies regarding the relationship between 
pressure and modifications in actors’ policy preferences.
From the simple additive cumulation of the potential cost which can be imposed 
upon a network actor by those who have power over him follows the first hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: The higher the degree o f pressure (P, in per cent), i.e. number o f 
directly related actors exerting pressure (E) on a single actor X  out o f all actors 
who could exert pressure on him or her (L), the more likely is actor X  to change 
his or her policy preference.
According to the first hypothesis actors who are exposed to higher pressure to change 
their policy preferences are more likely to modify their position than those who are subject 
to lower degrees of pressure. The degree of pressure P on actor X during a phase T, which 
is delineated by two preference changes T -lst and Tst, is calculated in the form of:
PT [X] = number o f ‘E '/ number o f  X ’59
To take an illustrative example from the following case study regarding air strikes in 
Bosnia, seven out of 39 actors who were directly linked to the British Prime Minister 
pressed him in May 1992 to support air strikes in order to contain the Serb advances in 
Bosnia. According to the formula, P! [PM] = 7/39 = 18%, this amounted to a degree of 
pressure of 18 per cent. By comparison, 28 per cent of the actors who are able to exert 
power over the American President urged him to adopt air strikes in May, namely nine out 
of 32 with Pj [Pre] = 9/32 = 28%. Following the proposition of the first hypothesis, the 
American President was, therefore, more likely to change his preference in favour of air 
strikes than the British Prime Minister. Indeed, as the case study will show, President Bush 
publicly endorsed air strikes in the following month, while Prime Minister Major resisted 
the calls for military strikes until spring 1993 by which time the pressure on him had 
increased to 36 per cent.
The actors who are able to exert direct pressure on an actor (L) are also called his 
or her ‘constituency’. It is important to note that each actor has a different constituency, 
since each is linked to different actors in the network. As a consequence, the degree of 
pressure in favour of a particular policy is always relative with regard to the target of the 
pressure. Some actors have fewer pluralistic or interdependent power relations than others 
and can thus be described as relatively insulated from external pressure. However, this
59 The degree of pressure is given in per cent.
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often means that they also have fewer linkages through which they themselves can exert 
pressure for their preferred policy. Other actors, in particular actors with multiple or 
boundary roles, are more tightly integrated into the network by means of a large range of 
linkages. These tend to be exposed to more pressure, but are on the other hand frequently 
able to use their relations to mobilise pressure.
Crucially for the explanation of the decision-making process, the role actor who 
forms the ultimate decision unit for a specific issue or at a certain point during the 
decision-making process is subject to the same behavioural rules as other network actors. 
Since the policy outcome is the preference of the ultimate decision unit, it is determined 
by the degree of pressure to which this actor is exposed from other actors in the network. 
The concept of the ‘winning coalition’, which has been used in network models as well as 
other multilevel theories, here always refers to actors who are directly linked to an ultimate 
decision unit, i.e. his or her constituency. Actors who are not directly connected to a 
decision-maker cannot influence the outcome, except indirectly through a series of 
preference changes which involves actors who are directly linked to the ultimate decision 
unit. Since most actors are not directly linked to the ultimate decision unit, the decision­
making process becomes therefore an essential element in the explanation of the formation 
of a winning coalition and the policy outcome.
However, the first hypothesis can be qualified according to the third premise to 
form hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Collective decision-making units can resist higher degrees of 
pressure than role actors if  members use a veto or i f  a decision requires a 
(qualified) majority [ ‘veto’ or ‘blocking’ strategy].
The second hypothesis, which will be referred to as ‘veto or blocking strategy’ in the 
following case studies, suggests that collective decision-making units, such as parliaments 
or international organisations, will typically modify their policy preferences at higher 
degrees of pressure than unitary role actors if one or several members use a veto or if a 
required majority blocks a preference change. In order to explain this difference in 
behaviour, collective decision-making units are best understood as a ‘network within the 
network’. Internally, the decision-making process within collective decision-making units
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is defined by hypotheses 1 and 2. However, externally collective decision-making units act 
as a unitary role actor within the network. In order to do so these organisations have to 
reach a certain degree of consensus in order to arrive at a single policy preference which 
is then supported and expressed by the collective body mainly in the form of 
communiques.
In addition to increasing the ability of collective decision-making units to resist 
network pressure, the blocking of a decision-making unit influences the decision-making 
process in that it can cause the issue to be referred to another decision unit, usually with 
higher institutional authority. For instance, the first case study will show that the inability 
of most European organisations such as the EU and the WEU to agree on a decision to 
intervene in Bosnia led to the transfer of the responsibility over the international response 
to the Yugoslav crisis to the UN Security Council in summer 1992. In fact, the case study 
illustrates that some actors intentionally blocked a decision in these organisations in order 
to transfer the authority over the issue to the UN Security Council where they not only had 
a veto, but the balance of preferences was also more in favour of air strikes. These 
examples illustrate that the multilevel network theory which has been outlined in this 
section has to be further specified in order to be utilised in empirical analyses. The final 
part of this chapter, therefore, proceeds to set the parameters for the following four case 
studies.
2.5 The Operationalisation of Multilevel Network Theory
In order to operationalise multilevel network theory various questions have to be 
addressed which concern the delineation of the British and the German foreign policy 
networks, the deduction of the power relations in these networks as well as the induction 
of the preferences and strategic interactions in the case studies. The ways in which these 
variables were measured or observed in the four cases depended crucially on the data used. 
The following, therefore, discusses the availability, reliability and validity of the primary 
and secondary sources employed in the testing of multilevel network theory.
Mapping the British and German Foreign Policy Networks
Although the multilevel network theory outlined above can be used as a general model of 
political decision-making processes, it has been argued in the introduction of this thesis
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that in particular foreign policy analysis can gain from multilevel theorizing. Moreover, it 
has been contended that the degree of transnational and international integration of 
decision-making has been much higher among Western European governments and within 
the transatlantic community. The focus of this thesis on two Western European states is 
a response to the limits within which multilevel network theory is believed to be most 
fruitful. It also specifies the sectoral boundaries of the networks which are to be analysed, 
namely all actors who routinely seek to influence the foreign policy decision-making 
processes of the British or German governments.
The maps ofthetwo distinct, but overlapping Western European multilevel foreign 
policy decision-making networks, in the following case studies were derived from primary 
sources and secondary literature about the foreign policy decision-making process in 
Britain and Germany. From this literature a stable set of national and international role 
actors could be identified which were predominantly involved in foreign policy issues. The 
involvement of these actors in the network arose from their role functions and how they 
were affected by political decision-making processes. Analytically, three types of roles 
could be distinguished among the actors of the British and German foreign policy 
networks: political, administrative and socioeconomic roles. The former two were 
primarily defined by formal and informal political institutions on the national and 
international level. They typically involved the government and various departments 
primarily engaged in foreign policy decision-making.60 Specifically, the British foreign 
policy network included the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary, the 
Secretary of Defence, the Chancellor of Exchequer, the Trade Secretary and their 
respective departments. In addition, the Members of the House of Commons and its 
Foreign and Defence Standing Committees, both in their roles as parliament members and 
as members of the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal-Democratic Party 
played a role in foreign policy decision-making. The German multilevel foreign policy 
network correspondingly included the Chancellor, the Cabinet, the Foreign Minister, the 
Defence Minister, the Finance Minister, the Economic Minister, the Minister of the 
Chancellor’s Office and their ministries. Political roles outside the government and the
In the case of Germany, the analysis of formal institutions involved the Basic Law, the 
Geschaftsordnung des Bundestagcs and the Geschaftsordnung der Bundesregierung. In Britain because 
of the lack of a written constitution secondary literature was used.
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administration which regularly participated in foreign policy decision-making were the 
members of the ‘Coalition Meeting’ which brings together the Cabinet as well as the leader 
of the coalition parties, the Bundestag, its Foreign and Defence Committees, the 
Bundesrat, the Bundestag members of the conservative Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the liberal Free 
Democratic Party (FDP), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens and the Party 
of Democratic Socialism (PDS).
A major difference between the two networks could be found in the relations 
between parties and the administration. Thus, unlike in Britain where civil servants take 
pride in party political neutrality, the CDU/CSU and FDP had close links with members 
of the bureaucracy. The differences could be attributed to the fact that in Germany not 
only are high level departmental offices given to members of the government parties, but 
civil servants have also traditionally been selected and promoted according to party 
membership. Furthermore, in Germany the Federal Constitutional Court engages in policy 
decision-making albeit indirectly through its ruling, specifically on the case of international 
engagements of the German Bundeswehr.
In the international arena, the two foreign policy networks overlapped by including
a range of roles in multilateral organisations. In foreign policy, it involved specifically the
EU, NATO, the WEU, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
'I  t
and the United Nations (UN). The roles within these organisations were mainly prescribed 
by the primary documents such as the founding treaties and their subsequent amendments. 
Typically actors who held positions in international institutions simultaneously wielded 
high-ranking domestic roles. As such, they were holding boundary roles between the 
national and the international system.
The roles of social and economic actors were primarily described by convention 
and practice. The analysis, therefore, drew almost exclusively on secondary literature 
about the roles of private actors in the political decision-making process.61 Generally, the 
role actors of two types of socioeconomic pressure groups could be distinguished which 
displayed distinct characteristics in the political decision-making process: interest or 
sectional groups and cause groups. The representatives of interest groups are motivated
61 See Appendix 1 ‘British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95’ and Appendix 2 ‘German Foreign Policy 
Network, 1990-95’.
by the specific, often economic, needs of the actors who are organised in them. They 
subsume the leading members of trade unions, employer associations as well as large 
companies which can be conceived of as pursuing the main interest of their management 
and employees, i.e. continued employment.
The representatives of cause groups, on the contrary, pursue interests which are 
not directly determined by the basic needs of their members. While in the first case some 
general propositions regarding the roles of interest group representatives can be deduced 
from the requirements for organisational welfare and its functions, the characteristics of 
cause groups can only be inferred from their explicit goals and observable behaviour. Due 
to their variable nature, however, the members of cause groups are rarely part of stable 
decision-making networks. In the case of Britain, only the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) appeared to have sufficiently stable linkages with key actors in the 
foreign policy decision-making process to merit inclusion into the network. Its role could 
be attributed to strong linkages with the Labour Party and a prominent voice in the media. 
In Germany, no cause group could be regarded as regular actor in the foreign policy 
decision-making network.
Leading members of interest groups, on the other hand, were regularly and 
strongly engaged in both the British and the German multilevel foreign policy decision­
making network. In Britain, the key economic actors in the policy network generally 
involved large export-dependent companies and the defence industry, although only the 
latter was actively engaged in one of the case studies. The trade unions appeared to have 
lost their role in the decision-making process since the dismantling of trade union influence 
under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and were consequently not included in the current 
British foreign policy network. Conversely in Germany, representatives of both industry 
and unions were identified as central actors in the foreign policy decision-making network. 
Only a few major armaments companies, such as German Aerospace (DASA), directly 
participated in the debate.62 Most firms left the role of their representation in the political 
process to the two employers federations, the German Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (DIHT) and the Federation of German Industries (BDI). Similarly, the German 
trade unions were mainly involved through their collective body, the German Trade Union
ff) ‘Keine gezielten Hilfen fur Dasa\ Frankfurter Allgemeine, 28/10/93.
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Association (DGB), but sectoral trade unions also unilaterally articulated their political 
preferences.63 In addition, the British and German voter, whose preferences were 
expressed in opinion polls, as well as the national and international media engaged in the 
foreign policy debates in both Britain and Germany. Having delineated the members of the 
two multilevel networks, the analysis turned to the power relations between them.
Power Relations in the Empirical Analysis
Since the analysis of power relations in multilevel networks prohibits the development of 
conclusive lists of power bases, the power relations in the British and German decision­
making networks were deduced from a comprehensive study of the directional influence 
prescribed by formal and informal institutions and resource-dependencies among the 
actors. The formal institutional authority of different roles at the national and international 
level was primarily defined by basic laws, rules and regulations. In the British political 
system, which is not based on a single well-defined constitution, conventions and 
procedures provided further evidence for the nature of the institutional relations among 
network actors. Fortunately for the analysis, the British government embarked in the early 
1990s upon a policy of greater openness which has led to the publication of several 
informal procedural codes which had previously been secret. Most importantly for the 
analysis of the political decision-making process, was the publication of the ‘Rules of 
Procedure for Ministers’. In the German case, formal stipulations regarding the roles of 
political actors were freely available in form of the Geschaftsordnung der 
Bundesregierung and Geschaftsordnung des Bundestages,64 The formal institutions, 
nevertheless, gave considerable freedom for interpretations because their operation 
sometimes deviates from the legal understanding. The analysis of the primary documents 
was, therefore, complemented by an inquiry into the actual functions and usage of political
63 Manfred Himer, ‘Der Deutsche Bundestag im Nctzwerk organisierter Interessen’, in Dietrich Herzog, 
Hilke Rebenstorf and Bernhard Wessels, eds., Parlament und Gesellschaft (Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1993), pp. 138-183; Jurgen Weber, Die Interessengruppen im politischen System der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland  (Stuttgart: Kohlhanuner, 1977); Suzanne S. Schuttemeyer, ‘Offentliche 
Anhdrungen’, in Hans-Petcr Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., Parlamentsrecht undParlamentspraxis 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp. 1145-1157; Bernhard Wessels, 
‘Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft: Offentliche Anhorungen, informellen 
Kontakte und innere Lobby in wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Parlainentsausschussen’, Zeitschrijl fa r  
Parlamentsfragen 18:2, 1987, pp. 285-311; Rudolf Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, 
in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.217-258.
64 Die Geschaftsordnung der Bundesregierung, GMBl. S.382, 1987, 17.7.
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and administrative roles. It was achieved by an in-depth analysis of the secondary literature 
regarding the political decision-making process in both countries.65
The analysis of the resource-dependence relations among the members of the two 
networks proceeded in two steps. First, the needs of each role actor were deduced from 
the role’s functions which typically included ‘survival’, i.e. the preservation of the role 
itself and the control over it by a particular actor, as well as a range of attributes defined 
by formal and informal institutions and expectations within the network. Second, these 
needs were matched with the corresponding resources of other actors. While again the list 
of these individual needs and resources was infinite, most roles required information, 
expertise, support and cooperation in some form from each other. In order to investigate 
the distribution of both needs and resources, the same primary and secondary sources were 
used which helped to establish the institutional relations among the network actors.
Issues, Options and Preferences in the Four Case Studies
Before the decision-making process could be analysed, the situation and the issue of the 
political debate had to be examined. The definition of the circumstances of a decision 
involved two main questions: how was the policy problem defined and what political 
responses were considered? Generally, issues can arise from either factors external or 
internal to a network. Events or actions of actors who are located outside a network can 
be conceived of as external factors. In such situations, the origins of the issue are beyond 
the immediate control of network actors. However, their needs and preferences are 
affected by these events or actions in such a way that they require a political decision 
regarding their response. Since networks by definition involve all actors who are 
commonly affected by an issue-area and connected through stable resource dependencies 
and institutional structures, issues which emanate from the external environment often 
represent non-routine matters or even crises. Internal issues, on the contrary, arise from 
the needs and interests of network members. They typically concern routine questions. 
Although it has been argued elsewhere that in foreign affairs issues often arise from events
65 For details see Appendix 1 ‘British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95’ and Appendix 2 ‘German 
Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95’.
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or actors beyond the domestic arena66, a multilevel approach would define these issues as 
‘internal’ if they stemmed from the interactions within the international community 
delineated in Western Europe primarily by the members of the EU, the WEU and NATO.
The nature of the issue determines the location of the legitimate ultimate decision­
making unit. While in crises the ultimate decision-makers will be those who wield the 
highest legitimate authority, on routine matters more subordinate actors will take a 
decision. However, this general tendency does not apply when an issue is particularly 
controversial among the members of a decision-making network. If subordinate decision 
units are not able to agree on a political decision or if specific actors use a blocking 
strategy, the issue will be transferred to a higher decision-making authority. Generally, the 
ultimate decision unit in the British and German foreign policy decision-making networks 
are the respective foreign or defence ministries for routine issues and the cabinets or 
parliaments in crises or controversial cases. If an issue is perceived to require a multilateral 
response, the ultimate decision unit can also be an international organisation, such as the 
EU or the UN Security Council.
In fact, in all four case studies the national policies and, for the purposes of this 
thesis, the ‘outcomes’ of the decision-making processes led to additional international 
policies. Thus, the decision of the British government to support air strikes in Bosnia led 
to the passing of a respective resolution in the UN Security Council in the first case study. 
Conversely, the decision to abandon the requirement for Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles 
(TASM) within NATO increased the pressure for the cancellation of the British TASM 
programme in the second case. In the German case studies the two decisions were not 
immediately necessary for subsequent international actions which included the military 
intervention in Bosnia and the establishment of common European dual-use goods export 
regulations, but contributed to them. However, because of the focus of this thesis, the case 
studies were confined to the decisions taken by the two governments.
The character of the issue also determines whether network actors can use a 
blocking strategy. In this respect two situations have to be distinguished, namely whether 
a policy requires a proactive decision, as in the two British and the first German case, or 
will be the result of a non-decision, as in the second German case study. Only a policy
66 Dan B. Wood and Jeffrey S. Peake, ‘The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting’, American 
Political Science Review  92:1, 1998, pp. 173-184.
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change which is based on an active decision can be prevented by blocking behaviour. 
Conversely, if a new policy will emerge because of the failure to react to a transformation 
of external or internal factors, a veto will lead to a change of the status quo, not its 
preservation.
Moreover, the nature of the issue limits the policies which are considered in 
response. The solutions which are proposed for an issue are defined by the needs, 
resources and preferences of the actors. Moreover, they are influenced by the ability of 
different actors to set the agenda and define the policy options.67 The number of options 
and preferences with regard to an issue is theoretically infinite. Many rational choice 
approaches, therefore, assume that each actor has to compute a preference schedule, 
ranking each policy according to an expected cost-utility function.68 This view has been 
disconfirmed by a number of empirical studies. They have revealed that role actors resolve 
policy problems in a series of incremental binary choices. Rather than considering an issue 
and all its solutions at once, actors typically debate a single policy solution and decide for 
or against it before moving on to debate other options. As a result, the decision-making 
process consists of a sequence of binary pro-contra choices.69 An exhaustive analysis of 
an issue would, therefore, require the examination of several simultaneous debates and 
decisions. Due to the incremental nature of the decision-making process these would not 
be linked and would frequently lead to incompatible and contradictory policies.70 The 
consequences of this behaviour for network analysis are considerable. Most important, 
multilevel network analysis does not have to establish a preference hierarchy for each 
actor, but merely their preferences with regard to one particular policy option. As has been 
argued above, these preferences can be inferred by empirical observation.
In the four case studies, the analysis of preferences was based on public statements
On agenda setting see for instance Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies; Fay Lomax 
Cook et al., ‘Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers and 
Policy’, Public Opinion Quarterly 47:1,1983, pp. 16-35; Mark Considine, ‘Making Up the Government’s 
Mind: Agenda Setting in a Parliamentary System’, Governance 11:3,1998, pp.297-317; Wood and Peake, 
‘The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting’.
68 Elster, ‘Introduction’, p.4.
69 See for instance Paul A. Anderson, ‘What Do Decision Makers Do When They Make a Foreign Policy 
Decision? The Implications for the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy’, in Charles F. Hermann, Charles 
W. Kegley and James N. Rosenau, eds., New Directions in the Study o f  Foreign Policy (Winchester, 
Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp.285-308; Inntraud N. Gallhofer and Willem E. Saris, Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis o f  Political Argumentation (Westport: Praeger, 
1996).
70 See for instance Chapter 1.
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by the network actors themselves such as policy drafts submitted for Parliamentary debates 
and the views expressed in these debates, party programmes and organisational 
declarations. It was complemented by an analysis of preferences as expressed in the print 
media. The British debates were covered by keyword analysis of the UKNEWS-file 
available on FT-Profile which includes 25 daily newspapers in Britain as well as the 
DEFENCE news file for the TASM case.71 Jane’s Defence Weekly was also included 
because of its unique coverage of foreign and defence issues. For the domestic debate and 
the interactions between German and international role actors, keyword-searches were 
conducted using FT-Profile UKNEWS-File, as well as files of the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung and Reuters German News. In addition, the newspaper clip collection of the Freie 
Universitat Berlin provided relevant articles from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, Das Parlament, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 
Die Welt and Der Spiegel.
Strategic Interactions and Preference Changes
In order to test the hypotheses of network theory regarding the preference modifications
among network actors and the formation of a winning coalition in favour of a particular
policy outcome, their actions and preference changes had to be traced. The sequence of
the preference changes was the essential indicator which was used to establish the causality 
1 $
between the original preferences and the power structure on one hand and the exertion of 
pressure and subsequent preference changes on the other. Following the determination of 
the preferences at the beginning of the case studies, multilevel network analysis proposed 
the relations which specific actors should use to exert power, or ‘influence’, the actors 
who are likely to change their preferences and the collective units which should be blocked 
from a preference change.
The exercise of pressure was observed in a range of forms. Specifically, it included 
unilateral action, such as force, threat or persuasion, as well as transactions, such as
1 For a comprehensive list of the newspapers included in the newsfilc see Secondary Sources. The 
keywords used were for the first British case ‘air strikes’, the second British case ‘Tactical Air-to-Surfacc 
Missiles’ or ‘TASM’, for the first German case ‘Tornados’ and ‘out-of-area’ and for the second German 
case ‘dual-use’ as well as ‘defence industry’.
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negotiation and transactions.72 Transactions were defined in the broadest sense including 
the exchange of tangible as well as intangible resources, such as information or skill. Since 
the formation of a coalition among a set of actors was rarely made explicit73, it was 
regarded as sufficient to infer them from simultaneous preference statements often made 
in international organisations or in the media. Blocking behaviour, however, was almost 
always publicised. The degree of pressure (P) to which each of the actors was exposed at 
different stages during the decision-making process was computed with SPSS on the basis 
of the number of actual pressures (E) divided by the number of possible pressures as 
defined by the linkages leading towards an actor (L).
The degree of pressure was then set in relation to the preference changes of these 
actors. Specifically, preference changes were noted when actors modified their original 
preferences defined as the preferences they held at the beginning of the research period. 
With regard to the behaviour of the actors, the analysis distinguished four categories of 
preference-formation: no change (NC), unclear or undecided (U), change (C) and blocked 
(B). The first category was defined as the preservation of a preference after it had been 
stated in public. The first expressed preference was always noted as the initial preference 
of an actor, even though it might have been the result of network pressures before the 
beginning of the research period. Actors who did not state a preference at the beginning 
of the analysis, but only took a position at later stages of the debate, were not ascribed a 
preference change, unless they changed this preference in the following. Actors who did 
not explicate a preference at all were not included in the calculations.
The blocking of a preference change was an option that only applied to collective 
decision-making units in the network, namely national parliaments and international 
organisations. A blocking strategy was recorded if a member expressed a veto and the 
organisation failed to reach a decision in its communique. An unclear or undecided 
preference was recorded when the data provided contradictory evidence or, in collective 
decision-making organisations as those noted above, the membership was equally divided. 
If there was a clear majority within a collective decision-making organisation with a
72 Compare R. A. W. Rhodes, Power-Dependence, Policy Communities and Intergovernmental Networks, 
(Colchester: Department of Government University of Essex, 1985), p. 3.
73 The few exceptions included a Labour-LibDem agreement to abolish TASMs in case of a hung 
Parliament in Britain and the transnational coalition between the German Inspector-General Klaus 
Naumann and his American colleagues in NATO in favour of a despatch of German Tornados.
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majority decision-making rule, such as the national parliaments of Britain and Germany, 
the preference of this majority was attributed to the organisation as a whole. A clear 
change of preference was recorded when actors publicly embraced the policy preference 
which they had previously opposed.
To trace the interactions and preference changes three sources were considered, 
each with its own bias and problems for operationalisation: (1) personal recollection, (2) 
primary documentation and (3) secondary sources such as newspaper articles and 
academic literature. Personal accounts of interactions would obviously have been coloured 
by the intentions of the individual actor. Thus, interviewees could distort information 
about interactions as to rationalise their behaviour a posteriori. Moreover, in test 
interviews it emerged that because of the considerable duration of the decision-making 
process, it was difficult for actors to remember the exact timing of interactions and 
preference changes which played such a crucial role in the testing of multilevel network 
theory. For the purposes of this thesis, written records and statements made at the time 
were, therefore, regarded as more reliable indicators of the preferences of the actors. 
Administrative recordings of the decision-making process would have been the most 
accurate, however, their usage was limited because of the access restrictions associated 
with such recent decisions. Where such sources were publicly available, such as the 
transcripts of debates as well as written and oral questions from jnembers of parliament 
(MPs) and the answers provided by civil servants and the government, were used. They 
were complemented by the analysis of committee reports, although with respect to 
sequencing these were less helpful because the reports did not give account of the 
development of the discussion within the committees, but merely a summary of the 
consensus which was eventually achieved.
For the main part, the analysis of the decision-making process relied on the same 
media sources which were used to establish the initial preferences of the network actors. 
Obviously, media coverage as a secondary source had to be treated more carefully as 
regards its reliability. Since specific newspapers and authors often attempted to meet their 
own objectives, they introduced a bias to the analysis which may be political or simply 
aimed at suiting its audience. The practical advantage of media sources, however, was that 
they were very easily accessible and the amount of information which could be collected 
in this way was unrivalled by the other options. In order to counterbalance any biases, the
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range of newspapers covered in the analysis was designed to be as broad as possible. By 
crosschecking pressures and preference changes reported by different national papers, the 
study sought to increase the reliability of the reports. Indeed, the analysis of the cases 
showed that in most instances newspapers across the political spectrum agreed in their 
attribution of preferences and actions to the main political actors.
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3. Case I: The Authorization of Air Strikes in Bosnia
3.1 Introduction
The question whether the international community should use air strikes in response to the 
Serb attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina1 arose formally with the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council resolution 752 which was approved on 15 May 1992.2 In the resolution, the 
Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded the withdrawal of Serb forces 
from Bosnian territory. The Security Council resolution acknowledged that the 
international community had a responsibility to seek to bring an end to the fighting. In 
order to do so the UN Secretary General was tasked with an examination of ways to 
protect human aid deliveries to the Bosnian capital Sarajevo and initiate an international 
peacekeeping operation. It was agreed that additional measures would be considered in 
the light of the further development of the crisis.
During the following year, the international community increasingly engaged in 
various efforts to contain and end the conflict. The main policy options had already been 
considered after the Serb invasion of Croatia in 1991. They included international 
negotiations, economic and military sanctions, humanitarian aid and military intervention. 
Although peaceful measures had been of little success in Croatia, the members of the UN
Security Council initially ruled out military action in Bosnia. In spite of the danger that
- ^  , « v <*■ -  • 
large numbers of refugees might flood intcfNorthern Europe, the five permanent members
agreed that the conflict did not affect any of their ‘vital security interests’ as to justify such
a step.3 Nevertheless, over the course of the year the positions of the Security Council
members with regard to military action changed radically. Among them was the British
government which had resisted pressure for air strikes for nearly a year. Following the
change of policy by the British administration, the UN Security Council decided on 4 June
1993 to endorse air strikes to protect the safe havens which it had established around the
1 In the following ‘Bosnia’.
2 S/RES/752 (1992) 15 May 1992, at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm.
3 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Peacekeeping im Jugoslawienkonflikt und die Folgen fur die sicherheitspolitische 
{Cooperation in Europa’, A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte 95 :B 6,1995, pp. 13-20, pp. 13f.; Thomas Paulsen, 
Die Jugoslawienpolitik der USA 1989 -1994 (Baden-Baden: Noinos, 1995), p.38.
cities of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica.4
This case study seeks to test multilevel network theory by analysing how the 
pressures of various national and international actors on the British government 
contributed to its change of policy concerning the use of air strikes in Bosnia in spring 
1993 .5 Specifically, the case study examines how the proponents of air strikes were able 
to form and enlarge their coalition in favour of military action by using strategically their 
positions within the British foreign policy network. According to multilevel network 
theory the degree of pressure on each actor was determined by the number of air strike 
supporters among the actors to which he or she was directly linked within the network. 
The degree of pressure (P) is represented in percentages with P standing for the number 
of actors who exerted pressure (E) on an actor X out of all who had power over him or 
her (L).6 The higher the percentage, the greater the pressure. If the first hypothesis is 
correct, rising degrees of pressure should indicate the increasing likelihood that an actor 
would abandon his or her opposition against air strikes. The instances of actors who joined 
the coalition in favour of air strikes should increase with higher degrees of pressure.
The second hypothesis relates to what can be termed in short as ‘blocking or veto 
strategy’. It asserts that specific actors should have been able to block increasing pressure 
in favour of air strikes by issuing a veto in collective decision-making units, such as the 
ministerial councils of international organisations, or block a decision due to majority 
requirements in their national parliaments! In the casd1 of air strikes in Bosnia, veto 
positions were held by the members of the ministerial councils of all international 
organisations involved, namely the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference of Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the members of the UN Security Council.7 If 
these organisations generally resisted higher pressures for air strikes than other actors
4 S/RES/836 (1993) 4 June 1992, at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93 htm.
5 The case study does not cover the debate over the implementation of air strikes after the resolution had 
been approved. Due to continuing dissent, particularly by the British and Russian governments, over 
questions of procedure air strikes were not implemented until 10-11 April 1994.
6 References denote the degree of pressure P on actor X during phase T between the T-T* and Ts! 
preference change in the form of: PT (XJ = number of ‘E7 number of ‘L’
The degree of pressure is given in per cent rounded to the fall digit. See for details Appendix 3 ‘Pressure 
for Air Strikes in Bosnia’.
7 Actors with a veto are marked with a * in Appendix 1 British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95’.
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when a veto was used by one of their members, it would support the second hypothesis. 
A blocking strategy could have been pursued by the majority party in the House of 
Commons which decided on the basis of a simple majority.
The following analysis distinguishes four behavioural options: no change of 
preference (NC), unclear or undecided preferences (U), change in preference (C) and the 
vetoing or blocking of a preference change (B). Crucially for the analysis of the decision­
making process, actors who changed their preferences in favour of air strikes in turn used 
their own links within the network to exert pressure for this policy. The chronological 
analysis of the case study regarding the decision to implement air strikes in Bosnia should, 
therefore, reveal that the sequence of preference changes and the emergence of a winning 
coalition in favour of military strikes were influenced by the structure of the network. The 
policy preference change of the British government represents the final change in this 
sequence. However, following the British change of policy and the lifting of its veto within 
the UN Security Council, NATO and the WEU, these organisations soon decided in 
favour of air strikes and, thus, continued the process beyond the scope of this case study. 
In fact, these organisations authorised and eventually implemented the air strikes. 
Nevertheless, the case study ends with the decision of the British government in order to 
enable the comparison with other cases and the multilevel theories examined in the 
introduction of this thesis which focus national foreign policy decisions.
Two factors mean the case of air strikes in Bosnia is especially suited for the 
testing of the hypotheses put forward by multilevel network theory. First, between the 
recognition of the Bosnian crisis by the UN in May 1992 and UN resolution 836 in June 
1993 which threatened air strikes, the British government effectively reversed its official 
policy regarding air strikes. According to network theory, the reversal should have been 
matched by the strategic interactions in the multilevel network surrounding the British 
government and the coming about and sequence of changes in the preferences of key 
actors. The decision of the British government to approve the authorisation of air strikes 
in the UN Security Council should have coincided with the formation of a winning 
coalition in favour of air strikes within the British multilevel foreign policy network.
Second, exogenous factors, i.e. the environment of the British multilevel network, 
were relatively stable. The fighting between the Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims continued 
irrespectively of the various attempts to solve the crisis which were coordinated by the
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CSCE, the EC, the UN and their negotiators Lord Carrington, later Cyrus Vance and Lord 
Owen. The cease-fires and peace settlements, which were achieved by the negotiations, 
were too short-lived to have brought about more than a temporary change in the 
perceptions and preferences of the network actors.8 The observed variances in the policy 
preferences of actors in the British decision-making network should, therefore, be 
explicable on the basis of the interactions among these actors themselves.
The specific focus of multilevel network theory on intentional pressure for political 
action and decisions, obviously reduces the analysis to a small number of explanatory 
variables. In particular, the approach does not examine the direct impact of arguments, 
norms, or ideas on the behaviour and preferences of the actors. If any statement can be 
made regarding alternative explanations, the findings derived from multilevel network 
analysis appear to suggest that the power relations of actors within their network were 
more important than the nature of the arguments which these actors used to promote their 
preferred policy. Thus, the persuasiveness of an argument seemed more closely associated 
with the power and authority of the actors who proposed it, than with the argument’s 
inherent logic, morality or practicality. The convincingness of this suggestion cannot be 
explored in this study, but will have to be assessed in comparison with the answers 
provided by such theories. Nevertheless, some brief points can be made which indicate that 
a focus on the ‘objective’ arguments for the various responses to the conflict which were 
considered by the international community does not sufficiently explain the change in 
British foreign policy.
In particular, the notion that the air strike resolution in June 1993 represented the 
end point of a rational, progressive escalation of means appears to be flawed. The 
following chronological analysis will show that air strikes were not only considered from 
the beginning of the conflict, but also that most of the military experts had believed that
8 ‘Leading article: Carrot or stick needed for Serbia’, Guardian , 26/8/92; ‘Owen faces up to big task as 
the fighting goes on’, Northern Echo, 29/8/92; Robert Fox, ‘Analysis: More jaw at peace conference 
means more war on the ground’. D aily Telegraph, 25/1/93. Compare also Michael Moodie, ‘The Balkan 
T ragedy ’, A nnals o f  the A merican A cadem y ofPolitical and Social Science 541, 1995, pp. 101-115, p. 106; 
Roland Schonfeld, ‘Balkankrieg und internationale Gemeinschaff, Siidosteuropa M itteilungen  34:4, 
1994, pp.257-278, p.270; Richard Ware and Fiona M. Watson, The Former Yugoslavia: A Further Update 
(London: House of Commons Library, 1992), p.2.
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an early and massive use of military force could have prevented the escalation of the war.9 
In fact, the more the UN engaged in a humanitarian operation, the greater became the 
obstacles and risks associated with air strikes. The governments of Britain and France, the 
two countries which had the largest contingents of peacekeepers in Bosnia, naturally had 
strong inhibitions against military action. They feared that the Serbs would retaliate and 
attack their ground troops if air strikes were implemented.10 Their fears were vindicated 
in 1994 when the Bosnian Serbs responded to military action in defence of the no-fly zone 
by taking UN peacekeepers hostage.11 Air strikes were not an escalation of the 
international involvement in Bosnia, but an alternative policy which conflicted with the 
logic of the ongoing humanitarian operation.
In the following this chapter presents a chronological analysis of the decision­
making process and concludes by evaluating the explanatory power of multilevel network 
theory. The case study begins by outlining the emergence of the issue and the policy 
options at the beginning of the research period. It continues by tracing in detail the 
interactions between the network actors and the resulting preference changes among the 
members of the British multilevel decision-making network. The conclusion summarises 
the findings in order to assess how far the hypotheses of multilevel network theory were 
corroborated by the data. Specifically, it draws on the percentages in the text and tables
which show the degrees of pressure to which different actors were subjected at crucial
*■
points in the decteion-making process. 11
Often a set of closely linked actors changed policy preferences within weeks or 
even days. At other times pressure had to build up over months before actors who were 
only indirectly linked to the proponents of air strikes modified their position. These breaks 
in the decision-making process which were the indirect result of gaps in the network’s 
structure are reflected by the division of the account into four stages. During the first 
stage, between 15 May and 5 August 1992, the majority of actors within the British
9 Already in July 1991 civil servants in the American State Department acknowledged that only a credible 
military threat could prevent the escalation of the conflict. See Newsweek, 15 July 1991, cited in Paulsen, 
Jugoslawienpolitik der USA, p.40.
10 Stephen Robinson and Jon Hibbs, ‘Draft resolution opens door to the use of force’, Daily Telegraph, 
11/8/92; James Bone and Tim Judah, ‘UN forbids military flights over Bosnia’, Times, 10/10/92; Martin 
Fletcher and Michael Evans. ‘US canvasses Europe over enforcement of air ban’, Times, 15/12/92.
11 See Chapter 5.
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foreign policy network were opposed to air strikes. In Britain, only the Liberal Democratic 
Party under the leadership of Paddy Ashdown advocated a military intervention into the 
war in Bosnia. The strongest proponents of air strikes were the governments of Germany,
Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria. However, their pressure for a military 
solution was soon blocked by British and French vetos in the international organisations 
involved in the conflict. On 6 August, the debate over air strikes received new impetus 
when TV coverage of Serb ‘concentration camps’ was broadcasted in the US and Western 
Europe. The public outrage initiated a second stage until 30 October in which the 
American government became one of the most ardent supporters of air strikes. The British 
administration, however, maintained its critical stance towards any form of military 
intervention. It was only during the third stage, from 1 November to 30 January, that the 
growing international pressure eventually began to affect the preferences of key 
government actors in Britain. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and officials in the Foreign 
Office reversed their position at the beginning of December. They received further support 
from the Labour Party and a growing number of Conservative parliamentarians. The 
dissolution of the British opposition to military action eventually led to the reversal of the 
government’s policy during the final stage, from 1 February to 30 April. At the end of 
April, Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind and Prime Minister John Major acceded to
the pressures. The Cabinet decided to support a resolution allowing air strikes in the UN
. *  ^
Security Council. •» v * 1
3.2 Air Strikes in Bosnia: From British Opposition to Acquiescence
The conflict between the Serbs and other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia started as early as 
the beginning of 1990 with human rights abuses in Kosovo and the rise of the autonomy 
movement among the local Albanian minority. However, the breakup of the Yugoslav 
republic only progressed from summer 1991 12 When on 25 June Slovenia and Croatia 
formally declared their independence, Serb forces moved into Slovenia to prevent its
12 For detailed accounts o f the Yugoslav break-up see James Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will. 
International D iplom acy and the Yugoslav War (London: Hurst&Company, 1997); Sabrina Petra Ramet, 
Balkan Babel. The D isintegration o f  Yugoslavia from  the Death o f  Tito to Ethnic War (Boulder, Col.: 
Westvicvv Press, 1996).
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secession.13 The key members of the UN Security Council and the North Atlantic Alliance 
decided at this stage that their vital security interests were not at stake.14 The concern 
among Western governments was limited to keeping the conflict at bay and civilians within 
the warring republics To achieve its aims, the international community embarked upon 
the long-term effort to contain the conflict by economic and military sanctions. In addition, 
it made an attempt to resolve the conflict through negotiations under the auspices of the 
EC and the CSCE.15
After the fighting in Croatia subsided in spring 1992, the conflict moved to 
Bosnia.16 Although the UN had already despatched a small peacekeeping mission to 
Croatia, the spread of the conflict to another part of the Balkans again presented the 
international community with the question of the terms of its involvement.17 Bosnia 
provided an opportunity to reassess previous policies and, if deemed necessary, to modify 
them. The aims and options were essentially the same. Yet, in spring 1992, they had 
already been debated once and their implications were known.
The option of seeking a peaceful settlement through international negotiations 
under the auspices of the CSCE, the EC and the UN had so far proved unsuccessful in 
solving the conflict. The efforts of the CSCE had been inhibited by its recent reform and 
new, untested, procedures, such as the crisis mechanism.18 Moreover, lacking sanctions,
13 GOw, Triumph o f  th e \a c k  o f  Will, p.46.
14 Neal Ascheron, ‘Bring on the fire engines not the pantomime horses’, Independent on Sunday, 16/8/92; 
Marie-Janine Calic, ‘Jugoslawienpolitik am Wendepunkt \  A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte 93 :B 3 7 ,1993, 
pp. 11 -20, p. 14; Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p. 189, pp. 206f.; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, M ultilateralism  
M atters but How ? The Impact o f  M ultilateralism on Great Power Policy Towards the Break-up o f  
Yugoslavia (San Domenico: Badia Fiesolana, 1994), p.5; Alex Macleod, ‘French Policy toward the War 
in the Former Yugoslavia: A Bid for International Leadership’, International Journal lAY.2, 1997, pp. 243- 
264, p.25(); Paulsen, Jugoslawienpolitik der USA, p.38.
15 Paulsen, Jugoslawienpolitik der USA, pp.39ff.
16 Gazmen Xhudo, Diplom acy and Crisis Management in the Balkans. A US Foreign Policy Perspective  
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p.86.
17 The Security Council had set the terms for a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
r e s o l u t i o n  7 4 3 .  S e e  S / R E S / 7 4 3  ( 1 9 9 2 )  2 1 F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 2 ,  at
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htin. Compare Tom Dodd, War and Peacekeeping in the 
Former Yugoslavia (London: House o f Commons Library, 1995), p.9; Thomas Halverson, ‘American 
Perspectives’, in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds.. International Perspectives on the Yugoslav 
Crisis (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 1-28, p.9; Schdnfeld, ‘Balkankrieg und intemationale 
Gemeinschaft’, p. 266.
18Gunther Bitchier, Bosnien-IIerzegowina: Friedliche Streitbeilegung zwischen R ealitdt und konkreter 
Utopie (Zurich: Forschungsstelle fur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, 1993), p.5.
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the CSCE relied on the cooperation of the warring parties - a condition for which there 
was little prospect in 1991. The consensus rule in the CSCE provided the Yugoslav 
government and, in their support, Russia with the opportunity to veto stronger action.19 
Similarly, the EC was neither prepared nor suited for negotiating a peace in the former 
Yugoslavia. The end of the fighting in Slovenia and Croatia was marked by the EU- 
negotiated ‘Brioni Accords’. However, it was the achievement of Serb objectives in 
Croatia, namely the control over the Krajina, and the reassessment of their interests and 
their ability to force Slovenia to return to a unified Yugoslavia, that had induced the Serb 
leadership to accept the cease-fire.20 The disunity among the EC member states, which was 
displayed over the issue of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, partly accounted for 
the EC’s inability to contain Serb expansion.21 Some member states seemed, albeit 
unintentionally, to encourage Serb aggression by proclaiming their support for a united 
Yugoslavia.22 Others threatened to deploy an international peace force which strengthened 
the secessionist movement. In short, the European governments’ messages were far from 
clear.
Embargos also had only a limited impact. The economic sanctions which had 
immediately been imposed by the EC could only be effective in the long term. Yet, when 
the Serb economy eventually showed signs of weakening, it did not appear to affect 
military capabilities or the willingness of the Serb leadership to continue the war.23 The 
weapons embargo, which had been initiated by the UN in September 1991, had been 
equally futile.24 After a delay of the maritime control of the embargo by the WEU and 
NATO until July 1992, it took another four months to authorise the patrolling ships to 
pursue and search suspected offenders.25 Generally, the best that could have been expected
19 Paulsen, Jugoslawienpolitik der USA, p.40.
20 Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will.
21 ‘Leading article: A common policy o f Balkans bungling’, Independent on Sunday, 24/5/92; Macleod, 
‘French Policy’, p.245; Bachler, Bosnien-Herzegowina, p.2; Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p.54.
22 Stefan Oeter, ‘ Jugoslawien und die Staatengemeinschaft. Die Normalitdt der Barbarei und das Problem 
der (prdventiven) Konfliktdiplomatie’, Kritische Justiz 29:1, 1996, pp. 15-36, pp,23f.
23 Schdnfeld, ‘Balkankrieg und internationale Gemeinschaft’, p.271.
24 S/RES/713 (1991) 25 September 1991, at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991 /scres91 htm.
25 Extraordinary meeting o f  WEI) Council M inisters on the situation in Yugoslavia, Helsinki, 10 July 
1992, File: 10-07-92.C, at http://wmv.weu.int/eng/index.html; NATO Fact Sheet NATO's role in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina at http://wmv.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm; Robert Mauthner and Judy
from the embargo was a freeze of the military capabilities in the former Yugoslavia. But 
any hopes that the embargoes would lead to an end of the fighting ignored the fact that all
republics, especially Serbia, had built up considerable weapons arsenals over the preceding
26years.
The third policy option, the UN peacekeeping force, had been successful in 
providing humanitarian relief Moreover, it had helped to alleviate the consequences of the 
war for the international community. In particular, it had contained the exodus of the 
civilian population. However, it could not resolve the conflict.27
Due to the apparent lack of success of peaceful measures28 and the repeated 
disregard shown by the warring parties to their own commitments29, the fourth option - 
the use of military force in the form of ground troops or air strikes - had been discussed 
as early as 1991 30 Since Western governments were unanimous in their resolve not to 
become embroiled in a ground war, ‘military action’ soon became synonymous with air 
strikes. In the following, the terms ‘military action’ and ‘military intervention’ are, 
therefore, used in this sense. The possible objectives of air strikes were fourfold: reducing 
(Serb) military capabilities, safeguarding human aid, pressurising the warring factions into 
negotiations and imposing a peace settlement by force. The military capabilities required 
for the operation could be provided by NATO or its member states in an ad hoc 
arrangement similar to the Gulf War ‘Desert Storm’. While the international community 
agreed that the costs of imposing a peace settlement in the former Yugoslavia was out of 
proportion with their interests in the region, the first three options matched the need for
Dempsey, ‘Western warships to tighten Serbian sanctions’. Financial Times, 10/7/92.
26 Sabrina Petra Ramet, The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding “Vietnam” and Blundering into
“Abyssinia”’, East European Politics and Societies 8:1, 1994, pp. 189-219, p.201; Paul Beaver, ‘Success 
at all costs’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 17:14, 4/3/92, p.588.
27 Bachlcr. Bosnien-LIerzegowina, p. 13.
28 Stefan Oeter even argues that the experience o f Western disunity and the lack o f sanctions strengthened 
the position o f the ‘hawks’ among the Serb military and thus contributed to the escalation o f the war in 
Bosnia. See Oeter, Jugoslawien und die Staatengemeinschaft, pp.23f. Compare Thomas Genett, ‘Die 
konfliktverscharfenden Folgen von Beschwichtigungspolitik. Das jugoslawische Sezessionsdrama’, 
Berliner Debatte Initial 2, 1996, pp. 102-113.
29
Calic, Jugoslawienpolitik am W endepunkf, pp. 11 f .; Xhudo, Diplom acy and Crisis Management, p.85.
Ian Taylor and Michael White, ‘ EC says wait to recognise Croatia’, Guardian, 12/12/91; Misha Glenny, 
Jugoslawien -Der grolie Zerfall’, Leviathan 23:4, 1995, pp.472-495, p.486; Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack 
o f  Will, p. 160; Halverson, American Perspectives’, p.5.
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Table 3.1
Preference Changes: 
15 May - 8 August 1992
‘action’ with the costs which governments were willing 
to consider. Nevertheless, the following analysis of the 
decision-making process from May 1992 to April 1993 
illustrates how it took nearly a year for the advocates of 
air strikes to gather sufficient support for a military 
intervention.
Air Strike Advocates Reach Early Impasse 
At the beginning of the debate over air strikes in mid- 
May 1992, the opposition of the British government to 
military action reflected the distribution of preferences 
within the British foreign policy network which 
stretched from the government, the key ministries, the 
parliamentary parties and the House of Commons to the 
international organisations involved in foreign and 
security matters and the governments of their member 
states.31 While the pressure for air strikes was too low 
to elicit organised opposition, the overwhelming 
majority of domestic and international actors 
unilaterally rejected military intervention as 
disproportionate and unsuitable. In fact, the salience of 
the issue was so low that some actors within the 
network, such as the European Commission and the 
British Labour Party, did not have a public position on 
the question of air strikes at the beginning of summer 
1992.
The British government was strongly opposed 
to military intervention. Although Prime Minister John 
Major was careful not to exclude military strikes as a
last resort, the extensive conditions set by his government for such action de facto ruled
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
WEU 53 B
Nato-Org. 45 NC
EU-CM 40 B
Nato-CM 37 B
US-Pen 37 NC
EU-Co 36 NC
UN-Org 36 NC
CSCE 35 B
EP 33 NC
US-SD 33 NC
MoD 29 NC
US-Pre 28 NC
Fco 27 NC
US-Wh 25 NC
FS 22 NC
DS 21 NC
Med 20 C
US-con 20 C
PM 18 NC
UN-SC 10 NC
Par 9 NC
vote 5 NC
Cab 0 NC
con 0 NC
lab 0 NC
Com 0 NC
31 See Appendix 1: ‘British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'.
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air strikes out.32 Indeed, at the beginning of the summer, the British government was still 
unwilling to consider any form of active participation in Bosnia, including the provision 
of ground troops to an international peacekeeping force. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd 
and Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind concurred with their staffs assessment that the 
war in the former Yugoslavia did not affect British interests such as to justify the risks 
involved in military action.33 Officials in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in particular were 
strongly opposed to air strikes. The military argued that in the absence of a clear political 
imperative a half-hearted intervention would lead to disaster, as the American involvement 
in Vietnam had shown before.34 In the Foreign Office opinions had initially been split. 
After Serb forces had invaded Croatia at the end of 1991, a small number of senior 
officials had considered the threat of air strikes.35 However, by May 1992 the internal 
consensus in the Foreign Office was that military intervention was not politically viable.36 
Part of this conclusion was due to the fact that the British public and members of 
Parliament (MPs) had so far taken little notice of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 
The country was of little direct relevance to the United Kingdom and lacked a strong 
national lobby.
Lady Margaret Thatcher was the only prominent political figure in the government 
party who advocated air strikes. However, her calls for military intervention were met with 
incomprehension, if not embarrassment, within the Conservative Party.37 Conservative 
MPs fully backe# the position of the government, as did the Laboiir opposition members 
when they eventually took a stance on the issue at the end of the summer. Essentially 
Labour MPs shared the government’s assessment that the conflict did not justify action
32 John Palmer and Hella Pick, ‘EC may send troops to Sarajevo’, Guardian, 26/6/92; Colin Brown, 
‘Bosnia may get Nato air cover’. Independent, 5/8/92. Compare Gow, ‘British Perspectives’, p.95.
33 David Wallen, ‘Yugoslav envoy expelled and flights stopped’, Scotsman, 2/6/92.
34 General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley (former NATO Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Northern 
Europe), ‘Should we intervene?’, Sunday Times, 9/8/92. Compare Ware and Watson, Former Yugoslavia, 
p.25 citing C.J. Dick in British Army Review, December 1992.
35 John Palmer and Michael White, German plan to recognise Croatia puts EC in turmoil’, Guardian, 
16/12/91.
36 Michael Smith, ‘Pressure grows for sanctions against Serbia’, D aily Telegraph, 15/5/92.
37 John Palmer and Michael White, German plan to recognise Croatia puts EC in turmoil’, Guardian, 
16/12/91.
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which would put the lives of British soldiers in jeopardy .38
Among the domestic actors in the British foreign policy network, the Liberal 
Democrats were the only outspoken proponents of air strikes at the beginning of summer 
1992.39 However, their ability to influence the policy of the government was restricted by 
their weak position in the British foreign policy network and the absence of further 
supporters of military strikes in Britain. In particular. Liberal MPs lacked direct influence 
over the administration since their linkages with government ministers and civil servants 
in the key departments were characterised by dependence rather than authority.40 The 
Liberal MPs’ only options for exerting pressure on the government were indirectly through 
Parliament and the Parliamentary Defence Committee, or by using their relations with the 
electorate and the media.41 However, within the first two, the position of the Liberal 
Democrats was very weak. Due to the first-past-the-post system, the party had won only 
20 out of 651 seats in the previous general election.42 Proportionally, the pressure of the 
Liberal MPs amounted to only 9 per cent within the Commons.43 In the House of 
Commons Standing Defence Committee, where the Liberal Democrats were granted a 
single seat, their influence was negligible.
The highest probability of affecting the preference of another actor lay with 
representatives of the media who were exposed to much higher pressure than Parliament 
as a collective decision unit. While the relations of the House of Commons were mainly . _ „
restricted tb the government and the parties represented in it, the journalists were *
dependent on information not only from domestic, but also international actors. Accessible 
to pressure for military intervention from a wide range of actors, the international press
38 Philip Stephens, ‘Unease in UK over Bosnia troops decision’. Financial Times, 20/8/92; Michael Jones, 
‘MPs left in summer slumber as perilous military acts take shape’, Sunday Times, 23/8/92.
39 Alan Philips, ‘Bosnia “relief zones” urged for refugees’. D a ily  Telegraph, 31/7/92; Hella Pick, 
‘Refugees flee, diplomats dither’, Guardian, 1/8/92;‘Save the children; Leading article’, Times, 3/8/92; 
Colin Brown, ‘Appeals for UK military action in Bosnia rejected’, Independent, 4/8/92; Colin Brown and 
Annika Savill, ‘Bosnia may get Nato air cover’. Independent, 5/8/92 .
40 See Appendix 1: ‘British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'.
41 Ibid.
42 General Elections 1992, at http://ourworId.compuserve.com/homepages/tiinb/UK92.HTM.
43 Altogether 16 actors were linked to the 651 MPs in the House o f Commons, accounting for 
L = 16x651 = 10416, among these 20 liberal MPs used their links to exert pressure in the Commons as well 
as on other MPs, raising E to E=320+631=951 and P, [Par] =E/L= 951/10416 = 9%.
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was used specifically by the governments of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Austria to promote the option of air strikes. In fact, together 
with the Liberal MPs, politicians and officials from these seven administrations accounted 
for 20 per cent of the actors from whom journalists gained their information.44 Since this 
pressure was higher than on any other actors to which Liberal MPs were directly linked, 
party leader Paddy Ashdown acted rationally in his use of network relations when he 
concentrated his efforts on a media campaign to raise the prominence of the conflict in 
Bosnia, rather than attempting to exert pressure on the government via Parliament. In 
particular, Ashdown travelled repeatedly to the former Yugoslavia, trailing groups of 
journalists who reported directly back from the war-torn country to the British public.45 
In addition, Ashdown published several articles in the Guardian in which he urged for 
international intervention in Bosnia.46 The Liberal Party leader also approached the 
government in personal letters and was eventually granted private meetings with Prime 
Minister Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd. Although Ashdown was unable to influence 
the policy of the government directly, the meetings furthered his cause by receiving 
considerable media attention.47
Between May and August 1992, the strongest advocates of air strikes were 
politicians and officials from Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Austria.48 Unlike members of the Liberal Democratic Party, these governments had
„ - •' #*' £* J* 4*
44 Eleven o f 56 actors to whom the national and international media had links in the network favoured 
air strikes, namely the governments o f Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium  and 
Austria, US Secretary o f State James Baker, US National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, officials in 
the US State Department and the members of the Liberal Democrats, accounting for P, [Med] = 11/56 =
20%.
Michael Evans and Alan McGregor, ‘Europe shies away from military role with Bosnia convoys’, 
Times, 31/7/91; Colin Brown, ‘Appeals for UK military action in Bosnia rejected’, Independent, 4/8/92; 
John McGhie and Patrick Brogan, ‘Major backs armed convoys’, O bserver , 9/8/92; Leonard Doyle and 
Patricia Wynn Davies, “Give us weapons to fight”, Independent, 10/8/92; James Bone, ‘Britain, France 
and US agree on Bosnia force’, Sunday Times, 11/8/92; ‘Britannia rules the wavercrs’. Economist, 
15/8/92; Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, Summit talks for Major and Bush over Bosnia’, Times, 
15/12/92; Ewen MacAskill and Gary Duncan, ‘Fears grow of all-out Balkan war’, Scotsman, 16/12/92; 
Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, ‘Nato prepares for air strikes against Serbs’, Times, 16/12/92 .
46 Alan Travis, Major says firm no to Nato force in Bosnia’, Guardian, 4/8/92.
47 Colin Brown, ‘Bosnia may get Nato air cover’. Independent, 5/8/92.
48 Calic, German Perspectives’, p.58, p.62; Michael White and Kurt Schork, ‘Renewed peace effort as 
Gorazde convoy fails’. Guardian, 27/7/92; Will Huton, Hella Pick and Larry Elliot, ‘The Munich Summit: 
Yeltsin accepts tough IMF loan terms’, Guardian, 7/7/92; John Palmer and Hella Pick, ‘EC may send 
troops to Sarajevo’, Guardian, 26/6/92; ‘Save the children; Leading article’, Times, 3/8/92.
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a considerable number of influential relations with key actors in the British government 
and international organisations. Since their ministers and officials were in regular bilateral 
and multilateral contact, not only with each other, but also with their British counterparts, 
they were particularly able to press the British administration on the air strike question. 
In fact, collectively the foreign and defence ministers from the seven countries accounted 
for 22 per cent of the linkages of Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in the network49. Their 
pressure was only marginally lower on Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind for whom 
they represented 21 per cent of his regular contacts.50 Practically, it meant that nearly a 
quarter of the actors to which the two ministers were directly linked within the British 
multilevel foreign policy network urged them to implement air strikes in Bosnia. In the 
case of Foreign Office and MoD officials, the degree of pressure was even higher at 27 per 
cent51 and 29 per cent52 respectively because they had fewer linkages than their ministers. 
Consequentially, their colleagues in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Austria represented a larger proportion of their relations.
However, although the staff in the Foreign Office and the MoD were under acute 
transnational pressure, the strong consensus within the British executive and Parliament 
helped them to resist the calls for air strikes. Most of the domestic actors with whom civil 
servants from the two ministries had regular contacts, such as their ministers, the Cabinet, 
Prime Minister Major and officials from other ministries, maintained their opposition 
against military strikes. While significant, the pressure dti the officials from the Foreign 
Office or the MoD was not sufficient for them to abandon their doubts. Crucially for the 
decision-making process, the resistance from the officials in the Foreign Office and the 
MoD prevented the formation of a transnational coalition among the bureaucracies in
49 Eight out o f 36 actors to whom Foreign Secretary Hurd was linked in the network favoured air strikes, 
including, US Secretary o f State James Baker and the Foreign Ministers o f Germany, Italy, Turkey, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, accounting for P, [FSJ = 8/36 = 22%.
50 In the case of Defence Secretary Rifkind, six actors advocated air strikes among his 29 linkages, namely 
the defence ministers o f Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, raising the 
pressure to P, [DS] = 6/29 = 21%.
51 Foreign Office officials were pressed for air strikes by their counterparts in the US State Department 
and the Foreign Ministries o f Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, 
accounting for P, [Fco] = 8/30 = 27%.
52 Similarly, the British Ministry o f Defence staff was pressurised by their defence ministry colleagues in 
Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, i.e. P, [Mod] = 6/21 = 29%.
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favour of military action during summer 1992. Their boundary position, thus, enabled them 
to insulate a large number of domestic actors in the British network from international 
pressure.
However, ministers and officials from the European governments who favoured 
air strikes had alternative network relations which they could use to persuade or press 
other actors to support air strikes. Specifically, they were able to use their common 
membership in the international organisations which had become involved in the crisis, i.e. 
the EC, NATO, the WEU and the CSCE, to form an intergovernmental coalition. The 
rationale behind this strategy was that the participation of these organisations, in the 
resolution of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, would provide them with indirect 
influence over the British administration if the organisations adopted a favourable stance 
towards air strikes. Moreover, the nature of these organisations as collective decision units 
ensured that the preferences of all members were reflected. Due to differences in the 
membership of each organisation, the balance of pressure for military action was highest 
within the WEU where 53 per cent of the actors linked to it favoured air strikes.53 The 
pressure was marginally lower in the NATO’s integrated military organisation at 45 per 
cent54, the European Council of Ministers at 40 per cent55, the North Atlantic Council at 
37 per cent56 and the CSCE at 35 per cent57. The UN Security Council was almost free 
from direct pressure for air strikes since its permanent members, in particular the US, 
Britain, France and Russia, were opposed to military action. Latent support for air strikes
53 In the Western European Union, the heads of state, foreign ministers, defence ministers, foreign 
ministry staff and miliary officials from Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium accounted 
for P, IWeu] = 25/47 = 53%.
54 In NATO ’s integrated organisation, the diplomatic and military staff from Germany, Italy, Turkey, 
Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium as well as US State Department officials raised the pressure to 
thirteen out o f 29 linkages, i.e. P, [Nato-Org.|= 1.3/29 = 45%.
55 In the European Union Council o f Ministers, the same balance applied as to the Western European 
Union with P, [EU-CM] = 25/63 = 40%.
56 In the North Atlantic Council, the advocacy of air strikes by the heads o f  state, foreign ministers and 
defence ministers from Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as James 
Baker accounted for nineteen of its 51 linkages in the network, with P, [Nato-CM| = 19/51 = 37%.
57 In the CSCE air strikes were supported by 23 out o f 65 actors who were linked to the organisation, 
including, the heads of state, foreign ministers and diplomatic officials from Germany, Italy, Turkey, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, the US Secretary of State and State Department staff, with 
P, [CSCE| = 23/65 = 35%.
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from US Secretary of State James Baker raised the pressure to a mere 10 per cent.58
In spite of the considerable pressure in these international organisations, the limited 
authority of these multilateral institutions over an international operation like air strikes 
impeded the effectiveness of the international coalition in favour of military action. The 
CSCE was still in the process of being transformed from a series of conferences into an 
international security organisation. Although several mechanisms had just been established 
which permitted CSCE delegations to monitor and intervene peacefully into the solution 
of conflicts among its member states, military action was beyond their capabilities.59 
Similarly, the European Council of Ministers had neither the military means nor the 
legitimacy to order air strikes in Bosnia. Recent attempts to include the WEU into the 
structure of the EC in order to provide it with a defence arm had not been very successful. 
The strengthening of the EC’s role in foreign and security policy matters had been 
prevented by the disagreement among member states over the degree to which an EC- 
WEU force should be independent from NATO.60 As a result, the Franco-German Euro- 
Corps remained the only integrated military unit under the command of the WEU. 
However, as a lightly equipped land force the Euro-Corps was not more suitable for a full- 
scale intervention than for selective air strikes.61 Moreover, the corps was not yet 
operational. In order to implement air strikes, the EC Council of Ministers would have to 
call upon the member states of NATO or the WEU to act on its behalf. This would mean 
transferring the decision-making authority over the international involvement in Bosnia to 
these organisations. However, in terms of international law, an intervention by NATO, the 
WEU, or an ad-hoc arrangement between the major powers comparable to that in the Gulf 
War could only be authorised by the UN Security Council. This would remove the issue 
further from the influence of the European advocates of air strikes. Moreover, NATO and 
the WTLU were not yet legitimised to take action beyond the territory of their member
58 P, [UN-SC] = 1/10 = 10%.
59 Ehrhart, ‘Peacekeeping im Jugoslawienkonflikt’, p. 15.
60 Treaty on European Union, III Final Act, Declaration on the WEU, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, at 
http://curopa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/trcaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_cn.pdf; WEU Council o f Ministers, Petersberg 
Declaration , Bonn, 19 June 1992, at http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html.
61 Moreover, the corps was not expected to be operational before 1 October 1995. See ‘Presseerkl&rung 
iiber die Aufstellung eines Europaischen Korps, veroffentlicht zum AbschluB der deutsch-franzosischen 
Konsultationcn in La Rochelle am 22. Mai 1992’, Europa Archiv  13, 1992, pp.D154-D155.
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states. Since the treaties of both organisations stipulated their functions as collective self- 
defence rather than collective security, the intervention into a conflict that did not involve 
any of their member states was outside their scope.62
While the functional scope of NATO and the WEU could be changed, just as the 
CSCE had taken on new tasks, the most serious obstacle lay in the decision-making 
structures of the two institutions. Both provided member states with a veto due to their 
formal requirement of a consensus for all Council decisions. While multilevel network 
theory suggests that a veto can be overruled if the pressure is sufficiently high, it also 
contends that a veto of one or several of their members allows organisations, such as 
NATO and the WEU, to withstand higher degrees of pressure than actors without veto 
rules such as in ministerial departments or political parties. Indeed, although the pressure 
for air strikes was considerable in all organisations, their veto position not only allowed 
member states which opposed military action to block an endorsement of air strikes, but 
also the extension of the authority of these organisations to implement them.
In the CSCE, the Russian and Serbian veto effectively prevented a direct 
involvement of the organisation in most of the international operation in Bosnia. While 
uncontroversial tasks, such as fact-finding missions, had been permitted at the beginning 
of the conflict, by 1992 it had been recognised that due to its large membership and the 
prominent Russian veto of outside intervention, the ability of th j CSCE to end the war 
was restricted.63 The EC Council of Ministers was equally divided '6ver military action, in 
spite of the smaller number of its member states and their greater homogeneity. In fact, the 
failure of the EC to achieve any significant progress in the peace negotiations which were 
under its authority had been partly attributed to the conflicting signals emanating from its 
members’ governments.64 The split within the EC had its origins in the debate over the 
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 65 The failure of the EC Council of Ministers 
to agree on measures other than economic sanctions, while the UN Security Council
62 The North A tlantic Treaty, Washington, 4 April 1949, at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm
and the Brussels Treaty - Treaty o f  Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self- 
Defence, Brussels, 17 March 1948, at http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html.
63 Paulsen, Jugoslawienpolitik der USA, p.40.
64 BSchler, Bosn ien -Herzego wina, p.2; Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p.54.
65 ‘Leading article: A common policy o f Balkans bungling , Independent on Sunday, 24/5/92. Compare 
Maclcod, ‘French Policy’, p.245; Oeter, Jugoslawien und die Staatengemeinschaft’, pp.23f.
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decided upon and implemented a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to 
safeguard aid deliveries in Bosnia, eventually contributed to the transfer of the issue to the 
primary authority to the Security Council.66 In fact, some member states appeared to block 
action by the EC, NATO and the WEU with the aim to pass the responsibility over the 
international response to the Yugoslav crisis to the Security Council. The French 
government in particular was wary of its lack of influence over NATO’s military decisions 
if air strikes were considered. Its representatives, therefore, vehemently demanded a UN 
resolution to back such action.
The French interposition came at a time when the supporters of air strikes began 
to focus their pressure on enlarging the functional scope of NATO in order to prepare it 
for intervention ‘out-of-area’, such as in the former Yugoslavia. At the beginning of June, 
the Dutch Defence Minister took the lead on the issue by proposing to make NATO forces 
available to UN and CSCE peacekeeping operations outside the borders of its member 
states.67 Recognised as a necessary first step towards military action in Bosnia, the 
proposal was supported by the representatives of Germany, Italy and Turkey.68 The 
governments in Britain and the US were divided over the issue. On the one hand, both 
administrations had long been in favour of enlarging the functional scope of NATO. It 
would enable them to more easily use NATO’s integrated military structure in cases like
the Gulf War. On the other hand, most British and American politicians and officials were** •- 0’ '.,***' *- <% tf‘ , fQstrongly opposed to similar involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Doubts over the 
transformation of NATO were also expressed by the governments of Spain and Belgium, 
in spite of the latter’s support for air strikes in Bosnia. The strongest opposition came 
from the French administration which not only disapproved of military strikes in Bosnia, 
but also of the extension of the functions and the authority of NATO. With regard to 
military action in Bosnia, the French government preferred the authority to rest with the 
UN Security Council where it had a veto and where the consensus was against air strikes. 
As to out-of-area missions, the French administration envisaged a global peacekeeping role
66 S/RES/743 (1992), 21 February 1992, at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm.
67 Michael Evans, ‘Nato chief lists perils for peace force’. Times, 3/6/92.
68 Chris McLaughlin, Practical difficulties set against moral rectitude’, Scotsman, 12/8/92.
69 Hella Pick, ‘Nato accepts wider peacekeeping role’, Guardian, 5/6/92.
for the WEU.70 Since the representatives of Britain and the US sided with the advocates 
of air strikes on the question of out-of-area missions, the French veto was easily overruled 
in the North Atlantic Council.71
Nevertheless, on the issue of Bosnia, the French government succeeded with the 
support of the British and Americans in blocking further moves towards military action in 
the North Atlantic Council. The representatives ofthe three governments insisted that such 
measures could only be decided on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution. The 
demand implied the transfer of the ultimate decision-making authority over the 
international operation in Bosnia to the Security Council. Although the transfer of the 
authority was not favoured by the air strike advocates, they were not able to prevent it. 
The EC and NATO had proved incapable of agreeing on effective measures. Moreover, 
the support of the three Security Council members, France, Britain and the US, was in any 
case a condition for air strikes because of their military contributions to NATO or the 
WEU. In the absence of any prospects for an agreement, the transfer at least relieved the 
other European governments from their responsibility with regard to the conflict. 
Essentially, however, the coalition between the governments of Germany, Italy, Turkey, 
Portugal, the Netherlands and Austria had reached an impasse. Although their ministers 
and officials continued to press for air strikes in the EC and the WEU, the sidelining of 
these organisations on the Bosnia issue deprived them of direct control over the
^ - • C* , * ' g* ^  1
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international intervention. Since the advocates of air strikes had used all their linkages 
within the network to exert pressure, but not succeeded in gaining new supporters, the 
option of air strikes appeared to have been finally ruled out. However, at the same time 
the pressure for air strikes was reaching critical degrees in the US. The new Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger and President George Bush were especially susceptible to 
further pressure when news about Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia emerged at the
70 Michael Evans, ‘Nato chief lists perils for peace force’. Times, 3/6/92; Hella Pick, ‘Nato accepts wider 
peacekeeping role’, Guardian, 5/6/92; Michael Binyon and James Bone, ‘Hurd demands end to Bosnia 
camp atrocities’, Times, 8/8/92. Indeed, France had suggested sending a WEU peacekeeping force to the 
former Yugoslavia, but the proposal was vetoed by Britain. See Lepick, ‘French Perspectives’, p.79; David 
Fairhall and Mark Tran. ‘Nato role in new British force for Bosnia’, Guardian, 8/10/92.
71 N orth  At l a n t i c  C o u n cil, F in a l C o m m u n iq u e ,  Os l o ,  4 June 1992 ,  at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm. The WEU followed suit with a similar offer on 19 
June 1992. See WEU Council o f Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at 
http://www.weu.int/eng/index.hlml.
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beginning of August 1992.
‘Concentration Camp ’ Report Triggers US Policy Change
The second stage of the debate over air strikes in Bosnia was marked by a decisive shift 
of US foreign policy towards military action. It was followed by attempts from US 
officials to press their French and British partners in the UN Security Council into 
supporting air strikes. The American policy change in favour of air strikes was triggered 
by a broadcast from Independent Television News which showed 80 starving prisoners in 
a Serb ‘concentration camp’ near Omarska. As the pictures flashed about television 
screens in the US and Europe, voters and parliamentarians who so far had been largely 
ignorant about the conflict were outraged.72 Within days leading Congressmen and 
Senators urged the US administration to intervene militarily in order to end the atrocities. 
Although Congress did not have any immediate decision-making authority in this case, its 
direct influence over the President and the Secretary of State due to the general 
institutional dependence of the US administration on Congress in other matters allowed 
its members to exert considerable pressure. Journalists through their own relations as 
provider of information for the government and as mediator of the public opinion 
reinforced the demands of Congress members by reports about other Serb camps in Bosnia 
and commentaries on the viability of military action.
<1
As opinions changed, they profited from the latent support for air strikes within 
the State Department. Officials within the State Department had for some time been 
dissatisfied with the government’s reluctance to take action in Bosnia. In fact, several had 
resigned in protest of the official policy.73 When the ITN broadcast finally raised the public 
awareness of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, members of the State Department 
authenticated the news about the killing of civilians in the Serb camps without consulting 
their political leadership. Although Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles was 
subsequently forced to deny the announcement, his assurance that the administration could
72 Halverson, American Perspectives’, p.8. By 10 August, 53 per cent o f the American public supported 
air strikes against Serb positions. See also Simon Tisdall, Hella Pick and Kurt Schork, ‘UN edges towards 
Bosnia force’, Guardian , 5/8/92; Patrick Cockbum, ‘US under domestic pressure to act’, Independent, 
10/8/92. On the position of the Congress see Patrick Cockburn, T h e  Bosnia crisis: Sight that shook the 
world’. Independent on Sunday, 9/8/92; Ramct, Yugoslav Crisis, p.204.
Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p.211; Ramct, Yugoslav Crisis, p.204.
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not ‘confirm reports of Serb death camps’ now lacked credibility.74
Table 3.2 Preference Changes: 8 August - 29 October 1992
2nd Phase -10/8/92) 3rd Phase (-16/8/92) 4th Phase (-29/9/92) 5th Phase (-29/10/92)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
WEU 55 B US-Wh 75 NC US-Wh 100 C WEU 55 B
US-Wh 50 NC WEU 55 B WEU 55 B EP 47 C
Nato-Org 45 NC EP 47 NC EP 47 NC US-SD 46 NC
US-SD 42 NC Nalo-Org 45 NC US-SD 46 NC Nato-Org 45 NC
EU-CM 41 B EU-CM 43 NC Nato-Org 45 NC EU-CM 43 B
EP 40 NC US-SD 42 NC EU-CM 43 B US-Pen 42 NC
EU-Co 39 C Nato-CM 39 B US-Pen 42 NC Nato-CM 41 B
Nato-CM 39 B CSCE 37 B Nato-CM 41 B CSCE 38 B
CSCE 37 B US-Pen 37 NC CSCE 38 B UN-Org 36 NC
US-Pen 37 NC UN-Org 36 NC UN-Org 36 NC UN-SC 30 NC
UN-Org 36 . NC US-Pre 34 C UN-SC 30 NC Mod 29 NC
US-Pre 34 B Mod 29 NC Mod 29 NC Fco 27 NC
Mod 29 NC Fco 27 NC Fco 27 NC FS 25 NC
Fco 27 NC FS 25 NC FS 25 NC DS 24 NC
FS 25 NC DS 24 NC DS 24 NC PM 23 NC
DS 24 NC PM 21 NC PM ^  - NC con 17 . NC
PM 21 NC UN-SC 20 NC con 17 1C lab 17 ' U
UN-SC 20 NC con 17 NC lab 17 NC Par 15 NC
con 17 NC lab 17 NC Par 15 NC vote 14 NC
lab 17 NC Par 15 NC vote 14 NC Cab 7 NC
Par 15 NC vote 14 NC Cab 7 NC Com 6 NC
vote 10 NC Cab 7 NC Com 6 NC
Cab 7 NC Com 6 NC
Com 6 NC
President Bush was particularly exposed to the rising pressure from members of Congress, 
the media and the American public. Not only was he linked, through a web of formal and
74 Simon Tisdall, Hella Pick and Kurt Schork, ‘UN edges towards Bosnia force’, Guardian, 5/8/92; Phil 
Davidson, ‘West presses for access to Bosnia camps’, Independent, 5/8/92.
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informal relations to Senators and journalists, Bush also had to be especially wary about 
the view of the American electorate due to the upcoming presidential elections.75 The 
resolve of the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, who called for selective air strikes to end 
the conflict, appeared more favourably in the American public than the wavering of 
President Bush. Within two weeks the national and international pressure on the President 
increased from 28 to 34 per cent of his contacts in the network76 and Bush began to 
sway.77 Although the Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney and officials from the 
Pentagon reiterated their oppositiipn against military action78, Bush indicated an impending 
change of policy with regard to the military strikes on 16 August 1992.
The Secretary of Defence and his staff, however, resisted the calls for air strikes 
from 42 and 37 per cent of the actors with whom they had contacts in the network.79 They 
were supported by their colleagues in NATO who agreed on the dangers of intervening 
in Bosnia. Crucially, the continuing internal disputes between the ‘hawkish’ officials in the 
State Department and the ‘dovish’ military in the Pentagon seriously reduced the ability 
of the administration to press for military action.80 In fact, the officials from both 
departments used their relations within the network to pursue their divergent policy 
preferences, sometimes undermining the position of the US government in international 
organisations and among its European partners. While State Department officials 
embarked upon a^policy of persuasion and negotiation with America’s closest allies in the 
UN Security Council during autumn in order to promote the new US policy81, Pentagon
75 Jon Hibbs and Patricia Wilson, ‘Agreement near on use o f UN troops’, Daily Telegraph, 10/8/92; 
Halverson, ‘American Perspectives’, p. 10.
76 Due to the changes o f opinion among Congress members and journalists the pressure on the Bush  
increased from nine out o f 32 actors to eleven, i.e. from P, [Pre] = 9/32 = 28% to P2 [Pre] = 11/32 = 34%.
77 Adam Lebor and Michael Binyon, ‘Mourners flee mortar attack on Sarajevo children’s funeral’, Times, 
5/8/92; Jurek Martin, Judy Dempsey and Laura Silber, ‘Bush calls on UN to sanction use o f  force in 
Bosnia’, Financial Times, 7/8/92; John Lichfield, ‘The Bosnia crisis: Bush feels pressure for intervention’, 
Independent, 8/8/92; James Adams and Andrew Hogg, ‘America considers air strikes against Serbia’, 
Sunday Times, 9/8/92.
n o
A position which the Pentagon continued to hold. See George Graham, ‘How to lead the world without 
becoming its policeman’, Financial Times, 7/1/93.
79 Due to the preference change among Senators, the media and President Bush, ten and seven actors who 
were linked to Defence Secretary Cheney and Pentagon official respectively favoured air strikes, raising 
the pressure on the former to P3 [US-SD] = 10/24 = 42% and the latter to P3 fUS-pen] = 7/19 = 37%.
80Ware and Watson, Former Yugoslavia, p.7.
81 Jakobsen, Multilateralism Matters hut How, p.20.
102
staff used their linkages within the US administration and NATO’s integrated military 
organisation to urge caution.
Since the transfer of the ultimate decision-making authority to the Security 
Council, the main targets for pressure from State Department officials had to be their 
colleagues in Britain and France who continued to veto air strikes. Although the European 
press and public were equally outraged at the ITN pictures of the Serb detention camps 
as the Americans, they shared the scepticism of their political representatives as to whether 
military strikes could resolve the conflict in Bosnia. Risking the lives of British or French 
military personnel without a clear objective or strategy appeared self-defeating.83 
Nevertheless, the calls for military action had increased in Europe as well. Among the new 
proponents of military action were the members of the European Commission, represented 
by Jacques Delors and the External Relations Commissioner Flans van den Broek and the 
European Parliament. The Commissioner who had so far been neutral on the issue 
responded to calls for air strikes from the German, Italian, Portugese, Dutch and Belgian 
administration, which together with the media accounted for 41 per cent of the 
Commission’s links within the network.84 Moreover, without immediate authority or 
responsibility over the international operation in Bosnia, the Commission could safely take 
a radical stance. Speaking to the European Parliament, Commission President Jacques 
Delors advocated air strikes as the new solution to the Yugoslav ‘quagmire’.85 Among the 
European Parliament members his views were increasingly shared.®6 However, in spite of 
the growing pressure from EU institutions, the representatives of Britain and France
O 'J
George Graham, ‘How to lead the world without becoming its policem an’, Financial Times, 7/1/93.
83 Patrick Cockburn, ‘The Bosnia crisis: Sight that shook the world’, Independent on Sunday, 9/8/92; 
‘Leading article: The crossing of a Rubicon’ , Independent, 11/8/92. See also Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack 
o f  Will, p .211.
84 P2 [EU-Co] = 11/27 = 41%.
85 Commission President Jaques Delors’ speech at the special session o f European Parliament Committees 
on the Former Yugoslavia, Brussels, 10 August 1992, SPEECH/92/77 at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. See 
also Andrew Hill, ‘Delors condemns EC lack of resolve’, Financial Times, 11/8/92; Martin Walker and 
Patrick Wintour, West backs air force for Bosnia’, Guardian, 11/8/92; James Bone and Michael Binyon, 
‘Britain, France and US agree on Bosnia force’. Times, 11/8/92; Chris McLaughlin ‘UN close to vote on 
military role in Bosnia’, Scotsman, 11/8/92; ‘Britannia rules the waverers’, Economist, 15/8/92.
86 Andrew Hill, ‘Delors condemns EC lack of resolve’. Financial Times, 11/8/92.
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continued to veto the endorsement of air strikes in the EC Council of Ministers.87
While President Bush was still wavering about his position on air strikes during the 
second week of August, officials from the US State Department began to focus their 
pressure for military action on diplomats in the UN Security Council. Specifically, State 
Department officials proposed a resolution authorising the use o f ‘all necessary means’ in 
Bosnia.88 Although the phrase had obvious similarities with the UN resolution which 
preceded the international intervention in the Gulf War, the formulation was sufficiently 
vague to accommodate the diverse positions in the US, Britain and France. It stipulated 
neither the form of the measures to be taken, nor a deadline for an intervention. The 
British and French administrations accepted the resolution to placate the media and the 
increasing proportion of their public who were favouring military action.
The British and French acquiescence to a resolution which could pave the way for 
air strikes gave an indication of the increasing pressure on the two governments with the 
emerging shift in US foreign policy. However, accounting for 23 per cent, the number of 
air strikes supporters among the actors to whom the British Prime Minister John Major 
was linked in the network, was still significantly lower than the 34 per cent which led 
President Bush to adopt air strikes as an official policy objective only days after the UN 
resolution.89 Nevertheless, the resolution effectively committed the governments in Britain 
and France to some form of action in Bosnia. The French administration was certainly 
aWare of the implicit change of policy The question which international organisation 
would implement military action, if it could be agreed upon, already caused disagreements 
between US and French officials. The latter insisted that the UN should maintain the 
command over the operations in Bosnia, including military action implemented by NATO. 
Conversely, the US administration preferred a fully independent NATO mission.90 The 
outcome of this debate was a nominal compromise which revealed how far the Security
87 See joint statement o f the Council of Ministers within the EPC, ‘Former Yugoslavia’, 5 October 1992, 
Bulletin o f  the European Communities, Commission, 25/10, p.91.
88 John McGhie and Patrick Brogan, ‘Major backs armed convoys’, O bserver, 9/8/92; Jon Hibbs and 
Patricia Wilson, ‘Agreement near on use o f UN troops’. D aily Telegraph, 10/8/92.
on
Specifically, nine out o f 39 actors to whom Major had regular contacts favoured air strikes, including, 
the heads o f state in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, the international 
press and the EU Commission, accounting for ? A (PM| = 9/39 = 23%.
90 Martin Walker and Patrick Wintour, ‘West backs aid force for Bosnia’, Guardian, 11/8/92; Stephen 
Robinson and Jon Hibbs, Draft resolution opens door to the use of force’, D aily Telegraph, 11/8/92.
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Council was from considering military action in practice.91 In the text of resolution 770, 
which was approved on 13 August, the members of the Security Council declared to ‘take 
nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate 
in coordination with the United Nations’ the delivery of aid to Bosnia. Practically, it meant 
that the specific nature of the intervention would be decided upon when the UN Security 
Council members had reached a consensus on the question.92
If US State Department officials had assumed that the new resolution would open 
the way for air strikes in Bosnia, their hopes were soon shattered. Not only did their 
colleagues in Britain and France insist that all other measures were tried before military 
action was even considered, the American plans for air strikes also met the resistance of 
a Pentagon-led transgovernmental coalition among the military staff in NATO. The 
military used the fact that the UN Security Council had tasked NATO with examining the 
options for the implementation of resolution 770 to question a military intervention in 
Bosnia. The suggestion to seize the Bosnian capital Sarajevo with a 100,000 strength force 
made by military officials from the headquarters of the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels was, 
as newspapers commented, ‘an impractical proposal designed to get a thumbs-down from 
Congress, the Bush administration and NATO’93. It was well known to the military that 
neither American, nor European politicians were willing to despatch fighting troops to the 
former Yugoslavia. However, NATO commanders claimed that this was necessary if the 
international commuhity wanted to enforbe the UN resolution with military means.
In addition, Pentagon officials and their British colleagues used their domestic 
relations in the network to repeat the estimates in conversations with their political leaders 
and with parliamentary representatives. In the US, the assistant to General Colin Powell, 
Lt General Barry Me Caffrey, told the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
that between 60,000 and 120,000 troops were required to secure Sarajevo for the delivery
91 Martin Walker and Patrick W intour,1 West backs aid force for Bosnia’, Guardian, 11/8/92; James Bone 
and Michael Binyon, ‘Britain, France and US agree on Bosnia force’, Times, 11/8/92; Chris McLaughlin, 
‘UN close to vote on military role in Bosnia’, Scotsman, 11/8/92; Stephen Robinson and Jon Hibbs, ‘Draft 
resolution opens door to the use o f force’, Daily Telegraph, 11/8/92.
92 S/RES/770 (1992 ) 13 August 1992, at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm.
93 James Adams, Louise Branson, Ian Glover-James and Andrew Hogg, ‘Have they got away with it?’, 
Sunday Times, 16/8/92; Christopher Bellamy, ‘Nato ponders how to turn words into action’, Independent, 
12/8/92.
105
of humanitarian aid as envisaged by the UN resolution. He pointed out that such military 
intervention would certainly involve a high number of casualties.94 When questioned by 
the British government, the Chiefs of Staff even topped the dire scenario painted by the 
American military. They suggested the creation of corridors for aid convoys to Sarajevo 
would require at least 300,000 fighting troops.95
As both European and American politicians were alarmed by the vision of 
becoming embroiled in the Yugoslav war, the prospect of a military solution again 
received a setback. It was hardly noted that the less risky option of air strikes on Serb 
bases had beenprima facie excluded by the military under the pretence that nothing short 
of a full-scale intervention would be ‘effective’. Thus, with the explicit support from 
NATO military planners, British and French representatives in the North Atlantic Council 
were able to maintain their veto regarding air strikes in spite of the increase in pressure 
from 39 to 41 per cent following President Bush’s preference change in support of air 
strikes.96
After NATO military action had been ruled out, the governments of Britain and 
France decided unilaterally to implement resolution 770 by means of a small, defensive 
protection force of about 3,000 soldiers. In Britain where the news of Serb ‘concentration 
camps’ had not changed the doubts of politicians and the public over military action, the 
decision was met by broad approval within the executiye and legislative.97 In the House 
of Commons,' even the members of thfe Labour Shadow Cabinet supported the 
government’s policy.98 The failure of Labour Party leader John Smith to request a recall 
of Parliament from its summer recess in order to debate this decision led to some protest 
within the party. However, the substance of the government’s decision was not a subject
94 Barbara Starr, ‘No speedy end to war, warns USA ’, Jane ’s Defence Weekly 18:8, 22/8/92, p. 12.
95 Patrick Wintour, Simon Tisdall and David Fairhall, ‘Major sends planes to Gulf and offers 1,800 troops 
for Bosnia’, Guardian , 19/8/92.
96 The pressure on the North Atlantic Council had increased due to President Bush’s preference change 
by one out o f 51 from P3 [Nato-CM] = 20/51 = 39% to P4 [Nato-CM] = 21/51 = 41%.
97 Patrick Wintour, Simon Tisdali and David Fairhall, ‘Major sends planes to Gulf and offers 1,800 troops 
for Bosnia’, Guardian, 19/8/92.
98 Philip Stephens, ‘Unease in UK over Bosnia troops decision’, Financial Times, 20/8/92; Michael Jones, 
‘MPs left in summer slumber as perilous military acts take shape’, Sunday Times, 23/8/92.
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of controversy."
Effectively the emerging coalition in favour of air strikes stalled at the borders of 
the United Kingdom in October 1992. The effect of the American policy change on 
domestic actors in Britain was limited. Officials in the British MoD who had been under 
the highest pressure within the British administration at 29 per cent, were not exposed to 
American pressure for military action because they were only linked to their colleagues in 
the Pentagon who continued to oppose air strikes. The main change in pressure was 
noticed by Prime Minister Major who was now confronted with President Bush’s support 
for military strikes in international summits. While the pressure on the key roles within the 
British government ranged between 21 and 29 per cent, it did not lead to an immediate 
response, with its long-term consequences showing during the winter of 1992-93.
First Preference Changes in Britain
During autumn 1992 the international pressure on the British administration persisted. 
Since resolution 770 had failed to induce the governments of Britain and France to shift 
towards the implementation of military action, US officials embarked on renegotiating the 
issue in the UN Security Council. The vagueness of the resolution’s stipulations had been 
one of the reasons why the British and the French governments had been able to 
circumvent military strikes by taking alternative actiop. With a new resolution, President 
Bush and Secretary of State Eagleburger wanted to endorse explicitly the use of offensive 
means of action. Since the representatives of Britain and France ruled out a 
straightforward air attack on Serb targets such as airfields and artillery, US State 
Department officials proposed the extension and subsequent enforcement of the no-fly 
zone to the Bosnian airspace.100 The repeated violations by Serb and Croat planes provided
99 Philip Stephens, ‘Labour seeks assurances on RAF operations in Iraq’, Financial Times, 22/8/92; Colin 
Brown, ‘Labour may demand recall o f Parliament’, Independent, 24/8/92;‘Leading article: Time to break 
into the holidays’, Guardian, 24/8/92; Patrick Wintour, ‘Major “within rights” to refuse recall’, Guardian, 
4/9/92; Anthony Bevins, ‘Labour criticises refusal to recall MPs as arrogant’, Independent, 4/9/92; David 
Wallen, ‘Troops heading for Bosnia get permission to open fire first’, Scotsman, 16/9/92.
100 Ware and Watson, Former Yugoslavia, p. 7; Laura Silber, Robert Mauthner and George Graham, 
‘Sarajevo airlift resumes’, Financial Times, 3/10/92; Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, ‘UK ready to 
back air strikes on Serbs’, Times, 3/12/92; ‘Bosnian-Serb air violations continue’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 
18:24-25, 12/12/92, p.8; Simon Tisdall and David Fairhall, ‘Clinton calls for West to “turn up heat” on 
Serbs’, Guardian, 12/12/92; Martin Fletcher and Michael Evans, ‘US canvasses Europe over enforcement 
of air ban’, Times, 15/12/92.
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suitable justification, although most of the flights had been for logistic purposes and travel, 
rather than offensive action. In reality, the US were little concerned about the breaches of 
the no-fly zone. As one official admitted later, the question of pursuing planes in violation 
of the no-fly zone was seized upon as an opportunity to introduce air strikes on Serb 
airfields as a ‘logical extension’ of the enforcement measures.101 Since the American 
proposal avoided the mentioning of air strikes, the members of the UN Security Council 
quickly agreed on the principle of extending the no-fly zone over the former Yugoslavia 
to Bosnia. On 9 October, the Security Council approved, in resolution 781, the extension 
of the no-fly zone.102
It was little surprising, however, that British and French representatives at the UN 
vetoed any efforts to enforce the zone by shooting down planes caught in violation. Their 
ability to resist the pressure for air strikes was enhanced by similar inhibitions within the 
Canadian, Danish and Spanish administrations. The three countries had contributed ground 
troops to UNPROFOR and shared French and British fears of retaliation.103 Moreover, the 
Russian government had been fundamentally opposed to any intervention in the former 
Yugoslavia since the beginning of the conflict. Air strikes were unacceptable to the 
Russian leadership, not only because of close historical ties with the Serbs, but also 
because it might set a precedent for Western intervention into the former Soviet Union and 
its sphere of influence.104 ^
' Nevertheless, the persistent pressure from Eagleburger and US State Department 
officials, as well as from the administrations of the seven European countries who had 
advocated air strikes since May, slowly eroded the opposition to an enforcement of the no- 
fly zone between October and December 1992. British Foreign Office officials were 
particularly likely to change their view on the issue because 27 per cent of the actors with
101 James Fergusson, ‘Six ways to turn up the heat’, European, 17/12/92.
102 S/RES/781 (1992) 9 October 1992, at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm. See also James 
Bone and Tim Judah, ‘UN forbids military flights over Bosnia’, Times, 10/10/92.
103 Simon Tisdall and David Fairhall, ‘Clinton calls for West to “turn up heat” on Serbs’, Guardian, 
12/12/92; Ewen MacAskill and Gary Duncan, ‘Fears grow of all-out Balkan war’, Scotsman, 16/12/92; 
Alan Philips, M ichael Montgomery and Philip Johnston, ‘Cautious Nato ready to back no-fly zone’, Daily 
Telegraph, 18/12/92; Ian Mather and Dusko Doder, ‘Bosnia’s last chance’, European, 7/1/93.
104 George Jones and Peter Almond, ‘Britain considers force against Serbs’, Daily Telegraph, 3/12/92; 
Alan Philips, ‘Kosyrev U-turn is warning to West’, Daily Telegraph, 15/12/92.
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whom they regularly cooperated in the network supported air strikes.105 Moreover, due 
to their involvement in the UN negotiations about the implementation of the no-fly zone, 
Foreign Office diplomats were constantly exposed to the international demands for military 
action. At the beginning of December 1992, Foreign Office officials speaking to the press 
expressed a changed preference in favour of air strikes.106
Table 3.3 Preference Changes: 30 October 1992 -19 January 1993
6* Phase (-1/12/92) 7th Phase (-3/12/92) 8* Phase (-4/12/92) 9» Phase (-19/1/93)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
WEU 55 B WEU 57 B WEU 60 B WEU 60 B
US-SD 46 NC Nato-Org 48 NC Nato-Org 48 NC Par 59 U
Nato-Org 45 NC EC-CM 46 B EU-CM 48 B Nato-Org 48 NC
EU-CM 44 B US-SD 46 NC US-SD 46 NC EU-CM 48 B
US-Pen 42 NC US-Pen 42 NC Nato-CM 43 B US-SD 46 C
Nato-CM 41 B Nato-CM 41 B CSCE 42 B Nato-CM 43 B
CSCE 38 B UN-Org 41 NC US-Pen 42 NC CSCE 42 B
UN-Org 36 NC CSCE 40 B UN-Org 41 NC US-Pen 42 NC
UN-SC 30 NC Mod 33 NC UN-SC 40 NC UN-Org 41 U
Mod 29 NC UN-SC 30 NC Mod 33 NC UN-SC 40 NC
Fco 27 m  C FS 28 C vote 24 NC Mod ' 33 NC
FS 25 fNC PM 26 NC PM 28 NC vote 29 U
DS 24 NC DS 24 NC DS 28 NC PM 28 NC
PM 23 NC vote 19 NC con 25 NC DS 28 NC
vote 19 NC con 17 NC lab 25 C con 25 U
con 17 U lab 17 U Cab 21 NC Com 25 NC
lab 17 U Par 15 NC Par 21 NC Cab 21 NC
Par 15 NC Cab 14 NC Com 19 NC
Cab 7 NC Com 13 NC
Com 6 NC
105 P6 [FcoJ = 8/30 = 27%. Compare footnote 52.
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The consequences of their preference reversal for the formation of a winning 
coalition in favour of air strikes were considerable. Specifically, the advocacy of air strikes 
by Foreign Office officials instantly increased the pressure for military action on Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd from 25 to 28 per cent of his contacts in the network.107 Only 
three days later, Douglas Hurd announced in the media that, according to his opinion, the 
time had come to consider the use of air strikes in Bosnia.108 Moreover, the support for 
air strikes from Foreign Secretary Hurd and Foreign Office officials in turn raised the 
pressure for, and the credibility of, military strikes among MPs and the members of the 
Conservative and Labour Parties who looked to these two actors for expertise and 
information on the issue. Of the actors to which Conservatives and Labour members were 
directly linked within the British foreign policy network, 25 per cent now called for a 
military intervention.109 However, while the Labour opposition joined the coalition in 
favour of air strikes110, the same increase in pressure had less effect on the members of the 
Conservative Party. Although the number of proponents of military action was increasing 
among the Conservatives, the majority of MPs maintained their support for the 
government’s policy.111
The scope of the preference changes among civil servants and politicians 
significantly weakened the opposition against air strikes in the British foreign policy 
network. By mid-December, the support for air strikes by Douglas Hurd and Foreign 
Office officials had increased the pressure on the Prime Minister and the Secretary of 
Defence to 28 per cent112 and on the military and civilian staff in the MoD to 33 per cent
107 The preference change among Foreign Office officials increased the pressure on the Foreign Secretary 
by one from nine to ten out of 36 actors, i.e. from P6 [FSJ = 9/36 = 25% to P7 [FS] = 10/36 = 28%.
108 Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, ‘UK ready to back air strikes on Serbs’, Times, 3/12/92; Philip 
Stephens, ‘Parliament and Politics: Caution on Bosnia reflects risks o f entanglement’, Financial Times, 
16/12/92; Anthony Bevins and Annika Savill, ‘Major wants tough, swift response if  Serbs attack’, 
Independent, 16/12/92.
109 Specifically, the support for air strikes from Foreign Secretary Hurd increased the pressure on the 
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111 Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, Nato prepares for air strikes against Serbs’, Times, 16/12/92; 
Ralph Atkins, ‘Parliament and Politics: PM “would not block UN effort’” , Financial Times, 16/12/92.
112 In addition to their counterparts from seven European countries, US President Bush, the international 
media, now Foreign Secretary Hurd and Foreign office staff supported air strikes, raising the pressure on
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of their network contacts113 Yet, collectively the members of the Cabinet maintained their 
objections to military action during December. Moreover, as a consequence of the 
convention of collective responsibility in the Cabinet, Foreign Secretary Hurd was forced 
to defend the official policy line nationally in the media and internationally in the ongoing 
negotiations about the enforcement of the no-fly zone. While the preference changes had 
stopped short of British acquiescence to air strikes, the split within the British 
administration weakened its ability and willingness to resist the pressure for the 
implementation of the no-fly zone by air strikes. In the Cabinet’s Overseas Policy and 
Defence Committee, the differences between Foreign Secretary Hurd and Defence 
Secretary Rifkind were resolved by a compromise in favour of a UN resolution which 
authorised the enforcement of the no-fly zone, but ruled out air strikes on ground 
targets.114
In the international negotiations the discussions focussed on the question of how 
to implement the no-fly zone. A draft resolution tabled by the French government with 
support from the US, the Netherlands and Turkey set the starting point for extended 
bargaining between the governments over the means of enforcement.115 In the North 
Atlantic Council, the representatives of the US and the other Western European 
governments which supported military action secured a blank agreement in which NATO 
offered its military capabilities to the UN for the implementation of the resolution. 
However, ministers frorrt twelve out of sixteen member states warned about any action 
which could put the lives of UNPROFOR soldiers in jeopardy. NATO’s final communique 
stressed that the effects of enforcement action on the humanitarian operation would be
Prime Minister Major to P8 (PM] = 11/39 = 28% and on Defence Secretary Rifkind to P8 [DS] = 8/29 = 
28%. Compare footnotes 90 and 51.
113 The preference change among Foreign Office staff increased the pressure on their MoD colleagues by 
one to P8 [Mod] = 7/21 = 33%. Compare footnote 53.
114 Patrick Wintour and Michael Simons, Yugoslav War: Britain warns off Serbs’, Guardian, 4/12/92; 
Philip Johnston and Peter Almond, ‘Major dismisses talk of Bosnia offensive’, Daily Telegraph, 4/12/92; 
Philip Stephens, ‘Parliament and Politics: Caution on Bosnia reflects risks of entanglement’, Financial 
Times, 16/12/92.
115 Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, Nato prepares for air strikes against Serbs’, Times, 16/12/92; 
Annika Savill and Colin Brown, NATO backs “pause” over no-fly zone’, Independent, 18/12/92; ‘Shame 
at a war without end’, Economist, 19/12/92.
taken into account.116
Nevertheless, in the further course of the international negotiations in the UN, a 
coalition between the British and French representatives, with the support of the Canadian 
government, broke up because of the increasing tacit support for military action within the 
British administration.117 In a meeting with President Bush at Camp David, Prime Minister 
Major acceded to the use of air strikes as a last resort and after a 30-day warning period.118 
Once the British government had changed sides on the issue, French and Canadian 
diplomats were not able to prevent further moves towards a UN Security Council 
resolution. The text of the resolution was eventually agreed along the lines agreed between 
Bush and Major.119
The Security Council vote on the resolution, however, was delayed because of the 
election of a new government in the US. Although President-elect Bill Clinton had 
strongly argued in favour of air strikes during his election campaign, the incoming 
administration was not prepared to endorse the resolution which had been negotiated by 
its predecessor without a policy review.120 Instead, the new administration embarked upon 
a reassessment of the situation in Bosnia and the policy options at its disposal which put 
a halt to the resolution until March 1993.121
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Lodge, ‘Major agrees two-week Bosnia deadline’, Sunday Telegraph, 20/12/92.
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ally’, Independent on Sunday, 7/2/93; Martin Fletcher and Michael Evans, ‘US plan aims to roll back 
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to sell Bosnia peace plan to sceptical Clinton’, Times, 1/2/93; ‘Clinton wants more time over Bosnia’, 
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British Public and Politicians Support Military Action
The fourth and final stage of the debate over air strikes was characterised by increasing 
public and parliamentary support for military action in Britain. At the beginning of 1993, 
however, the debate appeared to have come to a standstill because of the US policy 
review. For a short period in February, it even seemed as if the new US government had 
reversed its stance on air strikes because of the opposition from Pentagon officials and the 
governments of Britain and France.122 The Vance-Owen Plan which at the time had been 
accepted by the leaderships of the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims raised expectations in 
the US and Western Europe that a peace settlement was close. However, Bill Clinton’s 
six-point initiative included the enforcement of the no-fly zone as one of its key 
measures.123 When the Serbs continued their policy of ethnic cleansing in spite of the 
Vance-Owen peace plan, the pressure from State Department officials, Senators and the 
American public which had existed before the election soon came to bear upon the 
members of the new administration.124 Although Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
adopted a cautious stance, while the new Secretary of Defence Les Aspin became an 
ardent promoter of air strikes, the overall balance of pressures in the administration 
remained unchanged.125 By March, Clinton resumed the course of the previous 
government in favour of air strikes. To exert pressure on their European colleagues US 
administrators threatened to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and 
to consider ‘other options’, i.e. air strikes, to stop the war.126 Moreover, State Department 
officials took advantage of the increasing domestic pressure on the British government by 
organizing a series of bilateral meetings with their British counterparts to discuss military
122 «Martin Fletcher and Eve-Ann Prentice, ‘US resistance brings Owen’s Bosnia deal to brink of failure’, 
Times, 5/2/93; Annika Savill, ‘Hurd to press US over Bosnia plan’, Independent, 6/2/93; Roger Boyes, 
‘American bluster masks qualified approval for peace plan’, Times, 9/2/93; Patricia Wilson and Stephen 
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Evans, ‘US plan aims to roll back Serbs’ gains in Bosnia’, Times, 11/2/93.
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124 Andrew Marr, ‘The case for trying to bully the bullies\  Independent, 25/3/93; Jeremy Campbell, ‘US 
“ready to bomb Serbian forces’” , Standard, 29/3/93.
125 Martin Fletcher, ‘Recall of Carter old guard tests global policy resolve’, Times, 19/1/93; Roger Boyes, 
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action in Bosnia.127
In Britain, the additional support for air strikes from Foreign Secretary Hurd, 
Foreign Office civil servants and Labour MPs that had increased the pressure on 
Parliament from 15 to 59 per cent began to show its effect.128 Although the Conservative 
MPs remained divided over the question of air strikes, the support for military action 
increased to up to a third of the Conservative Parliamentary Party during the spring.129 
Among the latter were the chairmen of the Commons Committees on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Policy, David Howell and Nicholas Bonsor, who advised the government to 
consider ‘stronger’ action.130 Yet, these experts spoke as individual MPs. Collectively, the 
Conservative Parliamentary Party did not challenge the government but supported its 
policy with its blocking majority in the Commons and its Committees. Noting the'growing 
support for military action, however, the government sought to exert counter pressure on 
MPs through extensive briefings of the Standing Committees and the Commons about the 
dangers of military intervention.131
The government could do less to prevent a change of opinion among the British 
public. The electorate had been exposed to calls for air strikes from the media and other 
actors since August. In December, the balance appeared to be shifting, but the public 
remained divided over the viability of military action. By the first week of April a MORI 
poll confirmed that 60 per cent of the British population were dissatisfied with the 
government’s performance and as many as 64 per cent supported a despatch of British
197 George Jones and Maurice Weaver, ‘Crisis in Bosnia: Reluctant Britain ready to back US over air 
strikes’, Daily Telegraph, 23/4/93; Peter Oborne, ‘British troops outraged by new massacre’, Standard, 
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130 John Wiliams, ‘Bosnia: “No John Wayne Solution’” , Standard, 7/4/93; Christy Campbell, David 
Wastcll, Toby Helm and Charles Glass, ‘Midnight mercy deal for Srebrenica’, Sunday Telegraph, 18/4/93; 
John Williams, ‘Cabinet rules out military help for Moslems’, Standard, 19/4/93; Marcus Tanner, 
‘Srebrenica victims airlifted to safety’, Independent, 19/4/93; Paul Wilenius, ‘Britain prepares for air 
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Table 3.4 Preference Changes: 19 January - 30 April 1993
10* Phase (-23/3/93) 11m Phase (-7/4/93) 12m Phase (-15/4/ 93) 13m Phase (-25/4/93) 14« Phase (-30/4/93)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
WEU 60 B WEU 60
t* 4A
B Par 62 U Par 65 U Par 69 U
Par 59 U Par 59 U WEU 60 B WEU 62 B WEU 64 B
Nato-Org 48 NC Nato-Org 48 NC Nato-Org 48 NC Nato-Org 48 NC con 50 U
EU-CM 48 C US-Pen 47 NC US-Pen 47 NC US-Pen 47 NC Nato-Org 48 NC
US-Pen 47 NC US-SS 43 NC US-SS 43 NC Nato-CM 45 B US-Pen 47 NC
US-SS 43 NC Nato-CM 43 B Nato-CM 43 B US-SS 43 NC Nato-CM 47 B
Nato-CM 43 B UN-Org 41 U UN-Org 41 U con 42 U CE 45 C
UN-Org 41 U CSCE 40 B CSCE 40 B UN-Org 41 U Com 44 U
CSCE 40 B Mod 33 NC DS 34 C CSCE 40 B Cab 43 C
Mod 33 NC vote 33 C con 33 U Mod 38 NC Mod 43 NC
DS 31 NC DS 31 NC PM 33 NC Com 38 U US-SS 43 NC
UN-SC 30 NC PM 31 NC Mod 33 NC PM 36 C CSCE 42 B
vote 29 U UN-SC 30
. f f Com 31 U Cab 36 U UN-Org 41 U
PM 28 NC con 25 U UN-SC 30 NC CE 36 NC UN-SC 40 NC
con 25 U Com 25 u Cab 29 U UN-SC 30 NC
Com 25 NC Cab 21 NC CE 27 NC
Cab 21 NC
troops to Bosnia to stop the fighting.132 The change of public opinion in favour of military 
action increased the pressure on MPs and cabinet ministers. Due to his boundary position 
in the network Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind was not only exposed to 
transgovernmental pressure from the governments which called for air strikes, but also to 
the demands of his colleague Foreign Secretary Hurd. The recent swing in opinion polls 
increased the percentage of actors who supported air strikes among Rifkind’s linkages in 
the network from 31 to 3 5.133 The change of the public mood also raised the pressure for 
air strikes on Prime Minister Major from 31 to 33 per cent134 and on the Cabinet from 21 
to 29 per cent135. On 25 April, Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind acceded and 
expressed his support for air strikes.136 His preference change in turn raised the stakes for 
Prime Minister Major from 33 to 36 per cent of his network contacts.137 Ten days later, 
John Major announced that the government did not rule out air strikes anymore.138
As a policy change in the Cabinet appeared close, the NATO military made a final 
attempt to prevent air strikes through a transgovernmental coalition. At the core of this 
counter-coalition was the military staff from the British MoD. Unlike their political 
leaders, the military were not dependent on support from the public and Parliament and, 
thus, unaffected by their increasing pressure. Conversely, military officers were able to use 
their position as provider of authoritative information on defence issues for journalists and 
politicians to try to convince them of the unsuitability of air strikes. In a coalition with
r  / / ' ■' J P  A* •"*
their colleagues in NATO, British rtiilitary leaders decided to focus their efforts on the 
media. One day before the crucial meeting of the British Cabinet, the NATO Chiefs of 
Staff issued a statement in the international press in which they warned collectively of the
132 John Keegan, ‘How to silence the guns?’. D aily Telegraph, 16/12/92.
1 33 The change o f public opinion increased the pressure on Rifkind from nine to ten out o f 29 actors to 
which the Defence Secretary was linked., i.e. from P,, (DSJ = 9/29 = 31% to P,2 fDS] = 10/29 = 34%.
134 The pressure on Prime Minister Major increased with the electorate by one out o f 39 actors from Pn 
[PM] = 12/39 = 31% to P 12 [PM] = 13/39 = 33%.
135 The pressure on the Cabinet increased from three to four out o f 14 actors, i.e. from Pn [Cab] = 3/14 
= 21% to Pl2 [Cab] = 4/14 = 29%.
136 Philip Stephens. ‘Parliament and Politics: Little appetite for diet o f military involvement’, Sunday 
Telegraph, 28/4/93, Andrew Marr, ‘A British tail wagging the American dog’, Independent, 29/4/93.
137 The preference change o f the Defence Secretary raised the pressure on the Prime Minister by one to 
Pl3 [PM] = 14/39 = 36%.
138 Andrew Marr, A British tail wagging the American dog’, Independent, 29/4/93.
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dangers of military intervention. In the Cabinet, Chancellor Norman Lamont, Home 
Secretary Kenneth Clarke, Social Security Secretary Peter Lilley and Scottish Secretary 
Ian Lang also rejected air strikes. However, these ministers had little influence on the 
decision because most of them were not part o f the foreign policy network.139 In the end, 
neither they nor the military were able to prevent the formation of a ‘winning coalition’ 
in favour of air strikes in the British Cabinet. The collective pressure from the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, Foreign Office officials and the 
public which represented 43 per cent of the actors linked to the Cabinet was 
overwhelming.140 On 30 April, the British government approved air strikes in Bosnia.141
3.3 Conclusion
The previous analysis has revealed a strong correlation between the pressure which actors 
were able to exert in the British multilevel foreign policy network and the formation o f a 
winning coalition in favour of air strikes. In order to evaluate the two hypotheses proposed 
by multilevel network theory, this conclusion summarises the data across actors. It thereby 
seeks to assess how far the two hypotheses were generally corroborated by the case study. 
Specifically, it examines four indicators: (1) the frequency of preference changes with 
rising degrees of pressure, (2) the distribution of the four behavioural categories ‘no 
change’ ‘unclear orjytndgcided’, ‘ change’^ nd. ‘blocked’ across the range of pressure from 
zero to 100 per cent, (3) tbe average degree of pressure for each behavioural category and 
(4) the timing of the preference changes during the research period. In addition, it attempts 
to identify general tendencies in the decision-making process which may suggest further 
inductive conclusions or a refinement o f the initial hypotheses. Finally, this preliminary 
conclusion investigates whether the multilevel network analysis of the case was able to 
provide new insights into the British policy change on the question o f air strikes in Bosnia.
139 Boris Johnson, David Wastell and Christy Campbell, ‘Tornados on Bosnia alert’, Sunday Telegraph , 
25/4/93.
140 PM [Cab] = 6/14 = 43%. Compare footnote 136.
14! George Jones, ‘Peace talks on Bosnia to resume’. D aily Telegraph , 30/4/93; Ian Black, Patrick Wintour 
and Martin Walker, ‘Serbs join last-ditch peace talks’, Guardian, 30/4/93; Ewen McAskill, ‘Approval 
close for air strikes on Serbs’, Scotsman , 30/4/93.
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Assessment o f the Hypotheses 
The validity of the first hypothesis which 
suggests that higher degrees of pressure 
increase the probability that an actor will 
change his or her policy preference can 
directly be evaluated through the number 
of preference changes among all actors 
who were subject to pressure of a 
particular range.142 Thus, for instance, 
none out of five actors who were subject 
to very low pressure in the range of 0-5 
per cent changed their preferences, whereas one of twenty actors who were subject to 
higher pressure of 15-20 per cent changed theirs. The results displayed in Graph 3.1 
confirm that the frequency of preference changes increased almost monotonously with 
rising degrees of pressure. The gaps in the distribution and the decrease in the range 
between 40 and 45 per cent can be attributed to the fact that a single case study does not 
provide a sufficiently large number of instances to provide a continuous curve. 
Nevertheless, the first hypothesis was confirmed in 209 out of 214 instances of preference 
change, i.e. 98 per cent.
A second measure for the explanatory value‘■'of the first hypothesis is the 
distribution of the four behavioural categories which have been identified, namely 
‘change’, ‘unclear or undecided’, ‘change’ and ‘blocked’, across different degrees of 
pressure from zero to 100 per cent. Thus, according to the first hypothesis it can be 
expected that the number of instances o f ‘no change’ behaviour is higher at lower degrees 
of pressure, while ‘changes’ occur primarily at higher degrees of pressure. In addition, an 
analysis of the distribution of each behavioural category can suggest more specific 
hypotheses about the relationship between changes of the political preferences of network 
actors and the degrees of pressure to which they are subjected.
Taking the instances in which actors who did not change their policy preferences
142 Frequency = number ‘changed’ / number changed’+ ‘unclcar or undccided’+ ‘no change'
Instances of blocked preferences are excluded from the calculation because they are explained by the 
second hypothesis.
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first, it initially appears surprising that the 
distribution shown in Graph 3 .2 approaches 
a ‘normal’ curve with two peaks at 20-25 
and 40-45 per cent pressure and lower 
frequencies to both sides of them, i.e. 
pressures between zero and 15 per cent and 
above 45 per cent. The first hypothesis 
would lead to the expectation that the 
number of actors who maintain their 
preferences decreases steadily with the 
higher degrees of pressure. Visually, this 
would be represented by a diagonal 
distribution from a high rating on the left to 
a low rating on the right of the picture.
However, the divergence can easily be 
explained by the choice of the research 
period. Since the case study examined the 
decision-making process during the months 
in which the British government came 
under increasing pressure to support air 
strikes in Bosnia, very few actors were 
under no or little pressure. A different 
selection of the research period, beginning 
at a time when none of the actors seriously 
pressed for air strikes, for instance in 1991, 
would increase the number of actors who 
were subject to pressure between zero and 
15 per cent.
This aside, the curve supports the 
hypothesis that actors are less able to resist demands for changes in their policy preference 
the higher the pressure from other actors in the network. Thus, the findings show that 
none of the actors were able to maintain their opposition to air strikes when the collective
Pressure (per cent)
Graph 3 4 ’Change’
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pressure on increased above 50 per cent. It suggests the inductive proposition that there 
is a threshold pressure which actors are not able to withstand. Interestingly, this threshold 
occurs here at exactly 50 per cent which represented the situation in which half of the 
actors who have power over a specific member of the network urged him or her to support 
air strikes.
The distribution of preference ‘change’ in Graph 3.4, is a better indicator for the 
explanatory value of the first hypothesis because it shows only the instances in which 
actors modified their preferences. As hypothesised, it shows a steady and almost 
monotonous increase in the number of preference changes with rising degrees of pressure. 
Moreover, the evidence shows that actors only began to change their preferences if the 
pressure increased above 15 per cent. Again the curve indicates a threshold at a pressure 
of 50 per cent, although there is one instance in which an actor withstood higher degrees 
of pressure, indeed up to 100 percent. Out of 16 instances, it can be regarded as a 
deviation.
A second inductive proposition can be made with regard to the considerable 
overlap among the three categories of behaviour at pressures between about 25 and 50 per 
cent. It implies a critical range of pressure in which actors are unsure about their 
preferences. This inductive proposition is supported by the distribution of unclear 
preferences in Graph 3.3. It shows that the number of actors whose preferences are 
unclear or who are undecided peaks just before the 50 per cent threshold. It can, thus, be 
suggested that actors pass through a stage of reorientation which is linked to the degree 
of pressure to which they are exposed.
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Preferences Number of 
Instances
Range of 
Pressure
Minimum
Pressure
Maximum
Pressure
Average
Pressure
No Change (NC) 169 50% 0% 50% 29%
Unclear or Undecided (U) 29 52% 17% 69% 40%
Change(C) 16 80% 20% 100% 40%
Blocked (B) 51 28% 35% 64% 46%
A third measure for the correlation between the degree of pressure and preference changes
120
is the statistically significant difference in the average degree of the pressures in each 
behavioural category. Table 3.5 shows that actors were able to withstand pressure at a 
mean of 29 per cent, while they were undecided or changed at a mean o f 40 per cent. A 
veto position, indeed, enabled actors to resist higher degree of pressure at an average of 
46 per cent.
Table 3.6 Timing o f Preference Changes
1st phase after an increase in pressure Other
Med (0% -> 20%) US-Pre (28% -> 34%): 2nd Phase
US-con (0%- > 20%) EU-CMi (46%- > 48%, no further rise over 3 phases): 3rd Phase
EU-Co (36%- > 39%) Fco (0% -> 27%): 5*’ Phase
vote (29% -> 33%) US-DS (42% -> 46%, no further rise over 6 phases): 6lh Phase
US-Wh (75% ->100%)
FS (25%- > 28%)
lab (17% -> 25%)
DS (31% -> 34%)
PM (33% -> 36%)
Cab (36% -> 43%)
CE (36% -> 45%)
The final indicatojffor the plausibility of the first hypothesis is the timing of the preference 
changes during the research period. It shows a strong link between increases in the degree 
of pressure and subsequent changes in the policy preferences of the actors. In this case, 
ten out of fifteen actors changed their preferences immediately after the pressure on them 
had increased, i.e. in the following phase. One actor, the American President, modified his 
preference in the second phase after the pressure on him had increased. Four role actors 
resisted an initial strengthening of the demand for air strikes, namely the US President, US 
Secretary of Defence, the EU Council ofMinisters and Foreign Office officials. Flowever, 
the ability of these actors to resist the pressure appears to be due to the fact that two of 
these four actors were subject to no further increases until they changed their preferences. 
Moreover, the degree of pressure on each of them was below the 50 per cent threshold 
identified above. The time span over which actors were able to withstand the demands
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forced upon them varied considerably, ranging between two and six phases.143
Due to these differences in time and position of the actors in the network, no 
inductive conclusions could be drawn which might explain these exceptions. While 
network theory leads one to expect that the high pressure on the US Secretary of Defence 
should have eventually led to a preference change, it appears in this case that the 
modification of preference was also determined by the change of government and the 
personal inclinations of Les Aspin. The behaviour of the US President and the European 
Council of Ministers who resisted for only two or three phases, however, can be regarded 
as supporting the first hypothesis. Although Foreign Office officials maintained their 
objection to air strikes over five phases, their ability to resist pressures for a change in their 
preferences appears to be explicable by the observation that they were subject to lower 
degrees of pressure, namely 27 per cent, than any of the other actors who failed to change 
their preferences within one phase.
The empirical findings of this case also support the second hypothesis regarding 
the role of a veto or blocking strategy in the decision-making process. According to the 
premises set out by network theory, actors should seek to block pressure from opponents 
by using their veto in collective decision-making institutions and by attempting to transfer 
the authority to decision units over which they have a power advantage, i.e. a veto, or 
within which the balance of preferences is more in their favour. Both options are linked 
in that the inability to agree on a decision 
within subordinate decision-making units 
often leads to the transfer of the issue to 
units of higher institutional authority. The 
second hypothesis proposes that the 
blocking strategy used by one or several 
actors within a collective decision-making 
institution allows them to resist higher 
degrees of pressure.
In the case of air strikes in Bosnia,
143 Note that each phase varies in terms of chronological time, since the duration of the phases was 
determined by the timing of the preference changes.
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a veto strategy was open to sixteen actors at various stages during the decision-making 
process. The relevance of the analysis of the process of decision-making was confirmed 
in that the number of the actors which were able to veto a decision regarding the air strikes 
decreased in the later stages due to a transfer of the decision-making authority to the UN 
Security Council. During the initial phases of the debate all major international 
organisations, such as the WEU, the EC, NATO and the UN Security Council, were 
involved in the negotiation of an international response to the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia, thus giving a maximum range of actors a veto. Because of disunity within the 
WEU, the EC and NATO, however, the French government succeeded in transferring the 
authority over the international response to the conflict in Bosnia to a ‘higher’ 
international decision unit, the UN Security Council, by summer 1992. Although the 
change in the ultimate decision unit limited the ability of most European governments to 
determine the nature of the international response to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 
they accepted the transfer in return for decreased responsibility.144 It enabled them to stand 
aside, while two Security Council members, namely France and Britain, provided the 
majority of ground troops for the United Nations protection force UNPROFOR. For the 
permanent UN Security Council members, who were unanimously opposed to air strikes 
at the time of the transfer, the change of the ultimate decision unit decreased the likelihood 
of a decision in favour of military action.
In most international organisations the member governments respected the transfer 
of the authority to the UN Security Council and refrained from taking further decisions on 
the issue. Although the members of NATO and the WEU were increasingly divided over 
air strikes, further action on their part was repeatedly made dependent upon prior 
authorization by the Security Council. The only exception was the EC Council of Ministers 
which called upon the international community to consider military action on 23 March 
1993. However, since the EC, as a collective organisation, was unable to organise or 
implement air strikes itself, the decision was more directed towards the Security Council 
members than a statement of intent on its own behalf.
Among the domestic actors of the British foreign policy network, a veto of the
144 WEU Council of Ministers, Extraordinary M eeting o f  WEU Council o f  Ministers on the Situation in 
Yugoslavia, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, at http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html; WEU Council of Ministers, 
Declaration on Former Yugoslavia, Rome, 20 November 1992, at http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html.
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government’s decision to support air strikes in April 1993 was theoretically open to a 
majority in Parliament, if only at the high cost of a vote of no-confidence and new general 
elections. The option was not used, however, because the Conservative parliamentary 
party was internally divided until the government decision. According to newspaper 
reports between a third and half of the Conservative MPs supported air strikes. But 
without a clear majority within the Conservative Party the consensus was that the policy 
of the Cabinet would not be challenged. When the Cabinet decided not to veto air strikes 
in the UN Security Council, the combined pressure for the policy and the support for 
military action which existed among the Conservative and the opposition parties was 
sufficient to ensure the backing of the House of Commons.
The members of the Cabinet who belonged to the British multilevel foreign policy 
network could also have blocked the decision for air strikes. However, when the pressure 
on the Cabinet reached a critical level in mid-April, Prime Minister John Major, Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd and Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind quickly reached an 
agreement in favour of air strikes. Although formally all Cabinet decisions are taken by 
consensus, the criticism of Chancellor Norman Lamont was overruled and he conceded. 
The protests from Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke, Social Security Secretary Peter Lilley 
and Scottish Secretary Ian Lang were without noticeable effect which confirmed the 
notion that they did not belong to the foreign policy network.
In general, the findings show that the use of a blocking strategy enhanced the 
ability of the involved actors to resist higher degrees of network pressures. The difference 
is indicated by the average pressure of the categories ‘blocked’ at 46 per cent and ‘change’ 
at 40 per cent. The evidence also shows that the ability of actors to block certain policy 
decisions cannot be understood independently from the first hypothesis. Thus, the blocking 
strategy of various actors led to a deferral of the decision to implement air strikes, but it 
could not prevent it. Moreover, the mean of the pressure that actors withstood in the 
collective decision-making institutions in which they formally held a veto position was at 
46 per cent below the simple majority threshold of 50 per cent. It appears, thus, that in 
spite of its formal institutional meaning, a veto does not enable actors to prevent a decision 
in practice. While a veto position increased the ability of actors to resist pressure from 
other members of the network, it did not fully isolate them.
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New Insights into the British Decision to Support Air Strikes in Bosnia 
In addition to empirical evidence for the testing of multilevel network theory, several new 
insights can be gained from the preceding analysis. Specifically, multilevel network theory 
illustrates that pressure for the permission of air strikes in Bosnia was exerted within and 
across levels of analysis. At the international level, ministers and officials from Germany, 
Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria in particular lobbied for air 
strikes. In order to do so, they used their membership in international organisations, such 
as NATO, the WEU and the EU, as well as transgovemmental relations with their 
colleagues in the Foreign and Defence Ministries in the transatlantic community. From 
autumn 1992 additional transnational pressure emerged from the members of the 
international media and the US Congress. And finally, nationally, the British government 
was under pressure first from Liberal and later from Labour MPs in the House of 
Commons.
The scope of the relations through which the advocates of air strikes could and did 
seek to influence British ministers, thus, disconfirms the notion of the government as a 
‘gatekeeper’ between the national and the international arena. However, it is interesting 
to note that transnational coalitions in favour of or against air strikes did not emerge in this 
case. While there were a number of international and transgovemmental coalitions, both 
the distribution of preferences and the structure of the network prevented the formation 
of alliances among non-governmental actors. Conversely, two coalitions among ministers 
and officials emerged during the decision-making process. The first coalition was formed 
among the representatives of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and 
Belgium in NATO and the WEU. Although they were able to raise the pressure for air 
strikes within these international organisations to a considerable degree, multilevel 
network theory suggests that a policy change was blocked due to vetos from Britain, 
France and, initially, the US. A second coalition emerged much later among military 
officials within NATO with the aim to prevent air strikes in Bosnia which they regarded 
as the first step towards a dangerous military intervention into the conflict. However, the 
coalition failed since by that time a majority of international and national actors in Britain 
had changed their preferences in favour of air strikes.
Another new insight into the British decision to support air strikes in the UN 
Security Council regards the importance of the sequence of interactions and preference
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changes during the decision-making process for the outcome. Specifically, the study 
suggests that the pressure of the initial proponents of military intervention was insufficient 
in bringing about a preference reversal among key actors in the summer of 1992. All major 
international organisations were blocked from taking action by vetos from Britain, France 
and the US. Moreover, the transgovemmental pressure on British ministers and officials 
was too low to overcome persistent majority against military action among British MPs 
and the MoD. It was only after US President Bush and his administration changed their 
position on air strikes following news of Serb ‘concentration camps’, that the decision­
making process gained new impetus due to US pressure for air strikes.
Finally, although the winning coalition is by definition confined to actors directly 
linked to the ultimate decision unit, a multilevel network analysis of the case suggests that 
it might be more than coincidental that the final decision of the British government to 
endorse air strikes came about at a time when air strikes were supported by a majority of 
actors across the network and, crucially, all levels of analysis. It suggests that single-level 
models which focus on domestic, transnational or international factors would have equally 
been able to explain the decision of the British government to support air strikes. 
However, they would have missed an important aspect of the decision-making process in 
the convergence of preferences among national and international actors.
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4. Case II: The Abolition of the Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile Project
4.1 Introduction
The debate over the British development of a tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) arose 
with the end of the Cold War. As democratic reforms spread over Eastern Europe, existing 
nuclear defences aimed at these countries appeared obsolete, if not counterproductive.1 
In particular, the Lance missile system with its 300-mile radius did not conform to the 
changed international environment. In May 1990, a review of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation’s (NATO) nuclear strategy was set up to consider tactical alternatives as the 
basis for a new nuclear defence posture in Western Europe. During the review it emerged 
that the majority of NATO member states opposed the replacement of the short-range 
Lance by TASMs as had been proposed by the governments of the United States (US) and 
Britain. Yet, in spite of the international opposition, the British government proceeded 
with the examination of TASMs as part of its independent nuclear deterrent and as a 
contribution to NATO’s nuclear defences. Over the following three years, the British 
government considered specifically two alternatives: a collaborative development of the 
missile with the French Aerospatiale company and two off-the-shelf platforms from the 
American companies Boeing and Martin Marietta. During this period, the international and 
domestic suppoij for a new nuclear missile diminished steadily. By August 1992 the 
TASM had effectively lost all backing within the British administration and the Cabinet. 
However, only after a year of conspicuous silence, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind 
announced the cancellation of the TASM programme on 18 October 1993.
This case study examines whether multilevel network theory can help to explain 
the decision-making process which led to the British government’s policy reversal 
regarding the TASM in 1993. Specifically, it addresses the question why the government 
pursued the development of the missile for three years after the changes in the international 
environment and budgetary pressures, which were later cited as reasons for the 
cancellation of the TASM programme, had manifested themselves. It is suggested that the 
delay in the decision can be attributed to the need of political decision-makers to secure 
the support of a majority of actors to whom they are linked in the foreign policy network
1 Jeffrey Boutwell, The German Nuclear Dilemma (London: Brassey’s, 1990), pp.218f.
127
for their policies. Multilevel network theory illustrates the formation of such a ‘winning 
coalition’ in the form of a series of preference changes among the international, 
transnational and domestic actors of the British multilevel foreign policy network. 
Moreover, this case study seeks to test the two hypotheses of multilevel network theory 
which suggest that these preference changes were related to the degree of pressure to 
which each actor was exposed to due to their position within the network. Since the 
opposition to the TASM originated in the international arena, multilevel network theory 
hypothesises that these actors were able to use their transnational relations with the British 
administration to exert pressure directly or within the network at large to increase the 
pressure on the British government indirectly.
However, according to the second hypothesis, actors who had a de facto veto 
within international organisations or held a majority in parliamentary assemblies on the 
issue were able to resist higher degrees of pressure. In the case of nuclear policy the formal 
decision-making authority and the ability to veto a decision was restricted to the 
governments of the three nuclear powers, the US, Britain and France, and NATO’s 
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) which takes decisions on the basis of a consensus among 
its members. Even the House of Commons had no direct authority over the details of 
British nuclear policy, but only over the entire defence budget. While the second 
hypothesis states that an institutional veto or blocking position should increase the ability 
of an actor to withstand pressure for a preference change, this does not mean that a veto 
can prevent a policy change. The second hypothesis still falls under the conditions of the 
first which proposes that sufficiently high pressure increases the likelihood of a preference 
change. Thus, the theory assumes that the North Atlantic Council was able to abandon 
NATO’s existing requirement for a TASM because of international opposition even 
though both Britain and the US had a veto in the NPG.
The selection of the cancellation of the TASM programme as a test case was based 
on two criteria. First, the case was characterised by a policy reversal by the ultimate 
decision unit. Second, it can be argued that the requirement of a defence system like the 
TASM was not affected by exogenous factors, such as the changing international security 
environment. The ultimate decision unit in this case was the British Cabinet which changed 
its policy radically over the three years. Originally, the British government maintained its 
commitment to the development of a TASM in spite of the end of the Cold War. In fact,
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some actors argued that the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and later the Soviet Union 
enhanced the requirement for sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Tactical missiles appeared 
to be more suitable for the new threats in form of small, but volatile states in Eastern 
Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Since these external conditions were still 
in place in 1993, the policy reversal of the government cannot simply be attributed to 
changes in the structure of the international security environment.
The application of multilevel network theory to the TASM case receives further 
justification from the fact that the arguments put forward by the British government for 
its cancellation of the TASM project in November 1993, namely that the decision had been 
due to budgetary pressures, only partly account for the policy change.2 In particular, the 
timing of the policy reversal remains incomprehensible. Pressures to reduce defence 
spending had already emerged in the late 1980s and were reinforced by the end of the Cold 
War in 1990.3 Nevertheless, the British government resisted them at the time by claiming 
that the changed nature of the threat required a new tactical nuclear weapon. While the 
TASM project was maintained, the government made the unpopular decision to reduce 
its standing forces which involved substantial job losses in sensitive regions across Britain.4 
In fact, as late as September 1992, the government invested another 4.8m dollars in pre­
project studies for a TASM by the US companies Boeing and Martin Marietta and 
France’s Aerospatiale.5 Moreover, it can be contended that, if budgetary reasons had been 
the primary concern of the government, the TASMs would have been preferable to a 
fourth Trident, which was chosen as the sub-strategic alternative to the TASM in 1993.
2 A similar argument has been made by Milan Rai, Britain, Maastricht and the Bomb. The Foreign and  
Security Policy Implications o f  the Treaty o f  the European Union (London: Drava Papers, 1993), pp. 15- 
17.
3 Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945 (London: Random Century, 
1992), p. 155; Stuart Croft and David H. Dunn, T he Impact of the Defence Budget on Arms Control 
Policy’, in Mark Hoffmann, UK Arms Control Policy in the 1990s (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1990), pp.53-69.
4 Michael White and David Fairhall, ‘Ministers back cuts in defence’, Guardian, 26/7/90; Robert Fox, 
‘British troops starting a long retreat from the Rhine, says King’, Daily Telegraph, 26/7/90; Michael 
Evans, ‘Cabinet slices 18% from armed forces’. Times, 26/7/90; Peter Hetherington, ‘Scots rally to 
defence threatened regiments’, Guardian, 22/8/92.
5 ‘Martin awarded dollars 1.6 million UK TASM studies contract’, Defense Daily, 9/9/92; ‘US wavering 
may put it out of TASM’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 18:12, 19/9/92, p.21; ‘Britain persues (sic!) missile 
studies. US - Martin Marietta wins UK TASM contract’, Defense News, 20/9/92; ‘Martin-Marietta 
TASM-UK award’, lntera\>ia-Aerospace World, 28/10/92.
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Not only was the TASM cheaper, it was according to military experts also more suitable 
for British defence.6 In fact, the British government itself had argued so in November 1992 
and again in 1993.7
The following case study is again structured in a chronological-analytical section 
and a conclusion which evaluates the findings from the case with regard to the explanatory 
value of multilevel network theory. The analytical section begins by exploring the nature 
of the issue and the conditions which led to the review of the TASM project. It continues 
with a detailed analysis of the decision-making process regarding its future between May 
1990 and October 1993. Specifically, the study examines the relationship between the 
competing pressures exerted by various members of the multilevel British foreign policy 
network and changes in their preferences with regard to the TASM project.
The chronological analysis of the resulting decision-making process is structured 
in four stages. During the first stage, from May 1990 to August 1991, an international 
coalition against the development of the missile began to emerge among most NATO 
member states. However, in NATO’s strategic review the US and the British government 
remained firmly committed to the development of a TASM. Only during the second stage 
between August and November 1991, did the effects of the international opposition to the 
missile begin to show in the US. Since their European partners were unwilling to allow the 
missile to be stationed on their territory, officials from the State Department and the 
Pentagon withdrew the government’s financial support for the development of the missile 
by American companies. The Post-Cold War defence review by the US Congress came to 
the conclusion that the rationale for the missile had been lost. President Bush pre-empted 
the cancellation of the TASM by Congress and abandoned the project. Following the 
American decision, the Atlantic Alliance quietly dropped its requirement for a TASM. The 
decisions of both the US government and NATO considerably raised the pressure on the
6 Michael White, ‘Tory defence planners split over Trident purchase’, Guardian, 14/1/92. See also Robert 
H. Paterson, B rita in ’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. From Before the V-Bomber to Beyond Trident. 
(London: Frank Cass & Co., 1997), pp. 113f. who contends that giving a sub-strategic role to Trident was 
plainly ‘illogical’.
7 Malcolm Rifkind, UK Defence Strategy: A Continued Role fo r  Nuclear Weapons?, speech delivered 16 
November 1993, House of Commons, Session 1993-94, cited in the Second Report of the Defence 
Committee, Progress o f  the Trident Programme, House of Commons Paper (London: HMSO, 4 May 
1994), p.32; First Report of the Defence Committee, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992, House of 
Commons Paper 218 (London: HMSO, 11 November 1992), p.X.
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British administration to back out of the programme during the third stage from November 
1991 to October 1992. Ministry of Defence (MoD) staff were especially hard pressed to 
acknowledge the reduced viability of developing a new tactical nuclear weapon. As a 
substitute officials in the MoD began to consider a sub-strategic role for the Trident 
submarines. Yet, the government refrained from announcing the cancellation ofthe project 
because of the ongoing general election campaign. It believed that a strong position on 
national defence was popular with the electorate. Moreover, the Conservative 
parliamentary party objected to the abolition. During the following fourth stage between 
October 1992 and October 1993, the British administration attempted to change the 
preference of the Commons. Cabinet ministers alleged that the cancellation was required 
because of budgetary pressures from the Treasury and succeeded in silencing protest from 
Conservative backbenchers over the loss of the TASM. On 18 October 1993 Defence 
Secretary Rifkind announced in the House of Commons that Britain had scrapped its plans 
for a TASM.
4.2 The Abandonment of the Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile
The issue of reconsidering the development of a TASM arose with the end of the Cold 
War. Although the weapon system had always been controversial within the Atlantic 
Alliance, national and international doubts over the necessity of the missile increased 
considerably after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Most Western European 
governments agreed that the changed nature of the international system reduced the need 
for large nuclear arsenals. Although few governments questioned the continued relevance 
of nuclear defences in principle, the development of new nuclear weapons systems 
appeared to contradict the dismantling of old stocks by NATO and the former Warsaw 
Pact countries. Moreover, the increasing development cost of new weapons weighed 
heavily on national defence budgets which were drastically cut back in the early 1990s to 
meet popular demands for a ‘peace dividend’. Still at the pre-development stage, the 
TASM project was particularly vulnerable to the calls for cutbacks. The investigation into 
a TASM had been begun by the United States in 1987 without the consultation of its 
Western European allies.8 At the time, the project had already caused some controversy
8 Duncan Lennox, ‘Sland-off delivery comes of age’, Jane's Defence Weekly 15:11, 13/3/91, p.394.
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in NATO because the governments in Belgium and Germany challenged the requirement 
for new nuclear weapons in Europe. Only the British administration, which sought a 
replacement for its W E-177 free-fall nuclear bombs, was keen to purchase the missile.9 
However, the British government also investigated a collaboration with France in the 
design of a TASM.10 In November 1989, the British Ministry of Defence awarded £ lm 
to the French Aerospatiale company for a pre-feasibility study.11 Apart from political 
reasons, problems with the development of nuclear warheads at the Aldermaston Atomic 
Weapons Establishment increased the attractiveness of the Franco-British option. While 
the US military was prohibited from sharing certain information about nuclear 
development under the US Atomic Energy Act of 1959, a collaboration with France was 
not legally restricted. However, a Franco-British project could endanger British nuclear 
testing in the US sites in Nevada.12 Moreover, Royal Air Force (RAF) staff preferred the 
US American options which included Boeing’s SRAM-T and Martin Marietta’s Tactical 
Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM).13 In May 1990, both options were still under 
investigation.14 As the criticism of the project increased, the focus of the decision-making 
process shifted from the selection of the missile to the question of whether TASMs were 
required at all. Moreover, in the latter stages of the debate, the issue was redefined as a 
direct competition between TASMs and a tactical missile to be carried by Britain’s Trident 
submarines. This case study examines how the interactions among the members of the 
British multilevel foreign policy network shaped the debate for and against the TASM.
NA TO Split over TASM
The first stage of the decision-making process regarding the British TASM stretched over
9 Mark Urban, ‘US pressing ahead with plans for new nuclear missile’, Independent, 29/10/88; David 
Marsh, Ian Davidson and Adriana Ierodiaconou, ‘W Germany reluctant to accept new US nuclear 
weapons’, Financial Times, 15/2/89.
10 Rai, Britain, M aastricht and the Bomb, p. 15.
11 Jaques Isnard, ‘France lines up ASLP for RAF’, Jane's Defence Weekly 13:16, 21/4/90, p.728.
12 Robin Oakley and Peter Stothard, ‘Thatcher basks in Bush’s approval’, Times, 16/4/90.
13 John Keegan, ‘French missile may replace RAF’s A-Bombs’, Daily Telegraph, 2/11/89; Nick Cook, 
‘SRAM T “natural” choice for UK’, Jane's Defence Weekly 13:5, 3/2/90, p. 185.
14 Secretary of Defence Tom King in ‘The JDW Interview’, Ja n e ’s Defence Weekly 13:8,24/2/90, p.368; 
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1990, Cm 1022-1 (London: HMSO, April 1990), p. 19.
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a year from NATO’s recognition of the end of the Cold War on 4 May 1990 to the 
publication of the British Defence White Paper on 9 July 1991. In spite of the international 
criticism of the missile during the year, the 1991 White Paper confirmed the continued 
commitment of the British government to the development and purchase of a TASM.
The international debate over TASMs began in early 1990, when the US President 
George Bush proposed the abolition of plans to replace Lance as a starting point for US- 
Soviet negotiations to remove all short-range nuclear weapons from Europe. In addition, 
Bush initiated a review of NATO’s nuclear strategy in a summit proposed for June or 
July.15 In spite of these measures, American and British political leaders agreed that the 
US should maintain its nuclear presence in Europe.16 Both governments planned to deploy 
the air-launched TASM as replacement for the land-based Lance.17 In the US, the TASM 
was praised as a weapon which would be suitable for the changed international security 
environment after the end of the Cold War.18 Nevertheless, other actors within the British 
multilevel foreign policy network soon voiced their opposition to the missile. Specifically, 
the German administration objected strongly to the British and American plans for basing 
the T ASM on the European continent. Following the dismantling of the Lance the German 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had hoped for the denuclearisation of Central 
Europe. The opposition of the German administration to the missile was shared by several
15 Colin Hughes, Isabel Hilton and David Usbome, ‘US signals nuclear rethink in Europe’, Independent, 
4/5/90; J.A.C. Lewis, ‘Lance follow-on to be axed’, Jane's Defence Weekly 13:17, 5/5/90, p.836; Peter 
Riddell, ‘Bush treads warily in European minefield’, Financial Times, 8/5/90; Hella Pick, ‘Tactical arms 
would go in Soviet offer’, Guardian, 16/6/90; ‘Drip, drip, drip - US continues to leak Nato summit 
proposals’, Economist, 7/7/90.
16 Carver, Tightrope Walking, p. 165.
17 ‘UK MoD admits to US basing talks’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 13:14, 7/4/90, p.627; Martin Fletcher, 
‘Bush approves plan for Nato summit this year’, Times, 20/4/90; Hella Pick, ‘Nato pressed on nuclear 
missiles’, Guardian, 27/4/90; Peter Stolhard, ‘Baker sets out to sell US vision for new Germany’, Times, 
3/5/90; Martin Fletcher, ‘Bush prepares way for higher cuts in forces’, Times, 5/5/90; Colin Hughes, 
‘Bush favours new airborne nuclear arsenal in Europe’, Independent, 5/5/90; Michael Evans, ‘West rallies 
to aid Gorbachev’, Times, 7/5/90; Peter Riddell, ‘Bush treads warily in European minefield’, Financial 
Times, 8/5/90; ‘Leading article: Hugger-mugger deployment’, Independent, 8/5/90. Compare also 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘The Dual Imperative of Britain’s Nuclear Deterrent: The Soviet Threat, Alliance 
Politics and Arms Control’, in Mark Hoffman, UK Arms Control Policy in the 1990s (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press), pp.32-52, p.43.
18J.A.C. Lewis, ‘Lance follow-on to be axed’, Jane's Defence Weekly 13:17,5/5/90, p.836; Barbara Starr, 
‘Filling the gap left by Lance’, Jane's Defence Weekly 13:20, 19/5/90, p.954.
133
of its European neighbours, such as the Netherlands, j ajj|e 41
Belgium and to some degree Italy.19 In addition, the Preference Changes:
4 May 1990 -11 August 1991
development of new nuclear weapons was criticised 
by representatives of the British Labour Party and the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
At the beginning of May 1990, however, the 
opposition to the TASM had yet to organise itself 
The linkages within the network through which the 
four governments and the two domestic opponents of 
the missile could exert pressure for the abolition of 
the missile programme were restricted. The strongest 
relations existed between the foreign and defence 
ministers of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy 
and Britain, and the officials from their respective 
ministries. However, combined, the politicians and 
civil servants of four countries did not amount to 
more than 28 per cent of the actors to whom the 
British Secretary of Defence, who had the primary
authority on the issue, was linked in the network.20#•*
Moreover, the four administrations did not have any 
contacts with the domestic opposition to the TASM 
in Britain among the Liberal Democrats, the Labour 
Party and the CND with whom they could have 
formed a transnational coalition.
19 Martin Fletcher, Bush prepares way for higher cuts in forces’, Times, 5/5/90; Ian Brodie and George 
Jones, ‘Nato split over plans for new nuclear missile’. D aily Telegraph, 9/5/90; Martin Fletcher, ‘Nato 
chiefs divided over short-range missile plan’. Times, 10/5/90; Ian Brodie, ‘“First-strike” option to stay in 
Nato plans’, D aily Telegraph, 10/5/90; Ian Brodie, ‘King faces tough questions on Nato nuclear fission’, 
D aily Telegraph, 11/5/90; Barbara Starr, ‘USA “may pull out nuclear shells’” , J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 
13:20,19/5/90, p. 943; Ian Brodie, ‘Nato leader plays down reports of nuclear arms rift’, D aily Telegraph, 
11/5/90; ‘Leading article: Nato family planning’. Times, 11/5/90; ‘Drip, Drip, drip - US continues to leak 
Nato summit proposals’. Economist, 7/7/90.
20Specifically, the defence ministers and staff from the four countries accounted for eight out of 29 actors 
to whom the British Secretary of Defence was linked, raising the pressure on him to P, [DS| = 8/29 = 
28%.
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
Nato-Org 48 NC
Par 46 B
Nato-CM 41 NC
US-Pen 37 NC
Mod 33 NC
US-SD 33 NC
US-Sd 31 NC
DS 28 NC
Fco 27 NC
US-SS 27 NC
US-Pre 25 NC
FS 22 NC
PM 21 NC
Med 20 NC
vote 14 U
US-Con 13 c
Com 6 NC
Cab 0 NC
con 0 NC
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The best prospects of increasing the pressure on the governments of Britain and 
the US existed within NATO which was the only international organisation in Western 
Europe with a significant role in nuclear decision-making. Since the TASM had been made 
a requirement under NATO’s integrated nuclear strategy in the 1980s, a common review 
of the Alliances strategic defence posture could lead to a reevaluation of the missile. 
Indeed, the defence ministers from the four governments used the next meeting of 
NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in Kananaskis, Canada, on 9-10 May 1990, to 
express their criticism of the T ASM. Predictably the four ministers clashed with the British 
Defence Secretary Tom King who had hoped to gain the member states’ approval for the 
deployment of the TASM on the continent.21 Questioned by journalists, NATO General 
Secretary Manfred Womer admitted that the policy faced not only the opposition from 
many European governments, but also the Soviet Union which demanded a nuclear-free 
Europe as condition for its consent to German reunification.22
Further discussions in the NPG revealed the scope of the opposition to the missile 
in NATO. Not only the representations of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy 
criticised the proposal to station TASMs in Europe, but also Denmark, Iceland and 
Norway. The defence secretaries of the US and Canada spoke out in favour of the 
TASMs. However, their countries were not suited for deployment if the missile was to be 
used in conflicts in Eastern Europe or the Middle East. This left only the British and,
“ 'X
perhaps, the Turkish government prepared to base the missile in their country. The 
governments of France and Spain did not object to the TASMs, but because they were not 
integrated into the military structure of NATO, they had no voice in the NPG.23 With 
seven NPG members explicitly opposed to the stationing of T ASMs in Europe, 41 per cent 
of the actors linked to and represented within NATO exerted pressure against the missile.24
21 Ian Brodie, George Jones and Patricia Wilson, ‘Nato split over plans for new nuclear missile’, Daily 
Telegraph, 9/5/90; Michael Evans, ‘West rallies to aid Gorbachev’, Times, 7/5/90; Ian Brodie, ‘German 
must stay nuclear says Nato ch ief, Daily Telegraph, 10/5/90; Sarah Helm, ‘Thatcher to seek Nato backing 
for air missile’, Independent, 12/5/90.
22 Ian Brodie, ‘German must stay nuclear says Nato ch ief, Daily Telegraph, 10/5/90; Hella Pick, ‘Bonn 
sets its face against new missile’. Guardian, 12/5/90.
23 Colin Brown, ‘Doubts over siting of missiles’, Independent, 14/5/90. For Belgium’s position see also 
‘Truppenabzug bis Ende 1996’, Reuter German News Service, 29/11/90.
24 In the North Atlantic Council the seven member states were represented through their heads of state, 
their foreign or defence ministers, thus accounting for £=3x7=21 links in the network and raising the
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However, in spite of the strong opposition, the international coalition among the 
defence ministers from the seven countries failed to achieve the unequivocal cancellation 
of the programme in the North Atlantic Council. The factual veto position of all NATO 
member states enabled the British and American representatives to block a change of 
NATO policy at this point. Crucial for the success of this strategy was the fact that the 
requirement for a tactical nuclear missile as part of NATO’s nuclear defence strategy had 
already been approved in the 1980s. The abandonment of TASMs was, therefore, a change 
from the status quo which Britain and the US could veto. The blocking position of the two 
governments in the Alliance effectively increased the pressure required for a policy change 
in the Alliance. Furthermore, the opposition to the missile was internally divided. Although 
not in favour of the missile, most NATO members had not yet developed a clear policy 
preference with regard to the future of NATO’s nuclear defence strategy.
In particular, the German administration would have preferred to avoid the topic 
of nuclear weapons altogether because it feared that its discussion would endanger the 
ongoing ‘two-plus-four’ negotiations with the Soviet Union over German unification.25 
Moreover, German politicians were aware that a public debate over the stationing of 
nuclear missiles in Germany would almost certainly lead to public protests as occurred 
after the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in the 1980s.26 Further indications of 
unclear policy preferences were differences in the governmental policy as expressed by the 
German Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry. While Foreign Minister Genscher and 
his staff objected to the replacement of nuclear missiles in Germany, Defence Minister 
Gerhard Stoltenberg avoided taking a critical stance on the issue of the TASM.27
pressure to P, fNato CM] = 21/51=41% .
25 David Marsh and Christopher Bobinski, ‘Bonn expected to oppose deployment of new missile’, 
Financial Times, 4/5/90; David White, ‘UK urges Nato to keep some US missiles’, Financial Times, 
10/5/90; Hella Pick, ‘Bonn sets its face against new missile’, Guardian, 12/5/90.
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Chancellor Kohl’s resistance to a modernisation of nuclear weapons in Germany 
appeared to be due more to its effect on the negotiations over German unification and the 
upcoming general elections in December, than to fundamental objections to nuclear 
weapons. Kohl certainly disagreed with Foreign Minister Genscher’s advocacy of a 
denuclearised Europe. However, on the issue of the TASM, the differences between Kohl 
and Genscher were less clear-cut. To avoid a controversy with his national, as well as 
international partners, Chancellor Kohl argued that it was too early to decide about the 
issue.28 Even the American intentions were unclear. Although President Bush had 
suggested a review of NATO nuclear strategy for the summer, Defence Secretary Richard 
Cheney stated at the meeting of the NPG that NATO’s doctrine of ‘flexible response’ 
would not be put into question.29
In order to allow for a policy review both internally and among its member states, 
the NPG decided to postpone the issue. In the NPG’s Final Communique, the conflicting 
views among its members over the future of nuclear weapons in Europe were played 
down. The TASM programme was not mentioned. The communique stated, however, that 
due to a reduction of short-range nuclear missiles, sub-strategic systems would ‘assume 
relatively greater importance’.30 If this suggested that the British and American delegates 
had prevailed in the discussion, their victory was built on shaky grounds because the NPG 
also agreed to task General John Galvin, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
(SACEUR), with a comprehensive review of conventional and nuclear weapons 
requirements after the end of the Cold War.31 The review would enable the opponents of 
the missile to express their concerns and co-ordinate their pressure along their national, 
transnational and international relations within the network over the coming months. In 
particular, foreign and defence ministers and officials from the seven countries were able 
to use the transgovemmental linkages with their British and American counterparts to
28 Colin Brown, ‘Doubts over siting of missiles’, Independent, 14/5/90; ‘Leading article: Genscher taps 
a pacifist vein’, Independent, 17/5/90; Robert Mauthner, ‘Foreign Affairs: Discretely embarrassed by 
defence’, Financial Times, 19/6/90. See also Boutwcll, German Nuclear Dilemma, pp.229f.
29 Martin Fletcher, ‘Nato chiefs divided over short-range missile plan’, Times, 10/5/90; Ian Brodie, 
‘“First-strike” option to stay in Nato plans’. Daily Telegraph, 10/5/90.
30 Nuclear Planning Group, Final Communique, Kananaskis, Canada, 9-10 May 1990, at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900510a.htm. See also Colin Hughes and John Eisenhammer, 
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press for a review of the TASM programme.
Thus, the transgovemmental pressure on the American administration was 
considerable. The degree of pressure was, at 37 per cent, highest on the relevant officials 
in the Pentagon who had close relations with their partners bilaterally and through NATO, 
but few other linkages within the network.32 The American Secretary of Defence Cheney 
was also subject to considerable pressure at 33 per cent33, while President Bush was less 
affected as the seven heads of state only accounted for 25 per cent of his linkages34. In 
Britain, the pressure on the administration was equally high at the level of the Ministry of 
Defence staff where the counterparts from the eight countries accounted for 33 per cent 
of their contacts in the network. However, the pressure from the eight administrations was 
significantly lower on Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd at 22 per cent and Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher at 21 per cent.35 Crucially, the British Cabinet was only indirectly 
linked to the governments through the departmental ministers and, therefore, insulated 
from international pressure as long as British ministers refused to abandon the TASM.
The lack of direct pressure on the Cabinet helps to explain why, in spite of the 
international protests, the British government continued to support the TASM programme 
during autumn 1990. In the House of Commons, Minister of State for Defence Archie 
Hamilton emphasised the government’s determination to proceed with the deployment of 
TASMs regardless of the opposition from its European partners.36 Speaking to the 
Commons Defence Committee, three former military service chiefs and a former civil 
servant from the Ministry of Defence pointed out that in order to maintain a viable 
defence, it was essential for Britain to retain its nuclear deterrent. While they endorsed the 
abolition of short-range nuclear weapons by the superpowers, they recommended the
32 Thus, the pressure from their counterparts in seven NATO member states accounted for 37 per cent of 
the Pentagon staffs’ linkages in the network, i.e. P, [US-pen] = 7/19 = 37%:
33 The pressure on the US Secretary of Defence was somewhat lower than on this staff because he had 
more contacts within the network, so that his eight colleagues accounted only for 33 per cent, with P, [US- 
SD] = 8/24 = 33%.
34 The number of linkages of the US President was even higher than those of the US Defence Secretary 
raising the pressure to 25 per cent, i.e. P, [US-Pre] = 8/32 = 25%.
35 The pressure from the seven NATO countries accounted respectively for P, [Mod] = 7/21 = 38%, P, 
[FS] = 8/36 = 22% and P, [PM] = 8/39 = 21%.
36 Stephen Goodwin, ‘Parliament and Politics: Nato “must maintain nuclear stalemate’” , Independent, 
16/6/90.
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deployment of medium-range missiles such as TASMs in their place.37 The American 
administration, too, decided to proceed with the development of the missile for the time 
being. At the end of May it awarded a 181m-dollar follow-on contract to Boeing 
Aerospace and Electronics for the full development of the SRAM-T.38
In May 1990, the main question for the British government was not whether to 
proceed with the development of the T ASM, but with whom to collaborate. MoD officials 
were still evaluating its two options: the purchase of American missiles or to cooperate 
with France. Prime Minister Thatcher increasingly appeared to support the French option. 
As a result of bilateral talks with President Mitterrand on 7 May, Thatcher agreed to 
enhance the cooperation between the British and French armed forces.39 The French 
government was little affected by the opposition to the missile within NATO and, thus, 
would be a reliable partner in the development of a TASM. While the US and Britain were 
increasingly under pressure in NATO, the French administration was unconcerned about 
the debate in the Atlantic Alliance as France had left NATO’s integrated military structure 
and maintained its nuclear independence.40 Moreover, the French government agreed with 
its counterparts in the US and Britain over the need to retain nuclear forces in Europe. In 
the view of the French administration, the end of the Cold War did not question the 
necessity of an independent nuclear deterrent for France. On the contrary, as the potential 
nuclear threat mpved from the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet Union, the Middle East and 
Third World countries, the French military had identified the TASM as a key element of 
its new defence posture.41
Although the British and American representations had temporarily prevailed in 
the North Atlantic Council and resisted international pressures for the abolition of the 
TASM, both governments recognised that it was crucial to gain the active support of their 
European partners if they planned to deploy the TASM in Europe. In order to do so, the
37 Robert Fox, ‘Soviet threat in Europe “now negligible’” , Daily Telegraph, 17/5/90.
38 ‘SRAM-T go-ahead’, Ja n e ’s Defence Weekly 13:21, 26/5/90, p. 1011.
39 Ian Brodie, George Jones and Patricia Wilson, ‘Nato split over plans for new nuclear missile’, Daily 
Telegraph, 9/5/90.
40 Michael Evans, ‘Britain and France resist Bush nuclear war doctrine’, Times, 6/7/90.
41 Bruce D. Larkin, Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France and China in the Global Governance o f  
Nuclear Arm s (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), p.26.
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British and American military began in turn to exert pressure on their colleagues for a 
positive reevaluation of the TASM. Soon after the NPG meeting in May, information was 
leaked from officials in Bonn and Washington about a Whitehall plan to overcome German 
objections to the TASM. According to a proposal discussed between senior NATO and 
Pentagon officials, a joint British, American and German air force based in Britain could 
integrate the German Bundeswehr into NATO’s nuclear defences, yet avoid the stationing 
of the missile on German soil.42 The plan was a step back from the original British 
intentions to station the TASM on the continent. Nevertheless, when Foreign Secretary 
Hurd raised the question during a meeting in Bonn, the German Foreign Minister Genscher 
immediately rejected the plan. Further discussions were envisaged for a gathering of 
NATO defence ministers in the Defence Planning Committee later in the week, but the 
plan was quietly dropped.43
In June 1990, the leadership of the Soviet Union used the discord within NATO 
to add to the transgovemmental pressure on the British and American administrations for 
the abolition of the TASM programme to achieve its own ends. Soviet representatives 
suggested the inclusion ofBritish and French tactical nuclear arsenals into the disarmament 
negotiations with the US. Soviet officials argued that TASMs and sea-launched cruise 
missiles effectively undermined the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
which had been signed in 1987. The treaty applied only to ground-launched nuclear 
weapons.44 The claim received unexpected support from US Admiral Eugene Carroll who 
admitted that the modernisation of NATO’s nuclear forces was ‘in breach of the spirit, if 
not the letter, of the INF T reaty’ .45 In Britain, representatives of the Labour Party and the 
CND made a similar argument.46 Nevertheless, politicians in the US and even Germany, 
which was opposed to the TASM, rejected the suggestion because of its possibly far-
42 Simon Tisdall, ‘Luftwaffe jets may fly from British bases as part of proposed NATO nuclear force’, 
Guardian, 15/5/90.
43 Simon O’Dwyer-Russell, ‘British Luftwaffe plan hits turbulence’, Sunday Telegraph, 20/5/90.
44 Treaty between the United States o f  American and the Union o f  Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination o f  their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Washington, 8 December 1987, at 
http ://www. state, gov/www/global/arms/treaties/infl. html
45 Quoted in Martin Walker, ‘Soviet generals may be behind nuclear stance’, Guardian, 7/6/90.
46 Colin Brown, ‘New nuclear weapons for UK’, Independent, 27/12/90.
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reaching consequences.47
At the next meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tumberry, Scotland, on 7-8 
June 1990, the distribution of preferences among the member states was unchanged. The 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reiterated her intentions to station TASMs in 
Britain and other European countries in order to maintain NATO’s nuclear defences. She 
was again challenged by the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher who was 
informally quoted as having said that Germany would refuse outright the deployment of 
TASMs if asked. An open confrontation between them was narrowly avoided when 
Genscher denied the statement. However, German representatives at NATO repeatedly 
made clear that their government was not in favour of basing TASMs in Germany. Again 
NATO ministers agreed to postpone a decision regarding the TASM - this time until 1992. 
Although the degree of pressure on the Alliance had not changed, its consistently high 
level of 41 per cent began to wear down the ability of the American and British foreign 
ministers to veto the abolition of the TASM requirement. In the Tumberry communique, 
the Alliance position was certainly formulated more carefully than it had been in May. In 
particular, NATO member states now expressed their willingness to consider and initiate 
adjustments in their number of conventional and nuclear forces.48
Soon after the NATO meeting, the Soviet leadership proposed to abolish all short- 
range nuclear arsenals and to cancel the French and American development of TASMs in 
negotiations which were to start in September. However, the French government rejected 
the suggestion. It fundamentally refused to negotiate its nuclear defences under a 
comprehensive multilateral framework together with those of the US and Britain.49 The 
explicit position of the French President Mitterrand was that his administration would not
47 Hella Pick, ‘US sees hope in new Soviet line on Germany’, Guardian, 29/5/90; Martin Walker, ‘Soviet 
bid to end UK deterrent’, Guardian, 6/6/90; Martin Walker, ‘Soviet generals may be behind nuclear 
stance’, Guardian, 7/6/90.
48 North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, Tumberry, United Kingdom, 7-8 June 1990, at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/conun/49-95/c900608a.htm; Philip Stephens and Robert Mauthner, ‘Thatcher 
calls for broader NATO role’, Financial Times, 8/6/90; Hella Pick, ‘Thatcher calls on NATO to move into 
new areas’, Guardian, 8/6/90; Michael Evans, ‘Baker hails Soviet hope of reaching German deal ’, Times, 
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join the international negotiations before the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers had 
reached levels comparative to that of France.50 In the meantime the French government 
would continue with the development of its new tactical nuclear missile. In fact, French 
and US scientists had carried out nuclear tests for the design of TASMs only days before 
the Soviet announcement.51 The North Atlantic Council also rejected the Soviet proposals, 
but agreed on negotiations over short-range nuclear forces (SNF) with the Soviet Union 
to begin in 1991. Moreover, the persisting international pressure from the representatives 
of many NATO member states and the Soviet Union for the abolition of the TASM 
showed first signs of weakening the American government’s resolve to update its tactical 
nuclear weapons.
The issue reemerged during the review of NATO’s nuclear doctrine at the summit 
in London on 5-6 July. In a letter to Alliance leaders, the American President George Bush 
suggested making NATO’s tactical weapons means of ‘last resort’. In addition, Bush 
pressed for a common position on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces.52 While US 
Secretary of State James Baker agreed with his British colleagues that the Alliance should 
reserve its right to respond to a conventional attack with nuclear missiles, his government 
seemed increasingly divided. The split ran between the ‘hawks’, led by Defence Secretary 
Richard Cheney and Vice-President Dan Quayle and the cautious President Bush. To 
avoid the public debacle of the previous, meetings, NATO heads of state agreed not to 
discuss the contentious TASMs at the summit.53 However, this informal agreement did not 
prevent the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from raising the subject of the 
missile in her speech. Thatcher pointed out that the Soviet Union continued to build 100 
TASMs per week implying that NATO should respond in kind.54 Thatcher also opposed
50 Larkin, Nuclear Designs, pp. 13 9-141.
51 Christopher Bellamy, ‘US and France may be testing warheads for tactical missiles’, Independent, 
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President Bush’s proposal to make tactical nuclear weapons means of last resort. 
Conversely, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl supported the American initiative.55 
Moreover, Chancellor Kohl himself privately dismissed the deployment of TASMs in 
Germany.56
The eventual endorsement of President Bush’s proposal by NATO leaders was 
perceived by the media as a surprise considering the unabated opposition of the British 
Prime Minister to a reduction in NATO’s nuclear defence posture. However, the degree 
of international pressure on the members of the North Atlantic Council can account for 
the erosion of NATO’s commitment to tactical nuclear weapons. Although the veto 
position of Britain and the US enabled Prime Minister Thatcher and President Bush to 
block the outright cancellation of the TASM requirement in the Council, the persistent 
pressure from 41 per cent of NATO’s members was forcing progressive shifts in its 
nuclear policy.57 In their final communique, NATO heads of state declared that nuclear 
forces would be made ‘truly weapons of last resort’.58 Although British officials tried to 
play down the associated change in NATO strategy, the new policy implied that its nuclear 
defence would now rest on long-range strategic weapons. It put the future role of the 
middle-range TASM implicitly into question.59
Following the defeat of the British administration on the question of making 
nuclear weapons means of last resort in NATO’s strategy, the domestic opponents of the 
TASM in Britain, namely members of the Labour Party and the CND, reasserted their 
criticism. In the absence of direct influence on the government they focussed their pressure 
on the national and international media. Spokespersons for the Labour Party used the 
public attention created by the NATO summit to expressly welcome NATO’s decision. 
The new NATO strategy matched the preference of Labour members for a no first-use 
policy of nuclear weapons. Moreover, party leader Neil Kinnock expressed his scepticism
55 Hella Pick and David Fairhall, ‘Nuclear arms to be last resort’, Guardian, 6/7/90; Hella Pick, ‘The 
London Declaration: Thatcher claims the fame while others take the credit’, Guardian, 7/7/90.
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57 See footnote 22.
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about the development of the TASM in the American press during a visit to Washington. 
However, Labour leaders indicated that they would honour British commitments if NATO 
decided to base the missiles in Europe.60 In Labour’s 1990 party programme, ‘Looking to 
the Future’, the Labour Party appeared similarly divided. While the programme advocated 
the destruction of all land-based short-range nuclear weapons, it did not discuss other 
nuclear weapons such as the TASM.61 Labour leaders themselves were under pressure 
from representatives of the CND among their members.62 CND representatives intended 
to use the issue of the TASM as a lever for a broader critique of NATO policy after the 
end of the Cold War. They planned a campaign against the deployment of the TASMs for 
the beginning of 1991.63 Moreover, CND members could claim to have broad support 
from the British public. According to a survey, which the CND had commissioned from 
Gallup, 60 per cent of the population were opposed to the TASM.64 Members of the 
Liberal Democrats also criticised the government for its plan to go ahead with the 
purchase of a TASM.65 In a political paper for its party conference, titled ‘Reshaping 
Europe’, Liberal Democrat leaders expressed their opposition to the replacement of the 
WE-177 free-fall nuclear bomb by TASMs.66
However, the ability of opposition MPs and members of the CND to exert pressure 
within the British foreign policy network was very limited. In particular, they lacked direct 
leverage over cabinet ministers or officials. In order to influence the administration, they 
had to use indirect linkages through the House of Commons, the members of the
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Parliamentary Defence Committee and journalists.67 In Parliament, a preference change 
was ruled out due to the blocking position of the Conservative parliamentary party. Thus, 
although the opposition members collectively raised the pressure on the Commons to 46 
per cent, this was not sufficient to overcome the dominance of the Conservative 
parliamentary majority.68 A change of the Parliament’s support for the TASM required 
first a preference change among the Conservative MPs. However, this was highly unlikely. 
Not only were Conservative MPs the main supporters of the TASM, they were also 
insulated from the international and national pressure against the project because the 
opponents of the TASM lacked direct relations with the members of the Conservative 
parliamentary party.
In the Commons Defence Committee, the Conservative majority was equally 
dominant. However, the balance of pressures in the committee was at 6 per cent slightly 
more favourable for the opposition parties as a result of the small number of members in 
the committee and their restricted linkages within the network.69 In their Tenth Report of 
11 July 1990, the members of the Defence Committee, thus, recognised that the 
deployment of the missiles in Germany or other NATO countries was in doubt.70 In the 
light of the opposition within the Alliance, the report concluded that there was ‘no evident 
urgency to deploy a nuclear-armed T ASM: rather the opposite’ .71 Moreover, the Defence 
Committee members suggested that a decision over its stationing ‘should be taken by 
NATO as a whole in the light of arms control negotiations’ .n  Nevertheless, the committee 
members demanded that a credible nuclear deterrent, including a ‘spectrum of sub- 
strategic weapons’, should be retained. In another paragraph, the members of the Defence 
Committee supported the technical development of a TASM, perhaps in closer
67 See Appendix 1: British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95.
68 With 251 Labour and Liberal Democratic MPs using the 16 linkages of Parliament to oppose the T ASM 
and exerting pressure on the remaining 399 MPs, E=( 16x251 )+(2x3 99) =4814 and P, [Par] = 4814/10400 
= 46%.
69 Among the fifteen linkages of the Defence Committee members in the British multilevel foreign policy 
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70 Robert Mauthner, ‘The Defence Cuts: Changes will not be cheap’, Financial Times, 26/7/90; 
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72 Ibid.
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cooperation with France.73
The British electorate had theoretically the widest influence within the British 
foreign policy network because its voting power over both government and MPs. 
However, on the question of the TASM public opinion was unclear. The government 
believed that the electorate supported a ‘strong’ policy on national defence. This view was 
based on opinion polls which suggested that the public remained in favour of Britain’s 
independent nuclear deterrent.74 Conversely, a CND poll suggested that voters were 
increasingly critical of tactical nuclear missiles. Given the different phrasing of the 
questions and the highly technical nature of the issue, the lack of a clear opinion was little 
surprising. In the event, however, the lack of a clear preference meant that public opinion 
did not exert pressure on the government in either direction.
In October 1990, the British plans for the missile received another setback when 
the US Congress announced that it would cut the budget for the development of the 
American TASM back from 118m to 35m dollars. In a review of American security policy 
after the end of the Cold War, congressional leaders had concluded that the TASM was 
not a priority.75 US Air Force officials were also increasingly doubtful of the project 
because of repeated problems with the development of the missile.76 Although the 
withdrawal of US government funds limited the choices for British defence planners, it did 
not generally put the MoD requirement for a TASM into question. Instead, the British 
government beg'hn to redirect its attention to Franco-British collaboration in the 
construction of a TASM. Following the congressional decision, the British Defence 
Secretary Tom King met his French colleague Jean-Pierre Chevenement to further explore
73 Tenth Report of the Defence Committee, Defence Implications o f  Recent Events, Session 1989-90, 
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the possibility of jointly developing a TASM. The French Prime Minister Michel Rocard 
favoured the collaboration as a step towards an independent European security identity. 
In addition, Franco-British cooperation would split the costs for the research and 
development of the weapon. Closer European collaboration in defence procurement was 
also widely supported among British MPs and the members of the Commons Defence 
Committee. According to David Owen, MP, it would be ‘a historic decision...profoundly 
important for the development of Europe’. MoD staff, however, were not ready to decide 
on the question. They were waiting for the results of a feasibility study of a Franco-British 
missile which were expected by the end of the year.77
In the meantime, the international opposition from within Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and the Soviet Union to the 
development of tactical nuclear missiles by Britain and the US persisted. After the signing 
of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty in late November, the Soviet Union 
urged again for negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons, which had been agreed with 
NATO in the summer.78 The leadership in Moscow indicated that it would seek the 
abolition of the TASM project by NATO. The call for nuclear reductions was widely 
shared among the European public. In particular, the German government was coming 
increasingly under pressure from the electorate to reject the stationing of TASMs and to 
declare Germany a nuclear-free zone.79
However, the opponents of the TASM had so far not been able to enlarge their 
coalition by pressurizing or persuading any other actors within the British foreign policy 
network to abandon the project. In particular, the British Cabinet remained free from 
direct pressure from British ministers and was, therefore, able to maintain its commitment 
to the TASM during winter 1990. The resignation of Prime Minister Thatcher, who had 
been a strong supporter of the missile within the government, did not bring about a change 
in policy preferences. In December 1990, cabinet ministers reconfirmed their determination 
to go ahead with the deployment of the TASM. RAF staff were particularly eager to
77 Andrew McEwen, ‘Britain ‘poised to pick France’ as partner in nuclear missile project’, Times, 
24/10/90.
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purchase the weapon in order to preserve their role in the nuclear defence of Britain after 
the phasing out of the WE-177 bomb. Although officials in the MoD were still considering 
both the American and French options, Franco-British collaboration received new support 
due to the interest of Prime Minister John Major in strengthening European relations.80 
The Minister of State for Defence Procurement Alan Clark and his Parliamentary Under­
secretary Kenneth Carlisle were also believed to favour collaboration with France.81 
However, by February 1991 MoD officials who were subject to the highest degree of 
pressure at 33 per cent because of their linkages with their colleagues in NATO showed 
first signs of a preference change. After an internal dispute over the selection and the cost 
of the weapon among the three services, the officials postponed the decision regarding the 
purchase of a missile platform for another year.82 It had become increasingly difficult for 
MoD staff to ignore the effects of the international opposition to the TASM. Crucially, the 
refusal of Britain’s NATO partners to station the TASM on the continent reduced the 
practical value of the missile for British forward defence against rogue states in the Middle 
East. In addition, the development cost of the missile was rising because of the 
congressional cutbacks in the American involvement in the programme. When Navy 
officials suggested the conversion of Trident missiles for sub-strategic use as a less costly 
and independent alternative to the T ASM, the programme was for the first time openly put 
into doubt within the British administration.
While the British government maintained its support for the missile in public, the 
American debate over the future of the TASM project intensified during spring 1991. 
Driven by countervailing demands from its partners in NATO and American Senators on 
one hand, and the Secretary of Defence and the American armaments industry on the 
other, the policy of the US administration began to waver. In February 1991, a US 
government spokesman announced that the administration planned to withdraw its F-l 11 
aircraft, which would have carried the TASM, from Britain. However, he hastened to add
80 Christopher Bellamy, ‘Anglo-French deal likely for missiles’, Independent, 29/12/90; Colin Brown, 
‘New nuclear weapons for UK’, Independent, 27/12/90; ‘GEC considers TASM-UK bid’, J a n e ’s Defence 
Weekly 15:1, 5/1/91, p.5; Colin Brown, ‘New nuclear bunkers at US bases’, Independent, 14/4/91.
81 ‘UK may spum US to develop nuclear missile’, Defence News, 7/1/91.
82 ‘Selection of new nuclear missile for RAF Tornadoes delayed’, Financial Times, 6/2/91; Nick Cook, 
‘TASM-UK delayed by MoD dispute’, Jane'sD efence Weekly 15:6,9/2/91, p. 165; Christy Campbell and 
Mike Witt, ‘BAe pleads with Major over pounds 2bn copter deal’, Sunday Telegraph, 11/8/91.
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that some of the bombers would be replaced with nuclear-capable F-15E planes. The 
decision implied that the administration still intended to deploy TASMs in Europe in spite 
of wide ranging cuts of US forces there.83 Ironically, the cuts in the defence budget 
enhanced the commitment of the US government to the TASM deployment which was 
perceived as a cheap alternative to American soldiers in Europe. The argument was 
outlined in a report by the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute in March. In the face of 
US troop reductions in Germany, the report called for the deployment of TASMs ‘at a 
limited number of airfields in Germany and other countries’.84 The report was supported 
by leading Senators,^uch as Democrat Sam Nunn, the Republican chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee William Cohen, the former Democratic Defence Secretary Harold 
Brown and the Republican William Simon, former US government officials, military heads 
and defence experts. However, the widespread publicity of the report could not conceal 
that the advocates of the TASM were increasingly on the defensive. Most Senators were 
eager to abolish the missile project.
In Britain, the argument over the choice between the TASM and a sub-strategic 
Trident increasingly split opinions within the MoD. RAF officers naturally argued the case 
for preserving a tactical role for the Air Force after the phasing out of the WE-177 in 
addition to the strategic Trident submarines. In a speech in April, the Chief of Air Staff, 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Harding affirmed: ‘Ministers in this nuclear proliferation world 
are going to need wider options’.85 However, during the review of British defence policy 
before the publication of the annual Defence White Paper on 9 July 1991, RAF staff were 
more and more on the defensive. In addition to the international opposition to the 
development and stationing of the missile, budgetary pressures from Treasury officials led 
to tension between the three MoD services.86 Nevertheless, cabinet ministers and
83 Alan Travis, Peter Hetherington and Simon Tisdall, ‘Holy Loch nuclear base to close’. Guardian, 
6/2/91; Colin Brown and Will Bennett, ‘US Navy to pull out of Holy Loch nuclear base’, Independent, 
6/2/91.
84 Sarah Helm, ‘Nuclear arms return to European agenda’, Independent, 1/3/91; Sarah Helm, ‘US 
exaggerating Soviet threat’, Independent, 2/3/91; Peter Riddell, ‘US to keep ‘sizeable’ forces in Europe’, 
Financial Times, 5/3/91.
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Christy Campbell, ‘Nuclear role for Tornado crews’, Sunday Telegraph, 28/4/91.
86 Colin Brown and Anthony Bevins, ‘Parliament and Politics: Treasury alarmed at pounds 1.5 bn MoD 
overspend’, Independent, 1/5/91; Colin Brown, ‘Parliament and Politics: Defence White Paper will 
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Conservative MPs remained in favour of the missile, so the cancellation of the TASM was 
out of the question. Just before the publication of the White Paper, officials from the RAF 
and the Navy reached an agreement to keep the TASM and leave the strategic Trident as 
a last resort.87 The 1991 White Paper ‘Britain’s Defence for the 90s’ maintained that the 
RAF would ‘continue to make our major contribution to the provision of sub-strategic 
nuclear forces in support of NATO and to provide a national independent sub-strategic 
deterrent’. For this purpose, the government was ‘studying US and French options to 
replace [the free-fall nuclear bomb] around the end of the century with a tactical air-to- 
surface missile to deliver a British warhead’.88 To meet the budgetary demands, MoD 
ministers and officials decided to cut its civilian staff and the British troops in Germany.89 
The decision was deeply unpopular with MoD troops and service suppliers. However, it 
allowed the MoD to keep its options regarding the future of the TASM open. The first 
stage of the debate, thus, ended without a major policy review by any of the members of 
the British multilevel foreign policy network. However, the international opposition to the 
TASM had shown some impact on NATO where the British government had to accept a 
series of decisions which put the future role of the TASM for Europe’s nuclear defences 
increasingly into question. The pressure from many of the continental European 
governments had also weakened the rationale of the missile for the US government. In the 
following months this would lead to the first preference changes which resulted in 
President Bush’s cancellation of the American TASM in autumn 1991. The North Atlantic 
Council and NATO’s integrated staff followed suit within weeks.
US Withdraws Support for TASM
In August 1991, it became public that the members of the US Congress, who had been 
critical of the TASM since October 1990, planned to end the government’s contributions 
for Boeing’s SRAM-T. The missile programme had already been rejected in the House of
87 Christopher Bellamy, ‘RAF looks for smaller and stronger force’, Independent, 2/8/90.
88 Statement on the Defence Estimates: Britain's Defence fo r  the 90s, Cm 1559-1 (London: HMSO, July 
1991), p.40. See also Carver, Tightrope Walking, p. 169.
89 Michael White and David Fairhall, ‘Ministers back cuts in defence’, Guardian, 26/7/90; Robert Fox, 
‘British troops starting a long retreat from the Rhine, says King’, Daily Telegraph, 26/7/90; Michael 
Evans, ‘Cabinet slices 18% from armed forces’, Times, 26/7/90. See also Carver, Tightrope Walking, 
p. 169.
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Representatives when US Senators temporarily blocked further funds for the development 
of the SRAM-T. The impending blockage of the administration’s contribution to the 
TASM represented the final straw for Pentagon officials. For more than a year the 
Pentagon staff had been subject to the highest degree of transgovemmental pressures 
within the American administration at 37 per cent.90 Now the military withdrew its support 
for the missile programme.91
Table 4.2 Preference Changes: 11 August -14 November 1991
2nd Phase (-30/9/91) 3rd Phase (-3/10/91) 4th Phase (-12/10/91)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
Nato-Org 48 NC Nato-Org 52 U Nato-Org 55 C
Par 46 B Par 46 B Nato-CM 47 C
Nato-CM 41 NC US-SD 42 C Par 46 B
US-SD 38 NC Nato-CM 41 U Mod 38 U
US-Pen 37 C Mod 38 NC DS 31 NC
Mod 33 NC US-Sd 35 C Fco 30 NC
US-Sd 31 NC US-Pre 31 C Med 30 NC
US-SS 30 NC US-SS 30 C FS 25 NC
US-Pre 28 NC DS 28 NC PM 23 NC
DS 28 < NC Fco 27 NC vote 14 U
Fco 27 NC Med 23 NC con 8 NC
FS 22 NC FS 22 NC Com 6 NC
Med 21 NC PM 21 NC Ind 3 NC
PM 21 NC vote 14 U Cab 0 NC
vote 14 U con 8 NC
con 8 NC Com 6 NC
Com 6 NC Ind 3 NC
Ind 3 NC Cab 0 NC
Cab 0 NC
90 See footnote 30.
91 Peter Almond, ‘Fears over shifting American defence policy priorities’, Daily Telegraph, 18/10/91; 
Christy Campbell and Mike Witt, ‘BAe pleads with Major over pounds 2bn copter deal’, Sunday 
Telegraph, 11/8/91.
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The consequences of preference change in the Pentagon for the decision-making process 
were extensive. Not only did Pentagon staff have the main authority over the decision 
whether to proceed with the development of an American T ASM, the department was also 
well connected within the multilevel network between the US, Britain and the other 
NATO members. By using their national and international linkages, Pentagon officials 
were able to exert pressure on other actors to abandon the programme. Specifically, their 
support for the cancellation of the missile increased the pressure on the head of their 
department, Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, from 38 to 42 per cent as Pentagon officials 
contended that the missile had lost its rationale.92 Moreover, since Pentagon officials had 
direct linkages to the President through the Chiefs of Staff, the number of actors in the 
network who pressed President Bush to abandon the TASM increased from 28 to 31 per 
cent.93 The President soon responded to the changed balance of preferences. In September 
1991, President Bush announced that the US government would cancel its support for the 
development of Boeing’s SRAM-T as part of his unilateral reductions of nuclear 
weapons.94 The policy change of the President pre-empted a congressional vote on the 
issue. The question whether another missile would be converted to a TASM remained 
open. Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams commented: ‘We have made a decision on that 
specific system. But we have not made a decision on whether we want to follow along 
with a TASM-like programme. That is something we want to pursue with our NATO 
allies’.95
When the US abandoned their missile programme the balance of pressures in 
NATO turned against the TASM. Following the preference changes within the Pentagon
92 Due to the preference change among Pentagon officials, the number of actors who favoured the 
cancellation of the missile increased from P2 [US-SD] = 9/24 = 38% to P3 [US-SD] = 10/24 = 42% among 
those who were directly linked to Defence Secretary Cheney.
q i
The Pentagon staff also increased to pressure on the US President from P2 [US-Pre] =9/32 = 28% to P-, 
[US-Pre] = 10/32 = 31% of his contacts in the network.
94 David White, ‘Bush’s nuclear cuts: questions remain over role of airborne tactical missiles’, Financial 
Times, 30/9/91; David Fairhall, ‘Impact of US arms cuts may be grater than defence ministry admits’, 
Guardian, 3/10/91; Nick Cook, ‘The tactical missile debate that refuses to lie down’, J a n e’s  Defence 
Weekly 16:16, 19/10/91, p.708; Peter Almond, ‘US team in arms talks with Moscow’, D aily Telegraph, 
4/10/91; Michael Evans, ‘Nato cuts its nuclear bomb stock by half. Times, 9/10/91.
95 Nick Cook, ‘The tactical missile debate that refuses to lie down’, Jane's Defence Weekly 16:16, 
19/10/91, p.708. See also ‘SRAM II cancelled for cause’. Aerospace Daily, 2/10/91; ‘Bush plan does not 
rule out TASM’, Defense Daily, 2/10/91; ‘UK may spurn US to develop nuclear missile’. Defense News, 
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and by President Bush, 55 per cent of NATO’s military links96 and 47 per cent of the 
actors directly connected to or represented in the North Atlantic Council97 were now 
opposed to the development and stationing of TASMs in Europe. The intergovernmental 
European coalition among politicians and civil servants against the TASMs used the 
increased pressure to propose far ranging arms reductions which included the Alliance’s 
stockpile of tactical nuclear bombs. The scope of the reductions was scheduled for 
discussion at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Taormina, Sicily, in mid- 
October. A formal agreement was expected for the NATO summit in Rome in November. 
Discussed were two proposals: the removal of all land-based short-range nuclear weapons 
and cuts of between 1,300 and 1,400 American free-fall nuclear bombs in Europe as well 
as the British WE-177.98 After the American government had practically backed out of its 
T ASM programme, representatives within NATO quickly reached a tacit agreement about 
the cancellation of NATO’s requirement for TASMs. Even before the formal meeting of 
the Council of Ministers in Taormina, a senior NATO official confirmed that the Alliance 
had decided to suspend its development of TASMs - at least until 1995." The opposition 
among NATO’s members to the TASM programme was simply overwhelming and 
without the support of the US administration, the British government was unable to veto 
a policy change any longer. Several NATO member governments welcomed the end of the
debate which they believed to be final. The Belgian Defence Minister Guy Come declared:
■%
‘The abandonment of TASM is a fundamental change’.100
In spite of the agreement, however, the debate within NATO over the future of the 
TASM continued until the end of November 1991 as opponents and proponents reiterated
96 Among the linkages of NATO’s bureaucratic organisation, officials from the foreign and defence 
departments of US, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Norway and Iceland favoured 
the cancellation of the TASM, accounting for P4 [Nato-Org] = 16/29 = 55%.
97 At this time 24 out of 51 actors linked to the North Atlantic Council opposed the TASM, namely the 
representatives of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Demark, Norway, Iceland and the US, 
accounting for P4 [Nato-CM] = 24/51 = 47%. Compare footnote 22.
98 Nick Cook, ‘The tactical missile debate that refuses to lie down’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 16:16, 
19/10/91, p.708. See also ‘SRAM II cancelled for cause’, Aerospace Daily, 2/10/91; ‘Bush plan does not 
rule out TASM’, Defense Daily, 2/10/91; ‘UK/5/spum US to develop nuclear missile’, Defense News, 
7/1/91.
99 ‘Nato plans cutback in nuclear bombs’, Independent, 9/10/91. Compare also Robert Shrimsley and Peter 
Almond, ‘RAF to lose its nuclear capability’, Daily Telegraph, 16/10/93.
100 Marc Rogers, ‘NATO relived as SRAM-T is cut’, Jane's Defence Weekly 16:15, 12/10/91, p.643.
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their arguments. Central to the discussion was President Bush’s wish to maintain an 
effective nuclear defence in Europe in spite of arms reductions.101 As replacement for the 
cancelled SRAM-T programme, the US government considered another TASM: the AM- 
127 supersonic low altitude target missile.102 TASMs were still viewed by both US and 
British ministers as the best option to fill the gap created by the disarmament 
negotiations.103 Conversely, the European governments which opposed the TASM 
demanded the inclusion of the missile in the negotiations. The Soviet President Gorbachev 
repeatedly expressed his interest in an agreement to remove all tactical air weapons from 
service.104 The Soviet proposal was supported by the members of the two main opposition 
parties in Britain. Labour representatives publicly called upon the British government to 
use its international role in order to advance the armaments negotiations. Members of the 
Liberal Democrats demanded in the press that the British government should take the 
opportunity created by Gorbachev’s defence cuts to reduce its military spending by 
abandoning its TASM programme.105 The British government had to recognise the 
growing likelihood that the ‘temporary’ suspension of the American and NATO 
requirement of a TASM would be final.106 Nevertheless, before the NATO Council 
meeting in Sicily the British Defence Secretary Tom King assured that, whatever the 
decision in NATO, Britain would go ahead with the deployment of its TASM.107 
Technically, Britain could still pursue both options, i.e. the development of a missile with
101 David White, ‘Bush’s nuclear cuts: questions remain over role of airborne tactical missiles’, Financial 
Times, 30/9/91; David Fairhall, ‘The nuclear lobby disarmed’, Guardian, 3/10/91.
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France and the purchase of an off-the-shelf missile from American suppliers because 
Boeing continued to research into the development of the SRAM-T for Britain.108
Although the meeting of the NPG in Taormina, Sicily, on 17-18 October 1991 was 
supposed to resolve the discussion about the future of tactical weapons in Europe, a 
decision about the TASM was not reached.109 At the meeting the British Defence Minister 
King continued to insist on deploying the TASM. King predictably clashed with the 
German Foreign Minister Genscher who in turn reiterated his demands for the dismantling 
of all short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, including air-launched missiles. While the 
Belgian, Dutch and Danish representatives supported Genscher’s position, the US 
delegation came once again to the rescue of Britain.110 In their final communique, the 
members of the NPG went little beyond the reductions that had been achieved between the 
two superpowers. In addition, NATO members declared that they would cut their 
stockpile of sub-strategic weapons, including the British WE-177 free-fall nuclear bombs, 
by 80 per cent. However, in a paragraph bom out of British insistence, the NPG members 
declared that NATO would ‘continue to base effective and up-to-date sub-strategic 
nuclear forces in Europe’. These would ‘consist solely of dual-capable aircraft, with 
continued widespread participation in nuclear roles and peacetime basing by Allies’.111
The ‘New Strategic Concept’ of NATO which was announced at the summit in 
Rome 7-8 November 1991 essentially reiterated the Taormina compromise. With regard 
to NATO’s nuclear force structure it stated that, due to the changed nature of the threats 
faced by NATO and the recent successes in nuclear disarmament, sub-strategic weapons 
could be significantly reduced. However, NATO would ‘maintain adequate sub-strategic 
forces based in Europe, which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, 
reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These [would] consist solely of dual capable aircraft
i no
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that could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems’.112 T ellingly the phrase that 
NATO members were expected to base dual-capable aircraft in their countries was 
omitted. De facto, the TASM had been eliminated from NATO’s defence doctrine. 
Whether N ATO member states were willing to develop and deploy the missile would rest 
on national decisions. The US government immediately drew its conclusions from the 
Alliance decision. Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Under-Secretary 
of Defence Paul Wolfowitz announced that neither the American government nor NATO 
planned to develop an alternative to the SRAM-T as tactical air-to-surface missile.113
Although the second stage of the TASM debate had seen the expansion of the 
international opposition to the missile from Western Europe to the US, and the 
abandonment of the programme by NATO, the British government persisted in its 
determination to go ahead with its TASM. While their limited exposure to international 
pressure meant that the Cabinet and Conservative MPs were able to maintain their support 
for the TASM, officials in the Ministry of Defence as the main target of the international 
protests over the missile was increasingly divided.
MoD Backs Trident Alternative for TASM
During the winter of 1991-92, the British government remained firmly committed to 
TASM despite the cancellation of the requirement within NATO and the US. Defence 
Secretary King defended the development of a sub-strategic deterrent in the House of 
Commons.114 British Ministers emphasised in particular the dangers associated with 
nuclear proliferation after the breakup of the Soviet Union.115 Since the international 
support for the missile was lost, it became crucial for the government and MoD officials 
to prevent increasing pressure for the cancellation of the TASM among the domestic 
actors to whom they were linked in the British multilevel foreign policy network. As long 
as the domestic actors within the network unanimously supported the missile, the
112North Atlantic Council, The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Rome, 7-8 November 1991, Part IV 
2.4, at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm.
113 No SRAM replacement seen’, Defense Daily, 14/11/91.
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government was able to resist the international calls for the abolition of the missile. 
However, three sets of actors were increasingly susceptible to a change of preference 
regarding the TASM because their linkages within the network exposed them to 
considerable transgovernmental pressure or because they were already divided over the 
issue: MoD staff, the new Defence Secretary Rifkind and the British public. MoD officials, 
in particular, had close direct relations with their colleagues in the US Pentagon and the 
other defence departments within NATO. Since their counterparts in NATO had 
collectively abandoned the missile, the pressure on the British MoD staff to follow suit had 
increased from 38 to 48 per cent.116 The transgovernmental pressure was compounded by 
the financial problems at the MoD, which had suffered from a series of budget cuts since 
the late 1980s. To reduce spending on the TASM, RAF officers suggested limiting the 
range of the missile.117
Table 4.3 Preference Changes: 14 November 1991 - 9 October 1992
5th Phase i-7/8/92) 6th Phase i-9/10/92)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
Par 46 B Par 52 B
Mod 43 C DS 38 C
DS 34 1 ( NC Fco 37 NC
Med 34 NC Med 36 NC
Fco 33 NC PM 28 NC
FS 28 NC FS 28 NC
PM 26 NC vote 14 U
vote 14 U Com 13 NC
con 8 NC con 8 NC
Com 6 NC Cab 7 NC
Ind 3 NC Ind 7 NC
Cab 0 NC
116 The preference changes among the Pentagon staff and NATO military increased the pressure on MoD 
officials from P2 [Mod] = 8/21 = 38% to P5 [Mod] = 9/21 = 43% of their linkages in the network.
117 .
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However, during the campaign for the upcoming British general elections in April 1992, 
the government again decided to postpone a decision regarding the missile. The position 
of the electorate on the question of nuclear weapons was still unclear, and the government 
preferred to keep the contentious project out of the public debate. Labour and Liberal 
Democratic MPs shared this sentiment and refrained from using their relations with the 
media to increase the public attention to the issue.118 Although the members of the two 
opposition parties publicly expressed their intentions to cancel the purchase of a TASM, 
these statements remained very low-key. Specifically, the Labour and Liberal Democrats 
leadership had agreed with each other not to purchase a TASM in the case of a hung 
parliament. However, the members of the two opposition parties wanted to avoid an anti- 
nuclear image.119 They feared that Conservative ministers and MPs would be able to 
ridicule such a position as ‘unrealistic’. At the heart of their reluctance was the continued 
insecurity among the members of the government and the opposition about the preferences 
of the electorate. On the one hand, the government believed that the British public 
supported the country’s nuclear forces. Moreover, the Trident nuclear submarine was 
associated with jobs in the marginal constituency of Barrow-in-Furness and the 
Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment.120 On the other hand, senior officials 
believed that the electorate was increasingly doubtful of the alleged Russian threat.121 
Nevertheless, Labour leaders welcomed the achievements in the disarmament negotiations 
between the two superpowers in its party programme ‘Agenda for Change’ and reiterated 
their long-term goal of the ‘total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide’.122 In 
Parliament, Labour and Liberal Democratic MPs urged the government at least to reduce
118 Nick Cook, ‘Politics hold up TASM decision’, Jane's Defence Weekly 16:2, 13/7/91, p.45.
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its nuclear deterrent by cutting the purchase of a fourth Trident submarine and cancelling 
the TASM.123 However, because of the blocking majority of the Conservatives in the 
House of Commons, the combined pressure from opposition MPs of 46 per cent was 
unsuccessful in bringing about a change of policy.124
In the MoD the controversy over the form of Britain’s nuclear deterrent intensified 
during spring 1992. Since the withdrawal of American funds for the missile had increased 
the development cost of the TASM, MoD officials felt increasingly forced to choose 
between a fourth Trident and the TASM. The cancellation of Trident would enable the 
ministry to spend more on the missile, perhaps to increase its range. Sir Michael Quinlan, 
Permanent Secretary at the MoD and Mr Clark supported this idea. Conversely, the 
abolition of the TASM would enable MoD staff to redirect the funds to the army and other 
projects which had been severely affected by previous budgetary cutbacks. By May 1992 
first signs indicated that MoD officials had decided against the TASM. They tasked Royal 
Navy planners with the assessment of a sub-strategic role for Trident, which would allow 
the TASM to be cancelled.125 Moreover, the Defence White Paper, published on 7 July 
1992, failed for the first time to mention the TASM. Conversely, it stated that the 
government was ‘studying possible replacements’ for the WE-177 free fall nuclear bomb - 
a clear reference to a sub-strategic role for Trident.126
As the policy change within the US and NATO had raised the pressure on the staff
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Bellamy, ‘Nuclear missile may be scrapped’, Independent, 8/7/92; Christopher Bellamy, ‘Defence strategy 
casts doubt on tactical missiles’, Independent, 8/7/92.
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in the British Ministry of Defence, the preference change among MoD officials in turn 
increased the opposition to the TASM within the British administration. Specifically, the 
actors who were directly linked to MoD officials, such as Secretary of Defence Malcolm 
Rifkind and Prime Minister John Major, were exposed to rising pressure to abandon the 
TASM. With the military making the case for a sub-strategic role for Trident, the number 
of actors who advocated a cancellation of the missile increased from 34 to 38 per cent 
among those who were linked to Rifkind127 and from 26 to 28 per cent of John Major’s 
linkages128. Since the House of Commons, which was subject to the highest pressure 
among the British decision units at 52 per cent129, was prevented from a policy change by 
the blocking majority of the Conservative MPs, the Secretary of Defence was the most 
likely to abandon the TASM programme.
At this point, however, the impending abolition of the TASM project triggered 
countervailing action from Conservative MPs in the Commons and the members of the 
Defence Committee. Both were insulated from the pressure of the international actors who 
advocated the abolition of the nuclear missile project. In fact, among the critics of the 
TASM only MoD officials were able to exert influence over Conservative MPs and the 
members of the Defence Committee, as they were dependent on the MoD staff for expert 
information. However, MoD officials amounted to only 8 per cent and 13 per cent 
respectively of the actors to whom Conservative MPs and the Defence Committee 
members were linked in the British foreign policy network.130 Since most other actors with 
whom they had close relations remained supportive of the missile, the Conservative MPs 
and committee members could afford to disregard the pressure from MoD staff for the 
cancellation.131 Conversely, alerted by the news that defence ministers were planning to 
abandon the development of the TASM, the Conservative members of the Commons
127 The preference change among the MoD staff increased the pressure on Defence Secretary Rifkind from 
P5 [DS] = 10/29 = 34% to P6 [DS] = 11/29 = 38% of the actors to whom he was linked in the network.
128 MoD officials further increased the number of actors who supported a cancellation of the British 
TASM from P5 [PM] = 10/39 = 26% to P6 [PM] = 11/39 = 28% among the network linkages of Prime 
Minister Major.
129 Due to changes in the composition of the House of Commons following the April 1992 General 
Election, P6 [Par) = 5376/10416= 48%. See Appendix 4.
130 The preference change among MoD officials raising the pressure on the members of the Defence 
Committee to P6 [Com] = 2/16 = 13%, while the pressure on the Conservatives remained constant.
131 Croft and Dunn, ‘Impact of the Defence Budget’, p.64.
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Defence Committee demanded an inquiry into the issue. The chairman of the committee, 
Sir Nicholas Bonsor, commented: ‘I don’t see why this nuclear capability is no longer 
needed, when one looks to the Middle East’.132
Indeed, after the government had argued for two years that the TASM was 
essential to British defence because of new threats from rogue states like Iraq, cabinet 
ministers were at a loss to explain why they now wanted to cancel the project. Since 
Conservative MPs remained staunchly committed to the TASM, the government chose to 
continue with the development for the time being. According to Defense Daily, the British 
government awarded the three contenders for the missile follow-on contracts, Martin 
Marietta, Boeing and Aerospatiale, in September 1992 each 1.6m dollars for a pre-project 
definition study into a tactical air-to-surface missile, including the development of a 
prototype. The claim that, if TASM was made a NATO requirement in 1995, Britain 
would be able to profit from sales to other NATO members once the TASM design was 
completed was scarcely convincing, however.133
By autumn, new international problems emerged with regard to the American 
contenders for the British missile. A nuclear test ban installed by the US Congress on 1 
October 1992 put the British TASM project further under strain because it prevented 
British scientists from testing the new warhead at US sites. Although the missile 
programme was increasingly unlikely, the British government urged the US to resume its 
nuclear tests as late as July 1993.134 Similar problems challenged the French ASLP. After 
the Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev announced that his government would extend 
its temporary nuclear test ban until at least mid-1993, a French Defence Ministry 
spokesman stated that it was considering extending its own one-year moratorium which
132 Colin Brown, ‘Tory MP’s oppose plans to scrap new missile’. Independent, 13/8/92.
133 ‘Martin awarded dollars 1.6 million UK TASM studies contract’, Defense Daily, 9/9/92; ‘US wavering 
may put it out of TASM ’, Ja n e 's  Defence Weekly 18:12, 19/9/92, p.21; ‘Britain persues [sic!] missile 
studies. US - Martin Marietta wins UK TASM contract’, Defense News, 20/9/92; ‘Martin-Marietta 
TASM-UK award’, Jnteravia-Aerospace World, 28/10/92.
134 ‘US wavering may put it out ofTASM ’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 18:12,19/9/92, p.21. See also Charles 
Bickers, ‘UK nuclear options widen as gravity bombs soldier on’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 19:10, 6/3/93, 
p. 17; Simon Tisdall, David Fairhall and Martin Walker, ‘US to scrap test ban: Clinton gives in to Britain 
and military’, Guardian, 18/5/93; Nick Cook, ‘“Uncertainties” delay Trident decisions’, Jane'sD efence  
Weekly 19:24, 12/6/93, p.5; Martin Walker and Simon Tisdall, ‘US to press ahead with nuclear tests’, 
Guardian, 17/6/93; Martin Walker, ‘Clinton rethinks new nuclear tests’. Guardian, 1/7/93.
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was to end.135 Although the French government assured that the test ban would not affect 
its nuclear capabilities136, the ASLP appeared to run into further problems as the French 
government, too, was pressed to reduce its defence spending.137
In October 1992, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind withdrew his support for the 
missile project. The minister not only had to take into account pressure from his staff for 
a cancellation of the missile, but also the international opposition from his NATO 
colleagues to the TASM, which together amounted to 38 per cent of his contacts in the 
network.138 Speaking to journalists, Rifkind acknowledged that Britain’s defence 
commitments might have to be reduced, allegedly because of budgetary restraints. He 
intimated that the cuts could include the TASM.139 The Defence Minister warned the 
Cabinet, however, that further cuts would force a reconsideration of British strategy as 
outlined in ‘Options for Change’.140 At the meeting of NATO defence ministers in 
Gleneagles, Rifkind stated that the review into the options for a British TASM would be 
completed by early 1993. The design of a nuclear warhead for the TASM had almost been 
finalised at the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment.141 The Defence Ministry had 
earmarked 1.5m pounds for 1993 to determine a missile platform for its TASM 
programme which was to be decided soon.142
Although the fact that Defence Secretary Rifkind was prepared to cut the TASM 
slightly increased the pressure on Parliament to accept the cancellation of the missile, the
135 Larkin, Nuclear Designs, p. L41.
136 ‘France is set to extend ban’, Ja n e’s Defence Weekly 18:17,24/10/92, p. 18; Barbara Starr and J. A.C. 
Lewis, ‘USA and France face nuclear test dilemma’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 19:20, 15/5/93, p.5.
137 Carol Reed, J.A.C. Lewis and Duncan Lennox, ‘Country Survey: France’, Jane's Defence Weekly 
17:25, 20/6/92, pp. 1065-1084, p. 1068, p. 1079, p. 1083; ‘France cuts nuclear funding’, J a n e ’s Defence 
Weekly 18:15, 10/10/92, p.18.
138 See footnote 125.
139 Colin Brown, ‘The Conservatives in Brighton: Cuts may hit defence commitments’. Independent, 
9/10/92. Malcolm Rilkind admitted in the Commons on 27 October 1992 that there were ‘a number of 
ways in which the United Kingdom’s sub-strategic requirements can be met’. See Hansard, Vol. 212, Oral 
Answers, Col. 860, 27 October 1992.
140 Colin Brown, ‘The Autumn Statement: Defence cut by pounds 575m’, Independent, 12/11/92.
141 Sevcrin Carrell, ‘UK nuclear bomb study “complete next year’” , Scotsman, 22/10/92; David Fairhall, 
‘New British nuclear bomb under threat’, Guardian, 22/10/92; ‘News: UK finances WE 177 replacement 
study’, Flight International, 10/2/93.
142 ‘News: UK finances WE 177 replacement study’, Flight International, 10/2/93; Charles Bickers, ‘UK 
nuclear options widen as gravity bombs soldier on’, Jane's Defence Weekly 19:10, 6/3/93, p. 17.
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comparative insulation of Conservative MPs and the members of the Commons Defence 
Committee from international actors limited the pressure on both. Thus, while Defence 
Committee members accepted that ‘financial considerations will quite properly play a part’ 
in the decision over the future of the TASM project, they warned the government that the 
‘risks inherent in any proposal whereby strategic and sub-strategic deterrents are 
dependent upon the same launch platform’, namely the Trident submarines, had to be 
addressed.143 In February, Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs used the increasing 
differences within the government to propose to the House of Commons the abolition of 
the TASM in order to save 3bn pounds for defence cuts which had been requested by 
Treasury staff. However, since the opponents of the missile could only exert indirect 
pressure on the Conservatives via Parliament, the Conservative MPs were able to maintain 
their resistance. In the Commons, the Conservative majority could easily block the 
proposed cancellation.144
The preference changes of the British MoD and Secretary of Defence Malcolm 
Rifkind during the summer of 1992 extended the transgovernmental pressure for the 
cancellation of the TASM programme into the domestic sphere of the British multilevel 
foreign policy network. However, the government hesitated in cutting the TASM. In 
particular, the blocking position of Conservative MPs in the Commons meant that the 
government had (o convince its parliamentary party first before it could risk a vote on a 
defence budget which incorporated the abolition of the T ASM programme. The struggle 
of the British administration to build a consensus among domestic actors for the 
cancellation of the TASM extended over another year from October 1992 to October 
1993.
TASM Cancellation Pushed through Parliament
By the beginning of 1992 RAF staff were resigned to losing their role in Britain’s nuclear 
defence. By giving up the TASM, Air Force officers could reallocate resources to retain
143 First Report of the Defence Committee, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992, House of Commons 
Paper 218 (London: HMSO, 11 November 1992), p.x. For the arguments regarding a sub-strategic role 
for Trident see Paterson, Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, pp. 113f.
144 Colin Brown, ‘Anger greets sacking of officers in the front line’, Independent, 25/2/93.
163
the Eurofighter Aircraft programme.145 The 1993 Defence White Paper ‘Defending Our 
Future’ published in July was expected to give the final blow to the TASM project. 
However, the defence review merely stated that the decision would be announced ‘in due 
course’. In a concession to Conservative opposition, the government’s White Paper 
emphasised the continued need for sub-strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the White Paper 
mentioned the ‘Provision of an Effective Independent Strategic and Substrategic Nuclear 
Capability’ first among Britain’s military tasks.146
Table 4.4 Preference Changes: 9 October 1992 -18 October 1993
7«. Phase (-3/7/93) 8<h Phase (-30/9/93) 9ft Phasei -18/10/93)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
Par 55 B Par 59 B Par 72 C
Med 38 NC Med 39 NC con 50 C
Fco 37 NC Fco 37 C Med 46 NC
FS 33 NC FS 36 C vote 38 U
PM 31 NC PM 33 C Ind 10 NC
Com 19 C con 25 NC
vote 19 U vote 24 U
con 17 NC Cab 21 C
Cab 14 U Ind 10 NC
Ind 7 NC
By the time of the publication of the White Paper, however, Defence Secretary Rifkind 
and MoD officials were making progress in convincing Conservative MPs that a tactical 
missile for Trident could substitute for a TASM. In particular, the government had 
focussed its efforts rationally on the members of the Commons Defence Committee who
145 Ian Bruce, ‘RAF counts cost of fighter project’, Herald , 22/10/92; Peter Almond, ‘Britain’s forces 
stand by for further cuts’, Daily Telegraph, 13/4/93; Nick Cook, ‘“Tactical” Trident set to kill RAF’s 
TASM’, J a n e ’s  Defence Weekly 20:1, 3/7/93, p.5; David Fairhall, ‘MPs call for end to Trident secrecy’, 
Guardian, 7/7/93.
146 Defending Our Future - Statement on the Defence Estimates 1993, Cm 2270 (London: HMSO, July 
1993), p. 14, p.20, p.24; Ian Bruce, ‘Cut-price defence of the realm’, Herald, 6/7/93; Anthony Bevins and 
Colin Brown, ‘Tories divided over defence cuts’, Independent, 5/7/93; Colin Brown, ‘Tories say defence 
cuts can go no deeper’, Independent, 6/7/93; Colin Brown, ‘Navy bears brunt of cuts as four submarines 
are axed’, Independent, 6/7/93; David Fairhall, ‘Blasting a hole in nuclear plan’, Guardian, 19/7/93.
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were, at 19 per cent147, under marginally higher collective pressure within the network than 
the Conservatives at 17 per cent148. After extensive briefings from the MoD staff, the 
members of the Defence Committee changed their position on the TASM. In June, the 
Defence Committee announced that there were no reasons why Trident could not take the 
sub-strategic role originally envisaged for the TASM.149
For the following development of a winning coalition in favour of a cancellation 
of the TASM, the preference change among the members of the Defence Committee 
proved critical. In particular, the support for the abolition of the TASM programme by 
the committee members increased the pressure on Conservative MPs, among whom the 
committee members had particular authority on matters of defence, to 25 per cent of their 
links in the network.150 Furthermore, due to the preference change of the committee 
members, the pressure on the House of Commons as a collective decision unit rose to 59 
per cent.151 The considerable support for the cancellation of the TASM in Parliament 
meant that it became increasingly politically unviable for the Conservative majority to 
block the abolition.
Following the approval of committee members of the abolition of the TASM 
project, Defence Secretary Rifkind raised the issue in the Cabinet on 30 September 1993. 
Although a small number of cabinet ministers were critical of the severe cuts in the defence 
budget, none challenged the ‘technical’ choice between the TASM and a sub-strategic 
Trident missile. Moreover, when the Cabinet announced its decision to cancel the TASM 
in Parliament, Conservative MPs acceded without major protests. With the Cabinet’s 
official change in policy an overwhelming 55 per cent of the actors to whom the 
Conservative MPs were connected in the network supported the decision, thus raising the
147 The preference change of Rifkind had increased the number of actors who opposed the TASM among 
the linkages of the Defence Committee members to three, accounting for P7 [Com] = 3/15 = 20%. 
Compare footnote 128.
148 The pressure on the Conservatives remained at P7 [con] = 2/12 = 17%. See footnote 128.
149 Nick Cook, “Tactical” Trident set to kill RAF’s TASM’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 20:1, 3/7/93, p.5; 
David Fairhall, ‘MPs call for end to Trident secrecy’, Guardian, 7/7/93; Severin Carrell, ‘Submerged in 
a murky future’, Scotsman, 1/1/93.
150 Specifically, three out of eleven actors to whom the Conservatives were linked in the network 
supported the cancellation of the TASM, namely Defence Secretary Rifkind, the members of the Defence 
Committee and US politicians, accounting for P8 [con] = 3/11 = 27%.
151 Pg [Par] = 6096/10416 = 59%.
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political stakes of a rejection.152 Their acceptance was made easier by a preceding public 
‘showdown’ over the defence budget between the Chancellor of Exchequer Kenneth 
Clarke and Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. To the Conservative MPs and the media, 
the government presented the TASM as the ‘sacrificial lamb’ which not only helped to 
prevent job losses in the armed forces of more than 20 per cent, but also the cancellation 
of the European Fighter Aircraft.153 The budget argument was preferable to admitting to 
the international pressures which had influenced the government’s decision. It maintained 
the image that British nuclear decision-making remained a national preserve. Although 
Conservative backbenchers continued to express fears that the abolition of a nuclear role 
for the RAF would undermine Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the threat of further 
redundancies among the armed services was a more serious concern to them.154 When 
Defence Secretary Rifkind announced in the House of Commons on 18 October 1993 that 
Britain was backing out of the TASM programme, the Conservative Party did not 
challenge the decision.155
4.3 Conclusion
In order to assess the explanatory value of the hypotheses suggested by multilevel network 
theory the conclusion of this case study examines four indicators: the frequency and
152 The open advocacy of the TASM cancellation by the Cabinet, including Prime Minister Major and 
Foreign Secretary Hurd increased the number of the actors who exerted pressure on the Conservatives by 
three to P9 [con] = 6/12 = 50%. Compare footnote 148.
153 Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith cited in Tim Barlass, ‘Clarke’s axe set to fall on pounds 3bn nuclear 
missile’, Standard, 15/10/93. Compare Christopher Bellamy, ‘Missile system “no longer needed’” , 
Independent, 19/10/93; Peter Almond, ‘Defence budget: Rifkind confirms RAF’s nuclear loss’, Daily 
Telegraph, 19/10/93.
154 Ninth Report of the Defence Committee, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1993, House of 
Commons Paper 869 (London: HMSO, 29 September 1993), pp. ix, xiii; Robert Chote and Donald 
MacIntyre, ‘Pressure on Clarke to cut rates’, Independent, 14/10/93; Tim Barlass, ‘Clarke’s axe set to fall 
on pounds 3bn nuclear missile’, Standard, 15/10/93; John Deans, ‘RAF is likely to loose its nuclear strike 
potential’, Daily M ail, 16/10/93; Joy Copley, ‘Tories split on threat of pounds 1 bn defence cuts’, 
Scotsman, 16/10/93; David White, ‘Britain to drop project for new pounds 3bn n-missile’, Financial 
Times, 16/10/93; Will Hutton and Patrick Wintour, ‘Ministers look for slow-bum tax changes’, Guardian, 
16/10/93; Donald MacIntyre, ‘Toiy unrest over pounds lbn defence cuts’, Independent, 16/10/93; Robert 
Shrimsley and Peter Almond, ‘RAF to lose its nuclear capability’, Daily Telegraph, 16/10/93; Ian Bruce, 
‘Rifkind shops in America to arm Trident’, Herald, 18/10/93.
155 Tim Barlass, ‘New Trident role will save pounds 750m’, Standard, 18/10/93; Gary Duncan and 
Severin Carrell, ‘Rosyth sell-off fuels defence row’, Scotsman, 19/10/93; ‘Parliament: Fury as Rifkind 
axes new RAF missile’, Herald, 19/10/93.
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probability of preference changes with rising degrees of pressure, the distribution of the 
four behavioural categories ‘no change’ ‘unclear or undecided’, ‘change’ and ‘blocked’ 
across the range of pressure from zero to 100 per cent, the average degree of pressure for 
each behavioural category and the timing of the preference changes in the research period. 
Moreover, by summarizing the findings of the case regarding the relationship between 
network pressure and preference changes, this section seeks to identify new inductive 
propositions or consolidate the inductive hypotheses derived from the first case study. 
Finally, it discusses whether multilevel network theory provides new insights into the 
decision to abolish the British tactical air-to-surface missile project.
Assessment o f the Hypotheses 
Summarizing its findings, the case of the 
decision to abolish the tactical air-to- 
surface missile programme generally 
corroborates the probabilistic causal 
relationship between pressure and 
preference changes by the actors in the 
British multilevel foreign policy network.
The explanatory value of the first 
hypothesis as evaluated by the relative 
frequency of preference changes is 
confirmed in 110 out of 115 instances, i.e. 96 per cent. Indeed, as displayed in Graph 4.1, 
the probability of a preference reversal increased steadily with rising degrees of pressure.
Graph 4.2 also shows that the frequency distribution of the ‘no change’ category 
matches the expectations derived from the first hypothesis. Although there are two peaks, 
the occurrence of which has been explained in the first case study, the number of actors 
who were able to maintain their original preference decreases steadily from the second 
peak with increasing degrees of pressure. Crucially for the refinement of the initial first
Graph 4.1 Frequency /  Probability
Pressure (per cent)
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Graph 4.2 'No Change'
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hypothesis, the impression of a threshold is 
supported by the findings from this case study.
As in the case of air strikes in Bosnia, none 
of the actors was able to resist degrees of 
pressure higher than 50 per cent.
The distribution of actors or 
instances whose preferences were unclear 
or who were undecided in Graph 4.3 
appears to be almost analogous to the 
frequency of the ‘no change’ category with 
two peaks. A first group of actors was 
undecided at pressures between 10 and 15 
per cent and a second between 35 and 55 
per cent. Since there are two groups, the 
inductive proposition that actors 
experience a phase of reorientation at 
intermediate degrees of pressure which had 
been suggested in the first case study is 
only weakly supported.
The frequency distribution of actors 
who changed their preferences regarding 
the TASM project in Graph 4.4 confirms 
more clearly the first hypothesis of 
multilevel network theory. The number of 
preference changes increases significantly 
at higher degrees of pressure. Moreover, 
while the curve in the ‘no change’ category 
peaks at a range between 30-35 per cent, 
the highest frequency of preference change 
occurs between 30 and 40 per cent. The
curve illustrates clearly that actors start changing their preferences if they become subject 
to pressure from other actors in the network Thus, there are very few preference changes
*  'o ' * * b r* * o * * * o <&-■%
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among actors who are subject to pressure from less than 30 per cent of their network 
linkages. Unlike in the first case study, there are fewer changes of preferences at high 
pressure rates beyond the 50 per cent threshold, the only exception being the House of 
Commons at 72 per cent. The deviation of Parliament, however, appears to reaffirm the 
evidence from the first case study which suggested that the members of collective 
decision-making units are in certain circumstances able to withstand higher pressures than 
other role actors.
Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Preference Changes Number of 
Instances
Range of 
Pressure
Minimum
Pressure
Maximum
Pressure
Average
Pressure
No Change (NC) 81 48% 0% 48% 22%
Unclear or Undecided (U) 12 37% 14% 52% 25%
Change(C) 22 59% 13% 72% 36%
Blocked (B) 8 12% 46% 59% 50%
As Table 4.5 shows, the first hypothesis which causally links higher degrees of pressure 
to the probability of a preference change is again clearly supported by the difference 
among the average pressure in each of the four behavioural categories ‘no change’, 
‘unclear or undecided’, ‘change’ and ‘blocked’. The average pressure which actors were 
able to resist was, at 22 per cent, significantly lower than the average pressure at which 
actors withdrew their support for the TASM programme at 36 per cent. Unlike in the first 
case, the mean of pressure at which network actors were divided over their preference or 
unclear was at 25 per cent also below the mean of pressure at which they succumbed to 
external influence. The averages, therefore, appear to confirm the inductive proposition 
drawn that actors pass through a phase of reorientation expressed by unclear preferences 
before they adopt a new policy preference. The range of pressure for each behavioural 
response was relatively broad, indicating the freedom of manouevre which actors have in 
spite of the probabilistic tendency associated with specific degrees of pressure.
The final indicator, the correlation between the degree of pressure exerted on 
network actors and the timing of their preference changes, is supported even more 
strongly than in the first case study. Out of fifteen actors who changed their preference
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during the decision-making process, thirteen modified their position immediately after the 
pressure on them had increased.156 The remaining two actors abandoned their support for 
the TASM project in the second phase after the pressure on them had been raised. None 
of the actors were able to withstand an increase in the degree of external pressure for more 
than two consecutive periods.
Table 4.6 Timing o f Preference Changes
1«i phase after an increase in pressure 2nd phase after an increase of pressure
US -Con (0->13%) US-Pentagon (0% -> 37%)
US-DS (38% -> 42%) US-Secretary of State (27% -> 30%)
US-Sd (31% -> 35%)
US-Pre (28% -> 31%)
Nato-CM (41% -> 47%)
Nato-Org (52% -> 55%)
Mod (38% -> 43%)
DS (34% -> 38%)
FS (33% -> 36%)
Cab (14% -> 21%)
Com (13% -> 19%)
Par (59% -> 72%)
con (25% -> 50%)
Turning to the second hypothesis, it has to be pointed out that a blocking strategy was 
open to only a very limited number of actors in the British multilevel foreign policy 
network regarding the decision over the TASM programme. Since the issue concerned 
nuclear defence policy, most international organisations did not have any authority over 
the decisions of the key actors - Britain, France, or the US. The only exception was the 
Nuclear Planning Group of NATO. However, its decision-making capacity applied merely 
to the nuclear defence doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance as a collective organisation to 
which the member states designated specific weapon systems. Whether and how the three 
Western nuclear powers decided to maintain their nuclear defence capabilities was under
156 See Table 4.6 Timing o f  Preference Changes.
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the exclusive authority of their governments. It is, therefore, questionable if the British 
government used its veto in the NPG. It could have been possible since formally all 
Alliance members hold a veto in the collective decision-making process. However, the fact 
that a veto was not necessary to maintain Britain’s freedom of action on the issue and the 
observation that NATO changed its defence requirement immediately after the US had 
withdrawn its support for the development of the SRAM-T, speak against such 
speculation. If Britain had exercised a blocking strategy, it should at least have delayed the 
NATO decision. In fact, there was no evidence of a ‘veto’ in the primary sources.
Indeed, with respect to the intra-governmental decision-making process in Britain, 
even the final control of Parliament over the outcome was restricted. The approval of the 
House of Commons to nuclear policy could only be given to the Defence White Paper as 
a whole, not to single projects. Since a rejection of the White Paper would be synonymous 
with a vote of no-confidence, the stakes against such action were prohibitively high. 
Nevertheless, in the decision regarding the future of the TASM programme, the Cabinet 
went through great pains to receive the backing of Parliament. For nearly three years, from 
summer 1990 to summer 1993, the support of the Conservative parliamentary party was 
crucial in order to fend off the collective 
pressure of the opposition parties for the 
cancellation of the TASM. During this 
period, the Conservative majority in the 
House of Commons successfully vetoed a 
rejection of the TASM programme 
However, even after key cabinet members 
had changed their preference with regard to 
the missile, the blocking majority remained 
in place; much to the detriment of the 
government which now increased the 
pressure on the reluctant MPs. At the maximum, the British Parliament was able to 
withstand a pressure of 72 per cent of the actors to whom it had direct links. Due to its 
nature as a collective decision-making unit, however, the crucial degree of pressure was 
that on the Conservative MPs who represented the majority in the Commons. Incidentally, 
the pressure on the Conservative MPs amounted to only 50 per cent and thus explains the
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ability of the Parliament as a whole to resist the great amount of pressure placed on it. 
Since the strategy of the Conservative parliamentary party was the only instance of 
blocking behaviour, the average degree of pressure which Parliament was able to 
withstand is less insightful than in the first case study. However, at 50 per cent it is 
generally comparable.157
New Insights into the British TASM Cancellation
From the findings of multilevel network theory presented above, three new insights can 
be gained into the decision of the British government to abolish its TASM project. In 
particular, multilevel network theory helps to explain the resistance of the British 
government to a cancellation of its TASM programme until autumn 1993. It suggests that 
the British redefinition of its nuclear requirements following the changes in the 
international arena with the end of the Cold War was, if not brought about, at least 
significantly influenced by Britain’s NATO allies who pressed for the abolition of most 
nuclear weapons in Europe in the aftermath of 1990. The argument is supported by the 
finding that the British administration invested 1.6m dollars into the development of the 
missile as late as September 1992 which illustrates that, in the views of British military 
planners and politicians, the end of the Cold War did not immediately reduce the 
requirement for the missile. Moreover, the case study raises questions regarding the 
suggestion that cuts in the defence budget were the primary reason for the government’s 
policy reversal. Thus, the above analysis points out that MoD officials considered the 
option of cancelling their order for a fourth Trident which would have led to even greater 
savings, but this was nevertheless rejected.
The alternative explanations offered by multilevel network theory to both puzzles 
rest on its examination of the decision-making process. Specifically, multilevel network 
theory links the prolonged deferral of a decision regarding the future of the TASM to the 
lack of direct influence over the government among the actors who advocated an abolition 
of the missile. In particular, the Cabinet and Parliament which held the ultimate decision­
making authority in this case had no direct relations with other national administrations 
and were thus insulated from the international opposition to the TASM which had
157 See Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics.
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emerged within NATO. As a consequence, the pressure for the abolition of the weapon 
had to build up gradually through indirect linkages. According to multilevel network 
theory, the preference change among officials in the British MoD who held a boundary 
role in the network, i.e. they were linked transnationally to their NATO colleagues and 
nationally to British politicians, was critical for this build-up. By forming a 
transgovernmental coalition in favour of the cancellation of the T ASM, the British military 
helped to extend the international pressure among domestic actors in Britain. It thereby 
fostered the formation of a winning coalition between cabinet ministers and the members 
of the Commons Defence Committee which eventually overcame the objections of 
Conservative MPs to the cancellation of the missile in the House of Commons.
Interestingly, as in the first case, multilevel network theory shows that the British 
government changed its policy only after a majority of national as well as international 
actors had come to favour the abolition of its TASM programme. The notion that Western 
European governments are increasingly controlled by international or transnational 
relations is thus modified from a multilevel network perspective. Although the case study 
illustrates that international pressures played a considerable role in bringing about the 
policy change of the British government, it also shows that the government resisted these 
pressures until it had gained the support of a range of domestic actors, in particular of the
Conservative MPs, the House of Commons and the members of the Defence Committee,
> ^
for the cancellation of the missile project.
Multilevel network theory offers a similar explanation for the decision of MoD 
officials to prefer a fourth Trident over the TASM. Thus, the case study suggests that the 
international opposition to the stationing of the missile and the following decision of the 
North Atlantic Council to cancel its TASM requirement removed the rationale for the 
missile for British forward defence. The Trident, on the contrary, did not directly affect 
Britain’s NATO partners and did not incur any international opposition. In the absence of 
international pressure, the decision in favour of a fourth Trident was therefore much easier 
to defend in the British foreign policy decision-making network.
Finally, multilevel network theory provides further insights into the nature of the 
decision-making process in terms of the scope of the pressure and the coalitions which 
emerged in opposition to the TASM programme. As has been noted in the above study, 
a range of actors across all levels of analysis exerted pressure for the abolition of the
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British TASM. In the initial stages of the decision-making process ministers and officials 
from most NATO member states exerted transgovemmental pressure on their British 
counterparts to cancel the programme. Through an international coalition within NATO 
these actors soon gained the support of the North Atlantic Council which abolished its 
TASM requirement by December 1991 and contributed to the international pressure on 
the British government. Moreover, a multilevel analysis of the case shows that the 
transgovemmental coalition among officials from these countries was eventually joined by 
the MoD military. As a consequence, Cabinet ministers and MPs not only came under 
international, but also national pressure.
While the case appears to illustrate the importance of the boundary and bridging 
roles of ministers and civil servants between national and international actors in that they 
can seek to influence and draw on the support from both arenas. It also shows that the 
concept of the government as a gatekeeper is not quite met by the empirical findings. In 
this case study it was specifically challenged in two ways. First, transnational pressure, 
such as that from US Congress members on British parliamentarians, was able to 
circumvent the administration. Second, the administration itself was divided and, as a 
consequence, could not successfully act as gatekeeper. In particular, the control of 
government ministers over policies was undermined by the ability and willingness of civil 
servants to forge a transgovemmental coalition with their colleagues in other NATO 
countries and tfe' pressure which this coalition exerted on the politicians.
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5. Case III: The Despatch of Tornados to Bosnia
5.1 Introduction
The question whether German soldiers could be deployed in out-of-area missions1 under 
the authority of the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) had been controversially discussed since German unification and the achievement 
of full sovereignty in March 1991. The debate came to a climax over the question whether 
Germany could and should send ECR2-Tornado aircraft to Bosnia to safeguard the 
regrouping or withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops in 1995. It was argued that with a 
decision in favour, German involvement in international affairs would reach a new level. 
Previous German contributions to international crisis managements like in Cambodia, 
Somalia or in the form of personnel on board of NATO’s airborne warning and control 
system (AWACS) surveillance planes had been undoubtedly humanitarian or defensive. 
The Tornados, on the contrary, had the task to detect and destroy Serbian anti-aircraft 
radar and missiles.
The debate entered a new stage when the German Federal Constitutional Court 
ruled in June 1994 that the German Basic Law permitted military action under the aegis 
of the UN or NATO. Moreover, the Constitutional Court concluded that action as part 
of Germany’s membership within international organisations could be approved by a 
simple majority in the Bundestag. Although the ruling solved the legal question, the 
political decision to use the newly acquired freedom of action was only taken during the 
course of 1994-95. A heated debate across all parties and sections of the German public 
preceded it. In addition, the government came under intense pressure from its allies across 
the Atlantic and in Europe as the situation in Bosnia worsened and the administrations in 
France and Britain considered pulling their troops out of the region. On 30 June 1995, the 
German Bundestag eventually approved the despatch of Tornados to Bosnia. The German 
government and its parliamentary majority, thereby, rejected the principle of non-military
1 The German Basic Law stipulated that the German Bundcswehr was only to be used for national self- 
defence or due to Germany’s obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty for the defence of NATO 
territory. Action beyond the territory of the NATO member states was defined as ‘out of area’ and not 
permitted by the constitution.
2 Electronic Combat and Reconnaissance.
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intervention which had been fundamental to German foreign policy since the Second 
World War. It opened the road to a new, stronger international role of the united 
Germany.
The case study examines the decision to despatch Tornados to Bosnia as the final 
episode of the German government’s progressive abandonment of the principle of military 
restraint following international and domestic pressure. By applying multilevel network 
theory to the different, but overlapping multilevel foreign policy decision-making network 
which surrounds the German government and the Bundestag, this and the following 
chapter seeks to establish the applicability of the multilevel network theory to distinct 
networks in Western Europe. However, while the British and the German networks differ 
with regard to their ultimate decision units and their domestic actors, they share their 
membership in international organisations such as NATO, the European Union (EU), the 
Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). Moreover, Britain and Germany both maintain strong bilateral linkages 
with most administrations in Western Europe and North America. The most significant 
difference between the international network relations of the two governments is the fact 
that the British government, unlike the German, has a seat on the UN Security Council.
In spite of these distinctions, multilevel network theory hypothesises that the 
decision-making processes in these networks are determined by the same basic axioms. 
Specifically, the first hypothesis suggests in this case that the degree of pressure to which 
the actors within the German multilevel foreign policy network were exposed at any time 
in the decision-making process explains their increasing support for the despatch of 
Tornados to Bosnia between spring 1994 and summer 1995. Moreover, the hypothesis 
proposes that the policy change of the ultimate decision unit, namely the German 
Bundestag which had to approve the despatch of the Tornados according to the ruling of 
the Federal Constitutional Court, was preceded by a sequence of preference changes which 
increased the direct pressure on key domestic actors. The second hypothesis states that 
collective decision units, such as international organisations and parliaments, can withstand 
higher degrees of network pressure if their members have a formal or informal veto. It will 
illustrate why the German Bundestag was able to block the despatch of Tornados in spite 
of considerable domestic and international pressure until June 1995.
Although the case generally meets the criteria for its selection, it should be noted
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that its environmental factors were not as ideal for the testing of the theory as the two 
British cases. As the first case study of the British decision to support air strikes in Bosnia 
has illustrated, the terms of the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia changed 
considerably due to conflicting policy preferences in the United States (US) and Western 
Europe. The sending of Tornados was closely linked to this context. However, while the 
broader debate over the intervention in the former Yugoslavia is not re-examined here, the 
case study illustrates the changes in the policy preferences of Germany’s allies which 
directly related to the issue of the Tornados. In particular, the increased assertiveness of 
the French and American administrations in the second half of 1994 and in May 1995, 
which led to the deployment of additional forces in Bosnia, will be attributed to the 
election of a Republican majority to Congress and the coming to power of Jacques Chirac 
in France. The role of the French presidential election in changing the policy preferences 
of the government is confirmed by the fact that, although events that were exogenous to 
the network, such as the taking of hostages in May 1995, might have contributed to the 
French demands for an increase in the firepower for UNPROFOR, a similar ‘hostage 
crisis’ in November 1994 had not triggered such calls.
In addition to the testing of multilevel network theory, the case study seeks to add 
to our understanding of the Bundestag’s approval of the despatch of Tornados to Bosnia 
by examining factors that have been neglected in the public and even academic debate on 
the decision. It raises the question what role international and domestic pressures played 
in the decision of the Cabinet and, eventually, the German Bundestag to despatch the 
Tornados. Thus, it moves beyond the level of the moral and practical arguments which 
characterised the German debate over the decision to the underlying dependency relations 
which influence foreign policy decision-making. Several observations show that the 
‘objective’ arguments in favour of the despatch which were put forward by the German 
government do not sufficiently explain its decision. In particular, the claim that Germany’s 
ECR-Tornados were crucial for the defence of UNPROFOR and could not be provided 
by other NATO members, is questionable on three grounds. First, Germany was not the 
only European country in possession of this type of fighter plane. The Italian government 
had also ordered ECR-Tornados which, according to defence journals, should have been
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operational by 1995.3 Although it could be argued that Italy as a neighbouring country 
might have been ruled out from military operations over Bosnia, Italian planes were 
involved in the safeguarding of the Adriatic.4 Second, American EF-111 planes could have 
served as an alternative to the ECR-Tornados. The E F - l l l ’s capabilities were more 
limited and had to be complemented with additional fighter planes, but they were 
successfully employed in the destruction of Serb positions in November 1994.5 Third, 
serious doubts about whether the German ECR-Tornados were fully operational emerged 
before their despatch.6 While at the time, information about problems with the Tornados 
was suppressed, their extent was revealed in a television report of the German news 
programme Panorama on 27 June 1997 which investigated the accident of an ECR- 
Tomado. The programme quoted an internal report from the Defence Ministry which 
confirmed that serious technical faults with the aircraft had been known when the planes 
were offered to NATO in 1995.
Like the two British case studies, the analysis of the German decision regarding 
the despatch of ECR-Tornados is structured into a chronological-analytical part and a 
concluding evaluation of multilevel network theory. The chronological analysis begins with 
a brief description of the circumstances which led to the international request for German 
military action in Bosnia and, thus, ‘out of area’. It continues by examining the interactions 
and preference changes within the network which eventually led the Bundestag to approve 
the despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia in June 1995, in four chronological stages. 
Specifically, the analysis seeks to establish how network relations accounted for the ability
3 C.G., ‘Bonn reagiert zuriickhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94; 
Antonio Ciampi, ‘First Tornado IT ECR takes o ff, Ja n e’s Defence Weekly 18:6, 8/8/92, p. 11; Antonio 
Ciampi, ‘First ECR Tornado moves SEAD ahead\ J a n e 's Defence Weekly 17:15,11/4/92, p.601; Charles 
Bickers, ‘Europe’s “Wild Weasels’” , Jane's Defence Weekly 17:15, 11/4/92, pp.615f.; Charles Bickers, 
‘Luftwaffe Tornados receive full ECR fit’, Jane's Defence Weekly 19:9, 27/2/93, p.5.
4 ‘Serbische Streitkr&fte suchen zunehmend die Konfrontation mit Einheiten der UN’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 3/5/94.
5 ‘Bonn bietet bis zu 2500 Soldaten fiir die Sicherung der Blauhelme an’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
22/12/94; ‘Luft und Wasser’, Spiegel 52, 26/12/94, p.23
6 In December 1994, Jurgen Koppelin (FDP) questioned the government’s assurances that the ECR- 
Tornados were fully operational. See fy., ‘Koppelin: Tornados nur bedingt einsatzbereit’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 27/12/94. The doubts reemerged in summer 1995 after the decision to despatch the Tornados 
had been taken. This time, the pilots themselves expressed their reservations over the state of the weapons 
system on board of the Tornados. See Wolfgang Stock, ‘Sorgen hinter der Fassade’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 5/7/95.
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of the actors to exert pressure for or against the despatch.
During the first stage of the debate from January to June 1994, the unresolved 
constitutional question allowed the opposition parties to veto a despatch of German 
military to Bosnia in the Bundestag. Although the governments of the US, Britain and 
France had expressed their interest in a German contribution, they recognised the inability 
of the Kohl administration to conform under these circumstances. On 12 June 1994, the 
ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court removed the opposition’s ability to veto the 
despatch by stipulating that a simple majority was sufficient to approve a Bundeswehr out- 
of-area mission under the auspices of an international organisation. During the following 
stage, between June and December, a transnational coalition between the German military 
and their colleagues from NATO member states supported by members of the Christian 
Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary party initiated 
a formal NATO request for German ECR-Tornados in order to force the German 
government into action. Within two weeks of the request, the Cabinet which had initially 
been opposed to the mission reversed its policy. Nevertheless, since the ultimate decision­
making authority in this case lay with the Bundestag, the debate continued during the third 
stage. In the final part of the debate between December 1994 to June 1995, the German 
administration attempted to increase the support for the despatch among the
parliamentarians of all parties. Given the unique historical nature of the issue and the
(
narrow majority of the governing coalition in the Bundestag, the government did not want 
to risk a negative vote.
Summarizing these findings, the conclusion of the chapter assess the explanatory 
value of multilevel network theory in this case. In order to do so, it abstracts the relations 
between different degrees of pressure and the four behavioural categories identified in the 
methodological section of the second chapter. Moreover, it seeks to improve the 
hypotheses and identify additional explanatory variables where systematic correlations can 
be observed. A comparison with the British cases is not attempted, but will be reserved 
for the final chapter of this thesis which integrates the findings from all four case studies.
5.2 The Erosion of German Objections to a Tornado Despatch
The question whether out-of-area operations of the Bundeswehr were constitutionally 
permissible already arose with the reunification of Germany in October 1990. However,
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since the Basic Law was not replaced by a new constitution, article 87a, sec. 22, which 
prohibited out-of-area missions of German soldiers, remained intact. At least the restrictive 
interpretation of the article which had been shared by politicians and legal experts for more 
than 40 years was not immediately challenged.7 The question which role the Bundeswehr 
should adopt after the end of the Cold War, however, led to the progressive erosion of this 
constitutional consensus. Specifically, the Gulf War in 1991 increased the willingness of 
Conservative politicians and the military in Germany to participate in multilateral 
international operations. They perceived the inability to give more than financial support 
and the consequent derision of German foreign policy as ‘chequebook diplomacy’ as a 
national embarrassment.8 In the subsequent domestic debate, leading members of the 
CDU/CSU, Defence Minister Volker Rtihe and Inspector General Klaus Naumann 
emerged as proponents of Bundeswehr. operations out of area.9 Although Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl and the members of the junior coalition partner in the government, the liberal 
Free-Democratic Party (FDP), were highly critical of sending German soldiers abroad, the 
support for German participation at least in peacekeeping operations increased 
progressively from German reunification in 1990 to the summer of 1995.10
7 ‘Nahe dran am echten Krieg’, Spiegel 30, 27/7/92, p.27; Sabine Berghahn, ‘Bundeswehreinsdtze “our 
of area”’, Gegenwartskunde 43:4, 1994, pp.467-477, p.467. The position had been acknowledged by the 
two recent governments. See Joachim F. Weber, ‘ Auslandseinsatze der Bundeswehr auch “out of area”? 
ImKem ein Streit iim Deutschlands neue Verantwortung’, Parlament, 11/11/94; Dr. Hermann Otto Solms 
(FDP), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 240.Sitzung, 22 July 1994, p.21179; Harald Muller, 
‘Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate’, in Lawrence Freedman, e d M ilitary 
Intervention in European Conflicts (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 125-141, p.129. See also ‘Kohl urges 
change in constitution’, Jane's Defence Weekly 15:12, 23/3/91, p.424; ‘Nahe dran am echten Krieg’, 
Spiegel 30, 27/7/92, p.27; “‘Bis an die Schmerzgrenze’” , Spiegel 15, 12/4/93, p.24; David Gow, ‘Court 
frees Bonn for military role’, Guardian, 13/7/94.
8 ‘Leading Article: Germany’s new role’, Daily Telegraph, 13/7/94; David Gow, ‘Court frees Bonn for 
military role’, Guardian, 13/7/94; Fredrick Studemann, ‘Court removes the Bundeswehr’s shackles’, 
European, 15/7/94; Andrew Gimson and Sally Malcolm-Smith, ‘Germany’s war machine is back’, Sunday 
Telegraph, 17/7/94. See also Michael J. Inaker, IJnter Ausschlufi der Offentlichkeit? Die Deutschen in 
der Golfallianz (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991).
9 ‘Out-of-area debate urged’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 16:23, 7/12/91, p. 1082; ‘Nahe dran am echten 
Krieg’, Spiegel 30, 27/7/92, p.27; Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr General Klaus Naumann, 
‘Standorbestimmung’, in Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Informationsstab, Referat 
Offentlichkeitsarbeit, ‘Bundeswehr 1993 - Wir stellen uns den Herausforderungen, 34. 
Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr in Mainz, 5. bis 7. Oktober 1993’, Informationen zur 
Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 1993, pp. 21-42, p.36; Muller, ‘Military Intervention for European Security’, 
p. 137. See also the interview with Defence Minister Volker Riihc in “‘Das ist keine Drohgebardc’” , 
Spiegel 30, 27/7/92, p.34.
10 Andrea Lederer (PDS), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 240.Sitzung, 22 July 1994, p.21196. 
See also ‘Antrcten zum Krieg’, Spiegel 31, 3/8/92, p.29; Muller, ‘Militaiy Intervention for European
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The request for the despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia emerged from the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia which raised international pressure for German 
contributions to the international peacekeeping mission. However, while members of the 
CDU/CSU parliamentary party were prepared to exclude peacekeeping operations from 
the legal restrictions of the Basic Law, their FDP coalition partners insisted on an 
amendment of the constitution. The required two-thirds majority for a constitutional 
amendment, however, was not attainable in the Bundestag without support from the 
opposition parties. Several attempts to forge a compromise between the coalition parties 
and the main opposition party, the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD), over the terms 
of an amendment in favour of out-of-area missions failed.11 Nevertheless, the government 
responded positively to WEU and NATO requests for contributions to the monitoring of 
the Adriatic and the airspace over Bosnia. The decisions almost caused the breakup of the 
coalition government.12 Together with the SPD, the FDP parliamentary party sued the 
government, including its own cabinet ministers, in the Federal Constitutional Court over 
a breach of the German Basic Law.13
In spring 1994 the ruling of the Constitutional Court was still pending. However, 
a step-up of international military pressure on Bosnia increased international demands for 
a German participation in the multinational operation. Between 1991 and 1993 the out-of- 
area question had almost exclusively been discussed in the abstract or with reference to
Security’, p. 128.
11 ‘Mogelei mit Blauhelmen’, Spiegel 27,6/7/92, p.52; ‘Toter Vogel’, Spiegel 29,20/7/92, p.23; ‘UN no- 
lly-order puts NATO into war zone’, Jane's Defence Weekly 19:15, 10/4/93, p.5; Muller, ‘Military 
Intervention for European Security’, pp. 13 If.; O. Diehl ‘UN-Einsatze der Bundeswehr. Auflenpolitische 
Handlungszw&nge und innenpolitischer Konsensbedarf, Europa Archiv 48:8, 1993, pp.219-227; Gerd 
Roellecke, ‘Bewaffnete Auslandseinsatze - Kreig, Aussenpolitik oder Innenpolitik?’, D erStaat 34,1995, 
pp.415-428, p.415.
12 Paul Beaver, ‘The UN secures a foothold towards peace in Sarajevo’, Jane's Defence Weekly 18:2, 
11/7/92, p. 18; ‘ Angetreten zum Krieg’, Spiegel 31, 10/8/92, p.29; ‘UK AWACS fly with NATO crews’, 
Ja n e ’s Defence Weekly 18:20, 14/11/92, p.7.
13 ‘Ein pathologischer Fall’, Spiegel 13, 29/3/93, pp.23f.; ‘Kohl und Kinkel vor Gericht’, Spiegel 14, 
5/4/93, pp. 18-22; Steve Crawshaw, ‘Germany to let its soldiers serve abroad’, Independent, 13/7/94; 
David Gow, ‘Court frees Bonn for military role’. Guardian, 13/7/94; Joachim F. Weber, ‘Auslandseinsatze 
der Bundeswehr auch “out of area”? Im Kern ein Streit urn Deutschlands neue Verantwortung’, 
Parlament, 11/11/94. See also Marie-Janine Calic, ‘German Perspectives’, in Alex Danchev and Thomas 
Halverson, eds., International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Crisis (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 
52-75, p.65; Dietmut Majer, ‘Bundeswehr und Auslandseinsatze - Diskussion ohne Ende?’, Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift 36, 1995, pp.523-530, p.524; Muller, ‘Military Intervention for European Security’, 
pp.l28f.
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German contributions to peacekeeping operations.14 Now, for the first time since the end 
of the Second World War, an offensive mission was considered for the Bundeswehr.15
International Pressure fo r German Participation in Bosnia 
Between 1 January and 12 June 1994 the decision-
Table 51making process was defined by the ability of the „ _ ‘
& v Preference Changes:
German opposition parties to veto military action out 1 January -12 June 1994
of area in the Bundestag due to the unresolved 
constitutional issue. The question of German 
participation in offensive military action in the 
former Yugoslavia was first raised in spring 1994 by 
NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), the US General George Joulwan, who 
inquired of all NATO members how many planes 
they could contribute to the defence of the no-fly 
zone over Bosnia. However, when officials from the 
German Defence Ministry used their close links with 
NATO to ask Joulwan informally to refrain from 
seeking German military support because of the 
impending decision of the Federal Constitutional 
Court on the out-of-area question, Joulwan obliged.
Moreover, the NATO General held back the request 
for a second time when Bundeswehr generals asked 
for another suspension of the request until after the 
general election which was coming up in summer
14 FDP parly leader Otto Graf Lambsdorff had threatened that his party would leave the governmental 
coalition if German soldiers on board AW ACS surveillance planes would become involved in directing 
operational missions in the former Yugoslavia. See Waldemar Schreckenberger, ‘Eine chaotische 
Sicherheitspolitik’, Spiegel 7, 15/2/93, p.40; ‘Mut zum Absurden’, Spiegel 13, 29/3/93, p. 19.
I5Diehl, ‘UN-Einsatze der Bundeswehr’, p.219. See also Karl Lamers (CDU/CSU), Deutscher Bundestag, 
12.Wahlperiode, 219.Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p. 18919.
U Phase (-12/6/94)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
BT 57 B
Nato-CM 27 NC
COf 25 NC
Fm 24 NC-
Com 20 U
Coa 20 NC
spd 20 NC
BR 18 U
Cha 17 NC
fdp 16 U
Med 16 NC
CM 15 NC
Cab 15 NC
FM 13 NC
90/G 12 NC
pds 12 NC
vote 12 NC
Uns 11 NC
BVG 0 C
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Although a transnational coalition in favour of a German contribution to the 
offensive capabilities of NATO in the former Yugoslavia extended from NATO’s 
integrated staff over their colleagues in the German Bundeswehr to Defence Minister 
Volker Riihe and members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary parties, their hesitation can be 
explained by their lack of power over the key decision-makers in the German foreign 
policy network.17 Since the degree of collective pressure which the transnational coalition 
could exert directly through their relations ranged between 25 per cent on the Chancellor’s 
Office staff48 and 15 per cent on the Cabinet19, the probability that the transnational 
pressure could overcome their continuing inhibitions about an offensive mission of the 
Bundeswehr was rather low. In fact, it was not in the government, but in the Bundestag 
where the pressure for military action was highest at 57 per cent due to the large number 
of CDU/CSU parliamentarians.20 However, the two-thirds majority required for an 
amendment of the constitution in favour of Bundeswehr missions out of area provided the 
members of the opposition parties with a veto position and, thus, the ability to block a 
decision. As long as the constitutional provisions remained in place, the members of the 
emerging coalition in favour of out-of-area missions had little prospect of bringing about 
a policy change.
In order to gain the necessary two-thirds majority, the proponents of a 
Bundeswehr operation in Bosnia would have had to change the preferences of the 
opposition members who strongly objected to such a mission. Practically, however, the
16 Karl Feldmeyer, ‘“Es gibt keine Garantie, aber es gibt auch keine Alternative’” , Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 9/6/95.
17 ‘“Einsatz ins Ungewisse”’, Spiegel 5, 30/1/95, p.75.
18 With the officials from the Defence Ministry and members of the CDU/CSU only two out of eight actors 
to whom the staff of the Chancellor’s Office were linked in the network favoured out-of-area action 
accounting for. P, [COf] = 2/8 = 25%.
19 The Cabinet was linked to three out of 22 actors who supported out-of-area missions, namely Defence 
Minister Volker Riihe, his staff and CDU/CSU parliamentarians, amounting to P, [Cab] = 3/20 = 15%.
20 • • The pressure in the Bundestag can be calculated in terms of its members and linkages. The composition
of the Bundestag at the time included 319 members of the CDU/CSU, 79 FDP members, 239 SPD
members, 8 Green members and 17 PDS members, i.e. altogether 662. Each of them had 24 linkages with
other actors in the network raising, i.e. L=24x662 = 15888. Since the members of the CDU/CSU
supported out-of-area missions, i.e. 24x319=7656 and four out of the 24 actors to whom all other
parliament members were linked urged them to support out-of-area missions, too, i.e. 4x343=1372, E
amounted to E =7656+l372=9028 with P, [BT] = E/L = 9028/15888 = 57%.
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advocates of out-of-area action lacked the relations with the opposition which would allow 
them to exert sufficient pressure. The parliamentary opposition was insulated from the 
international pressures which affected the German government because the members of 
the Bundestag lacked linkages with the American and Western European governments 
who advocated German engagement in Bosnia. Moreover, the members of the CDU/CSU 
who were the strongest supporters of Bundeswehr missions out-of-area among the 
domestic actors in Germany had no direct influence on the opposition. Only the Defence 
Minister and his staff could seek to influence the members of the opposition parties who 
they relied on their expert advice and information on the issue. However, since the 
collective pressure from the Ministry of Defence staff and Defence Minister Riihe 
accounted for only 12 per cent of the network linkages of parliamentarians from the Green 
Party and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)21, the pressure on the members of the 
two parliamentary parties in favour of military action was rather low. The members of the 
SPD opposition were slightly more exposed to actors who advocated military action 
through their involvement in the Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees. 
Indeed, the progress of the debate below shows that under pressure from 20 per cent of 
their contacts in the network, SPD members proved more likely to change their view on 
the issue.22 Nevertheless, the members of the transnational coalition among the defence 
staff, its NATO colleagues and the CDU/CSU parliamentarians acted rationally when they 
recognised the limits of their influence on the opposition parties and waited for the ruling 
of the Federal Constitutional Court.
In the meantime, Inspector General Klaus Naumann began to prepare the 
Bundeswehr for a global role. Although unnecessary within the integrated military 
structure of NATO, the Inspector General set up a preliminary independent Generalstab23 
in the Defence Ministry. In addition, the Bundeswehr conducted extensive planning for the
21 The members of the PDS and the Green parliamentary party were linked two out of 17 actors, namely 
the Defence Ministry staff and Defence Minister Riihe, who argued in favour of out-of-area missions, 
accounting for P, [pds; gr] = 2/17 = 12%.
22 Specifically, SPD members were linked to the Ministry of Defence staff, Defence Minister Riihe, 
representatives of the German industry which had taken a public stance on the issue and US Congress 
members who had travelled to Europe to discuss Germany’s new role in the international system, rasing 
the pressure to P, [spd] = 4/20 = 20%.
23 Chiefs of Staff.
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deployment of troops in the former Yugoslavia, in spite of the fact that the despatch of 
ground troops had been ruled out by the Cabinet.24 Naumann received tacit backing from 
Defence Minister Riihe, who did little to stop him. In spite of rumours that Naumann and 
Riihe were not on best personal terms, they were pursuing the same goal in this case.25 The 
close institutional relations between the two roles and their boundary positions between 
national and international members of the German multilevel foreign policy network, 
explain how the minister and the Bundeswehr were not only able to form a coalition within 
the German administration, but also to mobilise and profit from the transnational support 
of their NATO colleagues.26 As mentioned above, the administrations of the US, Britain 
and France favoured a stronger German contribution to the operation in the former 
Yugoslavia beyond its participation in the AW ACS surveillance planes and the monitoring 
of the Adriatic. However, asked by Naumann not to interfere during the ongoing 
constitutional review, these administrations kept a low profile with regard to the German 
debate over the out-of-area issue until the summer of 1994.
During this time, the developments in the international arena and changes in the 
Bosnia strategy of its allies had indirect repercussions on Germany. Specifically, the 
increase in military action by NATO led to the first involvement of German soldiers in a 
fighting operation out of area on 28 February 1994. With the support of an AWACS 
aircraft which included a German crew member American NATO fighters shot down four 
planes in violation of the air exclusion zone in East Bosnia.27 The German government 
backed the response, but members of the FDP parliamentary party expressed their concern 
over the participation of a German soldier in military action.28 The first active contribution 
of a German soldier to offensive action revived the debate over the constitutional and
24 James Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: 
Hurst&Company, 1997), p. 174.
25 ‘Nahe dran am echten Krieg’, Spiegel 30,3/8/92, p.26; Bundesministers der Vertcidigung Volker Riihe, 
‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik vor neiicn Aufgaben - Bilanz und Perspektiven’, in Der Bundesminister der 
Verteidigung, Informationsstab, Referat Offentlichkeitsarbeit, ‘Bundeswehr 1993 - Wir stellen uns den 
Herausforderungen, 34. Kommandeurlagung der Bundeswehr in Mainz, 5.-7. Oktober’, Informationen 
zur Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 1993, pp. 11-20, p. 14.
26 Naumann’s selection as chairman of NATO’s Military Council in December 1994 strengthened his 
transnational linkages through even more regular contacts.
27 K.F., ‘Der erste MilitSreinsatz der Nato - verborgen in einer knappen Mittcilung’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 1/3/94; Steve Doughty, ‘West united on Serb jet attack’, Daily Mail, 1/3/94.
28 Steve Doughty, ‘West united on Serb jet attack’, Daily Mail, 1/3/94.
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moral limits of German military action out of area. Two days after the incident, the PDS 
parliamentary group requested an emergency debate about the policy of the federal 
government.29 During the Bundestag debate, all sides reiterated their position on the out- 
of-area question.
The unity of the coalition government, however, showed first strains due to 
contradictory pressures from members of the FDP and the CDU/CSU. Although Foreign 
Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP) agreed with his party over the need to achieve constitutional 
clarity, Kinkel expressed the conviction that Germany should not stand aside if the 
international community required means for action.30 Defence Minister Volker Riihe 
(CDU) contended that German engagement under the authority of the UN should not be 
rejected, but qualified that in the ‘special’ case of the former Yugoslavia German soldiers 
should not become involved in military action. Chancellor Helmut Kohl held a similar 
view. The Chancellor stated that even after a constitutional amendment, German history 
in the Balkans raised doubts about whether the Bundeswehr would be the right partner in 
offensive action.31 With regards to a military operation of German troops in the former 
Yugoslavia the Chancellor was ‘very reluctant’.32 Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister 
Kinkel acted rationally when they resisted the pressure from Defence Minister Riihe, the 
Defence Ministry staff and members of the CDU/CSU. They had to take into account that 
the majority of domestic actors to whom they had direct contacts in the network still 
objected to a military operation of the Bundeswehr unless for the purpose of self-defence. 
In particular, among the FDP coalition partner doubts over military action were 
widespread. As a consequence, the collective pressure on Chancellor Kohl and Foreign 
Minister Kinkel remained comparatively low at 17 per cent33 and 13 per cent34
29 Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 213.Sitzung, 3 March 1994, pp. 18423-18438.
30 Klaus Kinkel (FDP), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 213.Sitzung, 3 March 1994, p. 18429.
31 Volker Riihe (CDU), ibid., p. 18424.
32 Interview with Helmut Kohl in the Silddeutsche Zeitung cited in ‘Die Bundeswehr nach Bosnien?’, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 16/4/94.
33 Chancellor Kohl was linked to seven out of 42 actors who supported military action, including Ministry 
of Defence staff, Defence Minister Riihe, CDU/CSU parliament members and the leaders of the US, 
Britain, France and the Netherlands raising the pressure to P, [Cha] = 7/42 = 17%.
34 Foreign Minister Kinkel was under less pressure than the Chancellor, since he was linked only to 
Defence Minister Riihe and his counterparts in the US, Britain, France and the Netherlands, with P, [FM] 
= 5/38 = 13%.
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respectively.
Failing to achieve a policy shift in the Bundestag or the Cabinet during the early 
months of 1994, CDU/CSU parliamentarians sought to use their contacts with journalists 
and the electorate to influence the public debate and, thereby, to increase the pressure on 
the Chancellor and cabinet ministers indirectly.35 In particular, the leader of the CDU/CSU 
faction, Wolfgang Schauble, argued in favour of a German participation in the military 
operation in Bosnia.36 The electorate and journalists were suitable targets since CDU/CSU 
parliamentarians had, so far unsuccessfully, used all other relations in the network through 
which they could influence the decision-making process. As long as the constitutional 
situation was unresolved, the Bundestag was blocked by the veto of the opposition parties. 
Moreover, due to the coalition structure of the German government, CDU/CSU 
parliamentarians had no direct influence over FDP cabinet ministers like Foreign Minister 
Kinkel.
In order to change the position of the government on the out-of-area issue, the 
support of FDP parliamentarians and ministers was essential. Fortunately, for the 
advocates of military action, the FDP parliamentary party was increasingly divided over 
the issue, despite low external pressure at 16 per cent.37 Only a small number of FDP 
parliamentarians continued to adhere to the original reasons for appealing to the Federal 
Constitutional Court over the participation of German soldiers in military action out of 
area, i.e. the limitation of the constitutional role of the Bundeswehr to national defence.38 
Conversely, most members had by now embraced the notion that the party’s appeal served 
to clarify the constitutional situation. In principle, the majority of FDP parliamentarians 
supported military action of German soldiers under the authority of multilateral 
institutions. However, doubts remained whether Bosnia was a suitable location for a first
35 Compare an article by Helmut Kohl’s speech writer, Dr Christoph Hoppe and his brother Joachim 
Hoppe, Captain in the German Bundeswehr, ‘ A role for German might and diplomacy in a better Europe’, 
European, 18/2/94.
36 Christian Schmidt (CDU/CSU), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 219.Sitzung, 14 April 1994, 
p. 18915. Compare Cohen in the International Herald Tribune of 30 March 1993, cited in Joachim F. 
Weber, ‘Auslandseinsatze der Bundeswehr auch “out of area”? Im Kern ein Streit um Deutschlands neue 
Verantwortung’, Parlament, 11/11/94.
37 P, [fdpj = 3/19 = 16%.
38 Dr. Burkhard Hirsch (FDP), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 219.Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p. 
18917.
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offensive mission.39
Support for German participation in the former Yugoslavia also began to mount 
in the SPD opposition party whose members were under pressure from the Defence 
Minister, his staff, US politicians and industry representatives which accounted for 20 per 
cent of their linkages.40 Dependent on the Defence Ministry for information about the 
international operation in Bosnia, SPD parliamentarians were easily impressed by the 
alleged success of military action in forcing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table.41 
However, the leadership of the SPD was divided. While some senior figures supported a 
German contribution, the deputy party leader Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul insisted that 
German soldiers had no place in the Balkans.42
In April 1994, the demand for military action in Bosnia increased after heavy Serb 
bombardment of Gorazde. The call for a contribution to the international operation in 
Bosnia came directly from the command of UNPROFOR which formally asked NATO for 
air support. Military strikes by American planes followed on 10 and 11 April as authorised 
by UN resolution 836.43 The UN Security Council approved the action on 11 April with 
the abstention of the Russian representative.44 The establishment of the Contact Group, 
consisting of the diplomats from the US, Russia, France, Britain and Germany, after the 
attack on Gorazde strengthened the links between the officials from the Foreign Offices 
of the four countries and Germany by instituting regular meetings on the Bosnian crisis.45 
The US and Russian governments set up the Contact Group because of Russian protests 
that it had failed to receive advance warning of US air strikes against the Serbs around 
Gorazde.46
39 Ulrich Irmer (FDP), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 219.Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p. 18915.
40 P, [spd] = 4/20 = 20%.
41 FreimutDuve (SPD), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlpcriode, 219.Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p. 18426. 
Dieter Schloten (SPD) changed his preference from opposition to support. See ibid., p. 18437. Compare 
also ‘Balkan in Bonn’, Spiegel 16, 18/4/94, pp. 18-20.
42 Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiodc, 219.Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p.18435.
43 Tom Dodd, War and Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia (London: House of Commons Libraiy, 
1995), p.13.
44 Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 219.Sitzung, 14 April 1994, pp. 18907-18925, pp.l8908f.
45 Halverson, ‘American Perspectives’, p.22.
46 Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p. 166.
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While the membership of the US and Russia as the two world superpowers and 
those of Britain and France because of their role as main contributors to UNPROFOR was 
undisputed, the inclusion of Germany was less obvious. Some authors have proposed 
Germany’s influence over the Croats as the reason.47 Others have argued that Germany 
participated as representative of the EU in which it held the presidency at the time.48 While 
the underlying reasons for the decision are not the subject of this study, the inclusion of 
German representatives in the Contact Group ‘represented a small step towards an equal 
and responsible role’ in the international community.49 It also meant that the network 
relations between the German Foreign Office, the Bundeswehr and its colleagues in the 
four countries were strengthened through even more frequent interaction than had been 
the case before the Contact Group was established. By means of these linkages, staff from 
the German Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence were now continuously subject to the 
considerations and influence of their colleagues in the countries that had the strongest 
interest in Bundeswehr participation in Bosnia, namely Britain, France and the US. Indeed, 
in the week following the attack, Inspector General Klaus Naumann used an unrelated 
incident in which eleven employees of a German radio station had to be rescued by Belgian 
soldiers in Ruanda to argue in the media for the ‘legitimate right’ of the German forces to 
protect German citizens anywhere in the world. Naumann added that the allies expected 
Germany to contribute to UN and NATO operations.50
By summer 1994, the governments of Britain and France increasingly considered 
the withdrawal of their troops from UNPROFOR. Ironically, this shift was caused by the 
political debate in the US, although the US government feared that the pullout of 
peacekeeping forces from the former Yugoslavia would raise calls for US intervention. 
Unwilling to despatch troops, the American administration was one of the most fervent 
proponents of the continued presence of UNPROFOR.51 Yet the apparent unwillingness
47 Fiona M. Watson and Tom Dodd, Bosnia and Croatia: The Conflict Continues (London: House of 
Commons Library, 1995), p .l.
48 Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p. 157.
49 Ibid., p. 173.
50 ‘Die Bundeswehr nach Bosnicn?’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 16/4/94.
51 Sir David Hannay, ‘The U N ’s Role in Bosnia Assessed’, The Oxford International Review  7:2, 1996, 
pp.4-12, p.7.
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of the Clinton administration to engage with ground troops in the former Yugoslavia, 
combined with the threat that the Republican-dominated US Congress would end the arms 
embargo over Bosnia, caused the administrations in France and Britain to contemplate 
plans for a withdrawal in the first place.52 The plans were supported by UN Secretary- 
General Boutros Ghali who appeared disillusioned about the effectiveness of the 
peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.53 With the governments in France and Britain increasingly 
unwilling to carry the main weight of the international operation in the former Yugoslavia 
and the US reluctant to step up its engagement, German participation was the obvious 
alternative. While UN and Contact Group officials hesitated to discuss a formal request 
of a German contribution in Bosnia, the question of Bundeswehr action out-of-area was 
repeatedly raised with regard to other issues. Thus, UN General Secretary Boutros Ghali 
publicly encouraged a German contribution to a permanent standby force for the UN54 and 
the French government suggested that it might ask the Bundeswehr to join its mission in 
setting up a safe zone for refugees in Rwanda.55 In Washington, the issue was discussed 
perhaps most explicitly in calls for German leadership ‘to solve the problems within 
Europe, like Bosnia and beyond Europe’s borders’.56
Although the Federal Constitutional Court had only been indirectly affected by the 
national and international pressure for the despatch of German soldiers out of area, it ruled 
on 12 July 1994 that any type of out-of-area mission was permissible under the existing 
stipulations of the Basic Law if undertaken as part of Germany’s contribution to 
multilateral international organisations. Moreover, according to the Constitutional Court, 
a simple majority in the Bundestag could approve out-of-area operations.57 The Federal
52 Marc Rogers, ‘NATO ponders force to cover UN pull-out’, Jane's Defence Weekly 22:12,24/9/94, p.4.
53 Halverson, ‘American Perspectives’, p.22.
54 ‘Marching orders for a German UN force’. Daily Mail, 12/7/94; Jochen Gaugele, ‘Kohl treads tightrope 
over military missions and electors’ votes’, Herald, 20/7/94.
55 ‘Marching orders for a German UN force’, Daily Mail, 12/7/94; David Gow, ‘Court frees Bonn for 
military role’, Guardian, 13/7/94; Jochen Gaugele, ‘Kohl treads tightrope over military m issions and 
electors’ votes’, Herald, 20/7/94.
56 David Gow, ‘US ends British “special link’” . Guardian, 12/7/94. See also Roger Boyes, ‘Clinton 
enhances Bonn’s role on the world stage’. Times, 12/7/94; Matthew Beard, ‘Bonn rules out military duty 
in world’s hotspots’, Times, 14/7/94.
57 For a discussion o f  the ruling see Ernst-Otto Czempicl, ‘Scliritt zuriick bei der Anwendung 
militarischcr Gewalt’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 24/8/94.
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Constitutional Court, thereby, ended the veto position of the opposition parties in the 
Bundestag and changed the conditions of the German foreign policy decision-making 
process. In fact, it can be argued that the decision modified the network relation between 
the opposition parties and the Bundestag in that it limited the institutional authority of the 
opposition members on issues such as military intervention. The consequences of the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling for the despatch of German Tornados were comprehensive. 
Not only did the ruling end the self-restraint of Germany’s NATO allies who in the second 
stage used their relations with NATO to publicly call for a German participation in Bosnia, 
it also decreased the ability of the members of the opposition parties in the Bundestag to 
resist the pressure for German participation in military action in Bosnia.
NATO Requests German Tornados
From 12 June to 10 December 1994, a transgovemmental coalition between officials from 
the US, Britain, France and the Bundeswehr strategically used its relations within the 
German foreign policy network to exert pressure on cabinet ministers. Although the 
government’s willingness and ability to participate in military action world-wide was 
undoubted after the ruling of the Constitutional Court,58 the Kohl Cabinet maintained that 
in the case of the former Yugoslavia special historical considerations had to be taken into
account.59 The leader of the FDP parliamentary party in the Bundestag, Hermann Otto
%
Solms, insisted that a broad consensus among all democratic parties beyond the simple 
majority required by the Constitutional Court should remain a condition for military action 
out of area. However, while the Chancellor appeared to share Solms’ view, his position 
was challenged even within the FDP. In particular the newly elected FDP party leader, 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, refused to make a decision dependent upon support from 
the opposition parties.60 Given that Green and PDS parliamentarians maintained their
58 Dr. Klaus Kinkel (FDP), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 240.Sitzung, 22 July 1994, pp.21165-
21218, pp.21166-21168.
59 Even Defence Minister Volker Riihe supported this position in public. See Matthew Beard, ‘Bonn rules 
out military duty in world’s hotspots’, Times, 14/7/94.
60 Charima Reinhardt, ‘Adria-Einsatz nachtrciglich gebilligt’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 23/7/94.
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fundamental opposition to out-of-area operations,
such a condition would continue to compromise Table 5.2
Preference ChenQes"
German foreign policy options.61 Nevertheless, a 12 June-9 December 1994 
‘grand coalition’ between the government 
parliamentary parties and the members of the SPD 
main opposition party appeared within the range of 
possibility.
Already, before the ruling of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the support for military action 
among some sections of the SPD parliamentary party 
had increased. The ruling itself further transformed the 
position of SPD parliamentarians who unlike the 
members of the other opposition parties accepted the 
new interpretation of the Basic Law.62 Only a few days 
after the publication of the ruling, SPD 
parliamentarians approved a decision to extend the 
participation of German soldiers in the AW ACS planes 
and in the Adriatic - the action for which their party 
had sued the government in the Constitutional Court.
Furthermore, a,majority of the SPD parliament 
members supported government proposals to expand 
the area covered by the AW ACS beyond NATO 
territory and to permit military action of ships 
patrolling the Adriatic as part of their engagements.63
61 Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 240.Sitzung, 22 July 1994, pp.21180-21184. See also Charima 
Reinhardt, ‘Adria-Einsatz nachtraglich gebilligt’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 23/7/94.
62 The disagreements mainly regarded the question whether military action had to be authorised by the 
U N  Security Council or whether a decision within Councils o f  NATO or the WEU was sufficient. See 
‘Kinkel und Scharping deuten das Bundeswehr-Urteil’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/7/94. Compare also 
Emst-Otto Czempiel, ‘Schritt zuriick bei der Anwendung milit&rischer Gewalt’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
24/8/94.
63 Antrag der Bundesregierung, ‘Deutsche Beteiligung an Malinahmen von NATO und WEU zur 
Durchsetzung von Beschliissen des Sicherhcitsrats der Vereinten Nalionen zum Adria-Embargo und 
Flugvcrbot iiber Bosnien-Herzcgowina’, Deutscher B undestag, 12.Wahlpcriode,Drucksache 12/8303,22  
July 1994. See also Dr. Klaus Kinkel (FDP) Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiodc, 240.Sitzung, 22 July
2nd Phase (-9 /12/94)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
BT 59 U
Nato-CM 51 C
Fm 36 NC
Cha 26 NC
COf 25 NC
FM 24 NC
Med 24 NC
Com 20 U
Coa 20 NC
spd 20 NC
Cab 20 NC
BR 18 U
fdp 16 U
CM 15 NC
gru 12 NC
pds 12 NC
vote 12 NC
Uns 11 NC
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Like the Cabinet, however, SPD Bundestag members maintained their objections 
with regard to a German participation in an offensive mission in Bosnia. One reason for 
the consensus between government and opposition on this particular issue was the fact 
that the German electorate continued to reject the idea of sending the Bundeswehr into 
combat.64 With a general election upcoming in October, politicians from all parties could 
not ignore public opinion on this hotly debated issue. Questioned by the visiting US 
President Clinton on a German contribution to out-of-area missions, Chancellor Kohl 
explained that the German public was not yet convinced of the need to participate in 
international peacekeeping.
Most of Germany’s NATO allies, its Eastern neighbours and the UN General 
Secretary Boutros Ghali welcomed the ruling.65 They believed that the ruling had finally 
removed all obstacles for a German participation in multilateral peacekeeping and fighting 
missions. While the American, British and French administrations had restrained their 
pressure for a German participation in Bosnia before the Constitutional Court’s decision, 
they did not hesitate to employ their wide range of direct and indirect links with cabinet 
ministers, officials in the German Foreign Office, the Defence Ministry and the 
international media to increase the pressure for a German contribution in Bosnia 
immediately after the ruling. The British administration in particular lauded the prospect 
of German forces being deployed out-of-area. The Conservative government even ignored 
the fears among its own backbenchers and the public over a resurgent Germany.66 In an 
interview with the BBC World Service, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated that 
Germany ‘should be able to send troops to international crisis zones in the same way that 
Britain, France and the US do. ...it was ‘absolutely artificial’ that a handful of European 
powers risked their troops in places such as Bosnia when Germany did not’.67 Since the
1994, p.21168. Among the SPD Parliament members, 111 voted for the government bill, 32 voted against, 
14 abstained. See Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiodc, 240.Sitzung, 22 July 1994, pp.21208-21210. 
See also ‘ A lles gedcckt’, Spiegel 30, 25/7/94, p.29.
64 ‘Leading Article: Germany’s role’, Financial Times, 12/7/94; ‘Leading Article: Germany’s new role’, 
Daily M ail, 13/7/94; Jochen Gaugele, ‘Kohl treads tightrope over military mission and electors’ votes’, 
Herald, 20/7/94.
65 Quentin Peel and George Graham, ‘German forces cleared for UN action’, Financial Times, 13/7/94; 
Matthew Beard, ‘Bonn rules out military duty in world’s hotspots’, Times, 14/7/94.
66 Jochen Gaugele, ‘Kohl treads tightrope over military mission and electors’ votes’, Herald, 20/7/94.
67 John Deans and Christopher Bell, ‘Room for one more at world’s top table’, Daily M ail, 30/7/94.
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relationship between Britain and Germany was characterised by mutual dependence rather 
than unilateral dominance, Hurd offered as incentive for German cooperation in Bosnia 
his support for a permanent German seat on the UN Security Council.68 US President Bill 
Clinton used his visit to Germany immediately after the constitutional decision to tell key 
politicians that Germany now had to accept a leading role in Europe and the world and 
that an active engagement in UN operations was expected.69 The US administration 
wanted to encourage German participation to counter the demand for American ground 
troops in the former Yugoslavia.70
The assertion of their demands by officials and politicians from the US, Britain, 
France, the Netherlands and four other NATO members through their direct bilateral 
relations with domestic actors in the German foreign policy network increased the degree 
of pressure on the government within days of the re-interpretation of the Basic Law. The 
pressure on Foreign Office staff grew from 24 to 36 per cent, thus, increasing the 
probability that the department would change its policy preference.71 In fact, officials in 
the Foreign Office were subject to the highest pressure within the government because of 
their links with colleagues in other foreign departments in the Atlantic Alliance and their 
close interdependent relations with staff in the German Defence Ministry. The pressure on 
Chancellor Kohl who was more widely linked with domestic actors in the German network 
increased from 17 to 26 per cent, and the support of a German involvement from actors 
directly connected to Foreign Minister Kinkel increased from 13 to 24 per cent.72 
Moreover, in the North Atlantic Council, the representatives of the US, Britain and France 
were able to form an international coalition with the majority of NATO members which 
raised the pressure for a German contribution to the Alliance’s operation in Bosnia to 51
/ 'O
John Deans and Christopher Bell, ‘Room for one more at world’s top table’, D aily M ail, 30/7/94.
69 Quentin Peel and George Graham, ‘German forces cleared for UN actions’, Financial Times, 13/7/94; 
Kurt Kister, ‘Pulling a Kennedy’, Guardian, 14/7/94; Matthew Beard, ‘Bonn rules out military duty in 
world’s hotspots’, Times, 14/7/94. See also Michael Glos (CDU/CSU) Deutscher Bundestag, 
12.Wahlperiodc, 240.Sitzung, 22 July 1994, p.21174.
70 Steve Doughty, ‘The German army rolls once again’, D aily M ail, 13/12/94.
71 The public calls for a German participation from officials from another four NATO member states 
raised the pressure on Foreign Office civil servants from P, [Fm] = 8/33 = 24% to P2 [Fm] = 12/33 = 36% 
of their linkages in the network.
72 The pressure from the same four NATO governments increased P, [Cha] = 7/42 = 17% to P2 [Cha] = 
11/42 = 26% and, in the case of Foreign Minister Kinkel, P, [FM] = 5/38 = 13% increased to P2 [FM] = 
9/38 = 24%.
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per cent.73
In this situation, Inspector General Klaus Naumann used his transnational linkages 
within NATO to coax the German government into action. The circumstances were 
perfect for forcing the government to take the step towards participating in international 
fighting missions. The Bundeswehr was prepared, domestic politicians were increasingly 
in favour of military action and the international pressure on cabinet ministers was 
considerable. Specifically, Naumann instigated a series of requests from the NATO 
militaries for a Bundeswehr contribution to the Bosnia mission. The first request was made 
at the beginning of November, when the representatives of the US, Belgium and the 
Netherlands inquired about German fighter planes for NATO’s operation ‘Deny Flight’. 
The German government hesitated. In the press, officials from the Foreign and Defence 
Ministry rejected speculations that German soldiers could participate in the control of the 
no-fly zone. According to the official government line a ‘formal’ request had not yet been 
made.74 A second international attempt at engaging the German Bundeswehr was made 
later in November when the conflict in Bosnia took a new turn with a Serb 
counteroffensive on the Muslim enclave Bihac in Serb-held Krajina. Differences between 
the governments of the US and France over the ‘lift and strike’ option, which envisaged 
the ending of military sanctions and selective air strikes on Serb positions, increased the 
likelihood of a massive withdrawal of UN forces from the former Yugoslavia and 
consequently a German participation in a NATO support operation.
The ‘lift and strike’ policy had been reconsidered in the US following the 
Congressional elections in which the Republicans had gained majorities in both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate. Preempting a Republican bill to lift the arms embargo, 
President Clinton announced in mid-November, that the US would no longer enforce the 
sanctions on the former Yugoslavia.75 In addition, the US Secretary of State urged the
73 The North Atlantic Council was linked to 26 out o f 51 actors in the network who supported a German 
contribution to the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia, namely the heads o f state, foreign 
and defence ministers o f the US, Britain, France, the Netherlands and four unnamed other NATO member 
states, NATO’s integrated military staff and the German Defence Minister Riihe, accounting for P2 [Nato- 
CM] = 26/51 = 51%.
74 “‘Da mtissen wir hin”\  Spiegel 45, 7/11/94, pp. 18f.
75 Barbara Starr, ‘US Navy to let through Bosnia-bound arms’, Jane's Defence Weekly 22:20, 19/11/94, 
p.3.
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NATO Ministerial Council to launch an air raid against Serb positions. Although the 
British and French representatives had threatened to withdraw unilaterally from Bosnia if 
the US government pursed a ‘lift and strike’ policy, the two governments eventually 
acceded to the American pressure. On 21 and 23 November, NATO aircraft bombed a 
Serb airfield in Croatia in response to three attacks from planes within Croatia on civilian 
targets around Bihac. However, the operation proved misguided as the British and French 
administrations had feared. The Serb forces responded to the strikes by taking UN 
peacekeepers as hostages. Moreover, the Serb military began to target allied planes with 
anti-aircraft missiles thus forcing a suspension of UN aid flights into Bosnia.76
Incidentally, the use of anti-aircraft missiles by the Serbs in response to NATO 
strikes gave the transnational coalition among military officers in the Alliance a convincing 
argument to demand a German participation in the former Yugoslavia. Germany was one 
of the few NATO members, other than the US, in possession of ECR-Tornados which 
could target and destroy anti-aircraft missiles when attacked. On 28 November, Inspector 
General Naumann, in association with his American colleagues, tipped off General George 
Joulwan, the Supreme Commander of NATO’s European forces, to ask the German 
government for six to eight ECR-Tornados.77 Since the US planes were involved in the 
Gulf, the General contended, the German planes were the only ones at hand.78 Doubts as 
to whether this was indeed the case, however, were soon raised. The Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung already reported at the time that Italy also had ECR-Tomdados.79
76 ‘“Einsatz hatte nur Eskalation zur Folge’” , Frankfurter Rundschau, 22/12/94.
77 Sir Richard Vincent, Chairman o f NATO’s Military Committee, admitted later that Naumann had 
instigated the request. See ‘“Kein Hurra geschrien”’, Spiegel 51, 19/12/94, p. 19. See also fy., ‘Kinkel 
schlielit den Einsatz deutscher Flugzeuge in Bosnien nicht mehr aus’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2/12/94; 
James Bone and George Brock, ‘Allies offer new sweetener to Serbs in push for peace’, Times, 2/12/94; 
Olaf Ihlau, ‘Kommentar: Nato, Bonn und Bihac’, Spiegel 49, 5 /12/94, p.21; Martin Winter, ‘Was 
Tornados mit Sardinien zu tun haben’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 7/12/94; Udo Bergdoll, ‘Aus Bonn ein 
vemcbeltes N ein’, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 8/12/94; ‘Ganz verbindlich’, Spiegel 50, 12/12/94, p.24; Marc 
Rogers, ‘NATO defies criticism over impotence... \J a n e  'sDefence W eekly22:23,10/12/94, p. 13;‘Einsatz 
ins Ungewisse’, Spiegel 5, 30/1/95, p.78.
78 Judy Dempsey, ‘Germany to decide on Nato’s request for jets’, Financial Times, 6 /12/94; Theo 
Sommer, ‘Deutsche Tornados iiber Sarajevo?’, Zeit, 9/12/94; Tony Paterson, ‘Will the Luftwaffe fly to 
the U N ’s aid in Bosnia?’, European, 16/12/94.
79 C.G., ‘Bonn reagiert zuriickhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94. The 
Italian Tornados were expected to be operational in 1995. See Antonio Ciampi, ‘First ECR Tornado 
moves SEAD ahead’, Jane's Defence Weekly 17:15, 11/4/92, p.601; Charles Bickers, ‘Europe’s “Wild 
Weasels’” , Jane's Defence Weekly 17:15, 11/4/92, pp. 6 15 f; Antonio Ciampi, ‘First Tornado IT ECR
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In Germany, the request caused turmoil in the coalition government.80 Although 
the problem of out-of-area missions had been resolved with the ruling of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the government was not prepared to engage in military action in the 
former Yugoslavia. In an assessment of the request, Defence Ministry staff who advocated 
the despatch of the Tornados clashed with officials in the Foreign Office and the 
Chancellor’s Office.81 An emergency Coalition Meeting, i.e. the semi-formal decision­
making unit of the coalition parties and the government, which was attended by Chancellor 
Kohl, Defence Minister Riihe, Foreign Minister Kinkel, Finance Minister Theo Waigel and 
the head of the Chancellor’s Office, Friedrich Bohl showed the government divided over 
the issue.82 Foreign Minister Kinkel objected to sending German soldiers to the former 
Yugoslavia - ‘not even in the air’.83 The Foreign Minister could not imagine the first 
fighting operation of the Bundeswehr to take place in Bosnia.84 Furthermore, Kinkel 
believed that it was unlikely that the Bundestag would approve of the mission.85 In fact, 
before the Bundestag elections 59 per cent of the actors linked to or represented in the 
Bundestag had supported military action. Due to the losses of the CDU/CSU, however, 
this number had decreased to 56 per cent, i.e. it was only marginally above the majority
takes o f f ,  Jane's Defence Weekly 18:6, 8/8/92, p. 11; Charles Bickers, ‘Luftwaffe Tornados receive full 
ECR fit’, Jane's Defence Weekly 19:9, 27/2/93, p.5. Moreover, Italian planes had already become 
involved before in the Adriatic. See ‘Serbische Streitkrafte suchen zunehmend die Konfrontation mit 
Einheiten der U N ’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/5/94.
80 The request was not as surprising as the government claimed. In principle, the German government had 
accepted the out-of-area deployment o f its ECR-Tornados in April 1994 when it decided to commit its 
Fighter-Bomber Wing 32 to NATO’s rapid reaction forces. See Nick Cook, ‘A new force for Europe’, 
Ja n e’s Defence Weekly 21:15,16/4/94, pp.37f. The despatch o f German troops had been discussed in the 
Nato Council months before the request. See ‘ Scharping: Bonn verletzt deutsche Interessen’, Silddeutsche 
Zeitung, 20/12/94.
81 Rmc./DW, ‘Bonn pru.fl Tornado-Kampfeinsatz in Bosnien’, Welt, 2/12/94; Martin Winter, ‘Was 
Tornados mit Sardinen zu tun haben’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 7/12/94.
82 ‘Kanzler ber&t mit Kinkel und R iihe’, Silddeutsche Zeitung, 6/12/94; Judy Dempsey, ‘Germany to 
decide on NATO’s request for jets’, Financial Times, 6/12/94; C.G./fy., ‘Deutsche “Tornados” vorerst 
nicht nach Bosnien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 8/12/94; ub., ‘Deutsche “Tornados” nicht nach Bosnien’, 
Silddeutsche Zeitung, 8/12/94.
83 C.G., ‘Bonn reagiert zuriickhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94.
84 C.G., ‘Bonn reagiert zuriickhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94. 
Compare Calic, ‘German Perspectives’, p.67.
85 Rmc./DW, ‘Bonn priift Tornado-Kampfeinsatz in Bosnien’, Welt, 2/12/94; fy., ‘Kinkel schlicfit den 
Einsatz deutscher Flugzcuge in Bosnien nicht mehr aus’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2/12/94.
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threshold.86 Kinkel’s position was strengthened by the fact that Chancellor Kohl continued 
to share his inhibitions.87 Only Defence Minister Riihe asked for a favourable consideration 
of the request.88 Riihe argued that Germany had to prove its solidarity with NATO.89
However, all ministers agreed in their puzzlement about the fact that the military 
had directly sent the request to Bonn without first clearing it with the political 
representatives at NATO’s headquarters.90 Suspicions emerged that the NATO military 
had calculated that the request would never get beyond the diplomats. Instead of using the 
proper institutional relations via the German Foreign Office, which opposed an offensive 
German mission in Bosnia, the military had tactically circumvented them by using their 
informal network with the German Defence Ministry staff.91 Since the differences among 
the cabinet members could not be immediately resolved, the Chancellor decided to defer 
the decision until a formal cabinet meeting which was scheduled for 20 December.92 To 
justify the postponement the government claimed that the NATO request had been 
informal and, therefore, did not immediately require a response. Since the Alliance request 
had indeed not been processed through the correct institutional channels, NATO’s new 
General Secretary, Willy Claes, confirmed the German government’s interpretation.93 In 
a letter to the German Foreign Minister, Claes agreed that Joulwan’s telex was merely a
86 P2 [BT] = 9351/15888 = 59% decreased to P3 [BT] = 8965/16128 as the number o f CDU/CSU  
parliamentarians fell from 319 to 295.
87 At the OSCE conference in Budapest starting 5 December, Chancellor Helmut Kohl reiterated that he 
would ‘not send any soldiers into the conflict’. See ‘Ganz vcrbindlich’, Spiegel 50, 12/12/94, p.22. See 
also C.G., ‘Bonn reagiert zuriickhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94; ub., 
‘Bonn will einen Einsatz deutscher Kampfllugzeuge in Ex-Jugoslawien ohne Gesichtsverlust vermeiden’, 
Silddeutsche Zeitung , 3/12/94.
88 C.G., ‘Bonn reagiert zuriickhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94; ‘Ganz 
verbindlich’, Spiegel 50, 12/12/94, p.23; ‘Bonn vertagt Tomado-Entscheidung’, Welt, 8/12/94.
89 ub., ‘Bonn w ill einen Einsatz deutscher Kampfflugzeuge in Ex-Jugoslawien ohne Gesichtsverlust 
vermeiden’, Silddeutsche Zeitung, 3/12/94; C.G., ‘Bonn reagiert zuriickhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94.
90 C.G., ‘Bonn reagiert zuriickhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94.
91 Martin Winter, ‘Was Tornados mit Sardinien zu tun haben’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 7/12/94; ‘Ganz 
verbindlich’, Spiegel 50, 12/12/94, pp.22f.
92 Martin S. Lambeck, ‘Bonn vertagt Tornado-Entscheidung’, Welt, 8/12/94; Martin Winter, ‘Bonn lailt 
Frage nach Tornados unbeantwortet’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 8/12/94; C.G./fy., ‘Deutsche “Tornados” 
vorerst nicht nach Bosnien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 8/12/94; ub., ‘Deutsche “Tornados” nicht nach 
Bosnien’, Silddeutsche Zeitung, 8/12/94.
93 Karl Feldmeyer, “‘Es gibt keine Garantie, aber es gibt auch keine Alternative’” , Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 9/6/95.
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‘preliminary request’ and served to assess informally whether German aircraft could be 
supplied.94
During the following weeks, the government sought to assess the distribution of 
preferences and its ability to increase the support for a Tornado despatch among the 
domestic actors in the German foreign policy network. Within Bundestag, which had to 
approve the despatch, opinions over the issue were split. However, since the CDU/CSU 
and FDP coalition government had only gained a slim parliamentary majority in the general 
election in October, a vote would have to be carefully prepared if the government did not 
want to risk a rejection.95 Consistent with the position they had taken since the beginning 
of the debate, the members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party were amongst the 
strongest supporters of the mission. CDU/CSU parliamentary party leader, Wolfgang 
Schauble, announced that he would fight for a Bundestag majority in favour of sending the 
Tornados to Bosnia.96 He was backed by the designated chairman of the Bundestag 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Karl-Heinz Homhues (CDU). Critical voices within the 
CDU/CSU were few, but included the designated chairman of the Defence Committee, 
Klaus Rose (CSU) who warned of a premature agreement to send fighter aircraft. 
Conversely, the majority of FDP parliamentarians opposed sending German Tornados with 
an offensive mission to Bosnia.97 Among them were such leading figures as defence expert 
Jurgen Koppelin, parliamentary party leader Hermann Otto Solms and the honorary party 
leader Otto Graf Lambsdorff.98 SPD parliamentarians also announced that they objected
94 ‘Ganz verbindlich’, Spiegel 50, 12/12/94, p.23; Martin S. Lambeck, ‘Bonn vertagt Tomado- 
Entscheidung’, Welt, 8/12/94; ‘Bonn laflt Frage nach Tornados unbeantwortet’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
8/12/94; UdoBergdoll, ‘Aus Bonn ein vemebeltes Nein’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 8/12/94; Tony Paterson, 
‘Will the Luftwaffe fly to the UN’s aid in Bosnia?’, European, 16/12/94; Karl Feldmeyer, “‘Es gibt keine 
Garantie, es gibt aber auch keine Alternative’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 9/6/95.
95 Ferdos Forudasten, ‘Tomado-Einsatz Fall fur den Bundestag’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 3/12/94; Udo 
Bergdoll, ‘Aus Bonn ein vemebeltes Nein’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 8/12/94; ‘Germany puts off Tornado 
vote’, Jane's Defence Weekly 22:24, 17/12/94, p.9.
96 Friedbert Pfliiger, Peter Kurt Wiirzbach, Hartmut Koschyk and Dietrich Austermann (all CDU/CSU) 
favoured sending German Tornados to Bosnia. See “‘Keine Bodentruppen ins bosnische Kampfgebiet’” , 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 5/12/94.
97 DW/rmc., ‘Kontroverse urn Tornado-Einsatz in Bosnien’, Welt, 3/12/92; ‘Sarajevo will den neuen Plan 
dcr Kontaktgruppe ablehncn’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5/12/94; “‘Keine Bodentruppen ins bosnische 
Kampfgebiet’” , Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 5/12/94.
98 ‘Bonn reagiert zuruckhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94; DW/rmc., 
‘Kontroverse um Tomado-Einsatz in Bosnien’, Welt, 3/12/94; ‘Tomado-Einsatz Fall fur den Bundestag’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 3/12/94; C.G., ‘“Keine Bodentruppen ins bosnische Kampfgebiet” ’, Siiddeutsche
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to the operation." Since the members of the Greens and the PDS rejected a Bundeswehr 
engagement out of area even in principle, it appeared that a majority of parliamentarians 
were opposed to the despatch.100 The German public shared the reluctance of the 
politicians. In an Emnid opinion poll for the weekly political magazine Der Spiegel, 62 per 
cent of the German electorate rejected the dispatch. In the former East Germany, 71 per 
cent opposed the deployment of German Tornados in Bosnia.101
While in Germany the domestic debate over the first offensive Bundeswehr mission 
since the Second World War split the country, the international situation was characterised 
by a rapprochement between the governments of the US, Britain and France over the 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.102 In response to the deterioration of the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia, President Clinton indicated that he was prepared to 
commit up to 4,000 US troops to help fly out British and French UN peacekeepers if 
necessary.103 A withdrawal had become more and more likely because Bob Dole, the 
Republican leader of the Senate, was expected to lead the Republican-dominated Congress 
into unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.104 At the request of UN 
General-Secretary Boutros Ghali, the NATO Council of Ministers approved the plans for 
the withdrawal operation on Friday 9 December.105
Zeitung, 5/12/94.
99 ‘Bonn reagiert zuriickhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/12/94; Ferdos 
Forudasten, ‘Tomado-Einsatz Fall fur den Bundestag’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 3/12/94; ub., ‘Bonn will 
einen Einsatz dcutscher Kampfllugzeuge in Ex-Jugoslawicn ohne Gesichtsverlust vermeiden’, 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 3/12/94; DW/rmc., ‘Kontroverse um Tomado-Einsatz in Bosnien’, Welt, 3/12/94; 
‘Nato-Anfrage entzweit die Koalition’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 3/12/94.
100 “‘Keine Bodentmppen ins bosnische Kampfgebiet’” , Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 5/12/94; Ferdos Forudasten, 
‘Tomado-Einsatz Fall fur den Bundestag’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 3/12/94; ‘Sarajevo will den neuen 
Plan der Kontaktgruppe ablehnen’, 5/12/94; Udo Bergdoll, ‘ Aus Bonn ein vemebeltes Nein’, Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, 8/12/94.
101 ‘Bonn vertagt Tomado-Entscheidung’, Welt, 8/12/94; ‘“Tornado” tiber Bosnien?’, Spiegel 50, 
12/12/94, p.26.
102 James Bone and George Brock, ‘Allies to offer sweetener to Serbs in push for peace’, Times, 2/12/94.
103 According to ‘Ganz verbindlich’, Spiegel 50, 12/12/94, p.26, Clinton promised even 10,000 troops.
104 James Adams, John Davidson and Michael Prescott, ‘Ties that unwind’, Sunday Times, 4/12/94; 
Kathleen Bunten, ‘Clinton says US troops will aid UN pull-out’, Jane'sD efence Weekly 22:24,17/12/94, 
p.4.
105 James Adams, John Davidson and Michael Prescott, ‘Ties that unwind’, Sunday Times, 4/12/94; Fiona 
M. Watson and Tom Dodd, Bosnia and Croatia: The Conflict Continues (London: House of Commons 
Library, 1995), p. 21.
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Although the decision implied that the request for German ECR-Tornados that had 
been made in November would now be formalised, the German representative did not 
attempt to prevent the decision. The German administration seemed to recognise that its 
ability to veto the withdrawal plans in the North Atlantic Council was limited since balance 
of pressure in NATO was in favour of the decision with 51 per cent of the actors linked 
to it supporting military action.106 As a consequence of the decision, the full pressure of 
the NATO Council to contribute to the operation in order to meet its obligations to the 
Alliance came to bear upon the German government. In the following week, SACEUR 
General Joulwan asked each of the NATO member states formally to give an indication 
of their possible contributions to the relief forces. This time Germany was not excluded 
from the request.107 Foreign Minister Kinkel and Foreign Office officials who participated 
in frequent meetings of the NATO Council and the military to discuss the pull-out of 
French and British forces during December were particularly exposed to international 
pressure for a positive answer.108 Moreover, Inspector General Naumann sought to put 
further pressure on his government by claiming that NATO needed a definite answer with 
regard to Germany’s contribution by the end of the year to prepare adequately for the 
withdrawal.109
In addition to the pressure from the military, US officials and politicians sought to 
influence the German government directly through their respective bilateral linkages with 
the staff in the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry as well as CDU/CSU 
parliamentarians. They hoped that a German contribution would reduce the necessity and 
the pressure for an American involvement. In fact, the designated speaker of the House 
of Representatives, Newt Gingrich and the speaker of the Senate, Bob Dole, tried to make 
an American contribution dependent on a participation of the Bundeswehr.110
106 See footnote 74.
107 ‘Ganz verbindlich’, Spiegel 50, 12/12/94, p.26; fy., ‘Die Nato fragt nach deutschen Bodentruppen fur 
Bosnien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 13/12/94; Martin Winter, ‘Bonn will bei AbzugderBlauhelmehelfen’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 14/12/94; fy., “‘Bundeswehr-Einsatz steht nicht auf der Tagesordnung’” , 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/12/94.
108 ‘UN/NATO powerless to stop Serbs’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 22:22, 3/12/94, p.l; ‘Nato- 
Verteidigungsminister berciten Verbleib und Abzug vor\ Frankfurter Allgemeine, 15/12/94.
109 fy., “‘Die Nato braucht genaue Vorgaben’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 16/12/94.
n° jy  ^ ‘“Buncieswehr-Einsatz steht nicht auf der Tagesordnung’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/12/94.
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Simultaneously, UN officials stepped up their efforts to persuade German decision­
makers. In Germany for personal talks with cabinet ministers and opposition leaders, UN 
General-Secretary Boutros Ghali repeatedly raised the issue of Germany’s future role in 
the UN and its participation in UN peacekeeping missions.111
Although the German government initially resisted the increased transnational and 
international pressure during autumn 1994, it set the stage for the policy change of the 
Kohl Cabinet. Specifically, the transgovernmental coalition among the NATO military and 
the approval of the North Atlantic Council to the international plans for a withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR soldiers, put the resolve of the German government to use its new freedom 
of action in foreign affairs to the test. As the domestic and international proponents of a 
Bundeswehr mission in Bosnia re-asserted their demands at the beginning of December, 
they prepared the change in government policy that took place within the following ten 
days.
German Cabinet Accepts Tornado Despatch
The third stage of the debate, from 10 to 20 December, was characterised by a series of 
preference changes within the Cabinet. Due to the increased international and transnational 
pressure following NATO’s formal request for German Tornados, Chancellor Kohl began 
to modify his position regarding military action almost immediately after he had postponed 
a decision. In a TV interview with the ZDF channel on the weekend of the 10-11 
December, Kohl indicated that he could imagine an engagement of German Tornados 
‘under certain circumstances’.112 The sudden preference change of the Chancellor is less 
surprising if it is considered that Kohl was under the highest degree of pressure in the 
Cabinet. With the decision of the North Atlantic Council to prepare for the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR, 29 per cent of the actors to whom Kohl had regular contacts in the network,
111 ‘Boutros-Ghali kommt nach Deutschland’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 17/1/95; ‘Bundesregierung 
verweigert Ghali konkrete Zusage’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 19/1/95. Boutros Ghali continued to lobby for 
German participation in his planned standby force during meetings with the Bundestag Foreign Affairs 
Committee in January 1995. See ibid. and eli, ‘Boutros Ghali wirbt fur Eingreiftruppe’, Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, 20/1/95.
112 ‘Tomado-Einsatz unter bestimmten Uinstanden inoglich’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 12/12/94; ‘Ganz 
verbindlich’, Spiegel 50, 12/12/94, p.26; fy., ‘Die Nato fragt nach dcutschen Bodentruppen ftir Bosnia’, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 13/12/94; Tony Paterson, ‘Will the Luftwaffe fly to the UN’s aid in Bosnia?’, 
European, 16/12/94.
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favoured a despatch of German Tornados.113
The Chancellor’s support for a despatch of German fighter planes to Bosnia raised 
the pressure on other actors within the German foreign policy network to approve the 
mission. In particular, Foreign Minister Kinkel who had for weeks been the target of 
transnational and international demands for a German contribution to the operation in 
Bosnia was sensitive to a further increase in pressure. Including Chancellor Kohl, now 29 
per cent of Kinkel’s links in the network urged him to accede to the Tornado despatch.114 
On 13 December, merely two days after Chancellor Kohl, the Foreign Minister declared 
his support for helping Germany’s NATO allies with ECR-Tornados.115 On the same day, 
the representatives of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties approved of a German 
participation in the possible withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from Bosnia in a 
Coalition Meeting. The decision in the Coalition Meeting reflected the considerable 
support for the action among the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians. However, the 
Coalition Meeting agreed that the Bundeswehr should offer primarily logistical and 
medical help. A decision regarding the despatch of German ECR-Tornados was again 
deferred. Nevertheless, the decision indicated that the coalition government’s position was 
on the brink of change. It might have been encouraged by the publication of a survey by 
the Bundeswehr Academy for Information and Communication which claimed that 53 per
cent of the West German population supported a German participation in military action
\ (
under the authority of the UN.116 Even if other polls showed different results, it could be 
assumed that the German public was at least divided over the question.
During the following week, Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel and Defence 
Minister Riihe used their linkages with the Bundestag, its committees and the 
parliamentary parties to lobby for the Tornado mission. On 15 December, Defence 
Minister Riihe personally talked to the members of the Bundestag Defence Committee
113 The North Atlantic Council’s decision to call for a German contribution added another actor’s pressure 
on the Chancellor raising P2 [Cha] = 11/42 = 26% to P3 [Cha] = 12/42 = 29%.
114 The Chancellor’s support for the despatch meant that eleven out of 38 actors to whom Kinkel had close 
contacts in the network favoured a German contribution to the relief operation in Bosnia, raising the 
pressure on the Foreign Minister by one from P3 [FM| = 10/38 = 26% to P4 [FM] = 11/38 = 29%.
1,5 ‘Bonn will bei Abzug der Blauhehne helfen’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 14/12/94.
116 The support for a fighting mission was still considerably lower in East Germany, where only 40 per 
cent favoured such action. See fy., ‘Wcnig Untcrstiitzung in der Bevdlkerung’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
14/12/94. ,
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about the situation in the former Yugoslavia.117 In the Bundestag’s budget debate that day. 
Chancellor Kohl argued that it might become necessary to investigate whether Germany’s 
partners required its help in Bosnia. If they did, Germany could not deny it.118
Table 5.3 Preference Changes: 10 - 20 December 1994
3m Phase (-11/12/04) 4th Phase (-13/12/94) 5» Phase (-16/12/04) 6th Phase (-20/12/94)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
BT 56 U BT 58 U BT 60 U BT 67 U
Med 43 NC Med 44 NC Med 46 NC Med 49 NC
Fm 36 NC COf 38 NC Fm 39 NC Fm 42 NC
Cha 29 C Fm 36 NC COf 38 NC Cab 40 C
FM 26 U FM 29 C Coa 33 C CM 38 C
COf 25 NC Coa 27 U CM 31 NC COf 38 NC
Com 20 U Com 25 U Cab 30 U BR 35 U
Coa 20 U Cab 25 U spd 30 U Com 35 U
spd 20 U spd 25 U Com 30 U vote 31 U
Cab 20 NC BR 24 U BR 29 U spd 30 U
BR 18 U CM 23 NC fdp 26 C gru 24 NC
fdp 16 U fdp 21 U gru 24 NC pds 24 NC
CM 15 NC vote 19 NC pds 24 NC Uns 11 NC
vote 15 NC gru 18 NC vote 23 U
gru 12 NC pds 18 NC Uns 11 NC
pds 12 NC Uns 11 NC
Uns 11 NC
The pressure for a despatch remained the highest in the Coalition Meeting in which the 
Chancellor and the Foreign Minister participated as leaders of their parties. Also present 
were Finance Minister Theo Waigel who was also the leader of the CSU, the parliamentary 
party leaders Wolfgang Schauble (CDU), Michael Glos (CSU) and Hermann Otto Solms 
(FDP), as well as the First Parliamentary Secretaries of the parliamentary parties and the
117 fy., “‘Die Nato braucht genaue Vorgaben”’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 16/12/94.
118 C.G., ‘Die SPD zu Gesprdchen iiber cincn deutschen Beitrag bereit’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
16/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck, ‘Scharping und Kohl ndhern sich’, Welt, 16/12/94.
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General-Secretaries of the coalition parties.119 On 16 December the Coalition Meeting 
eventually examined the general conditions for a German participation in Bosnia. Since the 
recent change of policy by the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister had increased the 
support for the mission among the actors linked to the coalition meeting from 20 to 33 per 
cent, the probability that the meeting would agree to the despatch was rising.120 In the 
event, the members of the Coalition Meeting not only decided to offer German Tornados 
for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, but also to protect aid deliveries if the UN should revive 
its humanitarian efforts in Bosnia.121 However, in accordance with the position taken by 
FDP parliamentarians after the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, the members of 
the Coalition Meeting decided that the government should seek the approval of more than 
a simple majority in the Bundestag given the historical weight of the mission. While it 
appeared that the members of the coalition, thereby, voluntarily extended the ability of the 
opposition parties to block the Bundeswehr’s first engagement out of area, the scope of 
this informal requirement was at the hands of the coalition parties. If they failed to secure 
the assent of the opposition, a despatch could still be approved by the Bundestag.
In order to gain the support of the opposition parties, the members of the Coalition 
Meeting asked the Minister of the Chancellor’s Office, Bohl, to speak with the 
parliamentary party leaders of SPD and the Greens, Rudolf Scharping and Joschka 
Fischer.122 Foreign Minister Kinkel was convinced that SPD parliamentarians would not 
refuse their support if a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia should become 
necessary.123 The assessment of the Foreign Minister matched the suggestion by multilevel 
network theory that the pressure on SPD parliamentarians had increased from 25 to 30 per
119 fy., ‘“Bundeswehr-Einsatz steht nicht auf der Tagesordnung’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/12/94.
120 The actors which pressed the representatives in the Coalition Meeting to support the despatch included 
in additin to CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians, Defence Minister Riihe, now also Foreign Minister 
Kinkel and Chancellor Kohl, increasing P3 [Coa] = 3/15 = 20 to P5 [Coa] = 5/15 = 33%.
121 Charima Reinhardt, ‘Umfangreicher Einsatz fur UN-Riickzug geplant’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
16/12/94; fy., ‘Bonn zur Entsendung von Tornados fiir Einsdtze in Bosnien bereit’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 17/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck, ‘Deutsche Tornados fiir Bosnien’, Welt, 17/12/94.
122 eli, ‘Kohl und Scharping: Kein Entscheidungszwang’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 14/12/94; Martin Winter, 
‘Bonn will bei AbzugderBlauhelmehelfen’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 14/12/94; fy., ‘“Bundeswehreinsatz 
steht nicht auf der Tagesordnung’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/12/94.
ub., ‘Kinkel rechnet fest mit SPD-Zustimmung’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 15/12/94.
205
cent.124 Among the opposition parties, the members of the SPD were now under the 
highest pressure to support the despatch. Moreover, the SPD had been internally divided 
over the issue for some time.125
In particular, the party leadership and the SPD members in the Bundestag’s 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees were swayed by government ministers who could 
use their influence as provider of expertise and information for the committees to convince 
the opposition members of the necessity to engage in Bosnia. The party leadership was 
also attracted by the government’s implicit offer to involve them more closely in the 
decision-making process in return for their support.126 Following talks with Chancellor’s 
Office Minister Bohl, SPD party leader Rudolf Scharping admitted that German Tornados 
might be required to safeguard aid deliveries and the possible withdrawal of UN troops.127 
His position was shared among the foreign and defence policy experts of the parliamentary 
party128 and SPD’s right-wing group ‘Seeheimer Kreis’.129 The opposition to the Tornado 
despatch in the SPD included the two deputy party leaders Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul 
and Oskar Lafontaine, as well as party manager Gunter Verheugen.130 They based their 
objections on a decision of the SPD party conference in Wiesbaden from November 1993 
which stipulated that only peacekeeping operations should be permissible .out of area.131
124 P4 [spd] = 5/20 = 25% increased to P5 [spd] = 6/20 = 30%.
125 Sto., ‘Grime gegen deutsche Beteiligung in Bosnien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 15/12/94; Tony 
Paterson, ‘Will Luftwaffe fly to the UN’s aid in Bosnia?’, European, 16/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck 
‘Scharping und Kohl nahem sich’, Welt, 16/12/94; ban., ‘SPD streitet iiber Bundeswehr-Einsatz in 
Bosnien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19/12/94; “‘Einsatz hatte Eskalation zur Folge’” , Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 22/12/94; ‘Grime nicht mehr generell gegen Blauhelmeinsatze’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung,
2i mm.
126 Martin S. Lambeck, ‘Scharping and Kohl nahem sich’, Welt, 16/12/94; ‘Kein Hurra geschrien’, 
Spiegel 51, 19/12/94, p.9; ‘Luff und Wasser’, Spiegel 52, 26/12/94, p.22.
127 ban., ‘Scharping erinnert an Bimdnispflichten’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 23/12/94.
Especially Freimut Druve, Karsten Voigt and Hans-Ulrich Klose supported military action in Bosnia. 
See ‘Luft und Wasser’, Spiegel 52, 26/12/94, p.24
129 ban., ‘SPD streitet iiber Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Bosnien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19/12/94.
130 Ibid.; deu., ‘Lafontaine geht auf Distanz zu Scharping’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 31/12/94; ‘Die neuen 
Kreuzrittcr’, Spiegel 1, 2/1/95, pp.21f; “‘Unser Profil mull klar sein’” , Spiegel 2, 9/1/95, p. 16; 
‘Lafontaine widerspricht Scharping’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/2/95.
131 SPD, Politik: Perspektiven einer neuenAufien- undSicherheitspolitik, BeschluB des SPD-Parteitages 
(Wiesbaden, 16-19 November 1993), p. 15. See also ‘Luft und Wasser’, Spiegel 52, 26/12/94; Ulrich 
Rosenbaum, ‘Showdown in der SPD’, Welt, 11/1/95; Ada Brandes, ‘Streiten statt feiem mull der 
Sozialdemokrat’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 22/6/95.
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In fact, the outcome of the Wiesbaden conference had been recently reaffirmed by similar 
decisions by the party presidium.132 Lafontaine insisted that a change in the party’s position 
on out-of-area missions would first have to be approved by a new SPD party 
conference.133
In spite of the increasing domestic pressure, the government failed to gain the 
unanimous consent of the SPD parliamentary party in December. Faced with apparently 
insurmountable divisions within the party, the SPD presidium agreed instead to defer a 
decision until the Cabinet had submitted a draft to the Bundestag.134 The government was 
also rebuffed by the members of the Green party who rejected ‘any participation of 
German fighting forces in military action in the former Yugoslavia’.135 The ability of the 
Greens to resist the government’s pressure was enhanced by the fact that it was linked to 
fewer proponents of the Tornado despatch than the SPD. The collective pressure from 24 
per cent of their contacts in the network was still sizeable and suggested a likelihood that 
at least a section of the Greens would succumb to it in time.136 Moreover, even if only the 
declared proponents of military action within the SPD sided with the government, the 
decision in favour of Tornado despatch had a comfortable majority in the Bundestag.137 
Thus, in spite of the government’s failure to obtain the support of the opposition parties 
at the time, the prospects that a contribution of the German Bundeswehr in Bosnia would 
eventually be approved by the Bundestag were good.
132 ban., ‘SPD streitet iiber Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Bosnien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19/12/94; 
‘Wieczorek-Zeul lehntEinsatzdeutscher Tornados ab \ Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 20/12/94; ‘UnserProfil muB 
klar sein’, Spiegel 2, 9/1/95, p. 16; Ulrich Rosenbaum, ‘Showdown in der SPD’, Welt, 11/1/95.
133 ‘Vorbehalt von Scharping zu Bosnien-Einsatz’, Welt, 21/12/94. At its special party conference at the 
end of 1992, the SPD decided that German peacekeeping troops had the right to use force for their 
protection. However, it demanded that the line to military action should not be crossed. See ‘Luft und 
Wasser’, Spiegel 52, 26/12/94, p.24.
134 Sto., ‘Voigt: Grime miissen bundnisfahig werden’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 21/12/94.
135 Sto., ‘Grime gegen dcutsche Beteiligung in Bosnien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 15/12/94; Tony 
Paterson, ‘Will Luftwaffe fly to the UN’s aid in Bosnia?’, European, 16/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck 
‘Scharping und Kohl ndhern sich’, Welt, 16/12/94; ban., ‘SPD streitet iiber Bundeswehr-Einsatz in 
Bosnien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19/12/94; “‘Einsatz hdtte Eskalation zur Folge’” , Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 22/12/94; ‘Griine nicht mchr generell gegen Blauhelmeinsdtze’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung,
n m m .
136 The members of the Green parliamentary party were specifically exposed to the pressure and 
arguments in favour of a German contribution to the relief mission in Bosnia from Chancellor Kohl, 
Foreign Minster Kinkel, Defence Minister Riihe and Defence Ministry staff, with P6 [gr] = 4/17 = 24%.
137 C.G./Sto., ‘Riihe: Keine deutschen Bodentruppen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 21/12/94.
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When the Cabinet met on 20 December with Inspector General Naumann to 
consider which forces would be offered to NATO for a withdrawal operation, the 
Chancellor could placate FDP ministers that the requirement of a significant parliamentary 
majority in support of the decision would be met. With the Coalition Meeting having 
already decided in favour of the Tornado despatch and 40 per cent of the actors linked to 
the Cabinet supporting the decision, the meeting formalised the government’s policy 
reversal.138 The Cabinet specified that the Bundeswehr should offer NATO eight 
Tornados, ten Transall transport aircraft, a minesweeper and fast patrol boats. Cabinet 
ministers, thereby, followed the recommendations of Inspector General Naumann who had 
just returned from the meeting of the NATO chiefs of defence staff in Den Haag.139 In 
public, cabinet ministers justified the abandonment of the government’s principle not to 
become involved in the former Yugoslavia with the argument that Germany could not 
leave its allies ‘in the ditch’.140
Although the cabinet decision had to be approved in the Bundestag before troops 
could be despatched, Germany’s NATO allies chose to interpret the offer as a firm 
commitment.141 In the following months, officials at NATO’s headquarters and in the 
Contact Group proceeded with their planning for the withdrawal and the regrouping of 
UNPROFOR on the basis of a Bundeswehr contribution. The transgovemmental coalition 
between the NATO military and German Bundeswehr, thus, made it increasingly difficult 
for Bundestag members to withdraw the offer. As the preparations for a withdrawal of UN 
peacekeeping forces from Bosnia were pressed ahead because of the danger that the US 
Congress would lift the arms embargo by February, the German administration incorrectly 
claimed that the Bundestag’s rejection of the Bundeswehr mission would be synonymous
138 The actors which supported the despatch included Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minster Kinkel, Defence 
Minister Riihe, officials from the Defence Ministry who advised the Cabinet, the Coalition Meeting, 
CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians and, implicitly, the members of the Federal Constitutional Court, 
accounting for P6 [Cab] = 8/20 = 40%.
139 ‘Bonner Hilfczusage fiir Blauhclm-Abzug aus Bosnien’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 21/12/94; Martin S. 
Lambeck, ‘Vorbehaltvon ScharpingzuBosnien-Einsatz’, Welt, 21/12/94; fy., ‘BonnsagtNatoH ilfezu’, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 22/12/94; Charima Reinhardt, ‘Bonn bietet bis zu 2500 Soldaten fiir die 
Sichenmg der Blauhelme an’. Frankfurter Rundschau, 22/12/94.
140 C.G., ‘Die Bundcsregierung bietet der Nato Flugzeuge und Schiffe an’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
21/12/94; ‘Bonner Hilfczusage fiir Blauhclm-Abzug ausBosnien’,SMfew/,s,c/zeZe/7w/7<g, 21/12/94; Martin 
S. Lambeck, ‘Vorbehaltvon Scharping zu Bosnien-Einsatz’, Welt, 21/12/94.
141 “‘Kein Hurra geschricn’” , Spiegel 51, 19/12/94, p. 19.
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with a breach of the North Atlantic Treaty.142
The question whether the withdrawal, termed by NATO as ‘Operation Determined 
Effort’, required a German participation was not raised. The evidence in favour of this 
view was limited. In fact, only a day after the Cabinet meeting, the UN continued its aid 
delivery to Sarajevo without the allegedly indispensable protection of ECR-Tornados.143 
When the spokesman of the Green party, Jurgen Trittin, stated that it was not the SAM-6 
missiles which were to be the target of Tornados that posed a threat for aid planes in 
Sarajevo, but the automatic guns which were fired from the surrounding mountains, the 
government brushed off his statement.144 Doubts over the requirement of German 
Tornados were also raised by a report of the British journal ‘Aviation Week&Space 
Technology’ according to which US EF-111 planes had been used successfully against 
Serb anti-aircraft missiles on 21 and 23 November.145
The domestic debate over the Tornado despatch dominated the decision-making 
process during its final stage until summer 1995. As argued above, the central claims made 
by the proponents of the mission such as the reliance of NATO on a Bundeswehr 
contribution and the obligation of Germany to participate in the NATO operation had been 
proved incorrect. Nevertheless, due to the formal and informal authority and influence of 
the actors who used these arguments in the German multilevel foreign policy network,
they were effectively employed to exert pressure on the German public and the Bundestag.
\ f
Opposition Split Over Tornado Despatch
During the fourth and final stage of the Tornado debate from 20 December 1994 to 30 
June 1995, the transnational coalition for a Bundeswehr operation in Bosnia was not able 
to further increase the pressure on the Bundestag as it had already exhausted all its direct 
and indirect linkages within the German foreign policy network. However, the pressure 
on the opposition parties was considerable and it was likely that they would eventually
142 “‘Kein Hurra geschrien”’, Spiegel 51, 19/12/94, p. 18.
143 See interview with Green spokesman Jiirgen Trittin, ‘“Einsatz hatte Eskalation zur Folge’” , 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 22/12/94.
144 “‘Einsatz hatte Eskalation zur Folge’” , Frankfurter Rundschau, 22/12/94.
145 ‘Bonn bietet bis zu 2500 Soldaten fur die Sicherung dcr Blauhelme an’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
22/12/94. See also ‘Luft und Wasser’, Spiegel 52, 26/12/94, p.23
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Table 5.4 Preference Changes:
20 December 1994 - 30 June 1995
acquiesce to the despatch.
Following the policy change of 
the Cabinet, the domestic debate 
slowed down until May 1995. Already 
in December the advocates of a 
Tornado despatch had employed 
unsuccessfully all their formal and 
inform al re la tio n s  with the 
parliamentary opposition to press for 
the approval of the Bundestag.
However, the government could 
expect to wear the opposition down on 
the issue given that not only the 
members of the opposition parties, but 
also the Bundestag and its committees 
collectively were exposed to significant 
pressure from the cabinet ministers,
officials from the Defence Ministry and the members of the coalition parties. Although 
NATO military staff proceeded with their contingency plans on the basis of a German 
participation, the, German government asserted that the question of a despatch was still 
open. The aim of the German government was to defer a vote in the Bundestag for as long 
as possible. The postponement had two advantages. First, the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia could improve and make a despatch of German Tornados obsolete. Second, 
the German administration had the opportunity to increase the support for military action 
among the opposition parties. Although the government could expect a secure vote in the 
Bundestag where CDU/CSU and FPD parliamentarians were in a majority and a collective 
pressure of 77 per cent should have ensured the support of a number of opposition 
members, the Kohl government continued to insist on a multiparty consensus for the 
decision.146 The probability that the government would gain supporters among the 
opposition parties was highest in the SPD parliamentary party and the Bundestag
7<h Phase (-28/6/95) 8«, Phase (-30/6/95)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
BT 71 U BT 73 C
Med 52 NC Med 54 - NC
COf 50 NC COf 50 NC
BR 47 U BR 47 U
Fm 42 NC spd 45 U
Com 40 C Fm 42 NC
spd 40 u gro 41 NC
vote 38 u pds 41 NC
gru 35 NC vote 38 U
pds 35 NC Uns 11 • NC
Uns 11 NC
146 P7 fBTJ = 11508/16128 = 71%.
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committees, which were under pressure from 40 per cent of the actors to which they were 
linked with the German foreign policy network.147 At 35 per cent, the probability was 
somewhat lower among the Greens, yet still considerable.148
In order to keep up the pressure on the opposition members, cabinet ministers 
closely cooperated with their NATO allies. By the end of January 1995, the detailed 
planning for ‘Operation Determined Effort’ was completed. However, when SACEUR 
US-General Joulwan asked NATO members to confirm their contribution offers for the 
withdrawal mission on 6 February, Chancellor Kohl agreed with Foreign Minister Kinkel, 
Defence Minister Riihe and the Minister of the Chancellor’s Office Bohl, that the 
permission of the Bundestag was not required until the actual despatch.149 On Wednesday 
22 February the Cabinet approved the contingency plans for a NATO operation in the 
former Yugoslavia.150 The decision was designed to raise the stakes for a rejection of the 
despatch by the Bundestag. A parliamentary veto would have put the entire NATO 
operation into question and seriously damaged Germany’s standing among its allies.151 
Parliamentarians across all parties felt that Germany could not afford such an 
embarrassment. In addition, cabinet ministers and members of the coalition parties argued 
that Germany had an obligation to participate in Bosnia as a member of NATO. Although 
legal experts refuted this suggestion152, the argument was reiterated widely in the 
Bundestag and the media because it carried the authority of the government.
In spite of the Kohl government’s strategic self-entanglement in NATO’s 
withdrawal operation, both the SPD and the Greens remained split over the issue. The
147 SPD parliamentarians were through their linkages in the network exposed to pressure from Chancellor 
Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, Defence Minister Riihe, Chancellor’s Office Minister Bohl, Defence 
Ministry officials, the collective Cabinet, industry representatives and some US politicians, accounting 
for P7 [spd] = 8/20 = 40%.
148 The pressure on Green parliamentarians was somewhat lower than on the SPD due to fewer linkages 
to actors who supported a despatch, including Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, Defence 
Minister Riihe, Chancellor’s Office Minister Bohl, Defence Ministry officials and the collective Cabinet 
which amounted to P7 [gr] = 6/17 = 35%.
149 eli, ‘ Vorerst kein Votum des Bundestages’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 8/2/95. See also Watson and Dodd, 
Bosnia and Croatia, p.22.
150 fy., ‘Bonn benennt VerbSnde fiir einen mfjglichen Balkan-Einsatz’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 23/2/95.
151 Andrea Lederer (PDS), DeutscherBundestag, 13.Wahlperiode, l8.Sitzung, 9 February 1995, p. 1256. 
Compare ‘Nur noch Gewalt’, Spiegel 23, 5/6/95, p.31.
152 See for instance Alexia Hostein, Das Verhdltnis des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen zu NA TO 
undO SZE  (Stuttgart: Richard Boorberg Verlag, 1996), pp. 151-208.
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internal division of the SPD was represented by the continuing disagreement between its 
leading figures, in particular, party leader Rudolf Scharping and deputy leader Oskar 
Lafontaine.153 However, the members of the right-wing ‘Seeheimer Kreis’ sided 
increasingly with the government and used their relations within the SPD parliamentary 
party to argue that if German Tornados were requested for the protection of UN aid 
delivery or the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, it was a question of solidarity which could not 
be rejected.154
Since the governments of France and Britain were not able to agree on a 
withdrawal between February and May, but appeared to move away from it, the domestic 
debate in Germany abated. It was revived on 25 May, after a Serb attack on Tuzla killed 
71 people and injured 150. The situation in Bosnia escalated when retaliatory air strikes 
by NATO planes destroyed five ammunition bunkers near the key Bosnian Serb base of 
Pale155 and Serb forces responded by taking French, Ukranian and Russian UN 
peacekeepers hostage and hand-cuffing them to strategically important positions.156 The 
news of Serb hostage taking emerged during a meeting between Defence Minister Riihe 
and his British colleague Rifkind. An emergency meeting between Riihe, Rifkind and US 
Secretary of Defence William Perry failed to produce a political agreement on a military 
or diplomatic response.157 However, among the NATO military, demands for a 
Bundeswehr contribution were reiterated as they considered various scenarios. Officers 
in the NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, even raised the question whether German 
Tornados could protect helicopters during an evacuation of UN peacekeepers or in a 
rescue operation for the hostages.
153 Ban., ‘Lafontaine widerspricht Scharping’, Fra/7&/Mrterv4//gememe, 3/2/95. See also the interview with 
Oskar Lafontaine, ‘Keine Tornados nach Bosnien’, Zeit, 17/3/95.
154 A policy paper by the groups was published in a shortened version in the Frankfurter Rundschau. See 
Dieter Schloten and Wolfgang Bruckmann, ‘Aufien- und sicherhcitspolitisch ist die SPD nicht 
regienmgsfUhig’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 19/1/95, p. 12. See also Gunter Bannas, ‘In der SPD wdchst das 
MiJJbchagen iiber aulienpolitische Orientierungslosigkeit der Partei’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 17/1/95.
155 Charles Reiss and Harriet Martin, ‘Pcacemen in human shield’, Evening Standard, 26/5/95.
156 Charles Reiss and Harriet Martin, ‘Peacemen in human shield’, Evening Standard, 26/5/95; ‘Durch 
Luftangriffe haben sich die UN und Nato abermals geschwacht’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 29/5/95. 
According to UN sources, the Bosnian Serbs held altogether 328 UN soldiers hostage. See ‘Paris, London 
und Washington schicken mchr Soldaten nach Bosnien und in die Adria’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
30/5/95.
157 Kurt Schark and Tom Condon, ‘Serbs turn the screw on UN’, Scotland on Sunday, 28/5/95.
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The plan for the first time suggested that the Tornados’ engagement should not be 
limited to a withdrawal of UNPROFOR as had been assumed by the German Cabinet in 
its decision in February. Conversely, the militaries in NATO intended for the Bundeswehr 
an active involvement in the increase of troops and the restructuring of the international 
forces in the former Yugoslavia. While still in Britain with his colleague Rifkind, Riihe 
narrowly prevented a formal request.158 However, as the French government increased its 
support for the step-up of military power in Bosnia, the German government’s ability to 
postpone a decision in the Bundestag on the scope of Germany’s contribution diminished. 
In a memorandum submitted to the North Atlantic Council, the French representative 
specifically proposed the reinforcement of UNPROFOR with a rapid reaction force. 
Fortunately for the German government, it was able to reject rumours that the French 
government planned to employ the German-French brigade in the operation. The brigade 
was not fully operational, amongst other reasons because conscripts were present in all its 
parts.159
In the North Atlantic Council the French proposal for a rapid reaction force was 
controversially discussed. While there was no agreement on whether a withdrawal or an 
increase in military power was desirable, the deployment of additional troops had the 
advantage that it supported both alternatives.160 The two main providers of troops for 
UNPROFOR, France and Britain, however, had abandoned their plans for a withdrawal.161 
This shift in the policy was welcomed in the US and Germany, although for quite contrary 
reasons. In spite of domestic opposition in both countries, the two governments had 
offered their military support for a pull-out in the hope that this case would never come 
about. Increasing the military capabilities of UNPROFOR by a rapid reaction force was 
a gamble. While it prevented a withdrawal in the short term by safeguarding peacekeepers 
from Serb attacks, it raised the likelihood of a pull-out in the long term because the rapid 
reaction force was in danger of being drawn into the military conflict.
158 ‘Nur nocli Gewalt’, Spiegel 23, 5/6/95, p.30.
159 fy., ‘Riihe rechnet mit militarischen Anforderungen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/6/95; fy., ‘Welches 
Mandat? Welche Befchle?’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 7/6/95.
160 John Palmer, Julian Borger and Ian Black, ‘Allies on Bosnia war footing’, Guardian, 30/5/95.
161 John Major rejected a withdrawal in talks with US President Clinton and the French President Jacques 
Chirac.
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Since neither the US nor German administration was able to reverse the French and 
British decision to despatch additional military troops, both governments decided to take 
the risk and support the reinforcement of UNRPOFOR. On 1 June, Bill Clinton offered 
to send American troops to Bosnia if the UN had to retreat. The German government in 
turn offered air support for the mission. Although the Cabinet had assured the opposition 
parties as late as 30 May that German forces would only become involved in Bosnia if 
UNPROFOR withdrew162, Defence Minister Riihe also agreed to commit German 
Tornados for the planned regrouping of the peacekeeping troops.163
As the four governments reached an agreement to step-up the military support for 
UNPROFOR, the Paris Conference on 3 June approved a joint French-British 
memorandum for an intervention with a rapid reaction force of 10,000 troops.164 At the 
conference, the main proponents of the intervention, namely the representatives of France, 
Britain and the Netherlands, repeated their expectations that the other participating 
countries would contribute to the safeguarding and support of the rapid reaction force. 
Less than a week later, during their annual spring meeting, NATO defence ministers 
responded by offering NATO air fighting forces as backup for the intervention.165 As part 
of these forces, the North Atlantic Council formally requested the air cover of Germany’s 
ECR-T omados.166
The NATO request meant that a Bundestag vote on the despatch of the Tornados 
could no longer be avoided. Foreign Minister Kinkel and Defence Minister Riihe had
162 Sto., ‘Deutschland stellt Soldaten bereit’. Frankfurter Allgemeine, 31/5/95.
Sto., ‘Riihe: Deutsche Soldaten miissen auf dem Balkan helfen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 1/6/95; 
‘Bonner Planspiele fur Militaraktion’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 2/6/95; Jochen Siemens, ‘Keine 
Vorratsentscheidung fur Bundeswehreins&tze’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 2/6/95; ban., ‘SPD Fraktion 
wartet mit Entscheidung zu Bosnien auf die Bundesregierung’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 21/6/95.
164 Mark Atkinson, ‘Bosnia: Major to pressure Clinton on force for Bosnia’, Press Association, 15/6/95. 
Compare Alex Macleod, ‘French Policy toward the War in the Former Yugoslavia: A Bid for International 
Leadership’, International Journal LII:2, 1997, pp.243-264, p.260.
165 Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, Final Communique, Brussels, 8 June 1995, 
athttp.V/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c950608a.htm. Seealso Antrag der Bundesregierung, ‘Deutsche 
Beteiligung an den Maflnahmen zum Schutz und zur Untersttitzung des schnellen Einsatzverbands im 
friiheren Jugoslawien einschlieMich des Untersttitzung eines eventuellen Abzugs der VN- 
Friedenstmppen’, Deutscher Bundestag, 13.Wahlpcriode, Drucksache 13/1802, 26 June 1995.
166 ‘“Tornacios” vor Verlegung nach Italien’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 7/6/95; ‘Auch Risiken fiir Deutsche’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 8/6/95; Manfred Geist, ‘Deutsches Kontingent bis 2000 Mann -Einsatz im Juli’, 
Welt am Sonntag, 11/6/95; Sto., ‘Bundcskabinett entscheidct am Montag’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
22/6/95.
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already started to use their linkages within the German foreign policy network to lobby for 
parliamentary support in discussions with the parliamentary party leaders and the members 
of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees.167 In fact, Defence Minister 
Volker Riihe indicated that his British and French colleagues had communicated their 
intentions to him even before the Paris Conference, enabling him to prepare for the 
request.168 The hostage crisis had already revived the debate over the German involvement 
in the former Yugoslavia among the opposition parties.169 According to Karsten Voigt 
(SPD) who spoke to the Siidwestfunk radio station on 29 May, a majority of SPD 
parliamentary party members were prepared to support a German participation in a 
withdrawal operation from Bosnia.170 Voigt’s estimate was exaggerated, but due to the 
persistent pressure from cabinet ministers and Defence Ministry officials, about 50 SPD 
parliamentarians had indicated their support for the mission.171 However, the SPD party 
leadership decided to reject the despatch of German Tornados in an internal vote on 12 
June.172 To prevent the defection of their party colleagues, the left wing of the SPD 
demanded the imposition of a party whip.173 However, party leader Scharping rejected the 
idea. Among the Greens, the debate over the possibility of a German involvement in the 
Bosnian crisis was equally fierce. In a meeting between the Green parliamentary party and
167 ‘Riihe: Deutsche Soldaten miissen auf dem Balkan helfen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 1/6/95; ‘Bonner 
Planspiele fur Militaraktion’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 2/6/95; ‘SPD-Fraktion wartet mit Entscheidung 
zu Bosnien auf die Bundesregierung’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 21/6/95.
168 fy., ‘Riihe rechnet mit militarischen Anforderungen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/6/95.
169 ‘Voigt fur Milit&reinsatz’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 30/5/95; ban., ‘“Luftangriffe wirken nicht 
mafiigend’” . Frankfurter Allgemeine, 31/5/95.
170 ‘Voigt fiir Militareinsatz’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 30/5/95.
171 ub., ‘50 SPD-Abgeordnete wollcn Regicrung unterstiitzen’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 24/6/95; ub./ck, 
‘Regierung bemiilit sich um Stimmen der Opposition’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 26/6/95. Compare also 
ub./deu., ‘“Tornados” vor Verlegung nach Italien’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 7/6/95; Ada Brandes, 
‘Entscheidung iiber Einsatz naht’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 7/6/95.
172 ban., ‘ SPD-Vorstand gegen Einsatz deutscher T ornados in Bosnien ’, Frankfurter A llgemeine, 13/6/95; 
ban., ‘EntschlulS des SPD-Vorstands umstritten’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 17/6/95; Ada Brandes, ‘SPD 
streitet sich emeut iiber Tomado-Einsatz’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 17/6/95; Ada Brandes, ‘Bonn soli 
nicht schon Stimmen der SPD fiir Einsatz zahlen’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 20/6/95.
173 ban., ‘Die SPD-Linke fodert eine “politische Vorgabe’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 8/6/95; Giinter 
Bannas, ‘Und wcnn die Serben den Sozialdemokraten Koschnik zur Geisel nahmen?’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 9/6/95. Compare also Lafontaine in an interview with Die Zeit, “‘Die SPD mull nein sagen’” , 
Zeit, 9/6/95.
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their party leadership a common position failed to emerge.174 The lobbying from the 
administration which accounted for 35 per cent of the actors to which the Greens were 
linked in the German foreign policy network had apparently been successful.175 About a 
fifth of the Green parliament members were believed to agree with an intervention.176
Since the internal debate in the opposition parties was still not resolved, officials 
from the Chancellor’s Office and the Foreign Ministry again tried to postpone the 
Bundestag vote.177 However, British and French defence ministers urged the German 
government finally to commit its Tornados to the despatch. Tactically just before a 
meeting of the German Cabinet on Wednesday 21 June, the French government issued a 
statement in which it expressed its determination to increase the military pressure on the 
Bosnian Serbs. At the same time, the French Defence Minister Charles Millon arrived for 
talks with his German counterpart Riihe.178 The time pressure on the German government 
to submit the issue to the Bundestag further increased when Britain threatened to 
announce the withdrawal of its forces by the end of September.179 This would immediately 
require the send-off of the German Tornados. On Monday 26 June, the German Cabinet 
eventually met to decide on the issue. Unsurprisingly given its previous commitment and 
the balance of preferences in the German foreign policy network, the Cabinet agreed to 
support the reordering of UNPROFOR with ECR-Tornados.180 In addition, the Cabinet 
offered naval minesweeping and a field hospital. The operation was estimated to cost
174 ‘Riihe: Deutsche Soldaten mlissen auf dem Balkan helfen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 1/6/95; Ada 
Brandes, ‘Fixiert auf den Tomado-Einsatz’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 3-5/6/95; Sto., ‘Griine streiten iiber 
Bundcswehreinsatze’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 9/6/95.
175 P7 [gr] = 6/17 = 35%.
176 ub., ‘50 SPD-Abgeordnete wollen Regierung unterstiitzen’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 24/6/95. Compare 
also ub./deu., ‘’’Tornados” vor Verlegung nach Italien’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 7/6/95; Sto., ‘Griine streiten 
iiber Bundeswehreinsatze’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 9/6/95. According to Ursula Schonberger the circle 
of members in favour of intervention had even grown to a fourth or third. See ‘Griine iiber mdglichen 
Einsatz’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/6/95; Peter Ziller, ‘Griine Tabubrecher riitteln am Pazifismus’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 14-15/6/95.
177 Martin Fietz, ‘Riihe: Keine militarische Ldsung in Bosnien’, Welt, 14/6/95.
178 Martin S. Lambeck, ‘Bosnien: Druck auf Bonn w&chst’, Welt, 20/6/95.
170 Ian Bruce, ‘UK planning Bosnia troop pull-out’, Herald, 26/6/95.
180 Antrag der Bundesregierung, ‘Deutsche Beteiligung an den Mafinahmen zum Schutz und zur 
Untersttitzung des schnellen Einsatzverbands im friiheren Jugoslawien einschliefilich des Untersttitzung 
eines eventucllen Abzugs der VN-Friedenstruppen’, Deutscher Bundestag, 13. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 
13/1802,26 June 1995. See also C.G./ban., ‘Kabinett stimint Einsatz deutscher Soldaten in Bosnien zu’, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 27/6/95.
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345m Deutsche Mark, 200m of which were to be made available through savings in the 
defence budget, 145m from reductions in the national budget. Finance Minister Waigel 
criticised the expenses, but the majority of ministers in the Cabinet were determined to 
contribute to the international operation in Bosnia.181
Once the Cabinet had decided on the exact contributions, a proposal for 
submission to the Bundestag was drafted. In spite of a degree of pressure of 45 per cent182, 
the members of the SPD presidium narrowly agreed to bring in an alternative bill in which 
the involvement of German ECR-T ornados was rejected because of the offensive character 
of their mission.183 However, in concession to the divisions within the party, SPD leader 
Scharping assured that all members were free to vote in the Bundestag according to their 
own conscience.184 The discussion in the Foreign Affairs Committee which met a day 
before the Bundestag debate was more consensual. In the committee the pressure from the 
administration, including the recent lobbying of the Defence Ministry, had succeeded in 
gaining the support of nearly all members for the despatch. In fact, all but one of the SPD 
members in the committee would eventually side with the government.185
On 30 June, after a four-hour debate the Bundestag approved the despatch of 
German troops to the former Yugoslavia with a simple majority o f386 members to 258.186 
Reflecting the support for the despatch of the Tornados among the actors to which they 
were linked in the network, 45 SPD parliamentarians supported the government.187 Only 
four members of the Green party voted for the government bill. The members of the
181 msl., ‘Kabinett fiir Bosnien-Einsatz’, Welt, 27/6/95.
182 P8 [spd] = 9/20 = 45%.
183 C.G./ban., ‘Kabinett stimmt Einsatz deutscher Soldaten in Bosnien zu’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
27/6/95; msl., ‘Kabinett fiir Bosnien-Einsatz’, Welt, 27/6/95; Ada Brandes and Stephan Hebei, ‘Kabinett 
beschlielit Kriegseinsatz’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 27/6/95; u.b., ‘SPD will deutschen Piloten nur 
Aufklarung erlauben’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 28/6/95; Ada Brandes and Peter Ziller, ‘Opposition leluit 
Einsatzplanung fiir Bosnien ab \ Frankfurter Rundschau, 28/6/95.
184 ban., ‘Scharping: SPD nicht isoliert’. Frankfurter Allgemeine, 28/6/95.
185 ban., ‘Scharping: SPD nicht isoliert’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 28/6/95; ‘Kinkel will nicht mehr 
werdcn, als er jetzt is t\ Frankfurter Allgemeine, Ml 195.
186 Out of 655 parliamentarians which had been present for the vote.
187 These were fewer than the 69 who had supported the despatch of Tornados before the vote. See ub./csc, 
‘Wehrpflichtige nur als Freiwillige nach Bosnien’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 29/6/95.
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coalition parties unanimously supported the government decision.188 Despite the support 
of 49 opposition members, the result fell short of a two-thirds majority which would have 
been required for a constitutional amendment. It, thus, hardly met the standards implied 
by the Kohl Cabinet in December 1994 when it announced that only a ‘significant’ majority 
in the Bundestag would suffice for a decision regarding the first military operation o f the 
Bundeswehr out of area. Nevertheless, the government accepted the decision.
5.3 Conclusion
In order to summarise the findings and evaluate the propositions of multilevel network 
theory in the case regarding the decision of the German Bundestag to despatch Tornados 
to Bosnia, this conclusion turns again to the four indicators identified in the previous case 
studies, namely the frequency and probability of preference changes with rising degrees 
of pressure, the distribution of the four behavioural categories ‘no change’ ‘unclear or 
undecided’, ‘change’ and ‘blocked’ across the range of pressure from zero to 100 per cent, 
the average degree of pressure for each behavioural category and the timing of the 
preference changes in the research period. It refrains from comparing in detail the findings 
of this case with the two British case studies which will be reserved for the final chapter 
of this thesis. However, it examines whether the inductive propositions derived from the 
British cases also apply to the German foreign policy decision-making process. Finally, it 
discusses which new insights into the 
decision to despatch German Tornados to
Bosnia were presented by multilevel Graph 5.1 Frequency / Probability
188 Deutscher Bundestag, 13.Wahlpcriodc, 48.Silzung, 30 June 1995, pp.3955-4039; ban./fy., ‘Der 
Bundestag mit deutlicher Mehrhcit fiir den Bosnien-Einsatz der Bundeswehr’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
1/7/95; Steve Crawshaw. ‘German vote to send planes’. Independent, 1/7/95.
network theory.
Assessment o f the Hypotheses
The first hypothesis which asserts that 
increasing degrees of pressure are related 
to higher probabilities of preference change 
is confirmed by the empirical evidence for Pressure (per cent)
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all behavioural categories. Although the 
relative frequency of preference changes 
as displayed in Graph 5.1 appears to 
deviate from the hypothesised increase 
with rising degrees of pressure, the first 
hypothesis was corroborated in 113 out of 
118 in s tan ces. The seemingly 
contradictory findings can be explained by 
the fact that the deviation in the first 
degree range is due to only a single 
instance, while the deviations in the 25-35 
per cent degree ranges is based on four 
instances. With five deviations out of 118 
instances, the first hypothesis was 
matched by 96 per cent of the observed 
preference changes.
The proposed probabilistic causal 
relationship between degrees of pressure 
and preference changes is further 
supported by the second indicator, i.e. the 
frequency distribution of the three 
behavioural categories ‘no change’,
‘unclear or undecided’ and ‘change’.
Although the clarity of the findings is 
impeded by the low number of preference 
changes in this case, the empirical 
evidence generally conforms with the first 
hypothesis. The distribution of the ‘no 
change’ category matches almost exactly 
the expectation of an early peak at low
degrees of pressure followed by an almost consistent decline. As in the British case 
studies, it appears to meet a threshold, although at a slightly higher level than the previous
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cases, between 50 and 55 per cent.
The distribution of the ‘no change’ category is closely matched by the frequency 
of the unclear and undecided instances. However, as hypothesised, the peak and slope are 
shifted to the right. An interesting observation is that the number of unclear or undecided 
positions was particularly high in proportion to the other behavioural categories in this 
case. Moreover, in six instances shifting preference positions were maintained in spite of 
very high degrees of pressure ranging from 55 to 75 per cent. The exception was in all six 
instances the Bundestag. It meets the observation made with regard to the two British 
cases that collective decision units are able to resist higher degrees of pressure. However, 
an explanation of this exception has to go beyond multilevel network theory. Thus, it 
emerges from the previous analysis of the case that it was Chancellor Kohl who insisted 
that a decision in favour of the despatch had to be based on a broader parliamentary 
majority than constitutionally necessary. In network terms, he single-handedly changed - 
or rather maintained - the veto power of a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag members 
it as had been the case before the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court.
The frequency curve of the ‘change’ category, nevertheless, meets the predictions. 
Specifically, the number of actors who changed their preferences peaks at a range between 
25 and 45 per cent. The degree of pressure is significantly higher than that of actors who 
retained their original policy position. The single instance in the 50-55 per cent bracket still 
falls within the critical range, leaving the Bundestag’s final reversal at 73 per cent, which 
has been explained above, as the only deviation.
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics
Preference Changes Number of 
Instances
Range of 
Pressure
Minimum
Pressure
Maximum
Pressure
Average
Pressure
No Change (NC) 70 43% 11% 54% 25%
Unclear or Undecided (U) 38 65% 16% 71% 33%
Change(C) 10 73% 0% 73% 36%
Blocked (B) 1 0% 57% 57% 57%
Again, the averages as displayed in Table 5.5 show a much clearer picture of the 
correlation between degrees of pressure and preference modification. The average
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pressure which actors were able to withstand was at 25 per cent significantly lower than 
the average pressure at which actors changed their preferences at 36 per cent. The mean 
of pressure at which actors were divided or 
their position was unclear lay at 33 per cent 
again between the two.
The timing of preference reversals 
also supports the link between the degree of 
pressure to which actors were exposed and 
their policy position. As outlined in Table
5.6 all actors with the exception of the 
Federal Constitutional Court modified their 
preferences immediately after the number of 
related network actors who demanded a 
change in policy had increased.
In the case of the German Tornados 
the number of blocking instances was too small to give any general indications about the 
circumstances and use of a veto strategy. The absence of veto behaviour in international
organisations can be explained by the overwhelming majority in favour of a German
engagement in Bosnia in the North Atlantic Council and the Contact Group. Although the 
German government could have attempted to veto the formal NATO request for a German 
contribution at the Council meeting in early December 1994, no evidence could be found 
which confirms such a strategy. This can 
be explained by the observation that half 
of the German NATO representatives, 
namely Defence Minister Volker Riihe and 
the Defence Ministry were in favour of the 
request. In fact, the minister and 
Bundeswehr officials appeared to have 
used their linkages within NATO to exert 
pressure on their own government.
Moreover, if any conclusions can be 
transferred from the British to the German
Graph 5.5 'Blocked'
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Table 5.6
Timing o f Preference Changes
1* phase after an 
increase in pressure
Other
Nato-CM (27% -> 51%) BVG (0%, no increase)
Cha (26% -> 29%)
FM (26% -> 29%)
Coa (27% -> 33%)
fdp ((21% -> 26%)
Cab (30% -> 40%)
CM (31% -> 38%)
Com (35% -> 40%)
BT (71% -> 73%)
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cases, they would suggest that the pressure for a despatch of the ECR-Tornados in the 
North Atlantic Council would have overruled a German veto. A similar assessment can be 
made with regard to the Contact Group. In addition, the German government was unable 
to prevent being drawn into the conflict by blocking the UN’s consideration of a 
withdrawal. In particular, it lacked a seat on the UN Security Council which had the 
authority over the international peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.
The only instance of blocking behaviour occurred in the Bundestag before the 
ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on 12 July. Because of the two-thirds 
requirement for the approval of a constitutional amendment, the members of the 
opposition parties were able to veto a German military contribution to the peacekeeping 
operation. The high average pressure withstood by the Bundestag at 57 per cent has to be 
understood in these terms. The decision of the Constitutional Court that out-of-area 
missions were permissible under the existing regulations of the Basic Law deprived the 
opposition of their veto option. The decision of Chancellor Kohl to try to achieve the 
largest majority possible in the Bundestag for Germany’s first military out-of-area mission, 
however, informally continued the two-thirds requirement. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
government parties were supported by only a small number of SPD and Green 
parliamentarian amounting to a 58 per cent majority in the Bundestag vote on 30 June, 
eventually did not prevent the despatch.
New Insights into the Despatch o f German Tornados to Bosnia 
In addition to providing confirmation for the empirical validity of the hypotheses proposed 
by multilevel network theory across different networks, the preceding analysis offers a 
distinct perspective of the German decision to despatch Tornados to Bosnia. In particular, 
multilevel network theory raises doubts over the suggestion that in the debate over the 
Tornado despatch the German government pursued a clear strategy designed to overcome 
public inhibitions against military action out of area.189 Conversely, the empirical evidence 
from the case study reveals that the government was initially divided over the question of 
a Tornado deployment in Bosnia. In particular, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister
189 Michael E. Smith, ‘Sending the Bundeswehr to the Balkans: The Domestic Politics of Reflexive 
Multilateralism’, German Politics and Society 14:4, 1996, pp.49-67.
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Kinkel appeared to have honestly been opposed to a first military mission in the Balkans 
due to Germany’s history in the region. The government’s repeated postponement of the 
decision and Kohl’s insistence that a Tornado despatch would have to be approved by 
more than a simple majority in the Bundestag provide further evidence for the view that 
not all cabinet ministers were convinced of the need or political viability of the despatch.
Multilevel network analysis suggests conversely that the German government and, 
later, the Bundestag changed its position in the issue due to considerable international and 
transgovemmental pressure for a military contribution to the international operation in 
Bosnia. In particular, it illustrates the emergence and critical role of a transgovemmental 
coalition between the NATO military, Defence Minister Riihe and Bundeswehr officials 
in bringing about the policy change of the German government. The analysis of the 
decision-making process indicates that the latter were able to use their boundary position 
within the network strategically to exert pressure over a range of domestic actors, in 
particular, Chancellor Kohl and his cabinet ministers and, thus, form a winning coalition 
in favour of the Tornado despatch.
However, multilevel network theory suggests that while their boundary position 
helped Riihe and Bundeswehr officials such as General Inspector Naumann to press to the 
Tornado mission, it did not relieve them of the need to gain broader domestic support for 
the decision. In particular, the analysis reveals that the Cabinet only decided to submit the 
issue to a vote in the Bundestag after a range of national actors in the German foreign 
policy network, such as the members of the FDP parliamentary party and sections of the 
SPD and Greens, had modified their views in favour of the despatch. Moreover, as in the 
two British case studies, the eventual policy change appears to have been linked to the 
emergence of a national as well as international majority in support of the decision.
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6. Case IV: The Relaxation of Dual-Use Export Regulations
6.1 Introduction
When in 1989 news emerged that German companies had played a significant role in the 
construction of a chemical weapons factory in Rabta, Libya, the German government 
responded by introducing tighter controls on the transfer of goods with civilian and 
military applications (‘dual-use’). In a number of amendments between 1989 and 1992 the 
German Foreign Trade Act became one of the most restrictive export regulations in 
Europe. However, while initially stronger national and international controls of sensitive 
exports were widely supported in Germany and the transatlantic community, by 1992 
domestic pressure began to mount for a relaxation of the regulations. In particular, the 
German machine and electronic industries pressed for a re-evaluation of the export 
controls on dual-use equipment because they felt internationally disadvantaged.
Following the introduction of the single European market in January 1993 which 
abolished border controls for intra-European exports, the question whether to maintain 
national controls for dual-use transfers or to introduce a common European scheme, the 
German export regulations came also under international pressure. The governments of 
Britain and France insisted that any common European dual-use transfer controls would 
have to be based on the lowest common denominator among the member states. Due to 
the pressure from their European counterparts, officials from the German Economics 
Ministry, who led the European negotiations for the German government, soon adjusted 
their policy advice in favour of less restrictive controls. Moreover, representatives of the 
German industry were able to gain the backing of the Christian Democratic Union and 
Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) members in the 
Bundestag. By the end of 1994, the balance of pressusesun the German foreign policy 
network had changed in favour of a relaxation of the German controls. Following this 
shift, the German government not only acceded to the common framework for European 
dual-use transfers, but also reduced its controls beyond the requirements of the common 
regulations.
This case study examines why the German government decided to relax its dual- 
use goods export controls in 1994-95, although it had tightened the regulations only two 
years earlier. Specifically, it analyses the role of the decision-making process defined as
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the formation of a winning coalition for the reduction of the German dual-use export 
controls in this radical policy change. Using multilevel network theory, the case study 
investigates how the actors of the German foreign policy network used their relations to 
influence each others’ preferences. Specifically, it seeks to test the theory’s two 
hypotheses which link the degree of pressure and the ability to use a veto in collective 
decision-making institutions to the probability that an actor would change his or her policy 
preference.
As in the previous case study, the ultimate decision unit with regard to dual-use 
export controls was the German Bundestag which had to approve all amendments to the 
German Foreign Trade Act. Although the European negotiations over common controls 
were instrumental in the revision of the German Foreign Trade Act, the focus on the 
national decision is merited by two reasons. First, the negotiations over common European 
export regulations proceeded on an intergovernmental level, i.e. outside the formal 
decision-making procedures of the European Community, since security-related issues are 
excluded from the EC’s competences under article 223 of the Treaty of Rome.1 Thus, the 
German government, like all other EC member states, had the ability to veto or opt out 
of common European dual-use export regulations at any time during the decision-making 
process. In addition, as indicated above, the national reduction of German dual-use export 
controls in 1995 went beyond the stipulations of the European agreement and, therefore, 
requires further explanation.
In order to avoid confusion between causes internal to the network and those 
external to it, particular attention in the selection of this case was paid to changes in the 
environment of the German foreign policy network. Several arguments can be brought 
forward to support the view that exogenous factors did not significantly change with 
regard to the sale of dual-use equipment during the research period. First, the danger of 
conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological proliferation did not decrease so as to 
justify less restrictive dual-use export controls. While the end of the Cold War reduced 
perceptions of threat from the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the sale of its military technology to Third World
1 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, Part Six, Article 223, at 
http://europa.eu.int/.
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countries actually increased the dangers of international proliferation. Second, the Gulf 
War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia illustrated that a multipolar international 
system was not necessarily more peaceful. Conversely, rogue states in the Middle East or 
Eastern Europe showed that they were willing to use the weapons they had acquired to 
achieve political and military aims. Third, although the governments of Germany and other 
Western industrialised countries enhanced their export controls, the series of arms export 
scandals continued unabated after the Rabta affair. In particular, the UN investigation into 
the Iraqi weapons programme after the end of the Gulf War provided a continuous stream 
of information about the contribution of American and Western European companies to 
the build-up of Third World weapons arsenals.2 Further scandals included the sale of 
sensitive technology to Iran and the building of a second Libyan chemical weapons plant 
near Tarhuna.3
In addition, the case of the German dual-use goods export controls is particularly 
interesting for multilevel network analysis because the argument put forward by the 
German government to justify its decision, namely that its policy reversal was attributable 
to the common European export regulations is insufficient, if not incorrect. The European 
negotiations, which are to a large extent analysed by multilevel network theory, 
contributed to the change of the German dual-use export controls in early 1995. However, 
the negotiations do not explain why the German Cabinet decreased its controls beyond the 
common requirejnents stipulated by the EC. Indeed, the German government could have 
maintained stricter export regulations in some areas since the agreement included a clause 
which allowed tighter national regulations if they were regarded as necessary to safeguard 
national security interests. Specifically, the German government could have preserved its 
export restrictions for certain volatile countries which were identified in the so called ‘H’ 
list. The ‘H’ list had been the most contentious section of the German Foreign Trade Act 
among national and international actors. However, country controls were the most 
efficient means of dual-use export controls. Ironically, the German government itself had
2 Ian Mather and Roman Rollnick, ‘Iraq arms build-up “portends second Gulf war’” , European, 1/7/93.
3 Simon Tisdall, ‘Oil gush produces unlikely bedfellows in the boardrooms of US and its allies’, Guardian, 
28/11/92; Michael Evans, ‘Spy agencies join forces to combat secret arms trade’, Times, 20/9/93.
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made this argument in the introduction of the H list.4 Thus, the Kohl Cabinet’s decision 
to drastically shorten Germany’s country list even before the EC regulations came into 
place indicates that the common European controls were neither the only nor the main 
reason for the government’s policy change. The fact that the British government 
maintained its country list under the European agreement increases the doubts over the 
explanation offered by the German government.
The case study follows the pattern of the previous studies of an extensive 
chronological analysis of the decision-making process and a summary of the findings with 
regard to the testing of the two hypotheses of multilevel network theory. The first section 
of the case study examines the conditions which led to the initial strengthening of German 
dual-use export controls after the Rabta affair and the re-emergence of the issue in 1992. 
The following chronological analysis of the decision-making process between 1992 and 
1995 is structured in three parts. During the first part, from February 1992 to January 
1993, the beginning of the European negotiations over common dual-use transfer controls 
led to increasing European pressure on the German government to accept lower controls 
standards. Since the majority of European governments objected to tight controls, the 
European Commissioner in charge of the internal market, Martin Bangemann, who had 
initially envisaged restrictive and centralised controls soon modified his proposals 
accordingly. Moreover, the German government’s attempts to strengthen export controls 
through multilateral regimes such as the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM) and a weapons register at the United Nations (UN) suffered from a 
similar lack of international support.
While the German administration was at first able to resist international demands 
for a reduction of its controls, it came under increasing domestic pressure between January 
1993 to April 1994. In addition to transnational pressure from their European colleagues, 
officials in the Ministry of Economics in particular were subject to mounting demands 
from CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians who challenged the viability of maintaining the
4 ‘ Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die GroBe Anfrage der Abgordneten Hermann Bachmeier, Wolfgang 
Roth, Ernst Schwanhold, Lieselott Blunck (Uctersen), Dr. Ulrich Bohme (Unna), Edelgard Bulmalin, 
Ursula Burchardt, Hans Martin Bury, Norbert Ganscl, Lothar Ibrugger, Walter Kolbow, Dr. Klaus Ktibler, 
Bernd Reuter, Dieter Schloten, Dr. Sigrid Skarpelis-Sperk, Dr. Peter Struck, Hans-Ulrich Klose und der 
Fraktion der SPD - Drucksache 12/3229’, Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/4241, 
1 February 1993, pp.9f.
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high export control standard of the Foreign Trade Act. When Economics Ministry officials 
changed their position on the issue, the emerging transnational coalition among the various 
representatives of the European Economics Ministries was soon able to convince Minister 
of Economics Gunter Rexrodt (FDP), Defence Minister Volker Riihe (CDU) and the 
relevant staff in the Defence Ministry of the necessity to reduce controls. However, the 
government maintained its export policy because Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP) 
insisted that the country list in particular should not be touched. Nevertheless, during the 
final stage of the debate between April and December 1994, the ability of Foreign Minister 
Kinkel to resist the national and international pressure weakened. On 9 December the 
German Cabinet announced its decision to cut back the country list from 32 to nine states. 
A majority in the Bundestag approved the amendment of the Foreign Trade Act in spring 
1995. Summarizing these findings, the conclusion evaluates the explanatory value of the 
hypotheses of multilevel network theory and assesses the insights into German foreign 
policy decision-making which were gained from the analysis.
6.2 German Dual-use Export Policy
The reconsideration of the German dual-use export regulations is best understood in the 
context of the national and international conditions which defined the agenda and the 
options with regard to the development of a comprehensive and restrictive dual-use 
control system in Germany between 1990 and 1992. The initial tightening of German dual- 
use export regulations followed the Rabta affair at the beginning of 1989.5 Intelligence 
information published by US American news sources revealed that German companies had 
sold dual-use technology to Libya where it had been used to build a chemical weapons 
factory in Rabta. The reaction to the news was outrage, both abroad and in Germany.6 The
5 For details see Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, ‘Bericht der Bundesregierung an den 
Deutschen Bundestag tiber eine mogliche Beteiligung deutscher Firmen an einer C-Waffcn-Produktion 
inLibyen’,DeutscherBundestag, ll.Wahlperiode,Drucksache 11/3995,15February 1989;Unterrichtung 
durch die Bundesregierung, ‘Bericht der Bundesregierung tiber legale und illegale Waffenexporte in den 
Iraq und die Aufrtistung des Irak durch Firmen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, Deutscher Bundestag, 
12.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/487, 8 May 1991.
6 Herbert Wulf, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany’, in Ian Anthony, ed., Arms Export Regulations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.72-85, p.83; Wolfgang Hantkc, ‘Stricter Controls on Arms 
Exports for Dual-use Goods: A Case Study for Drafting and Enacting Statutoiy Regulations’ in Hans 
Gtinter Brauch, Henny Van Der Graaf, John Grin and Wim A. Smit, eds., Controlling the Development 
and Spread o f  M ilitary Technology (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992),pp.257-268,p.257;Hartwig
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heated international and domestic debate about the need for stricter export controls for 
dual-use equipment which followed was fuelled by the discovery that German firms had 
also contributed to the military build-up of Iraq. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990-91, the fact that German soldiers did not participate in the Gulf War alongside 
contingents from the US, France and Britain contributed to the international criticism of 
Germany’s foreign policy. In reaction to national and international demands for tighter 
controls on dual-use equipment, the government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
introduced a range of amendments to the Weapons of War Act and the Foreign Trade Act 
between 1990 and 1992.7 Among others, the German government introduced the ‘H’ 
country list which established special controls for dual-use exports to 54 states.8 Although 
the list was shortened to 35 after the end of the Cold War, the new German export 
regulations for dual-use equipment were now among the strictest in Europe.9
However, German companies had not be alone in exporting extensively to sensitive 
regions in the Middle East. By 1992, the British administration was compromised by the 
‘supergun’ and ‘Matrix Churchill’ affairs10 and the US Commerce Department was 
accused of having ignored warnings from the Pentagon over American arms sales to Iraq
Hummel, Rtistungsexportbeschrdnkungen in Japan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland  (Munster: Lit, 
1991), p.226; Ulrich Egger, <tDual-Use”-Waren. Exportkontrolle und EG-Vertrag (Ktiln: Heymann, 
1996), p.l; Thomas Jestadt and Nicholas Baron von Behr, ‘Das neue Exportkontrollrecht fur Dual-use- 
Giiter’, R1W 9, 1995, pp.715-719, p.716.
7 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, ‘Entwurf eines Fiinften Gesetzes zur Anderung des 
Aufienwirtschaftsgesetzes’, Deutscher Bundestag, ll.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 11/4230,16March 1989; 
Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, ‘Entwurf eines Sechsten Gesetzes zur Anderung des 
Aufienwirtschaftsgesetzes’, Deutscher Bundestag, ll.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 11/4568, 19 May 1989; 
Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, ‘Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anderung des Aufienwirtschaftsgesetzes, 
des Strafgesetzbuches und anderer Gesetze ’, Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/1134, 
10 September 1991; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, ‘Entwurf eines Gesetzes iiber die Errichtung 
eines Bundesausfuhramtes’, Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/1461, 5 November 
1991.
8 Harald Bauer and Paul Eavis, cds., Arms and Dual-use Exports from  the EC: A Common Policy fo r  
Regulation and Control (Bristol: Safcrworld, 1992), p.7; Wulf, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany’, p.75.
9 Bauer and Eavis, Arm s and Dual-use Exports from  the EC, p.7.
10 Rosie Waterhouse and Sarah Strickland, ‘British firms “helped Saddam”’, Independent on Sunday, 
31/3/91; Philip Johnston, ‘Matrix Churchill Affair: Did ministers alter sales policy and then mount a 
cover-up?’, Daily Telegraph, 12/11/92. The British government admitted exports in the House of 
Commons. See Mr. Aitken, Hansard, Vol.214, Col.250, Written Answers, 18 November 1992. Compare 
also David Pallister, Kathy Evans and Simon Tisdall, ‘The Tehran Connection: Oil sales to US help 
bankroll Iranian drive for rearmament’, Guardian, 11/11/92; Tim Kelsey, ‘EC “could become a heaven 
for arms trade’” . Independent, 31/12/92.
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and Jordan.11 As most Western European governments and the US were forped to 
acknowledge that they were by far free from blame, the tightening of export legislation in 
Germany was matched by similar developments in the US12, Britain13, France14, Italy15, the 
Netherlands16, Belgium17 and Denmark18.
The range of international anti-proliferation agreements was also expanded. 
Alerted by the construction of a chemical weapons factory from fertiliser plant components 
in Rabta, the ‘Australia Group’, an informal group of 31 countries committed to chemical 
and biological non-proliferation, extended its controls to cover dual-use equipment and 
technology which could be used to manufacture chemical weapons.19 The Australia Group, 
which included among others Germany, Britain, France and the US, also expanded its list
11 Alan Friedman and Peter Riddell, ‘Crisis in the Gulf: US officials ignored objections to “dual-use” 
exports to Iraq’, Financial Times, 19/9/90; Alan Friedman, ‘US ignored alert on arms to Baghdad’, 
Financial Times, 17/4/91; Simon Tisdall, ‘Baker “signed clearance for Iraqi arms company’” , Guardian, 
19/10/92; Simon Tisdall, ‘Scandal haunting Bush’s dog-days’, Guardian, 19/10/92; Simpn Tisdall, ‘Oil 
gush produces unlikely bedfellows in the boardrooms of US and its allies’, Guardian, 28/11/92.
12 ‘Bush tightens export laws’, Jane's Defence Weekly 15:1, 5/1/91, p.7; Louise Kehoe, ‘US call to curb 
navigation aid sales: Proposal to place security restriction on equipment used to pinpoint Gulf war targets’, 
Financial Times, 14/6/91; Louise Kehoe. ‘Technology: Competition threatened from the enemy within’, 
Financial Times, 20/6/91.
13 In Britain, the tightening of controls led to educational measures in the Department for Trade and 
Industry (DTI) to help the identification of dual-use equipment and a reinstatement of several items which 
had been previously eliminated from the 1989 Export o f  Goods (Control) Order. See Holly Porteous, ‘UK 
puts onus on industry’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 16:13, 28/9/91, p.577. Officials nevertheless took a 
‘relaxed view’ of dual-use equipment transfers. See David Pallister, ‘Arms and the salesman: In the wake 
of war, arms control is high on the agenda - but there are commercial considerations’, Guardian, 13/5/91. 
Stricter regulations were only introduced on nuclear equipment. See David White, ‘A sharp shock to the 
system: Iraq’s nuclear programme has exposed weaknesses in the Non-Proliferation Treaty’, Financial 
Times, 5/10/91. In 1993, Britain tightened its controls over dual-use exports to Iran. See ‘Parliament 
&Politics: Britain tightens arms export curbs on Iran’, Herald, 2/3/93.
14 ‘Export law review’, Jane's Defence Weekly 15:13, 30/3/91, p.466. After a public outcry over French 
sales to Iraq, State Secretary for Defence Genon Renon was tasked with at tightening of arms export 
controls. See ‘French to list export details’, Ja n e’s  Defence Weekly 15:19, 11/5/91, p.775.
15 James Walker, ‘Exports eased as arms ban bites’, Jane's Defence Weekly 13:3, 20/1/90, p.97; ‘Italy’s 
new rules’, Jane's Defence Weekly 13:19, 12/5/90, p.930. See also Bauer and Eavis, Arms and Dual-use 
Exports from  the EC, p.7.
16 Marc Rogers, ‘One Europe, one policy’, Ja n e’s Defence Weekly 16:7, 1777/91, p.290.
17 J. A.C. Lewis, ‘Belgians move on export law’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 15:12, 23/3/91, p.430.
18 Ibid.
19StcnLundbo, ‘Non-Proliferation: Expansion of Export Control Mechanisms’, Aussenpolitik 42:2,1997, 
pp. 137-147, p. 138. The Australia Group includes among others all Germany, Britain, France and the 
United States. For a full list of member states see ‘Table of membership of multilateral military related 
export control regimes’, at http://www.sipri.se/projects/expcon/natexpcon/country_matrix.html.
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of precursor chemical substances from nine to fifty.20 The discovery of the ‘supergun’ 
project in Iraq triggered a revision of the Missile Technology Control Regime among a 
similar set of member states. The regime had been established in 1987 and issued common 
guidelines for the export of missiles and related equipment, material and technology.21 The 
transfer of nuclear related technology was in turn further regulated by the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, two informal groups of countries which, 
unlike the Australia Group, not only included most Western European states and the US, 
but also Russia.22 At their meeting in Warsaw on 3 April 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group specifically agreed on common export regulations for dual-use goods with nuclear 
applications.23
In spite of the broad consensus underlying the unilateral and multilateral tightening 
of dual-use export regulations between 1990 and 1992, the impending implementation of 
the European single market on 1 January 1993 put the new export controls almost 
immediately into question. The dismantling of border controls and licensing procedures 
for EC internal transfers threatened to undermine not only national export regulations on 
armaments and dual-use technology all over Europe, but also the multilateral regimes 
which were all nationally implemented. If effective controls were to be maintained, EC 
member states had to coordinate their policies. How this was to be achieved was a 
contentious issue among the member states. While EC members agreed that weapons 
exports should remain strictly under national authority according to article 223 of the 
Treaty of Rome, the distribution of competences was not so clear in the case of dual-use 
goods because they had primarily civilian applications.24
The EC member states had three options. First, they could treat the transfer of
20 Hantke, ‘Stricter Controls on Arms Exports for Dual-use Goods’, p.260.
21 See http://www.sipri.se/projects/expcon/.
22 Lundbo, ‘Non-Proliferation’, pp. 14 If.; Bauer and Eavis, A rms and Dual-use Exportsfrom the EC, p. 14. 
For a full list o f member states see ‘Table of membership of multilateral military related export control 
regimes’, at http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/country_matrix.html.
23 'See The Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting, Warsaw, Poland, 3 April 1992 and its 
Memorandum o f  Understanding on Implementation o f  the Guidelines fo r  Transfers o f  Nuclear-Related 
D u a l - U s e  E q u i p m e n t ,  M a t e r i a l  a n d  R e l a t e d  T e c h n o l o g y ,  a t  
http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/nsgj5lcnary92.htm. See also Bauer and Eavis, Arms and Dual-use Exports 
from  the EC, p. 14.
24 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, Part Six, Article 223, at 
http://europa.eu.int/.
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dual-use equipment as weapons exports and continue their national controls. Second, EC 
members could dismantle their national regulations and replace them by common 
European controls which would apply to all exports outside the EC. Finally, member states 
could seek to establish a multilateral control regime for dual-use equipment which included 
not only the EC, but also the United States and other industrialised countries. The 
impending renegotiation of the COCOM regime which had regulated dual-use exports of 
Western industrialised countries during the Cold War presented an opportunity for the 
latter. During the first stage of the decision-making process, all three options were still 
under consideration. However, as the following analysis will show, the pressure from 
various national and international actors in the German multilevel foreign policy network 
soon narrowed the debate down to the establishment of common EC regulations.
EC Negotiations Increase Pressure for Reduction o f German Controls 
The beginning of the debate over a revision of the German controls in view of common 
European dual-use controls immediately followed the approval of the German Bundestag 
for the nineteenth amendment of the Foreign Trade Act on 14 February 1992 which 
completed the tightening of the German dual-use export control system. While the 
distribution of preferences had been very much in favour of restrictive controls during the 
previous two years, the negotiations in the EC over common regulations for dual-use 
exports after the implementation of the internal market considerably changed the 
conditions which had led to the establishment of the new restrictive German legislation. 
Most importantly, it gave Germany’s European partners a direct interest in the level of the 
German dual-use export controls.
Before the start of the European negotiations the German industry, represented by 
its national associations such as the German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHT) 
and the Federation of German Industries (BDI), had been isolated in its advocacy of less 
restrictive export rules. In fact, key figures of the German industry themselves had initially 
supported stricter export controls after the scandals in Iraq and Libya. The international 
outrage at media reports of German armaments exports had been perceived as detrimental 
to the industry’s reputation. However, as early as 1991, industry spokespersons had 
criticised the extent of the' new regulations because it reduced the industry’s international
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competitiveness.25
The passing of the nineteenth amendment 
of the Foreign Trade Act, however, showed the 
resolve of the government and parliamentarians 
from all parties that German companies should 
not again be allowed to become involved in the 
military build-up in the Middle East or elsewhere 
in the world. Successive export scandals kept the 
public wary about the assurances of the industry 
that there had merely been a few ‘black sheep’. 
Due to the widespread national consensus 
regarding the tightening of the controls, the 
industry had not been able to prevent or change 
the revision of the German export regulations. 
With the start of negotiations about common 
European dual-use export controls, the industry 
instantly received support for controls at the level 
of the lowest common denominator from most 
other European countries where export 
regulations were much less restrictive than in 
Germany.
The fact that defence-related exports were 
a national prerogative according to article 223 of 
the EEC Treaty complicated the negotiations. It 
meant that a decision could not be taken within 
the regular decision-making framework of the 
EC, but had to be agreed upon in 
intergovernmental bargaining. Crucially for an
Table 6.1
Preference Changes:
14 February 1992 -1 January 1993
U  Phase (-31/8/92)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
EC-Co 82 C
Dm 40 NC
UN-SC 40 U
Em 39 NC
EM 34 NC
Fm 33 NC
FM 32 NC
DM 31 NC
Cha 29 NC
Med 21 NC
Uns 11 NC
vote B NC
UN-Org 9 NC
EP 7 NC
BR 6 NC
fdb 5 NC
Com 5 NC
spd 5 NC
cdu 5 NC
BT 4 NC
Cab 0 NC
Coa 0 NC
gru 0 NC
pds 0 NC
25 ‘Stiinmimg bei Hertel in Moll - Aber Hoffnungen’, Reuter German News Service, 19/6/91; ‘Deckel trotz 
Sanierungserfolgen weiter im Minus’, Reuter German News Service, 26/7/91; ‘Deckel vor weiterem 
Ertragseinbruch’, Reuter German News Service, 26/7/91; ‘GrolJauftrag fur deutsche Werften?’, 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 23/8/91; Dr Johann Schafflcr (German Aerospace), ‘Building on unity’, Jane's  
Defence Weekly 16:14, 5/10/91, p.616.
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understanding of the case, the intergovernmental nature of the decision-making process 
provided all EC governments with the ability to veto or block the outcome of the 
negotiations. This enabled the EC governments, including the German administration, to 
resist higher degrees of pressure than could have been expected under other 
circumstances. Moreover, the veto position of the German government had direct impact 
on the strategies which the advocates of less restrictive dual-use transfer laws could 
rationally pursue. Specifically, the German industry associations could not expect that 
British and French resistance to strict common European dual-use regulations would force 
the German government to accept lower national standards. The Kohl government could 
veto or opt out of the European scheme at any time if it believed the controls to be 
insufficient. Moreover, the German government retained the ultimate decision-making 
authority over its national export controls. In order to reduce the German controls the 
industry had to increase the active support for a revision of the Foreign Trade Act within 
the multilevel German foreign policy network.
In accord with these considerations, the German industry pursued a twofold 
strategy during the research period. On one hand industry representatives used their 
transnational linkages with European Commission and European Parliament members to 
lobby for common European dual-use transfer regulations. The negotiations would ensure 
continuous pressure of Germany’s European partners on the Kohl administration. An 
example of this strategy was a letter by the chairman of the Daimler-Benz AG Edzard 
Reuter addressed to Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the President of the European 
Commission Jacques Delors which called for joint European export controls on dual-use 
equipment as early as 1991.26 On the other hand, representatives of the BDI, the DIHT, 
sectoral industry associations and the largest German technological companies27 mobilised 
their relations with other domestic actors such as the members of the CDU/CSU and the 
FDP parliamentary parties, officials in the Economic, Foreign and Defence Ministries and 
cabinet ministers to argue that Germany should conform with the lower dual-use export
26 ‘Daimler fordert EG-weite Riistrungsexportkontolle’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 23/3/91.
27 In particular, the Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade (Bundesverband des Deutschen 
Groli- und Aufienhandel, BGA), the German Association ofMachinery and Plant Manufacturers (Verband 
Deutscher Maschincn- und Anlagenbau, VDMA) and such companies as Daimler-Benz and German 
Aerospace had high stakes in the issue of dual-use exports.
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control standards of its European neighbours.
The influence of industry representatives was based on the crucial role of 
manufacturing for the German economy. Particularly sensitive were regions such as Lower 
Saxony and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania where disproportionately large sections of the 
electorate were employed in technical and manufacturing industries. Given that 
unemployment had increased considerably due to German reunification and the problems 
associated with the economic restructuring of the former East German Lander, the threat 
of further redundancies because of decreasing exports was very persuasive. In this line, 
spokespersons of the DIHT complained that the German dual-use controls deterred 
potential costumers because they were not sure to receive export licenses. The Bavarian 
Economic Minister Georg von Aldenfels (CSU) agreed. However, the role of the Lander 
governments in the decision-making process was limited. Since export laws were 
exclusively under the authority of the federal government, the Lander governments could 
at best seek to influence the administration, and thus the decision, indirectly. Economics 
Minister Jurgen Mollemann (FDP), however, rebuffed the complaints from industry 
representatives and some Lander ministers. In the light of the recent experiences with 
illegal armaments exports the government perceived the legislation as necessary in the 
interest of national and international security.28
While German companies were the only domestic actors in the multilevel German 
foreign policy network who unreservedly supported a reduction of the German dual-use 
controls in February 1992, the beginning of the intra-European negotiations soon led to 
additional European pressure.29 It emerged quickly that most EC governments objected 
to common European dual-use controls at a level comparable to the German Foreign 
Trade Act. Among the EC member states, the German government’s demands for 
comprehensive dual-use export regulations were only supported by the Italian 
administration. However, the members of the European Commission and a majority in the 
European Parliament also favoured high standards for dual-use export controls. The fact 
that the Commissioner in charge of the internal market was the German Martin
28 Peter Ziller, ‘Heikle Riistiingsgeschafte - Rcxrodts Briicke soli Exporteuren den Weg frei machen’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 10/9/94.
29 RQdiger Scheidges, ‘Keine europaischc Riistungsexportkontrollc’, Tagesspiegel, 15/2/91.
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Bangemann almost certainly contributed to this position on dual-use exports.
The influence of the European Commissioner on the intergovernmental 
negotiations was initially enhanced because the Council of Ministers decided to task 
Bangemann to produce a first draft for a common dual-use export control system in 
January 1992.30 Bangemann’s proposal was accepted by the Commission later that month 
and communicated to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The draft 
proceeded from the premise that dual-use equipment was not defence technology under 
article 223 of the Treaty of Rome and that intra-EC restrictions on the free movement of 
dual-use goods should end with the implementation of the internal market. In order to 
prevent the export of technology with civil and military applications to sensitive 
destinations, Bangemann suggested the creation of an ‘external fence’ of controls for 
transfers outside the EC. The controls would apply to a list of dual-use technologies and 
a common list of countries which were to be agreed by all member states.
The German government welcomed the proposal which matched the German 
Foreign Trade Act. Moreover, the German administration agreed in principle with the 
Commission that the authority over common dual-use export regulations should lie with 
the EC. Nevertheless, German representatives warned that their political leadership would 
not compromise on the content of the lists.31 In the first discussions of the draft, the 
disagreement between the German delegates and their European colleagues was more 
fundamental. The British and French representatives outrightly rejected the introduction 
of a common country list.32 To settle this dispute and to negotiate the substantive contents 
of a common regulation, representatives agreed to pass on the issue to a high-level 
working group staffed by national officials.33 The strategy of transferring direct authority 
over the drafting process from the Commission, which was in favour of a comprehensive 
and centralised dual-use export controls system, was designed to remove the issue from
30 Bauer and Eavis, Arms and Dual-use Exports from  the EC , p. 11.
31 ‘Bericht tiber den Stand der Bemtihungen um EG-Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil 
und militarisch verwendbaren Gtitem’, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/3275,18 September 1992, 
p.2; Andrew Hill, ‘Brussels move on ‘dual-use’ goods’, Financial Times, 23/1/92; ‘EC moves to tighten 
rules’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 17:5,1/2/92, p. 144; Andrew Hill, ‘The European Market: Dual-use goods 
expose EC export control disparities’. Financial Times, 1712192.
32 Bauer and Eavis, Arms and Dual-use Exports from  the EC, p. 12.
33 Bauer and Eavis, Arms and Dual-use Exports from  the EC, p. 11.
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its influence. Moreover, the intergovernmental working group further institutionalised the 
existing close network among the EC administrations and provided through regular 
meetings additional opportunities to co-ordinate the opposition against high controls 
standards in the form of an intergovernmental coalition. Led by the British and French 
delegates, this intergovernmental coalition was able to exert considerable pressure on the 
European Commission and the German administration to accept the lowest common 
denominator as the basis for the European regulations during the course of summer
1992 34
The Commissioners who were directly selected by the national governments and 
consequently sensitive to their demands were under the highest pressure within the 
multilevel foreign policy network at 82 per cent.35 The degree of pressure helps to explain 
why the Commissioners were the first actors within the network to succumb to the 
international opposition to strict controls for dual-use exports. When the Commission 
submitted its second proposal on the basis of the deliberations in the intergovernmental 
working group, the framework for the common regulations had been significantly watered 
down. The new proposal accepted that the lists of sensitive goods, destinations and 
licensing criteria were to be decided unanimously by the member states. However, the 
direct pressure from the intergovernmental coalition in the working group also affected 
the ability of the German representatives to implement and maintain their preferences with 
regard to the common dual-use goods export regulations. The staff from the Economics 
Ministry, which led the German representation in the working group, was especially 
vulnerable because of their constant exposure to the pressure from their European 
colleagues who accounted for 39 per cent of their relations within the network.36
34 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Proposal for a council regulation (EEC) on the control of 
exports of certain dual-use goods and technologies and of certain nuclear products and technologies’, 
COM (1992) 317final, Brussels, 31 August 1992; Mr. Needham, Hansard, Vol.220, Col. 155, Written 
Answers, 3/3/93; Bauer and Eavis, Arms and Dual-use Exports from  the EC, p. 11; Paul Cornish, The 
Arms Trade and Europe (London: Pinter, 1995), p.40; ‘Bericht tiber den Stand der Bcmuhungen um EG- 
Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil und militarisch verwendbaren Gutem’, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/3275, 18 September 1992, p.2.
35 P, [EU-Co] = 23/28 = 82%. See Appendix 6: Pressure for a Reduction in German Dual-Use Export 
Controls.
36 The staff in the Economics Ministry was under pressure from twelve out of 31 actors to whom their had 
regular contacts in the network, i.e. the representatives of the German industry, their colleagues in France, 
Britain, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
the European Council of Ministers, equaling P, [Em] = 12/31 = 39%.
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Germany’s European partners were also able to exert additional indirect pressure 
on the government through their linkages with staff in the German Defence Ministry. 
Although the Defence staff were not immediately involved in the international 
negotiations, they had a central interest in the debate since the level of the controls would 
considerably impact on collaborative armaments projects within the Atlantic Alliance. 
Moreover, the German Defence Ministry staff was a strategic target for pressure from 
fellow European military officials since they had fewer linkages within the network than 
their colleagues in the Economics Ministry. Thus, the direct pressure from European 
Defence Ministry staffs and the Germany industry amounted to 40 per cent of the German 
military’s contacts in the network.37 The pressure on the heads of the two departments, 
Minister of Economics Mollemann and Defence Minister Volker Riihe was significantly 
lower at 34 and 31 per cent respectively.38
Although the staff from the two ministries maintained their support for the 
introduction of common EC regulations similar to the German Foreign Trade Act during 
the summer of 1992, the German negotiators had to concede on a range of issues as a 
consequence of the high international pressure. In spite of the veto position of the German 
government, they were only able to extract one major concession: the new proposal 
included a ‘catch-all clause’ similar to §5c of the German Foreign Trade Act. The ‘catch­
all clause’ subjected any technology which to the knowledge of the exporter was intended 
for military use to controls. However, the German negotiators were not able to secure the 
regulation of knowledge and service transfers in the proposal. In addition, they had to 
accept concessions on the content of the two lists regarding dual-use technology and 
country restrictions. Four groups of sensitive goods were excluded from the common 
European list. However, it was assured that these could remain under national controls.39
37 With the representatives of the German industry and their colleagues in France, Britain, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg eleven out of 25 actors to whom the 
Defence Ministry staff were linked, i.e. P, [Dm] = 10/25 = 44%, called for less restrictive controls.
38 Economics Minister Mdllemann was subject to pressure from twelve out 35 actors including the 
German industry, his European colleagues and the EC Council o f Ministers, with P, [EM] = 12/35 = 34%. 
Whereas Defence Minister Riihe was under similar pressure from the his European colleagues who 
accounted for ten out of 32 actors to whom he was linked in the network, i.e. P, [DM] = 10/32 = 31%.
39 ‘Bericht tiber den Stand der Bemtihungen urn EG-Harmonisienmg bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil 
und milittirisch vcrwcndbarQnGutcm', Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/3275,18 
September 1992, p. 3; ‘KommissionschlagtRahmenverordnungfur Ausfiihrenvon ‘Dual-Use’ Gtitemund 
Technologien vor’, Agence Europe, 17/7/92; David Buchan, ‘EC plan for dual-use arms exports’,
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In spite of the new proposal, the German administration was forced to admit by September 
1992 that due to diverging national preferences a compromise about the regulation of 
dual-use exports was not in sight.40 In particular, the representations of Britain and France 
were dissatisfied with the new draft. Nevertheless, the German government resisted 
pressure to further compromise on its policy during the autumn of 1992.
The new proposal was also criticised in the European Parliament. However, for 
contrary reasons. A substantial number of European Parliamentarians attacked the 
Commission proposal because it allowed the member states with the least restrictive trade 
controls to determine the common European standard.41 In order to assure that tight 
criteria for the controls were introduced, the French Socialist Gerard Fuchs suggested 
transferring the authority over the control of dual-use exports to the Commission. Fuchs 
had been tasked by the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and Industrial Policy to report on the Commission draft. However, his report had 
little impact. While the members of the European Parliament could exert pressure over the 
Commission and the political parties within each member state, they lacked direct influence 
over the European governments at the negotiation table. Although a majority in the 
European Parliament adopted a range of amendments to the draft and presented these to 
the European Commission, its views on the issue were disregarded.42
Given the predictable difficulties in the European negotiations over common dual- 
use export controls, the German government simultaneously pursued the tightening of 
multilateral dual-use export controls in the wider international community. A possible ally 
was the US government which was not only in favour of common European controls in 
order to simplify American exports to the EC, but also among the few countries who 
sought to strengthen international export controls. On 15 June 1992, the US government 
announced that it was tightening its controls on missile-related technologies to 21
Financial Times, 17/7/92; ‘Eekhoff - Grenzkontrollen hangen an Dual Use’, Reuter German News 
Service, 22/9/92.
40 Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, ‘Bericht iiber den Stand der Bemiihungen um EG- 
Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollcn von zivil und milit&risch vcrwendbaren Giitem’, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/3275,18 September 1992. See also‘KobramitLoch’,^p/ege/ 
18, 5/5/93.
41 wff, ‘Umstcllung der Industrie soil gefordert wcrden’, ITandelsblatt, 17/9/92.
42 European Parliament Report, Doc.A3-0398/B/92; ‘Plcnartagung des Europdischen Parlaments 8.- 
12.M&rz\ Agence Europe, 26/2/93
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countries in order to encourage the implementation of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime. The decision was followed by an agreement among the members of the regime 
at their 29 June-2 July meeting to extend its scope to missiles capable of delivering 
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.43
With regard to dual-use technology US pressure for controls was more selective. 
The US administration was primarily concerned about exports to Iran, Iraq, Libya and 
North Korea.44 Thus, in October 1992, senior officials from the US State, Defence and 
Commerce Departments made trips to Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Holland 
to try to persuade these governments to ban dual-use sales to Iran.45 However, even with 
regard to specific countries such as Iran, there was little support for dual-use transfer 
restrictions in these countries.46 While nuclear proliferation and the export of dual-use 
goods with nuclear applications were high on the political agenda, most Western European 
governments were hesitant to generally limit the transfer of dual-use technology because 
of its consequences for their national export industries.47 The difference was epitomised 
by the approval of the British and French administrations to export guidelines for weapons 
of mass destruction and to an international arms register in the UN Security Council on 
one hand, while the two governments advocated the reductions of controls on dual-use 
equipment on the other.48
Among the dual-use regulations which were questioned was the COCOM regime. 
The COCOM had regulated the export of dual-use goods from the Western allies during
43 See http://www.sipri.se/projects/expcon/; Bauer and Eavis, Arms and Dual-use Exports from  the EC, 
p. 17; Barbara Starr, ‘Third World SSM threat studied’, Jane's Defence Weekly 16:20, 16/11/91, p.944.
44 Mr. Llew Smith (question), Hansard, Vol.226, Col.640, Written Answers, 16 June 1993; Nancy Dunne, 
‘US calls for joint action to control arms sales’, Financial Times, 28/5/92.
45 Simon Tisdall, ‘Bush urges blanket ban on military materials for Iran’, Guardian, 11/11/92; Ian Brodie, 
‘US calls for arms ban on Teheran’, Daily Telegraph, 11/11/92; ‘New policy, old foes’, Economist, 
14/11/92; Charles Richards and Robert Block, ‘Inspectors give a clean bill of health’, Independent, 
30/11/92.
46 Simon Tisdall, ‘Oil gush produces unlikely bedfellows in the boardrooms of US and its allies’, 
Guardian, 28/1/92; Simon Tisdall, ‘Bush urges blanket ban on militaiy materials for Iran’, Guardian, 
11/11/92; Ian Brodie, ‘US calls for arms ban on Teheran’, Daily Telegraph, 11/11/92.
47 Thus, the EC agreed on controls of a common list of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use equipment 
in 1991. Scq Hansard, Vol.211, Col. 586, Written Answers, 14 July 1992. The Nuclear Suppliers Group 
adopted new guidelines to improve controls on its meeting in Warsaw April 1992. See Hansard, Vol.211, 
Col.735, Written Answers, 15 July 1992.
48 Bauer and Eavis, Arms and Dual-use Exports from  the EC, p. 15, p.20.
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the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the rationale for COCOM had 
ceased to exist. Keen to export to the newly opened markets of Eastern Europe, 
technological companies in the US, Britain and France had successfully pressed their 
governments to abolish the restrictions.49 As a result, a temporary revised COCOM list, 
the ‘New Industrial List’, had been agreed in summer 1991.50 Moreover, a US proposal 
to enhance cooperation with the former Warsaw Treaty members by replacing COCOM 
with a less restrictive regime was widely welcomed in Western Europe where the US had 
been criticised as too slow on export-control liberalisation after the end of the Cold War.51 
In May 1992, an informal COCOM Cooperation Forum was set up to re-negotiate the 
regime.
Crucially for the German administration’s intentions to increase multilateral dual- 
use controls, COCOM members acknowledged that the need for modem technology in the 
former Warsaw Treaty countries could not lead to the dismissal of the new danger of 
proliferation.52 Moreover, since the revision of the COCOM regime proceeded 
simultaneously and concurrently with the European negotiations, the German government 
could seek to use the regime to impose a wider multilateral framework on the EC controls. 
In coalition with the US government which appeared to support the preservation of at 
least some of the COCOM controls, the balance of pressures among the COCOM 
members was marginally more favourable for tighter controls than among Germany’s 
European partners. In order to push the multilateral regime, the German government set 
up an informal working-group on dual-use goods during its preparation for the G-7 
summit in Munich 1992. The group was to continue its work after the world trade summit. 
However, in spite of the support of the US the German administration was not able to shift
49 Barbara Starr, ‘NSC reviews export bar’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 13:2, 13/1/90, p.45; John Boatman, 
‘Industry calls for export equality’, Jane's Defence Weekly 13:11, 17/3/90, p.517; Barbara Starr, ‘Bush 
to agree COCOM easing’, J a n e ’s Defence Weekly 13:17, 28/4/90, p.824; John Boatman and Barbara 
Starr, ‘US Export Policy: Keeping a hold on control’, Jane 'sDefence Weekly 13:22,2/6/90, p.1109; John 
Boatman, ‘Trading after the thaw: COCOM lowers the barriers’, Jane ’sD efence Weekly 13:25,23/6/90, 
p.1243; Holly Porteous, ‘Dispute over core list delays COCOM’, Jane 'sDefence Weekly 15:10, 9/3/91, 
p.357.
50 Holly Porteous, ‘COCOM agrees to export reforms’,/a w e 'sDefence Weekly 15:22,1/6/91, p.932; Holly 
Porteous, ‘Securing export controls’, Jane's Defence Weekly 15:22, 29/6/91, p .l 194.
51 Nancy Dunne, ‘US calls for joint action to control arms sales’. Financial Times, 28/5/92.
52 Cornish, Arms Trade and Europe, p.35.
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the preferences among the COCOM members in favour of a strict follow-up agreement.53 
The proposal for a new successor institution published on 16 November 1992 not only 
transferred the control of the regime from the international to the national level, but also 
abolished controls for a large number of goods.54
In the European negotiations the German administration failed similarly. In spite 
of the impending implementation of the internal market, no agreement was reached before 
the end of 1992. In fact, the British and French representatives vetoed the new proposal 
which had been suggested in the autumn.55 To prevent the collapse of dual-use goods 
controls, the EC Foreign Affairs Council agreed on 21 December to establish interim 
controls starting 1 January 1993.56 During the first phase of the decision-making process 
the German government thus had not only failed to mobilise support for the adjustment 
of the European and international controls to the German standard, it was itself 
increasingly under pressure to modify the Foreign Trade Act. When in the course of 1993 
the staff from the Economics Ministry relented to the pressure, it strengthened the 
transnational coalition in favour of a reduction of dual-use export regulations among the 
European industry and the officials in the economics and trade departments which were 
engaged in the negotiations. Moreover, additional pressure from political actors in the 
German foreign policy network began to emerge.
Transnational Coalition Achieves First Preference Changes
The implementation of the internal market on 1 January 1993 was used by the 
transnational coalition among industry representatives and civil servants to reiterate their
53 Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, ‘Bericht iiber den Stand der Bemiihungen um EG- 
Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil und militarisch verwendbaren Giitem’, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/3275, 18 September 1992.
54 David Dodwell, ‘COCOM: a brute turned super sleuth’, Financial Times, 16/11/93.
55 Andrew Hill, ‘EC states asked to lift border controls’, Financial Times, 24/12/92.
56 Mr. Hurd, Hansard, Vol.216, Col.724. Written Answer, 12 Januaiy 1993. The Council statement on 
completion of the internal market in dual-use goods and technologies. Adopted by the Council on 21 
December, does not mention such an interim agreement. In fact, it states that ‘the member states agree 
that, as from 1 January 1993, intra-Community trade in them will no longer be subject to internal frontier 
controls...’ see Council of Ministers, Statement on the Completion of the Internal Market, 21 December 
1992, Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1992, p.60.
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arguments in favour of less restrictive dual-use export controls.57 Thus, spokespersons of 
the European industiy association, the Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederation 
of Europe (UNICE), expressed their concern about ‘licence shopping’ in the absence of 
a European dual-use export law.58 According to the interim agreement, member states 
were able to maintain their national border controls until a compromise on common 
regulations for dual-use export controls was reached.59 Thus, the agreement continued the 
competitive disadvantages in the export laws across Europe. In fact, with the practical 
elimination of the COCOM regime, the differences among the dual-use export controls in 
Western Europe had become even greater. Since member states seemed unwilling to 
submit to common EC controls, UNICE representatives suggested a series of bilateral 
agreements in their place.60
In Germany, industry leaders could point directly to the increasingly visible effects 
of the new German export legislation on the technological industrial base. One example 
was the decision of the Iranian Defence Industries Organisation to move its bureau from 
Dusseldorf to London. The office had organised the sale of dual-use equipment from over 
250 German companies to Iran, all of which had previously been licensed by the 
government.61 According to industry representatives 200,000 jobs were in danger due to 
decreased exports. Although the decline in exports was primarily attributable to 
international economic developments, industry spokespersons used the argument to 
demand a lifting of German dual-use export restrictions. In addition, exporters complained 
that they were discredited by their European competitors as not reliable because the 
German licensing system could prohibit agreed sales. Since the German controls were not 
acceptable to other European partners, representatives of the Federation of German 
Wholesale and Foreign Trade (BGA)62 argued that the law should be adjusted to the lower
57 Tim Kelsey, ‘EC “could become a heaven for arms trade’” , Independent, 31/12/92; ‘Kobra init Loch’, 
Spiegel 18, 5/5/93, p. 27.
58 David White, ‘Single market fear on weapons’, Financial Times, 11/12/92.
59 Michael Heseltine, Hansard, Vol.216, Cols.473f., Written Answers, 17 December 1992.
60 David White, ‘Single market fear on weapons’, Financial Times, 11/12/92.
61 UdoUlfkotte, ‘AufriistungamGolf, FrankfurterAllgemeine, 18/5/93; ulf., ‘Zusammenarbeit seit zwei 
Jahren’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/10/93.
62 Bundesverband des Deutschen GroB- und AuBenhandels (BGA).
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Table 6.2 Preference Changes: 1 January - 5 December 1993
2nd Phase (-23/10/93) 3rd Phase (-28/10/93) 4th Phase (-12/11/93) 5th Phase (-5/12/93)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
Dm 40 NC BT 65 U BT 67 U BT 68 U
UN-SC 40 U Dm 48 NC Dm 52 NC Dm 52 NC
Em 39 NC Em 45 C Fm 42 NC Fm 42 NC
EM 34 NC UN-SC 40 U EM 40 C UN-SC 40 U
Fm 33 NC Fm 39 NC UN-SC 40 U DM 38 C
FM 32 NC EM 37 NC DM 34 U FM 37 NC
DM 31 U FM 34 NC FM 34 NC Cha 36 NC
Cha 29 NC DM 34 U Cha 33 NC Uns 33 NC
Med 22 NC Cha 31 NC Uns 33 NC Med 29 NC
EP 13 NC Med 25 NC Med 27 NC Coa 27 NC
vote 12 NC Uns 22 NC Com 20 U Com 25 U
Uns 11 NC vote 19 NC Coa 20 NC BR 24 NC
UN-Org 9 NC BR 18 NC vote 19 NC vote 23 NC
BR 6 NC Com 15 NC BR 18 NC Cab 20 NC
ft* 5 C Coa 13 U Cab 15 NC spd 15 NC
Com 5 NC EP 13 NC EP 13 NC EP 13 NC
spd 5 NC Cab 10 NC spd 10 NC gro 12 NC
cdu 5 C UN-Org 9 NC UN-Org 9 NC pds 12 NC
BT 4 ‘ NC spd 5 . NC gru 6 NC UN-Org 9 NC
Cab 0 NC gru 0 NC pds 6 NC
Coa 0 NC pds 0 NC
gru 0 NC
pds 0 NC
European standards.63 In February 1993, the industry gained support from a group of 125 
CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians. In a proposal submitted to the President of the 
Bundestag, the members of the group urged their own government to revise Germany’s 
export restrictions.64 The preference change among these politicians came somewhat as
63 Stue., ‘Auflenhandel: 200 000 ArbeitsplStze gef&hrdet’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 26/5/93.
64 ‘U-Boot-Export Taiwan’, Saddeutsche Zeitung, 12/2193. The parliamentarians appeared to favour not 
only a relaxation of dual-use, but also of weapons exports. See ‘Kinkel: Keine U-Boote fur Taiwan’,
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a surprise as both CDU/CSU and FDP members in the German Bundestag had supported 
the strengthening of the controls a year earlier. Moreover, the pressure for a lowering of 
the dual-use export controls on German parliamentarians amounted to only 5 per cent of 
their linkages within the network, coming exclusively from representatives of the German 
industry.65 However, while the motion was indicative of increasing scepticism over the 
administration’s restrictive export policy among coalition members, the group represented 
only about a third of the government party members in the Bundestag at the time. It was 
not until October 1993, that the members of the CDU/CSU and the FDP factions 
collectively criticised the policy of their ministers on the dual-use issue. It followed the 
persistent lobbying from industry representatives and the group of the 125 over the 
summer. Although the parliamentary parties had approved the establishment of the 
restrictive German dual-use control regime little more than a year ago, CDU/CSU and 
FDP parliamentarians now unanimously called for the liberalization of German dual-use 
transfers.
The consequences of the preference change in the CDU/CSU and FDP for the 
decision-making process were considerable. Specifically, it raised the stakes for the 
coalition government which relied directly on the support of the CDU/CSU and FDP in 
the Bundestag for the approval of new export control regulations.66 In addition, the 
members of the government parties had close links with the bureaucracy where even lower 
ranking positions were traditionally held by party members.67 Officials in the Economics 
Ministry and the Defence Ministry were particularly sensitive to further pressure since they 
were already subject to the demand for a reduction of the German dual-use controls of 
their European counterparts. By utilising their linkages with civil servants in the two 
departments, the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP increased the pressure on the staff 
in the Defence Ministry from 40 to 48 per cent68 and in the Economics Ministry from 39
Saddeutsche Zeitung, 20/8/93
65 Industry representatives accounted for one of 21 linkages of the CDU/CSU and one of 19 linkages of 
the FDP parliamentarians, i.e. P2 [cdu] = 1/21 = 5% and P2 [fdp] = 1/19 = 5%.
66 deu., ‘EG wehrt sich gegen dcutschc Richtlinien’, Saddeutsche Zeitung, 23/10/93.
67 Renate Mayntz and Hans-Ulrich Derlien, ‘Party Patronage and Politicization of the West German 
Administrative Elite 1970-1987 - Toward Hybridization?’ Governance 2:4, 1989, pp.384-404.
68 Due to the preference change among CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians, the pressure on officials 
in the Defence Ministry increased by two out of 26 actors to which the officials were linked in the
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to 45 per cent69. The probability that the officials from the two departments would 
acquiesce to the demands of the politicians was thus growing. Indeed, within a week after 
the coalition parties had collectively expressed their support for a revision of the German 
dual-use export controls, Reinhard Goehner (CDU), Parliamentary State Secretary in the 
Economics Ministry, announced that officials in the Economics Ministry supported a 
revision of the Foreign Trade Act. In line with the German industry associations and the 
coalition parties, civil servants from the ministry advised that control regulations should 
be reduced to the European standard.70
The sequence of preference changes continued as the staff in the Economics 
Ministry raised in turn the pressure on the new Economics Minister Rexrodt (FDP) and 
officials from other departments who were affected by the issue. Among the members of 
the Kohl Cabinet, Economics Minister Rexrodt was now the most exposed to the pressure 
for a change in government policy. In total 40 per cent of the actors to whom Rexrodt was 
linked in the network advocated a revision of the German Foreign Trade Act.71 However, 
the pressure was even higher on officials from the Defence Ministry and the Foreign 
Office. The change of view by their colleagues in the Economics Ministry meant that now 
respectively 52 and 42 per cent of the Defence Ministry and Foreign Office contacts in the 
network favoured a reduction of dual-use export controls.72 Moreover, due to their 
boundary position between national and international actors, officials from the Economics 
Ministry were able to provide a transnational bridge between the intergovernmental 
coalition for a revision of the German dual-use controls among their European colleagues 
and domestic actors in the multilevel foreign policy network. Over the following months 
this position allowed Economics Ministry staff to link the pressure from both international 
and national actors on the German administration.
Only shortly after these changes, an announcement of another Parliamentary
network, i.e. from P2 [Dm] = 10/25 = 40% to P3 [Dm] = 12/25 = 48%.
69 Similarly, the pressure on officials in the Economics Ministry increased by two from P2 [Em] = 12/31 
= 39% to P3 [Em] = 14/31 = 45%
70 hal, ‘Keine gezielten Hilfen fur Dasa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 28/10/93.
71 The pressure from his own ministerial staff increased the pressure on Economics Minster Rexrodt by 
one from P3 [EM] = 13/35 = 37% to P4 [EM] = 14/35 = 40%.
72 That is P3 [Dm] = 12/25 = 48% increased to P4 [Dm] = 13/25 = 52% and P3 [Fm] = 13/33 = 39% to P3 
[Fm] = 14/33 = 42%.
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Secretary in the Economics Ministry, Heinrich Kolb (FDP) raised expectations about an 
impending change in government policy. Kolb stated that the government had recognised 
the need to examine the consequences of its national export legislation. Moreover, 
according to Economic Ministry officials, the administration had recognised that it was 
preferable to accept lower standards than to prevent the harmonization of the dual-use 
controls in the EC. However, cabinet ministers remained intent on bargaining for the 
highest standards possible. The strict line over dual-use export controls was in particular 
based on resistance from Foreign Minister Kinkel and officials in the Foreign Office who 
had bom the brunt of the criticism over the German arms export scandals during the early 
1990s and were, therefore, critical of less restrictive controls.
Foreign Office staff continued to oppose the weakening of German dual-use export 
controls during 1993, although they were at the centre of considerable pressure from their 
European colleagues, from the Economics Ministry and from the members of the 
CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary party who together accounted for 42 per cent of their 
relations in the network.73 They formed a close alliance with Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel 
who was especially reluctant to modify his position on the issue. The ability of Kinkel to 
maintain his opposition to a reduction in German dual-use regulations was enhanced by 
the fact that he was exposed to one of the lowest degrees of pressure in the German 
administration at 34 per cent.74 However, the balance in favour of retaining the existing 
German dual-use export laws was shifting among other government ministers. In August 
1993, Defence Minister Riihe tentatively supported calls from the German industry to 
reestablish its ability to compete on the international technological market. Since Riihe had 
no direct authority over the issue, however, he continued to adhere to the government 
position that German dual-use export controls would not be reduced.75
In the meantime, the European negotiations made first progress on the basis of a 
Belgian proposal which suggested a distinction between the general framework of the 
controls set by a Commission regulation and the content of the lists which would be 
flexible and under constant review under the Common Foreign and Security Policy
73 See footnote 71.
74 P4 [FM] = 13/38 = 34%.
75 K.B., ‘Was wird aus der deutschen Rustungsindustrie?’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 31/8/93.
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decision-making process.76 On the basis of this compromise, the European Commission 
submitted a new draft in autumn 1993. The question of a country list remained open. The 
request of the German representatives for an obligatory catch-all-clause, similar to §5c of 
the German Foreign Trade Act, was again rejected. However, on condition that it was 
restricted to weapons of mass destruction and carrier missiles, the governments of some 
member states appeared to consider supporting the clause. In particular, within the Italian 
administration there was initial encouragement for tighter regulations. Thus, German 
negotiators continued to demand a catch-all-clause.77 Nevertheless, the pressure from the 
German administration had weakened since officials from the German Economics Ministry, 
who led the German representation, had publicly expressed their support for less restrictive 
common controls. The German delegation appeared content to seek to safeguard existing 
national dual-use export regulations. To this purpose they used the German veto position 
in the intergovernmental negotiations. Specifically, German Economics Ministry 
representatives secured an ‘opt-out’ formula which allowed member states to maintain or 
implement stricter regulations. Amongst others, the opt-out formula would apply to the 
control of technological knowledge and services which was regulated in the German 
Foreign Trade Act.
The revision of the COCOM regime which was concluded at the same time equally 
failed to establish more comprehensive multilateral dual-use transfer regulations. Meeting 
in The Hague on 16 November 1993, COCOM member states agreed to dismantle the old 
regime and to replace it with a new institution by the end of 1994. During the interim 
period only a core list, the so-called ‘Interim List’, was to be controlled which gave more 
discretion to the member governments.78 The weakening of the COCOM regime was a 
direct result of a change of policy in the US. Initially, US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher had argued that non-proliferation was the most important challenge to the US
76 Cornish, Arms Trade and Europe, p.40.
77 Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, ‘Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der EG- 
Harmonisierung des Exportkontrollrechts fur Giiter und T echnologien mit doppeltem Verwendungszweck 
(Dual-use-Waren), Stand Ende Oktober 1993’, Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 
12/6187, 18 November 1993; sm, ‘Die rigorose deutschc Exportkontrollc bei Rustungsgutcm als 
Standortnachteil’, Handelsblatt, 12/11/93.
78 ‘Obsolete COCOM to be dissolved’, Jane 'sDefence Weekly 20:22,27/11/93, p.8; Cornish, Arrns Trade 
and Europe, p.35.
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and Europe in the 1990s and had praised the efforts of the EC to regulate its dual-use 
exports. However, the new US administration was more concerned about its export 
figures than about proliferation.79 President-elect Bill Clinton announced that it was his 
intention to encourage the research and development of dual-use goods through a range 
of government incentives.80
In the meantime, the domestic support for a revision of the German export laws 
continued to mount. CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians strategically lobbied Minister 
of Economics Gunter Rexrodt and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Both actors were not 
only under pressure from the transnational coalition that had emerged among officials from 
the German and Western European Economics Ministries, but also had the direct authority 
over the issue in the Cabinet. In a direct appeal to the two ministers, CDU/CSU foreign 
trade spokesman, Peter Kittelmann, asked the government to reconsider its position on 
dual-use export regulations. With reference to the opposition from within the Foreign 
Office to a revision of the Foreign Trade Act, Kittelmann demanded that the Economics 
Ministry should recover its ‘leadership’ on the issue. According to CDU/CSU 
parliamentarians the progress towards common European dual-use export controls should 
not be prevented by the Foreign Office.81
Given the combined international and domestic pressure on Rexrodt, the strategy 
of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties soon paid off. By mid-November, the 
Economics Minister publicly expressed his support for a review of the Foreign Trade Act. 
Rexrodt was, thus, the first cabinet minister to abandon the existing German dual-use 
transfer policy. Rexrodt’s support was a crucial success for the growing coalition in favour 
of a revision of the German dual-use export regulations. With the support of the minister, 
the coalition had not only gained direct influence over other cabinet ministers, but also a 
central voice in the Cabinet itself. Due to the preference change of the Economics Minister 
the pressure on all other members in the Cabinet increased notably. Defence Minister Riihe 
was now subject to the highest pressure with 38 per cent of the actors to whom he was
79 ‘Weitgehend Einigung zwischen Christopher und der EG iiber Jugoslawicn\/4ge/7ce Europe, 10/6/93.
80 Louise Kehoe, ‘Technology: Driving down a “superhighway”’, Financial Times, 19/11/92.
81 sm, ‘Die rigorose deutsche Exportkontrolle bei Rustungsgutern als Standortnachteil’, Handelsblatt, 
12/11/93; K.B., ‘Euro-Exportkontrolle in der Sackgasse’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 12/11/93. See also 
Peter Ziller, ‘Heikle Rustungsgeschafte - Rexrodts Briicke soil Exporteuren den Weg frei machen’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 10/9/94.
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linked in the network supporting the reduction of German export controls.82 As has been 
noted above, Riihe had expressed his doubts over the tight German regulations already in 
August, but had been forced to adhere to the official government line on the issue. 
Following Rexrodt’s preference change, Riihe soon came out in support of Rexrodt’s 
position.83 In the Cabinet, Foreign Minister Kinkel again prevented a change of policy. The 
Foreign Minister voiced his concern that a reduction of dual-use controls would encourage 
the arms build-up in volatile regions such as the Middle East.84 Flowever, the preference 
changes of his two Cabinet colleagues put Kinkel increasingly on the defensive since now 
42 per cent of his contacts in the network called for a revision of the Foreign Trade Act.85
The series of preference changes in autumn 1993, thus, ended with a stalemate in 
the German Cabinet. Although the combined pressure from the international community 
and an increasing number of domestic actors in the German foreign policy network had 
brought the government to the brink of a revision of the Foreign Trade Act, it was only 
when the pressure was maintained during the following year that the German 
administration began to make gradual changes in its dual-use export policy.
Majorities Shift in German Cabinet
Due to their failure to achieve a change in policy, CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians, 
as well as industry leaders, expanded the use of their relations within the German foreign 
policy network-during the winter of 1993-94. While the parliamentarians initially 
concentrated on their direct relations with cabinet ministers and civil servants, the 
members of the CDU/CSU and FDP now increasingly also employed their relations with 
the media, through the Bundestag and its committees to exert indirect pressure on the 
Cabinet. As part of this strategy which sought to broaden the support for a reduction of 
dual-use export controls within the network rather than focus directly on decision-makers, 
members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party submitted several memoranda drafted by
82 P5 P M ] = 12/32 = 38%.
83 ‘Allein auf der Bank’, Spiegel 51, 20/12/93, pp.20f.; K.B., ‘Nachteile fur deutsche Rustungsfiniicn 
mussen verschwinden’, Frankfurter A llgemeine, 5/1/94.
84 sm, ‘Die rigorose deutsche Exportkontrolle bei Ruslungsgutern als Standortiiachteil’, Handelsblatt, 
12/11/93.
85 P6 [FM| = 16/38 = 42%.
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its foreign policy working-group to cabinet ministers and officials. In the documents, the 
party’s foreign policy and economic experts appealed to the government to proceed with 
the harmonization of European export regulations even if this entailed the reduction of 
German dual-use goods controls. Specifically, they urged ministers to accept concessions 
on the equipment and country lists.86 Another part of this strategy involved the distribution 
of these proposals to the media in order to increase public pressure.87
In addition, members of the coalition parties began to use their parliamentary 
majority in the Bundestag to collectively exert pressure on the administration. Since the 
coalition members hesitated to challenge the government directly in the Bundestag as a 
matter of party solidarity88, the CDU/CSU parliamentary party decided to convene a 
Bundestag hearing of industry representatives at the beginning of December. The hearing 
provided spokespersons of industry associations and major companies with an opportunity 
to exert direct pressure on the relevant politicians. Moreover, parliamentarians were able 
to use the evidence from the hearing to support their demands for less restrictive dual-use 
export controls.89 During the hearing, representatives from the main German industry 
associations reiterated their concern that the current regulations undermined the ability of 
the German industry to compete in the world market.90 In particular, the representatives 
attacked the catch-all-clause and the control of knowledge and service exports which 
remained under national control due to the EC’s opt-out agreement.91
At the same time the industry employed its links with the media to exert indirectly 
pressure on the government for a revision of the Foreign Trade Act. Speaking to
86 K.B., ‘Westlicher Rustungsexport ausser Kontrolle’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 23/11/93; ‘Germany to 
consider easing export laws’, Ja n e ’s Defence Weekly 20:23,4/12/93, p.9; K.B., “‘Nachteile ftir deutsche 
Riistungsfirmen mussen verschwinden’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5/1/94.
87 ban, ‘Schauble: Kein Unterschied mehr zwischen innerer und aulierer Sicherheit’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 22/12/93.
88 ‘Volksbegehren und Volksentscheid’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19/11/93.
89 Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlpcriode, 202.Sitzung, Bonn, 13.Januar 1994, pp. 17449-17465; ‘Bei der 
Kontrolle von Dual-use-Ausfuhren ist die Bundesregierung kompromillbereit’, Handelsblatt, 14/1/94; 
K.B. ‘“Nachteile ftir deutsche Riistungsfirmen mussen verschwinden’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5/1/94.
90 Peter Kittelmann (CDU/CSU), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 202.Sitzung, 13 Januaiy 1994, 
pp.l7450f.; sm, ‘Die rigorosc deutsche Exportkontrolle bei Riistungsgiitem als Standortnachtcil’, 
Handelsblatt, 12/11/93; K.B., ‘Euro-Exportkontrolle in der Sackgasse’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 12/11/93.
91 Peter Ziller, ‘Hcikle Riistungsgeschafte - Rexrodts Briicke soli Exporteuren den Weg frei machcn’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 10/9/94.
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Germany’s main national newspaper, the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
representatives of the Federation of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHT) 
and the German Association of Machinery and Plant Manufacturers (VDMA) repeated 
their demands that German laws were adjusted to the average European standard92 The 
industiy associations’ spokespersons claimed that the existing controls contributed to or 
even were the cause of the increasing difficulties of the German armaments and 
manufacturing industry and the rising unemployment in the sector.
The statement indicated a shift in the debate which was marked by the increasing 
demand to relax not only controls for dual-use equipment, but also for armaments exports. 
The problems of the arms industry were symbolised by DAS A in Lower Saxony, one of 
the German Lander that had been suffering most from the conversion of the arms industry 
since the late 1980s. Although German labour unions, as represented by the German 
Labour Union Association (DGB), generally tended to be in favour of strict export 
controls, union representatives of DASA met personally with ministers and 
parliamentarians to ask for a relaxation of German export rules on dual-use goods in order 
to rescue the company’s future.93 The governments of Lander with a high proportion of 
armaments and manufacturing industry were especially susceptible to the warning that 
unemployment in the sector was rising. Moreover, the Bavarian Minister for Economics 
and Transport, Dr Otto Wiesheu (CSU), argued that Germany also had to harmonise its 
weapons export controls to recover its ability to co-operate in multinational armaments 
projects and to maintain Germany’s influence in NATO.94 Even SPD-govemed states such 
as Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, which had a high percentage of armaments and 
shipbuilding industry, were divided over the tight German export controls. However, the 
representatives of the Lander in the Bundesrat had no direct authority over national export 
legislation.
Although the evidence available did not support the argument that the German 
technological base and employment in Northern Germany could only be maintained
92 K.B., ‘Deutsche Alleingange in der Kontrollpolitik gcf&hrden Exportauftrdge’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
3/12/93.
93 ‘DASA-Betriebsrat will Milliarden-Programm’, Reuter German News Service, 4/2/94.
94 Otto Wiesheu, ‘Zwischen Emotion und Verantwortung’, Welt, 7/1/94.
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authoritative influence of the Foreign Office.95 The extension of the dual-use control 
debate to armaments exports, presented another attempt by industry representatives to 
change the conditions of the policy process by strategically shifting the decision-making 
authority over the issue to actors who were more favourable towards a revision of the 
German Foreign Trade Act.
Table 6.3 Preference Changes: 5 December 1993 - 9 December 1994
6th Phase (-14/4/93) 7th Phase (-5/12/94) 8th Phase (-9/12/94)
Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change Actor Pressure 
(per cent)
Change
BT 73 U BT 69 U BT 69 U
Dm 56 c Coa 53 C Fm 48 C
Coa 47 NC Fm 48 NC Cha 45 c
Fm 45 NC Cha 43 NC Cab 45 c
Cha 43 NC FM 42 NC FM 45 c
FM 42 NC UN-SC 40 U Com 45 u
UN-SC 40 U Cab 40 U UN-SC 40 u
Cab 35 U Com 35 U Med 37 NC
BR 35 U spd 35 NC gru 35 NC
Uns 33 U gru 35 NC pds 35 NC
Med 33 NC pds 35 NC BR 35 U
vote 31 NC BR 35 U spd 35 NC
Com 30 U Med 35 NC vote 35 U
spd 30 NC Uns 33 U Uns 33 U
gru 29 NC vote 31 U EP 13 NC
pds 29 NC EP 13 NC UN-Org 9 NC
EP 13 NC UN-Org 9 . NC.
UN-Org 9 NC
While the issue of dual-use transfers had been exclusively under the authority of the 
Economics and Foreign Ministries, the question of armaments exports led to a greater 
involvement of the Ministry of Defence in the decision-making process. Crucially for the 
aims of the industry, Defence Minister Volker Riihe supported its demands on both the
95 ‘Germany to consider easing export laws’, Jane's Defence Weekly 20:23, 4/12/93, p.9.
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dual-use and armaments export control issue. In a letter to Chancellor Kohl, Defence 
Minister Riihe contended that it was in Germany’s security interest to maintain a defence 
industrial base and to be able to collaborate in international armaments projects which 
were currently prevented by differences between the national export regulations in 
Western Europe. Like industry representatives, the Defence Minister criticised Foreign 
Minister Kinkel and the Foreign Office as the main obstacle to the required revision of 
Germany’s export rules. Only recently Foreign Minister Kinkel had blocked the licensing 
of arms transfers to Taiwan in the Cabinet’s Federal Security Council.96
Shortly after the Bundestag hearing, CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians sought 
to extract further concessions from cabinet ministers at the institutionalised Coalition 
Meeting. At the Coalition Meeting, the leaders of the CDU/CSU and FDP factions as well 
as the leading cabinet ministers were represented and able to exert direct pressure on each 
other. Given the unanimous support for a revision of the Foreign Trade Act among the 
CDU/CSU and the FDP parliamentary parties, the pressure on the Coalition Meeting in 
favour of a revision of the German dual-use controls was at 47 per cent97 significantly 
higher than in the Cabinet at 35 per cent98. In fact, the Coalition Meeting was subject to 
the third highest degree of pressure in the German foreign policy network following the 
Bundestag and officials in the Defence Ministry. As a result of the pressure from within 
the coalition, Chancellor Kohl and the leading members of the CDU/CSU and FDP 
conceded that the government would show a greater willingness to reconsider the German 
dual-use legislation in the European negotiations in order to allow for a settlement. 
However, Chancellor Kohl continued to urge for a European harmonization on the basis 
of the German legislation - as far as possible.99
96 ‘Allein auf der Bank’, Spiegel 51, 20/12/93, pp.20f.
97 Specifically, seven out of fifteen actors to which the Coalition Meeting was linked in the network, 
namely Economics Minister Rexrodt, Defence Minister Riihe, officials from the Economics Ministry, the 
Defence Ministry, CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians and industry representatives, raised the pressure 
to P6 [Coa] = 7/15 = 47%.
98 The Cabinet was under pressure from Economics Minister Rexrodt, Defence Minister Riihe, the 
Chancellor’s Office minister, officials from the Economics Ministry, the members of the CDU/CSU and 
FDP coalition parties as well as industry representatives, who accounted for seven of its 20 links in the 
network, i.e. P6 [Cab] = 7/20 = 35%.
QQ
‘Allein auf der Bank’, Spiegel 51, 20/12/93, pp.20f.; K.B., ‘“Nachteile fur deutsche Riistungsfirmen 
miisscn verschwinden’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5/1/94; Peter Kittelmann (CDU/CSU), Deutscher 
Bundestag, 12.Wahlpcriodc, 202.Sitzung, 13 January 1994, p. 17451; Ariane Gcnillard, ‘World Trade
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To discuss the terms of new German export rules, the government set up a 
working group of officials from the Economics Ministry, the Defence Ministiy and the 
Foreign Office. In response to the lobbying from the industry and the Defence Ministry, 
the ministries were, for the first time, ordered also to consider the effects of the dual-use 
sale regulations on employment and the maintenance of the defence industrial base. The 
talks concentrated on attempts to speed up the licensing of collaboration between German 
and European technological companies.100 With respect to international collaboration in 
technological developments, the issue of linking dual-use export controls with weapons 
transfer regulations reemerged. In particular, an alliance between industry representatives 
and officials in the Defence Ministry favoured a regulation that combined the Foreign 
Trade Act with the War Weapons Control Act in a comprehensive and less restrictive 
form. However, the attempt to link the two issues failed. While the Cabinet was prepared 
to compromise on the controls of dual-capable technology101, the majority of cabinet 
ministers opposed the liberalisation of armaments sales.102 Foreign Minister Kinkel and 
Minister of Economics Rexrodt proclaimed publicly that the War Weapons Control Act 
of 1982 would not be changed.103
The ability of the Cabinet to resist demands for the coupling of dual-use with arms 
exports was enhanced by the fact that CDU/CSU and FDP coalition parties were internally 
split on the question of liberalising weapons transfers. Foreign policy spokesman of the 
CDU/CSU, Karl Lamers, published a memorandum in which he advocated the reduction 
of German armaments export regulations along with common European regulations for 
dual-use equipment.104 Conversely, CDU/CSU deputy faction leader Johannes Gerster
News: Germany to relax dual-use curbs’, Financial Times, 14/1/94.
100 deu, ‘Regierung priift Lockerung der Lieferbedingungen’, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 7/1/94.
101 ‘Rexrodt sieht Lockerungen bei Dual-Use Regeln’, Reuter German News Service, 10/1/94; ‘Rexrodt 
sieht Abstriche bei Dual-Use-Kontrollen’, Reuter German News Service, 13/1/94; K.B., ‘Riistungs- 
Richtlinien bleiben unverSndert’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/1/94.
102 K.B., “‘Nachteile fur deutsche Riistungsfirmen mussen verschwinden’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
5/1/94.
103 Stue, ‘“Grundsatze nichl Sndern’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 11/1/94; K.B., ‘Riistungs-Richtlinien 
bleiben unverSndert’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/1/94.
104 deu, ‘Regierung priift Lockerung der Lieferbedingungen’, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 7/1/94. The proposal 
by Lamers was welcomed by the Federation of German Industries and the electronics and aerospace 
industry association. See also ‘Bonn darf nicht zaudern’, Focus, 24/1/94; Ho, ‘Die Industrie blickt 
skeptisch auf Europa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 4/2/94; hfe, ‘Gegen nationale Exportkontrollc’,
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contended that illegal armaments exports should be fought first, before more generous 
export licensing was considered.105 Several leading members of the CDU/CSU faction 
stated their objections to Lamer’s memorandum. Germany’s labour unions were similarly 
divided on this question. On one hand, Klaus Zwickel, the leader of the national federation 
of the metal workers, IG Metall, took the view that armaments exports were dangerous 
and without future. On the other, representatives of the Rheinmetall union contended that 
it was necessary to maintain a national defence industry as a contribution to the Western
a 1security system.
The Cabinet reacted to the competing pressures by distinguishing between licensing 
procedures for collaborative armaments projects among the members of the EC and 
NATO and armaments exports to third countries.107 While cabinet ministers did not want 
to appear to promote global proliferation, the former were supported by Defence Minister 
Riihe and civil servants in the Defence Ministry and the Economics Ministry:108 Initially, 
Defence Ministry officials had demanded that the German defence industry should not only 
be able to collaborate in European armaments projects for the home market, but also for 
international exports.109 However, ministers agreed to maintain Germany’s tight weapons 
export regulations.110 On 13 January 1994, the German Cabinet resolved the issue with a 
law designed to enable the cooperation and the sharing of information under a European 
armaments export regulation.111
In the European negotiations over the dual-use export controls, the German 
representation had resigned to the fact that it would not be able to achieve stricter
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 28/2/94.
105 deu, ‘Regierung priift Lockerung der Lieferbedingungen’, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 7/1/94.
106 K.B., ‘Kontroverse in IG Metall urn Rustungsexporte’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 20/1/94. See also 
VolkerKauder (CDU/CSU), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 214.Sitzung, 4March 1994, p. 18551.
107 K.B., ‘Unerwarteter Protest gegen vereinfachte Rustungsexporte’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 6/1/94; 
Stue, “‘Grundsatze nicht£ndern’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 11/1/94;K.B., ‘Riistungs-Richtlinien bleiben 
unverSndert’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/1/94.
108 K.B, “‘Nachteile fur deutsche Riistungsfirmen mussen verschwinden’” , Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
5/1/94; deu, ‘CDU/CSU fordert EU-einheitliche Regelung’, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 5/1/94.
109 ‘Bonn erwagt Riistungsexport-Harmonisierung’, Reuter German News Service, 6/1/94.
110 K.B., “‘Harmonisierung in Europa notig”’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 12/1/94.
111 ‘Kabinett will Zoll-Abhdrermachtigung verldngcm’, Reuter German News Service, 13/1/94; Ariane 
Genillard, ‘World Trade News: Germany to relax dual-use curbs’, Financial Times, 14/1/94.
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regulations than had been agreed in the compromise of October 1993 .112 Although the 
European Council of Ministers was expected to approve the draft for common European 
dual-use export regulations in May or June for implementation on 1 January 1995113, an 
agreement with the governments of France, Britain and Italy over which countries should 
be banned from dual-use exports was still missing.114 Nevertheless, the German Cabinet 
approved a series of amendments to the Foreign Trade Act which were designed to pave 
the way for the common European dual-use controls. The first amendment of the Foreign 
Trade Act on 28 February 1994, primarily made terminological corrections in response to 
the internal market. It also allocated the authority over the implementation of the common 
EC regulations to the appropriate national departments.115
SPD opposition members criticised the amendments and demanded that the 
loopholes which were created by the common European regulations be closed by 
additional national controls.116 Moreover, SPD parliamentarians argued that the 
government was giving the wrong signals to Brussels. Members of the Greens and the 
PDS, who favoured the prohibition of all armaments exports, supported this criticism. 
However, in spite of their unified opposition to the relaxation of German export controls, 
the opposition parties were not able to prevent the impending policy change. Following 
the extension of the transnational coalition in favour of a reduction of the German dual-use 
controls from civil servants to two cabinet ministers as well as the CDU/CSU and FDP 
parliamentary majority, the pressure on the German Cabinet was considerable, amounting 
to 35 per cent of its linkages within the network.117
While the previous analysis has suggested that the Kohl Cabinet had been able to
112 Minister of Economics Dr. Gunter Rexrodt (FDP), Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, 
202.Sitzung, 13 January 1994, p. 17455; ‘Bei der Kontrolle von Dual-use-Ausfuhren ist die 
Bundesregierung kompromilJbereit’, Handelsblatt, 14/1/94.
113 Stue, ‘Keine vollstandige Harmonisierung der Exportkontrolle in Europa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
26/4/94; Stue, ‘Keine deutschen U-Boote fiir Taiwan’, frankfurter Allgemeine, 28/4/94.
114 fy, ‘Besorgt um deutsche Riistung’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14/4/94.
115 Gesctzentwurf der Bundesregierung, ‘Entwurf eines Achten Gesetzes zur Anderung des 
Aufienwirtschaftsgesetzes’, Deutscher Bundestag, 12.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/6911, 28 February 
1994; ‘Wie kann illegaler Riistungsexport verhindert werdcn?’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5/3/94.
116 Dr. ElkeLeonhard-Schmid (SPD), Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 214.Sitzung, 4 March 1994, 
pp.l8550f; ‘Rustungsexporte bleiben Streitthema’, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 5/3/94; Hans Monath, 
‘Etappcnsieg fiir Waffenhandler’, Tageszeitung, 5/3/94.
117 See footnote 100.
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withstand the collective pressure from nearly all European governments due to the veto 
position of the government in the international negotiations, the combined demands from 
national and international actors began to compromise the Cabinet’s resistance. Due to the 
support for a revision of the German dual-use goods controls among domestic actors, 
cabinet ministers began to consider the lifting of its national dual-use controls even beyond 
the requirements of the European compromise. In talks with the Saudi-Arabian leadership 
in early February, Minister of Economics Rexrodt suggested that a revision of the 
government’s policy on dual-use exports was imminent.118 Rexrodt envisaged specifically 
a reduction of Germany’s country list.119 To sustain the pressure on the Cabinet, the 
Economics Minister and officials from the Defence Ministry sought to use transnational 
and international linkages with their European colleagues. In particular, Rexrodt attempted 
to transfer the issue of dual-use exports to international organisations where he could draw 
on their support for less restrictive regulations by redefining the authority over the issue. 
Thus, Minister of Economics Rexrodt argued that the Germany Foreign Trade Act needed 
to be reduced to comply with the ‘higher’ authority of international standards set by the 
multilateral dual-use control regimes of which Germany was a member.
Incidentally, multilateral dual-use export controls had been significantly cut back 
with the abolition of the COCOM regime in the previous year. Moreover, although an ad- 
hoc working group had been set up at a meeting in Wassenaar, Netherlands, in November 
1993 to draft a proposal for a COCOM successor regime, it soon became clear that the 
new regime would be much weaker than its predecessor.120 The first round of negotiations 
failed to reach an agreement and a second round had just opened on the bureaucratic level 
in March 1994.121 The French government, in particular, opposed tight controls. With 
reference to its national sovereignty, the French delegation vetoed the full control of 
conventional armaments technology.122 The US administration, which had initially resisted
118 The reference had particular weight for Saudi-Arabia because it was on Germany’s country list. See 
Carl Graf Hohenthal, ‘Saudi-Arabien versucht einen behutsamen Umbruch’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
7/2/94.
119 Stue, ‘Exportkontrolle: Rexrodt fiir Sonderregeln’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 7/3/94.
120 ‘COCOM offiziell aufgelost’, Agence Europe, 6/4/94.
121 Nancy Dunne, ‘World Trade news: Demise of a battle-scarred veteran of the cold war’, Financial 
Times, 31/3/94.
122 Stue, ‘Ein neucs Exportkontrollsystem fur Riistungsgiitcr’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 29/3/94.
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the weakening of the COCOM controls, had also relinquished its stance on dual-use 
exports.123 Thus, the Clinton administration issued a general licence dual-use exports to 
the former Soviet Union and China in order to ease exports. The move prompted fears 
among the European armaments industry that the US would take advantage of the weak 
multilateral regimes, while European exports were curtailed by the emerging common 
export regulations.124
The proposal for a COCOM successor regime, which was unveiled in April, 
confirmed fears among proliferation experts that national differences of interest would 
prevail. Although the member states had agreed on a set of common rules, the draft 
envisaged that licensing would be conducted nationally. Moreover, country controls were 
reduced to very few states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.125 While a decision 
on the draft was still outstanding and, in fact, not reached until July 1996126, Economics 
Minister Gunter Rexrodt immediately suggested the reduction of Germany’s country list 
from 33 to eight or ten countries to conform with the new arrangement. However when 
questioned by the press about the position of the German government on his proposal, 
Rexrodt had to admit that his initiative had not been co-ordinated with his Cabinet 
colleagues.127
Officials from the Defence Ministry pursued the same strategy of transferring the 
issue of export regulations to other authorities. Following the .officials’ failed attempts of 
December 1993 to reduce German armaments export controls in line with the revision of 
its dual-use transfer regulations, Defence Ministry officials now sought to utilise the 
opposition to strict multilateral controls among its European partners for their cause. In 
a working paper published on 24 May, the civil servants proposed the creation of a 
European Armaments Agency with full authority over European arms exports. The paper 
had been designed as the basis for negotiations about a West European Armament Group
123 ‘1500 “Dual-use”-Exporte in vicr Jahren gebilligt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19/5/94.
124 ‘ COCOM-Anschluflrcgclung nocli in der Schwcbe’, Reuter German News Service, 3/1/94. See also 
Cornish, Arms Trade and Europe, p.37.
125 Theodor Troev, ‘Business: Cold War trade bars call time’, European, 1/4/94.
126 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls fo r  Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies, Vienna, 12 July 1996, at http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/wass_elements.htm.
127 Peter Ziller, ‘Rexrodt riittelt an Export-Kontrollen’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 12/4/94; ‘Rexrodt will 
Exportkontrollen lockern’, Reuter German News Service, 12/4/94.
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in the WEU. Although the officials from the Defence Ministry insisted that the 
organization was not intended to undermine the German armaments export legislation, it 
would obviously limit the scope for national exceptions. Crucially, the paper suggested 
changing article 223 of the Treaty of Rome in the planned revision of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1996 to transfer the decision-making authority on armaments questions to the 
European level.128 The plan was criticised by the SPD opposition as ‘dangerous and 
stupid’.129 SPD members pointed out that a European Armaments Agency could be used 
to end national export controls. Thus, the agency would threaten the clause that had been 
secured in the negotiations over common European dual-use export regulations which 
allowed for additional national controls.
However, in May 1994, the combined pressure from officials in the German 
Economics and Defence Ministry and their European colleagues in NATO, COCOM and 
other multilateral export control regimes showed some success. As consequence of the 
negotiations about the COCOM successor regime, officials from the German Economics 
Ministry announced that the government was relaxing the rules for armaments cooperation 
with members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).130 The new regulation allowed German companies to export sensitive technology 
to OECD members without a licence if the goods contributed to not more than 20 per cent 
of the finished product. Weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, however, 
were exempted from the licence. The Cabinet approved the decision on 8 June 1994.131
Encouraged by the success of the transgovemmnetal coalition among the civil 
servants from the European Economics and Defence Ministries, representatives from the 
German technological industry also mobilised their transnational relations in order to exert
128 Sto, ‘Riistungsagentur fur Europa?’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 25/5/94; ‘SPD nennt Bonner Plane fur 
Rustungsexport “gefahrlich”’, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 26/5/94.
199 *‘ SPD: Richtlinicn fur deutsche Waffenexporte nicht lockem’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 26/5/94.
130 The members included in 1994 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. See 
http://www.oecd.org/about/general/member-countries.htin.
131 ‘Germany relaxes rules for arms industry cooperation’, The Reuter European Business Report, 
31/5/94; Hermann-JosefTenhagen, ‘Deutsche Waffcn lcichter in alle Welt’, Tageszeitung, 1/6/94; ‘SPD: 
Ausweitung des WafFencxports’, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 3/6/94; Holger H. Mey, ‘Nicht linger 
Rustungsexporte verwcigern’. Welt, 6/6/94; Slue, ‘Die Ausfuhrliste wird geftndert’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 9/6/94.
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pressure on the German administration. As the European negotiations were drawing to a 
close, the industry used its international European associations to lobby against the 
stipulations which allowed EC members to maintain additional national export controls.132 
‘It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a major company to contemplate collaboration 
with another company unless that company exists in a country where the government has 
accepted common principles of exporting policy’, concluded a spokesperson of the 
European Defence Industry Group (EDIG).133 Representatives of UNICE, the European 
association of businesses, demanded a quick resolution of the negotiations in Brussels in 
order to create an equal competitive environment.134
However, industry representatives were less successful than the civil servants. At 
their meeting of the European Council on Corfu, 24-25 June 1994, European foreign 
ministers approved of the draff for common dual-use export controls as it had been agreed 
over the past year.135 The general framework of the regulation was to be implemented in 
the form of a directive by the Commission. But the specific content of the contentious 
equipment and country lists would be open to constant review by the member states under 
the ‘joint action’ decision-making institutions of the European Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP).136 The final package contained lists of chemical, biological, 
nuclear and missile products which would require an export licence for transfers outside 
the EC. Their content widely matched the German lists. However, unlike the German 
Foreign Trade Act, the document did not include the transfer of sensitive knowledge and 
services. A regulation similar to the German ‘catch-all clause’ §5c which controlled 
equipment that to the knowledge of the exporter was intended for armaments production 
had also not been acceptable to the other EC members. To compensate for these
132 Stue, ‘Keine vollstdndige Harmonisierung der Exportkontrolle in Europa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
26/4/94.
133 Carol Reed and Heinz Schulte, ‘Germany views the way to go’, Jane'sD efence Weekly 21:24,18/6/94, 
pp.52f., p.52.
134 ‘UNICE betont Dringlichkeit einer Entscheidung des Rates tiber “Dual-Use-Guter” ’, Agence Europe, 
16/4/94.
135 ‘ Vorbehalte Belgiens und D&nemarks verzdgern Dossier betreffend Dual-Use Giiter’, Agence Europe, 
15/6/94; Mr. Heathcoat-Amory, Hansard, Vol.245. CoIs.l82f., Written Answers, 22 June 1994; Cornish, 
Arms Trade and Europe, pp.40f.
136 ‘Vorbehalte Belgiens und Ddnemarks verzogern Dossier betreffend Dual-Use Giiter\  Agence Europe, 
15 June 1994; Mr. Heathcoat-Amory, Hansard, Vol.245, Cols.l82f., Written Answers, 22 June 1994; 
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omissions, an opt-out formula allowed member states to maintain stricter national 
regulations where considered essential for national security. Although this formula should 
have paved the way for an agreement on the country lists by leaving the decision over the 
scope of the controls with the member states, the member governments continued to 
deliberate the content of a common European country list.137
Whether officials from the German Economics Ministry actively prolonged the 
discussions about the country controls does not emerge from the data. However, the 
continuing debate had a crucial impact on the decision-making process as it reasserted 
transnational and international pressure for a reduction of the German country list during 
the summer and autumn of 1994. Minister of Economics Rexrodt used the deadlock in the 
European negotiations on the country list question to insist in the German Cabinet on a 
reduction of the German country controls. Specifically, Rexrodt wanted to restrict 
Germany’s national exemptions from 32 to six states, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea and Syria. Rexrodt’s fellow FDP party member and Cabinet colleague Foreign 
Minister Klaus Kinkel and officials from the Foreign Office opposed the plan. Kinkel 
justified his objections with the argument that a reduction of the list would permit exports 
to Algeria, Angola, Pakistan, Cuba and Vietnam which were known for their human rights 
violations.138 In an official statement, Foreign Office civil servants rebutted the suggestion 
with the comment that with regard to the country list an agreement had not been reached. 
However, Kinkel and his staff were under high pressure due to their boundary position 
which exposed them to pressure from both national and international actors. Including the 
united coalition among the other European Foreign Ministries and his FDP party 
colleagues, 42 per cent of Kinkel’s contacts in the network demanded a reduction of the 
country controls.139
Support for the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Office staff on the question of 
the country controls came only from members of the SPD, the Green and the PDS
137 Peter Ziller, ‘Heikle RustungsgescMfte - Rexrodts Briicke soil Exportcuren den Weg frei machen’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 10/9/94.
1 IK‘Amnesty fordert: Rustungsexporte nicht erleichtem’, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 13/12/94.
139 P7 [FM] = 16/38 = 42%.
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opposition parties.140 However, the influence of the opposition members on the 
government was limited. Conversely, opposition parliamentarians were dependent on 
cabinet ministers and civil servants for expertise and regular information about the 
international negotiations. At best opposition members could exert indirect pressure via 
the media and the electorate during the ongoing general election campaign. An opportunity 
to direct public attention to the impending change of government policy arose during a 
meeting between EC foreign ministers and governmental representatives of ASEAN states. 
Using the meeting as a platform, SPD members urged the Cabinet in the media to refrain 
from allowing arms transfers to the region.141 In their election manifesto the SPD promised 
to restrict armaments exports to members ofNATO and the EC, if elected to government.
However, during the election campaign the question was not promoted as a central 
issue because of its association with job losses in the technological industries.142 Since even 
the German labour unions were divided over the question of armaments exports, the SPD 
was best advised not to raise the issue with its grass roots supporters. In fact, only 39 per 
cent of the electorate in West Germany favoured the banning of armaments transfers. In 
the former East, where the PDS had its main base, 52 per cent of the electorate supported 
the abolition of weapons exports. The PDS wanted to prohibit all arms exports, as did the 
Greens.143 However, when the Kohl coalition government won a third term in office in the 
general election of 16 October 1994, the only chance of the opposition members to 
prevent the revision of the German dual-use export controls by gaining control over the 
decision-making process was lost.144
In early December, a Coalition Meeting between the Chancellor, key cabinet 
ministers and the leaders of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties decided to 
reduce German dual-use export controls. The decision was no surprise. The Coalition 
Meeting had been under considerable pressure during the autumn from 53 per cent of the
140 Peter Ziller, ‘Heikle RustungsgeschSfte - Rexrodts Briicke soli Exporteuren den Weg frei machcn’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 10/9/94. See also Peter Ziller, ‘Bonn erleichtertRustungsgeschaft’, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 10/12/94; Stue, ‘Neue Landerliste fiir Exportkontrollen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 10/12/94.
141 ren, ‘SPD kritisiert Ostasien-Politik der Bundesregierung’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 23/9/94.
142 ban, ‘SPD Parteirat stellt sich mit grolier Geschlossenlieit hinter Scharping’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
4/5/94.
143 Sto, ‘PDS will rot-griine Regierung unterstiitzen’. Frankfurter Allgemeine, 22/8/94.
144 Elisabeth Noellc -Neumann, ‘Wahlkainpf der Gefuhle’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5/10/94.
263
actors to whom it was linked in the network. In particular, the members of the CDU/CSU 
and FDP parliamentary parties, Economics Minister Rexrodt and Defence Minister Riihe 
favoured a revision of the Foreign Trade Act .145 Although not a formal institution of the 
German policy process, the decision of the Cabinet Meeting had important consequences. 
Practically, the Coalition Meeting served to negotiate all controversial issues in the 
coalition government. As such, it had direct influence over the Cabinet. With the approval 
of the Meeting to a reduction in the German dual-use export controls, the pressure on the 
collective Cabinet was raised from 40 to 45 per cent.146 Moreover, the Cabinet Meeting 
increased the pressure on both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel also to 45 per 
cent, that is nearly half of the actors to which both were linked within the German foreign 
policy network supported the revision of the German dual-use export licensing 
conditions.147 On 9 December 1994, the Cabinet approved the amendment of the German 
Foreign Trade Act.
Following the Cabinet decision, officials from the Economics Ministry and the 
Foreign Office reduced the country list from 32 to 9 states in long and protracted 
negotiations between the two ministries.148 Removed from the list were among others 
Egypt, China, Pakistan, India, Angola, Algeria, Vietnam, Yemen, Cambodia, Lebanon and 
Taiwan.149 Foreign Office staff had originally wanted to include ten new countries which 
were affected by civil war, such as Georgia and Tajikistan, or which were subject to 
international embargos, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Haiti, Nigeria, Ruanda, Sudan and 
Zaire. However, after the decision of the Cabinet, the ability of the Foreign Office to 
influence the content of the country list was very limited.150
When it came to justifying the reduction of the country list in public, however, the 
German government was at a loss. Cabinet ministers could hardly admit that the revision 
of government policy had been a consequence of persistent and strategic pressure from the
145 P7 [Coa] = 8/15 = 53%.
146 P7 [Cab] = 8/20 = 40% to P8 [Cab] = 9/20 = 45%.
147 P8 [Cha] = 19/42 =45% and P8 [FM] = 17/38 = 45%.
148 The list now comprised dual-use exports to Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Birma, North Korea, Syria, 
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.
149 Peter Ziller, ‘Bonn erlciclUert Riistungsgesch&ft’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 10/12/94; Stue, ‘Neue 
Landerliste fur Exportkontrollen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 10/12/94.
150 Ibid.
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German armaments and export industry. Instead, Economics Minister Rexrodt falsely 
claimed that the amendment had become necessary due to the European agreement on 
common dual-use export regulations.151 As the German European Parliament Member 
Jannis Sakkellariou (SPD) correctly pointed out, however, the shortening of the country 
list was by no means required by the EC regulations.152 The British government, for 
instance, maintained a list of 44-45 countries for special controls.153
On 19 December 1994, shortly after the policy reversal of the German 
government, the European Council approved the common regulation for the control of 
exports of dual-use goods.154 Differences between the German controls and the common 
European regulation pertained to the lists of dual-use equipment which were less 
comprehensive than the Foreign Trade Act in the area of chemical and biological goods. 
However, with the support of a number of other member states, the German government 
had achieved the inclusion of a catch-all clause for nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons. Due to the opposition of the French administration, the catch-all clause 
exempted conventional technology. Moreover, exporters only required a licence if they 
had been informed by the authorities of the military use of their equipment or if they had 
‘positive knowledge’ that it was intended for military purposes. Yet, the European 
regulation included several stipulations which enabled member states to maintain stricter 
controls if they chose to do so.155 In line with these, the German government retained its 
controls for dual-use goods which could be converted to conventional weapons. 
Furthermore, Germany required licensing for dual-use equipment which was to be 
exported to countries on its new country list, the ‘X list’. National regulations for the
151 ‘Regierung einig iiber Regeln fur Dual-Use-Giiter’, Reuter German News Service, 9/12/94.
152 ‘Militarexporte - Jannis Sakellariou attackicrt deutsche Regierung’, Agence Europe, 14/12/94.
153 The numbers vary since the list is under constant review. See Mr. Ian Taylor, Hansard, Vol.254, 
Col.353, Written Answers, 9 February 1995; Mr. Nelson, Hansard, Vol.263, Col. 1550, Written Answers, 
19 July 1995.
154Regulation No 3381/94, at CELEX CD-ROM; ‘Kontrolleder Ausfuhrvon ‘Dual-Use-Giitem’,>4gewce 
Europe, 28/12/94. After further delays the regulation was implemented on 1 July 1995.
155 Alexander Reuter, Aufienwirtschafts- und Exportkontrollrecht Deutschland, Europdische Union 
(Mtinchen: Beck, 1995); Egger, "Dual-Use "-Waren. Exportkontrolle undEG-Vertrag\ Jest&dt and Behr, 
‘Exportkontrollrecht fiir Dual-use-Giiter’.
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transfer o f  sensitive know-how and technical services also remained in force.156
6.3 Conclusion
In order to assess the explanatory value of multilevel network theory, the following draws 
together the evidence from the above case study with regard to the plausibility of its two 
hypotheses. As in the previous case studies, it examines the hypotheses with regard to four 
measures: the probability of preference change, the distribution of the four behavioural 
categories across the range of pressure, the average degree of pressure in each category 
and the timing of the preference changes. Finally, it discusses the insights provided by 
multilevel network analysis into the u-turn of the German government on dual-use export 
regulations.
Assessment o f the Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis of multilevel network 
theory which suggests that rising degrees 
of pressure can be linked to preference 
changes among the affected network 
actors is widely supported by the results 
of this case. As displayed in Graph 6 1, 
higher degrees of pressure were nearly 
always associated with an increasing 
proportion of preference changes. In fact, 
the first hypothesis was confirmed by the 
empirical evidence in 155 out of 157 
instances, i.e. 99 per cent.
Further confirmation of the first hypothesis was derived from the distribution of 
instances in each of the four behavioural categories - ‘no change’, ‘unclear or undecided’, 
‘change’ and ‘blocked’. Thus, the distribution of the frequency of instances in which actors
156 Exportkontrolle in Europa wird harmonisiert’. Frankfurter A llgem eine , 19/12/94; ‘Bonn pafit 
Aufienwirtschaftsrccht an EU-Nonn an’, Reuter German News Service, 7/2/95. See also Eggcr, “Dual- 
Use "- Waren. Exportkontrolle und EG- Vertrag, p. 93; Jcstadt and Behr, ‘ Exportkontrollrecht fur Dual-use- 
Giiter’, p.717, p.719; Reuter, Aussenwirtschafls- und Exportkontrollrecht Deutschland, p.98.
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did not change their original preferences 
in Graph 6.2 conformed with the by now 
familiar picture of high numbers at a low 
range of 0-10 per cent, a slump at 15-30 
per cent and an early peak at 30-35 per 
cent. After the peak, the frequency falls 
steeply to zero at a degree of pressure of 
55 per cent. Beyond this degree none of 
the actors was able to advocate the 
preservation of German dual-use controls, 
thus providing further evidence for a 
threshold which has been identified in the 
previous case studies.
The frequency distribution of the 
instances in which actors’s preferences 
were unclear or divided which is shown in 
Graph 6.3 reaches its peak at slightly 
higher pressures than the previous 
category, namely at 30-45 per cent. It 
supports the notion of an intermediate 
phase. The six deviating instances at a 
range of 65-75 per cent suggest that 
unclear preferences enable actors to resist 
higher degrees of pressure. As in the other 
cases, the actor who was able to 
withstand these pressures was a collective 
decision-making institution, namely the 
German Bundestag. However, in this case 
the fact that the Bundestag’s preference
Graph 6.2 'No Change'
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was codified as ‘unclear or undecided’ was a consequence of the formal support for the 
government among the members of the coalition parliamentary parties. If the parties had 
decided to approve of an amendment of the Foreign Trade Act before a Cabinet decision,
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this would have been an open rebellion and could have led to a vote of no confidence. 
Although the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties were unanimously in favour of a 
reduction of dual-use controls, they chose not to challenge their government in the 
Bundestag. Nevertheless, as party members, they repeatedly and publicly criticised the 
government’s policy.
The distribution of the number of preference changes in Graph 6.4 further supports 
the first hypothesis as it reaches its peak at a higher degree of pressure than both the ‘no 
change’ and the ‘unclear or undecided’ category, namely between 40 and 50 per cent. The 
preference changes among the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties 
at 5 per cent pressure, cannot be explained within the framework of this theory. They also 
do not correlate with similar occurrences in the other cases and, therefore, do not suggest 
a revision of the existing hypothesis. An explanation could involve degrees of power to 
account for the presumed close relationship between the German industry and the coalition 
parties. Thus, in particular the FDP perceives itself as the party political representation of 
the German industry. However, as has been argued in the exposition of multilevel network 
theory, such an approach would incur serious theoretical and methodological problems. 
Since the error margin encountered this way is rather narrow, it appears more fruitful to 
treat the two instances as exceptions from a generally highly valuable hypothesis.
Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics
Preference Changes Number of 
Instances
Range of 
Pressure
Minimum
Pressure
Maximum
Pressure
Average
Pressure
No Change (NC) 112 52% 0% 52% 22%
Unclear or Undecided (U) 33 58% 15% 73% 41%
Change(C) 12 77% 5% 82% 42%
Blocked (B) 0 - - - -
The second indicator which supports the first hypothesis is the significant difference in the 
average degrees of pressure at which actors were able to maintain their original 
preferences at 22 per cent and those at which they modified them at 42 per cent.157 The 
average of the pressure at which actors were unclear or divided at 41 per cent is slightly
157 See Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics.
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below the mean of pressure at which actors change preferences, providing further 
indication for an intermediate phase of reconsideration and insecurity at an intermediate 
range of pressure.
The timing of the preference changes lends additional support for the hypothesis 
which links the preference reversals to the degree of pressure exerted over network actors. 
Nine of twelve actors changed their policy position immediately after an increase in their 
pressure quotient. Among the three actors which did not immediately respond to the 
growing demand for a modification in their preferences one role actor, i.e. Foreign Office 
staff, responded in the second phase after an increase. The belated preference change 
among Foreign Office officials matches their long-standing dedication to the cause of tight 
dual-use controls. However, the deferment of their preference reversal by merely one 
phase does not seriously challenge the generally close relationship between pressure 
increases and the timing of preference changes. The other two exceptions pertain again to 
the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties who modified their policy 
preferences although they were not subject to increasing, or indeed substantive, pressure 
from other actors within the German multilevel foreign policy network.
Table 6.5 Timing of Preference Changes
1>t phase after an increase In pressure Other
1. EC-Co (0 -> 82) 1. cdu (change without increase in pressure at 5%)
2. Em (39% -> 45%) 2. fdp (change without increase in pressure at 5%)
3. EM (37% -> 40%) 3. Fm (change in 2nd phase after increase, 45% -> 48%)
4. DM (34% ->38%)
5. Dm (52% -> 56%)
6. Coa (47% -> 53%)
7. Cha (43% -> 45%)
8. Cab (40% -> 45%)
9. FM (42% -> 45%)
The use of a blocking strategy was employed by none of the actors in the case of dual-use 
export regulations, primarily because of the nature of the issue. Unlike the first German 
case and the two British cases, the maintenance of high export standards in Germany 
required a positive decision in favour of a policy change which included the establishment
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of tight international controls. Since the introduction of the internal market threatened to 
undermine German dual-use controls by default, the German government had to lobby for 
support in favour of strict European regulations rather than merely block the issue. A 
similar situation applied to the negotiations for a COCOM successor regime. The nature 
of the regime as intergovernmental and voluntary agreement did not allow for a German 
veto over the dismantling of the controls. Again, the government was conversely forced 
to mobilise support for a multilateral control regime. In the national section of the German 
foreign and security policy network, however, the impending policy reversal could have 
been blocked by a majority in the Bundestag. Yet since the coalition government’s 
parliamentary parties were among the strongest and earliest advocates of less restrictive 
dual-use export controls, a veto was not considered by them. Conversely, members from 
the three opposition parties, which were opposed to an amendment of the Foreign Trade 
Act, were unable to veto the revision of German dual-use export regulations due to their 
minority position within the Bundestag.
New Insights into the Reduction o f German Dual-Use Export Regulations
The preceding analysis illustrates that the hypotheses of multilevel network theory are not 
only confirmed by the case of German dual-use export regulations, but also reveal 
interesting insights into the case and the German foreign policy decision-making process. 
Specifically, multilevel network analysis illustrates the range of national, transnational and 
international pressures which contributed to the amendment of German dual-use export 
controls. Moreover, multilevel network theory can help to explain why the German 
government changed its national regulations beyond the requirements of the common 
European framework by pointing to the increasing domestic support for a revision of the 
Foreign Trade Act.
According to multilevel network theory, the emergence of a winning coalition in 
favour of less restrictive dual-use regulations can be linked to the strategic pressure of 
German industry representatives. As part of their strategy the two main German industry 
associations and major technological companies used not only their national linkages to 
officials in the Economics Ministry and the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP 
parliamentary parties, but also transnational contacts with the European Commission and 
international employers associations to exert pressure for their policy preference. Once
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officials in the German Economics Ministry had succumbed to the mounting national, 
transnational and international pressure, they contributed to the direct pressure of this 
coalition on German cabinet ministers. In particular, Economics Minister Rexrodt proved 
susceptible to the mounting demands and, following his own preference change, in turn 
lobbied for the reduction of the German dual-use controls among his fellow ministers and 
in the Cabinet.
With regard to the question of a governmental gatekeeper position between the 
national and the international arena and the consequences for its ability to control foreign 
policy decisions, multilevel network theory suggests two conclusions in this case. First, 
the boundary position of ministers and civil servants played an important part in bringing 
about the policy change of the German government as roles were able to draw on both 
national and international support for a reduction of German dual-use export controls - 
once they had changed their preferences On the issue. However, the latter qualification 
alerts to some misconceptions regarding the gatekeeper concept. In particular, the 
evidence suggests that gatekeeper or ‘boundary’ roles, as they are termed here, are not 
only able to use their national and international relations to promote their own policy 
preferences, but are also more exposed to pressures for preference changes from actors 
in both arenas. Second, the case study indicates again that gatekeepers can be 
circumvented by transnational linkages among private actors such as German industry 
representatives with the EU or international industry associations.
In addition to its insights into multilevel coalitions, multilevel network theory offers 
a possible explanation for the observation that the German government reduced its ‘H ’ list 
beyond the requirements of the common European dual-use export regulations although 
it had the option of maintaining its original length. It suggests that the extension of the 
support for the revision of the German Foreign Trade Act among domestic actors in 
Germany proved critical for the Cabinet’s decision to amend the law. The 
transgovemmental coalition among European civil servants, as well as national and 
transnational pressure from the industry, played an important role in raising the pressure 
on the government in the international negotiations. However, with increasing domestic 
support for the reduction of dual-use controls, the government could go further in the 
revision of its national regulations. Multilevel network analysis thereby shows again a 
convergence between national and international policy preferences. As in the previous case
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studies, the change in Cabinet policy came about when a majority of both national and 
international actors supported the relaxation of the German dual-use export controls.
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7. Conclusion
This thesis has started with the observation that the study of contemporary foreign policy 
decision-making processes in Western Europe and North America increasingly requires 
the combination of multiple levels of analysis. As decision-making has come to involve a 
broad range of political, social and economic actors in the national and international arena, 
the division between empiricist theories of international relations and foreign policy 
analysis has been criticised for inhibiting more comprehensive explanations of foreign 
policy processes and outcomes. A range of multilevel models, such as transnationalism, 
the two-level game and network models, offer insights into the integrated policy decision­
making processes in this area. This thesis has argued that the network approach is 
particularly well suited for modelling the increasing multiplicity, diversity and 
interdependence of actors across the national, transnational and international levels of 
analysis. However, it has pointed out that most existing network models fail to address 
sufficiently the theoretical implications of integrating all three levels of analysis. Moreover, 
few network models propose testable hypotheses regarding decision-making processes as 
an intermediate variable between structure and outcomes. To address these criticisms this 
thesis has proposed a multilevel network theory which offers new developments in both 
areas. Specifically, multilevel network theory seeks to illustrate that rational choice 
hypotheses can help to explain how public and private actors are able to influence the 
foreign policy decision-making process and its outcome. In addition to proposing further 
theoretical developments in network analysis, this thesis sought to provide empirical 
insights into the question whether governments in Western Europe and the broader 
transatlantic community have lost their control over the determination of national foreign 
policies due to the emergence of multilevel networks. The specific focus of this thesis has, 
therefore, been the analysis of multilevel networks in the foreign policy decision-making 
processes of Britain and Germany.
By returning to the theoretical and empirical questions of this thesis, the following 
seeks to provide an overall assessment of multilevel network theory and its insights on 
contemporary British and German foreign policy decision-making. In order to do so, the 
first section analyses the findings from the four case studies to assess the empirical 
evidence for the validity of the two hypotheses presented by the theory and to induce
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modifications or new hypotheses. The second section turns to the empirical and theoretical 
debates outlined in the introduction. It first discusses the four case studies in the light of 
the insights suggested by multilevel network theory to the question whether governments 
in Western Europe and across the Atlantic are losing their control over the foreign policy 
decision-making process. It then proceeds to evaluate multilevel network theory in 
comparison with transnationalism, the two-level game and other network approaches. 
Finally, the conclusion proposes further areas for the testing and the development of 
multilevel network theory.
7.1 Evaluation of Multilevel Network Theory
In the exposition of multilevel network theory, it has been suggested that the axioms which 
guide the behaviour and preference changes of network actors in the foreign policy 
decision-making process should be valid independently of the specific network or issue 
area. In order to test this proposition, the four case studies analysed in the previous 
chapters were selected for their differences in two dimensions. First, the cases analysed 
decision-making processes in the distinct, though overlapping, foreign policy networks of 
Britain and Germany. Second, the cases included a security and a defence economic issue 
in each country. Before this section turns to the analysis of all cases, it returns to this 
question by examining whether the findings from the four cases were comparable or 
whether there were systematic differences between the British and the German network 
or between security and defence economic foreign policy decision-making. The section 
then proceeds to evaluate the degree to which the hypotheses of multilevel network theory 
were corroborated by empirical evidence from the four cases. In addition, it uses the 
findings from the four case studies to refine the two key hypotheses and induce additional 
propositions where possible.
Cross-Case Comparison and General Application o f Multilevel Network Theory 
In accordance with the initial assumptions of multilevel network theory, the comparison 
between the four cases [Table 7.1 ] shows no systematic differences between countries or 
issue areas. In so far as general conclusions can be drawn from four case studies, neither 
the British and the German multilevel foreign policy process nor security and defence 
economic decision-making are characterised by consistently higher or lower averages in
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each of the four behavioural categories, ‘no change’, ‘unclear or undecided’, ‘change’ or 
‘blocked’. Both the British and the German cases show a higher than average and a lower 
than average value in the four behavioural categories. Across issues the findings vary, too. 
Thus, the same average of 22 per cent in the ‘no change’ category of the two defence 
economic cases is not matched by similarities in the other behavioural categories. The 
averages in the security cases also show no consistent similarities. Only the results 
regarding blocking behaviour are inconclusive since there are no instances of blocking 
behaviour in the second German case.
Table 7.1 Average Pressure in Cross-Case Comparison
Preference Changes BRITAIN GERMANY Cross-Country
Case 1 
Security
Case II
Defence Economics
Case III 
Security
Case VI
Defence Economics
Cross-Issues
No Change (NC) 29% 22% 25% 22% 25%
Unclear or Undecided (U) 40% 25% 33% 41% 35%
Change(C) 40% 36% 36% 42% 39%
Blocked (B) 46% 50% 57% - 51%
While there are no symmetries between countries or issues, the cross-case comparison of 
the averages reveals a strong correlation within the four behavioural categories. In fact, 
the differences within these categories are consistently smaller than within a country or 
issue area. With the qualification that the small number of cases only permits preliminary 
conclusions, the findings confirm that neither the location of the ultimate decision-making 
unit within a particular country nor the nature of the issues leads to differences in the 
behaviour of the network actors. It follows, that a cumulative analysis of all cases is not 
only possible, but also imperative in order to test the general hypotheses of multilevel 
network theory.
Cumulative Evaluation o f the Hypotheses
According to the first hypothesis the higher the degree of pressure (P=E/L), i.e. number 
of directly related actors exerting pressure (E) on a single actor X in proportion to his or 
her absolute number of linkages within the network (L), the more likely is actor X -
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including the ultimate decision unit - to 
change his or her policy preference. As the 
four case studies have showed, the 
empirical evidence generally confirms the 
first hypothesis. However, the general 
characteristics of the distribution of each 
behavioural category in relation to the 
degree of pressure to which actors were 
exposed became clearer in the cumulative 
analysis. Specifically, the distribution of the 
relative frequency or probability of 
preference changes at different degrees of 
pressure reveals itself as a continuous 
curve if the findings from all cases are 
combined. Graph 7.1 shows that the 
relative frequency or probability of 
preference changes rises almost without 
interruptions in the cumulative analysis. In 
addition, the combined data from the four 
case studies offers further insights into the 
general nature of the probabilistic causal relationship between network pressure and 
preference changes. Thus, in deviation from the single case studies, the probability of a 
preference change reaches 100 per cent only at a degree of pressure between 80-85 per 
cent. The increase in the probability of a preference change is, thus, less steep than in some 
of the single case studies. However, since the first hypothesis does not specify the scale 
of the increase in the probability of a preference change with rising degrees of pressure, 
i.e. the steepness of the curve, the empirical evidence from the single case studies as well 
as the cumulative analysis support the proposition. In fact, the empirical findings conform 
with the first hypothesis in 600 out o f604 instances of preference change, i.e. 99 per cent.
The distribution of the curve in the cross-case analysis suggests, however, that the 
increase in the probability of a preference change with rising degrees of pressure can be 
further specified. Thus, Graph 7.2 indicates that the probability of an actor changing his
276
Graph 7.1 Frequency / Probability
120l---------------------------------------
„  100'
Pressure (per cent)
Graph 7.2 Probability Estimates
1 2 0 -
100 '
r:so
2 0 -
>.
O(U
.o
U n o a r
O
E x p o n e n tia lQl -20
Pressure (per cent)
or her policy preference rises exponentially with increasing degrees of pressure. A refined 
first hypothesis can, therefore, be stated as:
Hypothesis 1 The probability o f an actor changing his or her policy preference 
increases exponentially with rising degrees o f pressure (P=E/L), i.e. the number 
o f directly related actors exerting pressure on a single actor (E) in proportion to 
his or her absolute number o f linkages within the network (L).
Further new insights are provided by 
the cumulative analysis of each of 
the four behavioural categories.
Especially the distribution of the 
instances in which actors maintained 
their original preferences, shown in 
Graph 7.3, gives further indication 
about the behaviour of network 
members in the foreign policy 
decision-making process. The 
cumulative analysis shows a 
consistently high distribution of instances of preference preservation at low degrees of 
pressure up to a range of 45-50 per cent Moreover, although interrupted, the curve 
suggests a decrease in the ability of actors to maintain their policy preferences with rising 
pressure from its peak at 20-25 per cent. In addition, the curve supports the proposition 
of a threshold. Remarkably, this threshold lies almost exactly at a pressure of 50 per cent 
which characterises a situation in which an actor is exposed to pressure from half of the 
actors on which he or she is linked within the network. It conforms with the notion that 
in democracies a policy is determined by the preference of the majority. However, the 
findings derived from multilevel network theory suggest that the view of the majority of 
actors not only influences the policy preferences of cabinets or parliaments, but of all 
members in a network Who is part of the ‘majority view’ differs for each actor or 
decision-making unit because every member in the network has a different constituency, 
i.e. is linked to a different group of actors. It is the policy preferences of this group which
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Although the original exposition of multilevel network theory did not predict the 
existence of a threshold, it generally conforms with the premises and propositions of the 
model and thus can be incorporated into the approach. On the basis of the empirical 
findings, the new additional inductive hypothesis 1" can be stated as follows.
Hypothesis 1". Actors are unlikely to maintain their original preferences at a 
degree o f pressure (P E/L) higher than 50 per cent i f  their preference change is 
not blocked. They will either change their preferences, or appear unclear or 
undecided over their preferred policies.
The existence of a threshold implies that the degree of pressure is a sufficient, but not 
necessary explanation for changing preferences. In addition to the pressure from other 
actors within their network, each actor apparently also considers other variables. They can 
help to explain whether an actor modifies his or her preference at pressures lower than 50 
per cent. The nature of these variables and the degree to which they influence policy 
changes can only be established in further studies. However, the case studies indicate that 
once the pressure reaches the threshold level, alternative considerations recede into the 
background of an actor’s calculations. As multilevel network theory suggests, rational 
actors should not and, as the case studies confirm, do not ignore the policy preferences of 
the majority of actors to whom they are linked in their network, regardless of their other 
motives or the strength of their convictions.
The distribution of pressure 
in the category in which actors 
changed their policy preferences in 
Graph 7.4 provides further evidence 
for the above argument. While a 
small number of actors reversed their 
policy position in the absence of 
significant pressures and others were 
able to withstand strong external 
demands, the number of preference
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changes peaks between 30 and 50 per cent, i.e. just before the threshold level.
The dispersion of the curve beyond the majority threshold can be explained by 
differences in the intervals in which the pressure on each individual actor rises. Actors with 
few linkages within the foreign policy network have larger intervals than actors with a 
large number of linkages. Sudden, steep increases in pressure are also a result of 
simultaneous preference changes, often among a set of closely linked actors or towards 
the end of the research periods when overall pressures on a number of actors have reached 
high degrees.
The findings from the four 
cases further suggest that the 
difference between the behavioural 
categories ‘no change’ and ‘change’ 
is filled by a third category which has 
been described as ‘unclear or 
undecided’. The distribution of the 
pressures in this category, displayed 
in Graph 7.5, indicates that actors 
frequently pass through a phase in 
which their initial conviction falters, 
but a new policy position has yet to be adopted. As a consequence, an individual or 
different representatives of a particular role express diverging positions or contradictory 
preferences. In collective decision-making units which take decisions by vote or consensus, 
such as parliaments or the ministerial councils of international organisations, this behaviour 
usually signifies a split among their members.
The fact that the number of unclear or undecided positions peaks before the 
number of actors who changed their preferences implies that this phase precedes an 
eventual preference change. Interesting is the additional observation that an unclear or 
undecided preference not only precedes a change in policy preference, but also seems to 
delay it in some circumstances. Thus, in nineteen out of 112 instances, unclear preferences 
appeared to enable actors to withstand pressures beyond the threshold degree of 50 per 
cent.
According to the second hypothesis, the ability to resist network pressure is also
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enhanced by a veto or blocking 
position in collective decision­
making units, like parliaments or 
international organisations. That is, a 
policy preference change in these 
organisations can be prevented by 
their members, if they have a veto or 
if decisions require a (qualified) 
majority or a consensus. The 
empirical findings from all cases 
affirm this proposition in the 
distribution of blocking behaviour over different degrees of pressure in Graph 7.6 and in 
the average pressure shown in Table 7.2. Although it is difficult to make generalizations 
with regard to the German cases where no blocking strategy was used in the case of dual- 
use export regulations, the findings are generally consistent with the second hypothesis 
with averages ranging between 46 and 57 per cent. The cumulative average lies at 51 per 
cent and, thus, significantly above the average of actors who changed their preferences at 
39 per cent.
Table 7.2 Blocking Strategy
Case 1 Case li Case III Case IV All Cases
Number of Instances 51 8 1 - 60
Range of Pressure 28 12 0 - 28
Minimum Pressure 35% 46% 57% - 46%
Maximum Pressure 64% 59% 57% - 60%
Average Pressure 46% 50% 57% - 51%
From Graph 7.6, it emerges further that actors only used a veto strategy if the degree of 
pressure on their organisation increased beyond 35 per cent. This can be explained by the 
fact that a veto is not necessary to prevent a decision in collective decision-making units 
unless a considerable number of members support a change in policy. It seems far from 
incidental that at a starting range of pressures from 35-40 per cent, blocking behaviour
Graph 7.6 'Blocked'
'o s^-'b ■%■
Pressure (per cent)
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falls into the same bracket in which actors on average have a high probability of changing 
their preferences. Yet considering that decisions in all collective decision-making units 
required either a majority or a consensus among its members, the degree at which blocking 
behaviour fails appears to be rather low. At about 60 per cent it is only ten per cent above 
the majority threshold and, thus, far from meeting a qualified majority or, indeed, a 
consensus.
Differences between the degrees of pressure at which collective decision-making 
units with diverging decision-making rules, i.e. veto, (qualified) majority or consensus, 
changed their preferences could not be observed. As far as the limited evidence from the 
four cases can suggest any relationship, it appears to contradict institutional requirements. 
Among the international organisations involved in foreign policy decision-making, a 
consensus was formally the basis of all decisions. However, the findings from the two 
British cases in particular suggests that actual decision-making did not conform with the 
formal consensus rule. The average pressure of a winning coalition within a collective 
decision-making unit represented at 46 and 50 per cent a simple majority of the members, 
but clearly not a consensus. In fact, the North Atlantic Council ignored the explicit veto 
of one of its members in two instances, namely of France in the decision to go ‘out-of- 
area’ and Britain in the abolition of its tactical air-to-surface missile requirement.
Conversely, the British House of Commons and the Bundestag overcame the 
blocking position of key parties only at high pressure levels of 72 and 73 per cent 
respectively in spite of the fact that both required only a simple majority to change their 
policies.1 It has to be qualified, however, that in the German case a two-thirds requirement 
was informally upheld by the government because of the historical weight of the decision 
regarding the despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia. The only instance in which a 
formal veto was exercised in a German case, namely the objection of the Bundestag to the 
amendment of the Basic Law prior to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, 
confirms the strength of the two-thirds requirement as the Bundestag withstood a pressure 
of 57 per cent.
The fact that vetos failed to prevent changes of policy preferences in collective
1 See Chapter 4 ‘The Abolition of the Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile Project’ and chapter 5 ‘The 
Despatch of Tornados to Bosnia’.
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decision-making units even if less than 60 per cent of the members supported them, 
illustrates that collective decision-making units are still subject to the first hypothesis. 
Accordingly, a revised and more specific second hypothesis can be defined as follows:
Hypothesis 2': Collective decision-making units can resist pressure o f up to 60 
per cent i f  members use a veto or if a decision requires a (qualified) majority 
['veto or blocking strategy'].
The average pressure within each of the four behavioural categories across all cases as 
shown in Table 7.3 further corroborates the above findings. The first hypothesis is 
supported by the observation that the mean pressure which actors were able to withstand 
was at 25 per cent significantly lower than the average pressure at which actors changed 
their policy preferences at 38 per cent. The average pressure at which actors were unclear 
or undecided lies at 36 per cent only slightly below the mean pressure at which actors 
modified their preferences. Nevertheless, this average, and the finding that the maximum 
pressure in the ‘unclear or undecided’ category is at 73 per cent considerably lower than 
the maximum pressure in the ‘change’ category, can be taken as evidence for the 
proposition made above, namely that some actors pass through a phase of reorientation 
before they adapt their preferences to conform with network pressure. The second 
hypothesis is also met by the empirical evidence. Thus, it was observed across all cases 
that collective decision-making units were at 47 per cent able to resist significantly higher 
average pressure than unitary role actors.
Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics (Cumulative)
Preference Changes Number of 
Instances
Range of 
Pressure
Minimum
Pressure
Maximum
Pressure
Average
Pressure
No Change (NC) 432 54 0% 54% 25%
Unclear or Undecided (U) 112 59 14% 73% 36%
Change(C) 60 100 0% 100% 38%
Blocked (B) 60 28 35% 64% 47%
Assessed by the standard of empirical corroboration which is key to the scientific
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paradigm, the test of multilevel network theory in the four case studies supports the 
hypotheses proposed by the approach. However, even within this paradigm the 
explanatory value of a theory can in the final instance only be assessed in comparison with 
other approaches. Specifically, multilevel network theory has to be evaluated with regard 
to its ability to respond to the empirical and theoretical challenges outlined in the 
introduction of this thesis.
7.3 Insights into Contemporary Foreign Policy Decision-Making
Three aspects are essential for a positive evaluation of multilevel network theory in 
comparison with other empiricist multilevel approaches: (1) its ability to provide empirical 
insights into the question who influences national foreign policy decision-making and how, 
(2) the parsimony and empirical validity of its theoretical propositions and (3) its 
contribution to the theoretical integration of multiple levels in empiricist Foreign Policy 
Analysis. This section examines each aspect in turn before suggesting further areas for the 
application and development of multilevel network theory.
National Control over Foreign Policy Decision-Making
One of the objectives for the development of multilevel network theory has been the 
question who determines national foreign policies in decision-making processes which 
have come to involve a multiplicity of actors across national boundaries. It arises from the 
concern that governmental control over foreign policies, and with it national sovereignty2, 
might be undermined by changes in the decision-making process. This section analyses 
whether the four case studies presented in this thesis support the notion that national 
control over foreign policy decision-making has been reduced by multilevel networks.
2 Often the question of governmental control over foreign policies is confused with sovereignty and vice 
versa. Thus, while national sovereignty is formally understood as a government’s monopoly in the 
authoritative regulation of the internal and external relations of their societies. Informally, sovereignty 
is typically equated with control over decision-making processes and their outcomes. See for instance 
Ellen Kennedy, ‘Towards a Theory of State and Sovereignty in Contemporary Britain’, in Lawrence 
Freedman and Michael Clarke, cds., Britain in the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
pp. 143-165; Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Die Handlungsf&higkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten 
Jahrhunderts’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 32:4, 1991, pp.621-634; Janice E. Thomson, ‘State 
Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research’, 
International Studies Quarterly 39, 1995, pp.213-233. Withstanding its implications for sovereignty, the 
focus of this thesis has been on governmental control over the taking of national foreign policy decisions.
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Crucially for an assessment of the relative strength of national, transnational and 
international foreign policy actors, multilevel network theory examines the power relations 
among these actors across levels of analysis. Moreover, multilevel network theory 
investigates the role of formal veto or blocking positions in national or international 
collective decision-making units, such as parliaments or international organisations, in the 
ability of actors to influence policy processes and outcomes.
The specific contribution of multilevel network theory, however, lies in its analysis 
of decision-making processes as the formation of coalitions among national, transnational 
and international actors in Western Europe and North America. Based on this analysis 
multilevel network theory seeks to scrutinise the claim that national control over foreign 
policy decision-making has been subject to a steady erosion over the past decades. In 
particular, the increasing interdependence among public and private actors at the national 
and international level, pointed out in the introduction of this thesis, appears to have 
enhanced the ability of these actors to influence government policies. By analysing the 
relations and interactions between national governments and a multiplicity of actors, 
multilevel network theory seeks to assess whether, by whom and how governments are 
indeed influenced in their decisions. However, unlike transnationalism or the two-level 
game, the concept of multilevel networks highlights the dual nature of most power 
relations. Thus, in networks of predominantly interdependent relations, the ability of 
governments to resist external influence can be enhanced either by isolation or by 
integration. Each entailed different problems for the control of foreign policy decision­
making in the four cases.
Through the perspective of multilevel network theory, isolation denotes actors who 
have only a limited number of relations with other actors in a network. In the British and 
German foreign policy networks such positions were held by the members of domestic 
parties, especially the opposition parties, the parliaments and parliamentary committees. 
As a consequence of their lack of linkages, the actors in these roles were less exposed to 
direct or indirect pressures within the multilevel network and, thus, under little external 
control in the four case studies. Actors who wanted to influence the members of political 
parties or Members of Parliament (MPs) could utilise only few direct relations and often 
had to resort to indirect, and therefore weaker, linkages with intermediary actors. In 
Britain representatives of the electorate, the media and pressure groups, in particular,
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served as intermediaries between a variety of domestic and international actors on one 
hand and party or parliament members on the other. The members of the governmental 
party and their MPs had a slightly greater number of linkages in the network due to their 
relations with civil servants which also functioned as intermediaries between them and 
other Western European or North American governments, thereby exposing them to 
additional transnational influences. In Germany, the members of all major parties, including 
the SPD opposition party, were directly linked to civil servants in the key ministries 
because of widespread party membership among leading officials. Consequently, the 
members of the main German parties were also exposed to indirect influence from the 
government through their linkages with officials in the Foreign and Chancellor’s Office, 
the Defence and the Finance Ministry.
While a low number of linkages within the network limited the range of actors who 
could directly or indirectly exert pressure on British and German party and parliament 
members, multilevel network theory suggests that the reverse side of their comparative 
isolation within the network was that the relative weight of the pressure from each actor 
who was directly linked to them was greater than with actors who had a large number of 
linkages in the network. With regard to party members and parliamentarians, this meant 
that the close and exclusive relations between party and parliament members on one hand 
and representatives of the electorate, media and government on the other hand, ensured 
that the former were primarily responsive and accountable to the latter. Moreover with 
respect to the question of national control over foreign policies it should be noted that the 
linkages of both party members and parliamentarians were virtually limited to the domestic 
arena. Given that the democratic systems of Britain and Germany seek to ensure the 
responsiveness of political parties and their national parliaments to the preferences of the 
electorate and interest groups, the exclusiveness of the former’s relations should be 
evaluated positively.
The disadvantage of an isolated position within the multilevel foreign policy 
decision-making networks of Britain and Germany, however, was that the ability of these 
actors to exert influence in the network was also diminished. When the ultimate decision­
making authority did not rest with the parliaments, but with the cabinets or international 
organisations, the House of Commons and the Bundestag had very little influence over the 
policy process and its outcome. While actors who had a large and broad range of linkages
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within the network, such as civil servants and ministers, were able to exert direct pressure 
on transnational and international actors and decision units, the members of the national 
parliaments and parties were very much confined to domestic influence. Since an 
increasing number of foreign policy decisions in Western Europe and the transatlantic 
community are either taken by the cabinets or by international organisations and not 
national parliaments, the lack of linkages of party political representatives in the two 
multilevel foreign policy networks, thus, could lead to a democratic deficit.
The problem of insulation and limited influence among party political 
representatives and national MPs was particularly apparent in the decision regarding air 
strikes in Bosnia. In this case, the members of the British Cabinet simply disregarded the 
lack of support within the Conservative parliamentary party for military action. 
Conservative MPs only ‘rallied around the flag’ after the government had already 
approved the mission. In Germany, the weakness of the Bundestag and its members was 
exemplified by the prolonged inability of the coalition party members to convince cabinet 
ministers to reduce the country’s dual-use export regulations, although a policy change 
was supported unanimously by the CDU/CSU and FDP factions as soon as the beginning 
of 1993.
Multilevel network theory suggests that the alternative to maintaining national 
control over foreign policy decision-making through insulation from external influence is 
a highly integrated position in the network defined by a multiplicity of relations with 
national, transnational and international actors. In Britain and Germany, mainly ministers 
and civil servants held such roles. Typically, these actors had between twenty and forty 
linkages with national, transnational and international actors in their network. While the 
large number of their relations in the multilevel network made them accessible to pressure 
from a broad range of different actors, many of them not domestic, the relative impact of 
each was low according to the quantitative measurement for pressure proposed by 
multilevel network theory. Since the pressure on any actor is measured in relation to the 
absolute number of his or her linkages (L), more actors have to exert pressure (E) on an 
actor with many links than on an actor with few linkages in order to achieve the same 
degree of pressure (P=E/L).
The case of the British TASM project attests that even though most of Britain’s 
NATO partners were opposed to its nuclear policy, they were not able to increase their
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pressure on the British cabinet ministers above the critical 50 per cent threshold. 
Conversely, since the key cabinet ministers had a high number of linkages, many of them 
with domestic actors who continued to support the missile programme, they were able to 
resist the international pressure for the abolition of the missile for some time. Only after 
a policy change became increasingly accepted by members of the Conservative Party, in 
particular, in the Commons Defence Committee, the British Cabinet decided to cancel the 
TASM project. Similarly, civil servants in the German Economics Ministry and their 
Minister Gunter Rexrodt resisted transnational and international pressure for the reduction 
of German dual-use export controls until a change of the Foreign Trade Act was also 
supported by CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians in the Bundestag.
The concepts of isolation and integration as well as the empirical observations from 
the four case studies, thus, illustrate that it is unlikely that national foreign policies are 
determined either by ‘national interests’ or ‘international pressure’. Conversely, due to the 
fact that government ministers were linked to about the same number of national and 
international actors, it can rather be suggested that they were equally responsive to 
domestic and international demands. Indeed, the four case studies reveal that policy 
decisions typically came about when a majority of national and international actors 
supported them.
A second observation which refutes the concern that national control over foreign 
policies is threatened by multilevel networks, is that a large number of national and 
international relations increased the ability of the two governments to mobilise support for 
their own policy preferences. This capacity was enhanced by the boundary position of 
ministers and civil servants between the national and international arena. At the centre of 
a number of crosscutting relations, both administrations could not only form coalitions 
with actors who had the same policy preference, but also exert pressure on their 
opponents. Moreover, multilevel network theory illustrated in the four case studies that 
transnational coalitions were as common as national or international alliances since 
opponents and supporters of a policy were usually dispersed across levels of analysis. The 
notion that the loss of national control over decision-making processes compromises the 
‘national interest’ is thus disconfirmed as it presumes a non-existent consensus among 
domestic actors about foreign policies.
Finally, multilevel network theory offers further insights into the question of
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whether national governments have lost their control over foreign policy decision-making 
due to the increase in the number and functional authority of international organisations. 
Specifically, multilevel network theory suggests that governmental actors maintain 
considerable control not only over national foreign policies, but also over multilateral 
decisions through their roles in international organisations and in intergovernmental 
negotiations. In particular, the corroboration of the second hypothesis in the four case 
studies indicates that the veto or blocking position of national governments in international 
organisations can contribute to preserving their capacity to prevent unfavourable 
decisions. Although the findings from the four case studies reveal that the term ‘veto’ 
power is misleading in that national governments were not able to avert a decision when 
the international and transnational pressure on these organisations rose above 
approximately 60 per cent of the actors linked to an organisation, governments usually 
maintained the ability to opt-out of a multilateral decision if they did not support it. 
Moreover, the multinational actions investigated in the case studies did not necessarily 
require the participation of the British or German governments. Air strikes in Bosnia could 
have been implemented by the United States and France; NATO’s abolition of its TASM 
requirement did not rule out the stationing of the missile in Britain; the reinforcement of 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia did not rely on German Tornados; and the common European 
regulations of dual-use goods export controls permitted national exceptions.
In comparison, the distinction between isolation and integration which is suggested 
by multilevel network theory indicates that the danger to national control over foreign 
policy preferences and outcomes appears to be greater for actors who have few linkages 
within the network than for those who have many. If policy problems in contemporary 
Western Europe increasingly require multilateral decisions, it can thus be contended that 
the administrations of Britain and Germany are in fact in a good position to assert their 
interests.
Multilevel Network Theory in Comparison
In addition to addressing the empirical question of governmental control over 
contemporary foreign policy making processes in Western Europe and the transatlantic 
community, multilevel network theory suggests several theoretical developments for the 
empiricist analysis of multilevel decision-making. How far these developments offer a
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different perspective of foreign policy making can only be evaluated in comparison with 
other multilevel theories. Returning to the three multilevel approaches identified in the 
introduction of this thesis, namely transnationalism, the two-level game and network 
models, the following examines where multilevel network theory provides alternative or 
additional insights into the foreign policy process.
One of the key differences between multilevel network theory and the three 
multilevel approaches criticised in the introduction is the range of actors and their relations 
which are the basis of their theoretical propositions. While transnationalism focuses on 
transnational relations, two- or three-level games analyse domestic and international 
demands on international negotiators, and most network models and typologies are 
derived from conceptualisations of the domestic levels of analysis, multilevel network 
theory proposes a possible theoretical integration of the national, transnational and 
international levels. Only by doing so can multilevel network theory attempt to examine 
empirically whether there are significant differences in the frequency and form of 
participation between actors at different levels.
In the four test cases, multilevel network theory is thus able to show that national, 
transnational and international actors not only regularly sought to influence national or 
international decision-makers, but also each other across levels of analysis. Specifically, 
the empirical evidence from the four case studies refutes the premise of the two- or three- 
level game according to which governmental representatives at the international level are 
in the exclusive position to influence the formation of national or transnational coalitions 
in favour of a particular policy outcome. Although ministers and civil servants were, as has 
been pointed out above, able to exert pressure on a range of actors at the national and 
international level by means of their boundary role in the network, they were not the only 
actors which held transnational linkages, nor were they the only actors who influenced the 
formation of coalitions in favour of particular policies. Conversely, the insights gained by 
multilevel network theory illustrate that all actors sought to use their national, 
transnational or international relations within the foreign policy network to exert pressure 
on each other in favour of their most preferred policy. Moreover, the four case studies 
show that coalitions formed as often within as across levels of analysis.
The second difference between multilevel network theory and these three 
multilevel approaches regards its ability to hypothesise about the process of decision-
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making. This process is understood as a sequence of preference changes which leads to 
the formation of a winning coalition in favour of a specific policy outcome. By 
hypothesising about processes, multilevel network theory expands upon existing multilevel 
approaches in two ways. First, it introduces a concept of agency in the form of rational 
choice premises into the static and structural hypotheses which are often prevalent among 
transnationalism, two- and three-level games and network models. Second, it seeks to help 
to explain rather than to describe the foreign policy decision-making process and its 
outcomes.
The concept of agency is of particular importance for the explanation of the 
decision-making process and its outcomes because, as the four case studies indicate, 
neither the policy preferences nor the coalitions among public and private actors can be 
regarded as static. Contrary to the assumptions of the two- or three-level game and many 
network models, actors could and in many instances did change their policy preferences 
and coalition allegiances during the decision-making process. Indeed, the findings 
demonstrate that actors even chose whether to engage at all in the decision-making 
process or whether to remain neutral. Thus, actors joined the public debates regarding a 
policy only if their preferences were directly affected or if they were under pressure from 
other network actors to become part of a coalition for or against a policy.
It follows that the behaviour of actors and the process of decision-making are 
important elements in the explanation of policy outcomes. Rather than reading a decision 
off the distribution of preferences among the members of a network, multilevel network 
theory offers new insights into the decision-making process as an intermediate variable 
between preferences and outcomes. Specifically, it suggests that outcomes are influenced 
by a coalition formation process in which actors try to modify each others’ policy 
preferences. Network structures retain their importance in that they determine which 
actors have the potential to influence each other. However, this thesis illustrates that by 
combining structural analysis with rational choice assumptions, multilevel network theory 
can help to explain which actors will exert pressure on others and when actors will change 
their preferences and coalition in response to this pressure.
The formation and changes in the coalitions among network actors ultimately 
determine whether a winning coalition can emerge in favour of a particular policy. 
According to all four approaches, it is the winning coalition which defines the outcome of
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the decision-making process. However, while the two- or three-level game and some 
network models appear to identify the members of this coalition exclusively on the basis 
of similar policy preferences, multilevel network theory advances an alternative view. It 
contends not only that the members of a coalition have to be linked to each other, but also 
that, in order to influence policy outcomes, the members of the winning coalition have to 
be linked to the ultimate decision unit.
Evidence from the four case studies, supports this proposition. A particular 
example is the case regarding the abolition of the TASM programme by the British 
government. Although an overwhelming majority of actors in the international arena, 
officials from the MoD and members of the opposition parties were in favour of the 
cancellation of the TASM as early as August 1992, the relative insulation of the ultimate 
decision unit, i.e. the British Cabinet, from their pressure delayed the decision on the 
missile. Only in autumn 1993 when the abolition of the missile project had gained a 
majority among the actors who had direct influence over the Cabinet, namely the members 
of the Conservative parliamentary party and key cabinet ministers, did the government 
abandon its plans for the development of a TASM.
The above example illustrates that the decision-making process, defined as the 
sequence of preference changes among the members of a network, is an important factor 
in our understanding of policy outcomes since not all network actors have direct influence 
over the ultimate decision unit. It suggests that actors who lack direct linkages with the 
ultimate decision unit can influence policy outcomes only indirectly by changing the policy 
preferences of the actors who have direct influence over the decision-maker. How many 
and which actors serve as intermediate linkages between an actor and the ultimate decision 
unit determines the sequence of preference changes required for him or her to exert 
pressure indirectly. However, if the advocates of a policy fail to change the preferences 
of the actors who are directly linked to the ultimate decision unit, they should not be able 
to affect the outcome of the decision-making process.
Multilevel network theory, thus, suggests that while the structure of the network 
and the location of the ultimate decision unit delineate the scope of a winning coalition, 
it is the process which defines the preference of the winning coalition. Moreover, since the 
exertion of indirect pressure involves intermediaries, the number of actors advocating the 
eventual policy outcome should go beyond the winning coalition. Indeed, the findings from
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the four case studies suggest that the formation of a winning coalition in favour of a 
particular policy typically came about when a majority of national and international actors 
supported the policy.
The third theoretical development advanced by multilevel network theory is a 
quantitative measurement of political pressure in multilevel networks in terms of the 
number of actors who seek to influence another actor in order to change his or her policy 
preferences. Multilevel network theory, thereby, attempts to go beyond the qualitative 
descriptive analyses which dominate in transnationalism, the two-level game and British 
network analysis3. The explanatory value of this measurement is affirmed by the four case 
studies. In addition, the advantages of this quantitative measurement of pressure can be 
pointed out in comparison with the two-level game and descriptive network models in 
particular. Thus, unlike the notion of ‘win-sets’ advanced by the two-level game, the 
quantitative measurement of pressure proposes a clear and consistent criteria. Specifically, 
it remains ambiguous if the ‘size’ of different win-sets, which is regarded as central to the 
explanation of outcomes in the two-level game, is understood in terms of the number of 
actors who support a particular policy, the number of actors who form a coalition, or the 
influence of these actors. Explanations, therefore, run the risk of being circular with 
greater size or power being attributed to the win-set whose policy is eventually adopted 
by the decision-makers. Multilevel network theory, on the contrary, can measure and 
hypothesise about the influence of different coalitions independently from outcomes. 
Moreover, the quantitative measure proposed by multilevel network theory helps to assess 
changes in the size of win-sets or coalitions and thus their ability to exert influence in the 
foreign policy decision-making process. In the four case studies, multilevel network theory 
was able to link the likelihood of changes in the actors’ policy preferences to the degree 
of pressure to which they were exposed from other actors in the network.
The quantitative measurement of pressure in multilevel network theory also offers 
an alternative to the qualitative assessment of influence which has led to the unfruitful
3 In particular in the German network literature and Sociology, alternative quantitative measures have 
been proposed. See for instance Volker Schneider, T he Structure of Policy Networks - A Comparison of 
the “Chemicals Control” and “Telecommunications” Policy Domains in Germany’, European Journal o f  
Political Research 21:1-2, 1992, pp. 109-130; Toshio Yamagishi, Mary R. Gillmore and Karen S. Cook, 
‘Network Connections and the Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks’, American Journal o f  
Sociology 93:4, 1988, pp.833-851.
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proliferation of competing models and typologies in network analysis.4 These typologies 
attempt to link policy outcomes to the preferences of specific actors or stable coalitions 
which are believed to ‘dominate’ decision-making in distinct types of networks. One 
problem with this approach has been the tendency to identify new types o f networks 
whenever empirical observations point to different dominant actors. Another is that the 
large number of variables or dimensions according to which network types are categorised 
inhibits comparisons between the ability of different actors to influence policy outcomes.5 
It appears that disagreement about the nature of these variables among different network 
models has contributed to the disillusionment with the network approach.6
Multilevel network theory avoids these problems by relating outcomes to processes 
rather than types of networks. Specifically, it suggests that different dominant or ‘winning’ 
coalitions, as they have been termed in this thesis, can emerge within the same network as 
a result of the pressure which actors are able to exert on each other. This perspective not 
only precludes the need for new types of networks if a new winning coalition is identified, 
it also permits the analysis of how coalitions among actors form and transform across time 
and issues. In addition, multilevel network theory offers a way of increasing the parsimony 
of the approach by defining power relations exclusively in terms of their direction and 
reducing the measurement of the influence which is exerted through these relations to a 
single variable, namely the number of actors who seek to change the policy preferences 
of a particular actor in the network at a specific point of the decision-making process. The 
parsimony of multilevel network theory, aside from being an objective of empiricist 
theorizing, suggests how the divisions between competing network models over the 
number and nature of the variables which define different types of networks and dominant 
coalitions may fruitfully be overcome by identifying the common ground between them.
4 See for instance Grant Jordan, iron Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the 
Policy Process’, Journal o f  Public Policy  1:1, 1981, pp.95-123; R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, ‘Policy 
Networks in British Politics. A Critique of Existing Approaches’, in R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, 
eds., Policy Networks in Britsh Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 1-26. Even the more 
quantitatively oriented German network literature usually attempts to develop typologies of networks. See 
for instance Schneider, ‘Structure of Policy Networks’.
5 For a review see Frans van Waarden, Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks’, European Journal 
o f  Political Research  21:1-2, 1992. pp. 29-5 2.
6 See for instance Keith Dowding, Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network
Approach’, Political Studies XLIII: 1, 1995, pp. 136-158.
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Moreover, the reduction of influence to a quantitative measurement offers an objective and 
consistent analysis of pressure which permits the comparison of decision-making processes 
in multilevel networks across countries and cases. Finally, as has been argued in the 
introduction of this thesis, a more parsimonious network approach returns to the origins 
of network analysis which proceeded from the assumption that the distribution of linkages 
among actors makes a difference in policy decision-making.
Further Research in Multilevel Network Theory
From the preceding evaluation several areas for the further development and testing of 
multilevel network theory can be identified. First, new case studies will have to be 
conducted in order to test the refined and additional inductive hypotheses within the 
framework of multilevel network theory. Second, additional tests should include non­
decisions in order to examine whether this theory can also account for the failure to form 
a winning coalition. Finally, since multilevel network theory claims to help to explain 
foreign policies independently from the location of the ultimate decision unit, further case 
studies should be conducted which examine the foreign policies of international 
organisations, such as NATO or the EU.
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Codes:
* veto positions
1 became WEU member in 1995
2 became EU member in 1995
X not analysed by British multilevel foreign policy network analysis
Linkages o f International Organisations and Collective Decision Units:
L [Par] = 16 linkages x 651 MPs = 10416
L [Weu] = (PM, FS, DS, Fco, Mod in 9 member states) + Med + UN-SC = 47 
L [EU-CM] = (PM, FS, TS, Fco, dti in 12 member states) + Med + EU-Co + EP = 63 
L [EU-Co] = (PM, Cab in 12 member states) + Ind + Med + EU-CM + EP = 28 
L [Nato-CM] = (PM, FS, DS in 16 member states) + Med + Nato-Org + UN-SC = 51 
L [Nato-Org] = (Fco, Mod in 14 member states) + Nato-CM = 29 
L [Osce] = (PM, FS, Fco in 21 states) + Med + UN-SC = 65 
L [UN-SC] = (PM, FS in 4 states) + Med + UN-Org = 10 
L [UN-Org] = (Fm in member states) +Med =22
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see Parliament - Interest Groups
Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal Democratic Party - Media
see Parliament - Media
Conservative Party, Labour Party - US Congress 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Johnson, America as a World Power, p.239 [ o ] .
Power Relationship: <>
Voter - Interest Groups 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Marsh, ‘Introduction’, p.3 [<>]; Rush, ‘Pressure Politics’, p.5
[ o ] .
Power Relationship: <>
Voter - Media 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Kavanagh, British Politics, pp.208f. [ o ] ;  Norton, ‘Parliament 
in the United Kingdom’, p. 25 [<>].
Power Relationship: o
Voter - WEU, EU-CM, EU-Co, NATO-CM, OSCE, UN-SC 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: see webpages of international organisations [<].
Power Relationship: <
Voter - European Parliament
see European Parliament - voter in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu
Interest Groups - Media 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Jones and Kavanagh, ‘Pressure Groups’, p.224 [ o ] ;  Rush, 
‘Pressure Politics’, p.6 [>], p. 13 [<].
Power Relationship: o
Industry - EC-Commission 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Franco Algieri and Dietrich Rometsch, ‘EuropaischeKommission 
und organisierte Interessen’, in Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow, eds.,Europaische 
Integration und verbandliche Inleressenvermittlung (Marburg: Metropolis, 1994), 
pp.131-149, p .134 [>]; Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, ‘Policy-making and 
Institutions in the EC’, in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., Making Policy 
in Europe. The Eurofeication o f National Policy-Making (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 19- 
33, p.27 [>]; Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, ‘Complex Policy-Making: Lobbying 
the EC’, in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., Making Policy in Europe. Th
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e Eurofeication o f National Policy-Making (London: Sage, 1993), pp.35-53, p.39 [>]; 
John McCormick, The European Union. Politics and Policies (Boulder, Col.: Westview 
Press, 1996), p. 117 [>]; Wolfgang Schumann, ‘Das politische System der Europaischen 
Union als Rahmen fur Verbandsaktivitaten’, in Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow, 
eds., Europaische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung (Marburg: 
Metropolis, 1994), pp.71-108, p.83 [>]
Power Relationship: >
Industry - other countries 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, ‘Introduction: Society and 
Foreign Policy - Implications for Theory and Practice’, in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, 
eds., Britain and West Germany. Changing Societies and the F'uture o f Foreign Policy 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 1-15, p.3 [ o ] .
Power Relationship: <>
Media - WEU, EU-CM, EU-Co, EP, Nato-CM, OSCE, UN-SC, US Pre, US Nsa, US 
SS, US DS, US TR, US Wh, US Sd, US Pen, US Cd, US con, US vote, Ge, Fr, It, Ru, 
CA, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Sw, Au, Po, De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Kavanagh, British Politics, pp.207-223 [ o ] ;  McCormick, 
European Union, p. 143 [>], p. 151 [>]; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, 
American Foreign Policy. Pattern and Process, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1996), p.347 [ o ] ;  Evan Luard, The United Nations. How it Works and What it Does 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp,16f. [<>].
Power Relationship: o
WEU - Heads of State, FS, DS, Fco and MoD of UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, Gr 
(from 1995), Lu
Institutional Authority: Arie Bloed and Ramses A. Wessel, eds., The Changing 
Functions o f the Western European Union (WEU). Introduction and Basic Documents 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp.xix - xxiv [o * ] ;  Brussels Treaty - 
Treaty o f Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, 
Brussels, 17 March 1948, at http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html. ArticleVIII, 4 [<*], 
Article X [>]; http://www.weu.int/eng/info/members. htm [<*].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: o
WEU - OSCE
Institutional Authority: WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 
June 1992, at http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
WEU - UN Security Council
Institutional Authority: WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 
June 1992, at http://wAvw.weu.int/eng/index.html [<].
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Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
EU-Council of Ministers - EU Commission
Institutional Authority: Neil Nugent, The Government and Politics o f the European 
Union, 3rd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), pp.l76f. [ o ] ;  McCormick, 
European Union, pp. 116f. [<>]; Andersen and Eliassen, ‘Policy-making and Institutions 
in the EC’, p.20 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Peter Ludlow, ‘The European Commission’, in Robert O. 
Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community. Decision Making 
and Institutional Change (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), pp.85-97, p.90 [<]; 
Power Relationship: <>
EU- Council of Ministers - European Parliament
Institutional Authority: Andersen and Eliassen, ‘Policy-making and Institutions in the 
EC’, p.25 [ o ] ;  Nugent, Government and Politics o f the European Union, pp. 175 [<>]; 
McCormick, European Union, p. 143 [<>], pp. 157-159 [ o ]
Resource-Dependence: Nugent, Government and Politics ofthe European Union, p. 185 
[<]•
Power Relationship: <>
EU-Council of Ministers - Heads of State, FS, TS, Fco and Dti of UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, 
Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu
Institutional Authority: Andersen and Eliassen, ‘Policy-making and Institutions in the 
EC’, p.24 [>]; Adrian Budd, The EC and Foreign and Security Policy (London: 
University of North London Press, 1993), pp.2If. [<>*]; Treaty on European Union, 
M a a s t r i c h t ,  7 F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 2 ,  a t  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu cons treaty en.pdf. TitleV ‘Provisions on 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy’ [<>*]; McCormick, European Union, p. 124 [<], 
pp. 126-129 [<], p. 126 [*], p. 132 [>]; Milan Rai, Britain, Maastricht and the Bomb. The 
Foreign and Security Policy Implications o f the Treaty o f the European Union (London: 
Drava Papers, 1993), pp.6-9 [<>*].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: o *
EU-Commission - European Parliament
Institutional Authority: Nugent, Government and Politics o f the European Union, 
pp. 174-177 [<>]; McCormick, European Union, pp. 116f [ o ] ,  p. 143 [<>], p. 157 [<] 
Resource-Dependence: Nugent, Government and Politics o f the European Union, p. 182
m
Power Relationship: o
EU-Commission - Heads of State and Cabinets in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, 
Gr, Ir, Lu
Institutional Authority: Ludlow, ‘The European Commission’, p.89 [<], p.90 [<]; 
McCormick, European Union, p. 107 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
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Power Relationship: <
European Parliament - voter in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu 
Institutional Authority: McCormick, European Union, pp.l44f. [<], p.pl48-150 [<]; 
Nugent, Government and Politics o f the European Union, pp,186f. [<]; Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, at http://europa.eu.int/. 
Article 138 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
Nato-Council of Ministers - Heads of State, FS, DS of UK, US, Ge, Fr, It, Ca, Sp, 
Tu, Ne, Be, Po, De, No, Gr, Lu, Ic
Institutional Authority: NATO, The NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 1998-99), 
pp.35-56 [ o * ] .
Resource-Dependence: NATO, NATO Handbook, pp.37f. [>].
Power Relationship: o *
NATO-Council of Ministers - NATO-Organisation 
Institutional Authority: NATO, NA TO Handbook, p.37 [>].
Resource-Dependence: NATO, NATO Handbook, pp.37f[<].
Power Relationship: o
NATO-Council of Ministers - OSCE
Institutional Authority: North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, Oslo, 4 June 1992, 
at http://www.nato.int/docu/cornm/49-95/c920604a.htm [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
NATO-Council of Ministers - UN Security Council
Institutional Authority: NATO, NATO Handbook, p.314 [<]; North Atlantic Council, 
F i n a l  C o m m u n i q u e ,  O s l o ,  4 J u n e  1 9 9 2 ,  a t  
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm [<]; Alexia Holstein, Das Verhaltnis 
des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinlen Nationen zu NA TO und OSZE (Stuttgart: Boorberg,
1996), pp. 111-121 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
Nato-Organisation - Fco and Mod of UK, US, Ger, It, Ca, Tu, Ne, Be, Po, De, No, 
Gr, Lu, Ic
Institutional Authority: NATO, NATO Handbook, pp.37f. [o ] .  
Resource-Dependence: NATO, NATO Handbook, pp.37f. [<>]; Nailor, ‘Defence and 
Foreign Policy’, p.229 [<].
Power Relationship: <>
OSCE - Heads of State, FS and Fco of Britain, Fr, Ger, It, Ru, Ca, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, 
Sw, Au, Po, De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic
Institutional Authority: http://www.osce.Org/p:eneral/participating states/partstat.htm
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[<]; Helsinki Final Act, August 1975 [<*]; Prague Council, January 1992 [* - 1]; Fact 
Sheet ‘What is the OSCE’ at http://www.osceprag.cz; Jens Bortloff, Die Organisationfur 
Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Eine volkerrechtliche Bestandsaufnahme 
(Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1996), p.405 [<];
Resource-Dependence: Charter o f Paris, November 1990, [ o ] ;  Miriam Shapiro, 
‘Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation’, 
American Journal o f International Law 89:3, 1995, pp.631-636.
Power Relationship: <>*
OSCE - UN Security Council
Institutional Authority: Budapest Summit, December 1994 [<]; Bortloff, Organisation 
fur Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, pp.414-425 [<]; Holstein, Das Verhaltnis 
des Sicherheitsrates, pp. 111-121 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
UN Security Council - Heads of State, Foreign Ministers of UK, US, Fr, Ru 
Institutional Authority: Barry O’Neill, ‘Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations 
Security Council’, Journal o f Conflict Resolution 40:2, 1996, pp.219-237 [ o * ] ;  United 
Nations, Basic Facts About the United Nations (New York: United Nations, 1995), p:9
!<*], p-io [>].
Resource-Dependence: Adam Roberts, ‘The United Nations and International Security’, 
Survival 35:2, 1993, pp.3-30, p.5 [<>].
Power Relationship: <>*
UN Security Council - UN Organisation
Institutional Authority: United Nations, Basic Facts, p. 17 [>]; Peter R. Baehr and Leon 
Gordenker, The United Nations in the 1990s (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p.28 [>]. 
Resource-Dependence: United Nations, Basic Facts, p. 17 [<]; Baehr and Gordenker, 
United Nations, p.28 [<]
Power Relationship: <>
UN Organisation - Foreign Offices in all member countries 
Institutional Authority: United Nations, Basic Facts, p. 17 [|],
Resource-Dependence: Baehr and Gordenker, United Nations, p.29 [<>].
Power Relationship: <|>
US President - Departmental Secretaries
Institutional Authority: John Dumbrell, The Making o f US Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp.92f. [>];Kegley and Wittkopf, 
American Foreign Policy, p.339 [>], p.343 [>]; Loch K. Johnson, America as a World 
Power. Foreign Policy in a Constitutional Framework (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), 
p.187 [>].
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, pp.88f. [<];Kegley and 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.343 [<], p.348 [<], p.363 [<], p.387 [<], p.388 [<], 
p.412 [<], p.413 [<]; Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 185 [<].
Power Relationship: o
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US President - US White House
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p.92 [>]; Kegley and 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.345 [>], p.363 [>].
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p.91 [<]; Kegley and 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.346 [<], pp.386f. [<].
Power Relationship: <>
US President - US Pentagon
Institutional Authority: Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.392 [>]. 
Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.393 [<]. 
Power Relationship: o
US President - US Congress
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, pp.l 16f. [<], p. 121 
[ o ] ,  p. 132 [ o ] ,  p. 134 [<>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.341 [<]; 
Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 186 [>], p. 188 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 116 [>]; Johnson, 
America as a World Power, p.200 [>].
Power Relationship: o
US President - US voter
Institutional Authority: Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 188 [<], p.219 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
US President - other heads of state
see Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries
US departmental secretaries - other US departmental secretaries 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.344 [ o ] ;  
Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 195 [<>].
Power Relationship: o
US departmental secretaries - their departments
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell ,Makmg o f US Foreign Policy, pp.93f. [>], p.97 [>]; 
Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.378 [>]; Johnson, America as a World 
Power, pp.l90f. [>].
Resource-Dependence: Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 192 [<].
Power Relationship: <>
NSA - White House
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p.89 [>]; Johnson, 
America as a World Power, p. 190 [>].
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p.89 [<], p.91 [<]; 
Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 190 [<].
Power Relationship: <>
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US departmental secretaries - US Congress
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 138 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 121 [>]; Johnson, 
America as a World Power, p.200 [>].
Power Relationship: o
US Pentagon, US Commerce Department - Industry 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.416 [>]; 
Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 188 [>].
Power Relationship: >
US departments - other US departments 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 95 [ o ] ;  Kegley and 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p. 3 81 [<>].
Power Relationship: o
White House - Congress 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 188 [<], p.200 [>]. 
Power Relationship: o
US departments - US Congress 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 121 [>]; Kegley and 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.388 [>]; Johnson, America as a World Power,
p.200 [>].
Power Relationship: >
US Congress - US voter
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 116 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: Johnson, America as a World Power, p.225 [<].
Power Relationship: <
Congress -Industry 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 138 [>]; Kegley and 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.388 [>]; Johnson, America as a World Power,
p. 188 [>].
Power Relationship: >
Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Clarke, ‘Policy-Making Process’, p.88 [<>], pp.90f. [<>]; 
Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 184 [<], p. 195 [<>]; William Wallace, Britain's 
Bilateral Linkswithin Western Europe (London: Routledge&KeganPaul, 1984), p.2 [<>]. 
Power Relationship: o
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Appendix 2: German Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95
Com CoaA/B Cha Cab FM DM FiM EM CM Fm Dm Fim Em COf Uns vote Med Weu Nato
CM
Nato Oscecdu
csu
pds
CM
Cha <>*
Cab <> <> <> <> <>
FM <> <> o'
DM
FiM <> <l> <>
EM <> <l> o'
CM
<>•
Dm <>
Fim
Em <>
COf o
<>
Com o <> <> <>
Coa <> <>
cdu/csu <> <>
<> <> <>
Uns
vote
Med <> <>
Weu
EU-CM
EU-Co <>
Nato-CM
Nato-Org
Osce o
UN-SC
UN-Org
US-Pre
US-Nsa <>
us-ss
US-SD
US-TR
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-pen
US-Cd
US-con
US-vote
<> <>
<> o'
<> o'
<> o' <> <> o'
<>
<>
o'
<> <> o' <> o'
<>  <> o' <>
<>
<>•
<> <>♦
< >
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us
conPre Nsa, Wh pen
Cha <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <>
Cab
FM <> <><> <> <> <> <>
DM <> <> <> <>
FiM
EM <> <> <> <> <> <> <>
CM
<> <>
Dm <>
Fim
Em <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <>
COf
Com
Coa
cdu
spd
90G
pds
BVG
<> <>
Uns
vote
Med <> <> <>
Weu <>•o '
EU-CM
EU-Co
Nato-CM <>* < > •<>•
Nato-Org
Osce <>•o '
UN-SC < >*
UN-Org
US-Pre <>* <> <> <>
US-Nsa <>
US-SS <> <> <> <>
US-DS o <>
US-TR <>
US-Wh
US-Sd <>' <> <> <>
US-Pen
US-Cd
US-con
US-vote
<> <> <> <> <>
<> <>
<>
<>
<> <> <> <> <> <>
<> <> <> <> <>
<> <> <> <> <> <> <>
<> <> <> <> <> <> <>
<>
<>
<>
<> <>
<> <> <> <> <>
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Codes:
* veto positions
1 became WEU member in 1995
2 became EU member in 1995
X not analysed by German multilevel foreign policy network analysis
Detailed Linkages o f International Organisations and Collective Decision Units:
** Dec. 1990-Nov. 1994: L [Par] = 24 linkages x 662 MPs = 15888 
Nov. 1994-: L [Par] = 24 linkages x 672 MPs = 16128 
1990-1994: 319 cdu/csu, 299 spd, 79 fdp, 8 grii, 17 pds 
1994-: 295 cdu/csu, 251 spd, 47 fdp, 48 grii, 30 pds, 1 other 
L [Weu] = (Cha, FM, DM, Fm, Dm in 9 member states) + Med + UN-SC = 47 
L [EU-CM] = (Cha, FM, EM, Fm, Em in 12 member states) + Med + EU-Co + EP = 63 
L [EU-Co] = (Cha, Cab in 12 member states) + Ind + Med + EU-CM + EP = 28 
L [EP] = electorate in 15 member states
L [Nato-CM] = (Cha, FM, DM in 16 member states) + Med + Nato-Org + UN-SC = 51 
L [Nato-Org] = (Fm, Dm in 14 member states) + Nato-CM = 29 
L [Osce] = (Cha, FM, Fm in 21 states) + Med + UN-SC = 65 
L [UN-SC] = (Cha, FM in 4 states) + Med + UN-Org = 10 
L [UN-Org] = (Fm in member states) + Med = 22
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Resource-Dependence: Roland Sturm, ‘Entscheidungsstrukturen und
Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik - Zum Selbstverstandnis der 
Haushaltsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 26:3, 
1985, pp.245-269, p.251 [>], pp.257f. [>]; Michael Melzer, ‘VorbereitungundGestaltung 
der Ausschussarbeit durch die Fraktionen’, in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, 
eds., Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: 
DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1131-1143, p.l 133 [>].
Power Relationship: o
Chancellor - Coalition Meeting
Institutional Authority: Waldemar Schreckenberger, ‘lnformelle Verfahren der 
Entscheidungsvorbereitung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Mehrheitsfraktionen: 
Koalitionsgesprache und Koalitionsrunden’, Zeitschriftfur Parlamentsfragen 25:3 ,1994, 
pp.329-346, p.335 [<], p.340 [>]; Peter Haungs, ‘Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik 
im Vergleich: Adenauers Nachfolger’, A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte 89:Bl-2, 1989, 
pp.28-39, p.35 [<]; Ludger Helms, ‘Parteienregierung im Parteienstaat. Strukturelle 
Voraussetzungen und Charakteristika der Parteienregierung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland und in Osterreich (1949 bis 1992)’, Zeitschrift f i r  Parlamentsfragen 24:4, 
1993, pp.635-654, p.648 [<]; Konig, ‘Umgang mit Komplexitat’, p.60 [<], p.62 [<]; 
Murswieck, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie’, p. 160 [<]; Wewer, ‘Richtlinienkompetenz’, p. 147 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: o
Chancellor - CDU, CSU
Institutional Authority: Berry, ‘Organisation and Influence of the Chancellory’, p.346 
[<]; Haungs, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik’, p.53 [<]; Haungs, 
‘Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik’, p.37 [<]; Wolfgang Jager, ‘Von der 
Kanzlerdemokratie zur Koordinationsdemokratie’, Zeitschrift f i r  Politik 35:1, 1988, 
pp. 15-32, p.29 [<]; Wolfgang Jager, ‘Eine Lanze fur den Kanzlerwahlverein! ’, in Manfred 
Mols, Hans-Otto Miihleisen, Theo Stammen, and Bernhard Vogel, eds., Normative und 
institutionelle Ordmmgsprobleme des modernen Staates (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1990), 
pp.96-110., p. 103 [>]; Konig, ‘Umgang mit Komplexitat’, p.60 [<]; Mayntz, ‘Executive
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Leadership’, p. 144f. [<], p. 147 [<]; Muller-Rommel, ‘Centre of Government’, p. 182 [<]; 
Murswieck, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie’, p. 163 [<]; Wewer, ‘Richtlinienkompetenz’, p. 148 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: Berry, ‘Organisation and Influence of the Chancellory’, p.346 
[<]; Muller-Rommel and Pieper, ‘Bundeskanzleramt als Regierungszentrale’, p. 12 [<]; 
Murswieck, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie’, p. 158 [<]; Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der 
AusschuBarbeit’, p.l 132 [>]; Wilker, ‘Foreign Policy in the Bundestag’, p.404 [>]. 
Power Relationship: o
Chancellor - FDP, SPD, Grime, PDS 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Wilker, ‘Foreign Policy in the Bundestag’, p.404 [>].
Power Relationship: >
Chancellor - Bundesrat
Institutional Authority: GOBReg., Art. 31 [<]; Haungs, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie in der 
Bundesrepublik’, p.47 [<]; Wewer, ‘Richtlinienkompetenz’, p. 148 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: Wewer, ‘Richtlinienkompetenz’, p. 148 [>].
Power Relationship: o
Chancellor - Voters
Institutional Authority: GG, Art.70-82 [>]; Mayntz, ‘Executive Leadership’, p. 147 [<]; 
Muller-Rommel, ‘Centre of Government’, p. 182 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: o
Chancellor - Media 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Franz Ronneberger, ‘Die Rolle von Public Relations im 
politischenEntscheidungsprozess’, in Frank E. Bockelmann, ed.,Medienmacht und Politik 
(Berlin: Wissenschaftsverlag Volker SpieB, 1989), pp. 149-160, pp. 15If. [ o ] ;  Hermann 
Meyn, Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Alte und neue Bundeslander 
(Berlin: Colloquim Verlag, 1992), p. 174 [>].
Power Relationship: <>
Chancellor - WEU, EU-CM, NATO-CM, OSCE
see WEU, EU-CM, NATO-CM, OSCE
Chancellor - Heads of State of US, Fr, UK, It, Ru, Ca, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Sw, Au, Po, 
De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic
see Heads of state, ministers, officials - their counterparts in other countries 
Cabinet - Ministers
Institutional Authority: GG, Art. 65; GOBReg., §15 [>], §16 [>], §20 [>]; Ellwein and 
Hesse, Regierungssystem, p.302 [<]; Mayntz, ‘Executive Leadership’, p. 154 [>], p. 157 
[<]; Muller-Rommel and Pieper, ‘Bundeskanzleramt als Regierungszentrale’, p.5 [>]; 
Muller-Rommel, ‘Centre of Government’, p. 172 [<]; Thiebault, ‘Organisational 
Structure’, pp.82f [<].
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Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: o
Cabinet - Ministries
Institutional Authority: Thiebault, ‘Organisational Structure’, pp.88f[|], 
Resource-Dependence: Muller-Rommel, ‘Centre of Government’, p. 172 [<].
Power Relationship: <|
Cabinet - Bundestag
Institutional Authority: GG, Art.24 [<], Art.59 [<]; Jung, ‘EinfluBfaktoren und 
Entscheidungsprozesse in der AuBen- und Europapolitik’, p. 185 [<]; Haftendom, ‘Das 
auBen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, 
p. 12 [<], p. 13 [<]; Steffani, ‘Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees’, p.274 [<]; 
Wessels, ‘Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft’, p.285 [<]; 
Wilker, ‘Foreign Policy in the Bundestag’, p.396 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Steffani, ‘Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees’, p.276 
[>]•
Power Relationship: o
Cabinet - Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees 
Institutional Authority: GOBl\ §68 [<]; Sturm, ‘Entscheidungsstrukturen und 
Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik’, p.254 [<]; Wessels,
‘Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft’, p.309 [<]; Wilker, 
‘Foreign Policy in the Bundestag’, p.396 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Sturm, ‘Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in 
der Haushaltspolitik’, p.251 [>], pp.257f. [>]; Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der 
Ausschussarbeit’, p.1133 [>].
Power Relationship: o
Cabinet - Coalition Meeting
Institutional Authority: Helms, ‘Parteienregierung’, p.648 [<]; Helms, ‘Das Amt des 
deutschen Bundeskanzlers’, p.704 [<]; Haungs 1991: 120 [<]; Ismayr, ‘Parteien’, p.400 
[<]; Jaeger 1990:1070 [<]: Murswieck, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie’, p. 164 [<]: Schreckenberger, 
‘Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungs vorbereitung’, p.335 [<]; Wewer,
‘Richtlinienkompetenz’, p. 147 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
Cabinet - CDU, CSU, FDP
Institutional Authority: Haungs, ‘Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik’, p.37; Ismayr, 
‘Parteien’, p.399 [<], pp.400f. [<]; Murswieck, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie’, p. 164 [<].; Wilker, 
‘Foreign Policy in the Bundestag’, p.399 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, 
p.l 132 [>]; Wilker, ‘Foreign Policy in the Bundestag’, p.404 [>].
Power Relationship: <>
Cabinet - SPD, Griine, PDS
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Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Wilker, ‘Foreign Policy in the Bundestag’, p.404 [>].
Power Relationship: >
Cabinet - Bundesrat
Institutional Authority: GG, Art. 59 [<], Art.73 [<]; Haftendom, ‘Da5%UB'en- und 
sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, p. 12 [<]; 
Haungs, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, p.47 [<]; Mayntz, 
‘Executive Leadership’, p. 141 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Haftendorn, ‘Das auBen- und sicherheitspolitische
Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, p. 12 [>].
Power Relationship: <>
Cabinet - Federal Constitutional Court
Institutional Authority: BVer/GG, § 31 [<]; Haungs, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie in der 
Bundesrepublik’, p.47 [<]; Haungs, ‘Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik’, p.37 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
Cabinet - Voters
Institutional Authority: GG, Art.70-82 [>]; Wessels, ‘Kommunikationspotentiale 
zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft’, p.288 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: o
Cabinet - Media 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Meyn, Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 174 
[>]; Ronneberger, ‘Rolle von Public Relations’, pp. 15If. [ o ] ;
Power Relationship: o
Cabinet - European Commission
see EU-Commission
Ministers - Ministers
Institutional Authority: Haftendorn, ‘Das auBen- und sicherheitspolitische
Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, p.4 [|]; Mayntz, ‘Executive 
Leadership’, p. 143 [|], p. 156 [|]; Muller-Rommel, ‘Centre of Government’, p. 180 [<|>]; 
Thiebault, ‘Organisational Structure’, p.88 [|],
Resource-Dependence: Mayntz, ‘Executive Leadership’, p.l52f. [<>].
Power Relationship: <|>
Ministers - their own Ministry
Institutional Authority: Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, p.302 [>], p.312 [>]; 
Helms, ‘Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers’, p.703 [>]; Jung, ‘EinfluBfaktoren und 
Entscheidungsprozesse in der AuBen- und Europapolitik’, p. 188 [>]; Mayntz, ‘Executive 
Leadership’, p. 142 [>].
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Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, p.314f. [<]; Mayntz, 
‘Executive Leadership’, p. 152f. [<].
Power Relationship: <>
Ministers - Bundestag
Institutional Authority: Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, p.312 [>], p.313 [<]; 
(Finance Minister - budget) Mayntz, ‘Executive Leadership’, p. 157 [<]; Steffani, ‘Parties 
(Parliamentary Groups) and Committees’, p.274 [<]; Camilla Werner, ‘Das Dilemma 
parlamentarischer Opposition’, in Dietrich Herzog, Hilke Rebenstorf and Bernhard 
Wessels, eds., Parlament und Gesellschaft (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), 
pp. 184-217, p. 194 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Steffani, ‘Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees’, p.276 
[>]; Werner, ‘Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition’, p. 194 [>].
Power Relationship: o
Ministers - Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees 
Institutional Authority: GOBT, §68 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Haftendorn, ‘Das auBen- und sicherheitspolitische
Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, p. 13 [>]; Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung 
und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, p. 1133 [>]; Suzanne S. Schuttemeyer, ‘Offentliche 
Anhorungen’, in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., Parlamentsrecht und 
Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp. 1145- 
1157, p. 1153 [>]; Sturm, ‘Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der 
Haushaltspolitik’, p.251 [>].
Power Relationship: o
Ministers -Coalition Meeting
Institutional Authority: Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, p.310 [<]; Haungs, 
‘Kanzlerprinzip undRegierungstechnik’, p.35 [<]; Helms, ‘Parteienregierung’, p.648 [<]; 
Ismayr, ‘Parteien’, pp.400f. [<]; Konig, ‘Umgang mit Komplexitat’, p.62 [<];Murswieck, 
‘Kanzlerdemokratie’, p. 160 [<]; Wewer, ‘Richtlinienkompetenz’, p. 147 [<] 
R esource-D ependence: Schreckenberger, ‘Inform elle V erfahren der
Entscheidungsvorbereitung’, p.340 [>], p.336 [<], Rudzio, ‘Informelle
Entscheidungsmuster’, p. 135 [>].
Power Relationship: <>
Ministers -CDU, CSU, FDP 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, 
p. 1132 [>]; Schreckenberger, ‘Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung’, 
p.336 [>]; Sturm, ‘Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der 
Haushaltspolitik’, p.251 [>]; Wilker, ‘Foreign Policy in the Bundestag’, p.404 [>]. 
Power Relationship: >
Ministers - their Party
(Foreign Minister/Economics Minister- FDP, Defence Minister/Chancellor’s Office 
Minister - CDU, Finance Minister - CSU)
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Institutional Authority: Berry, ‘Organisation and Influence of the Chancellory’, p.339 
[<]; Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, p.312 [<]; Haftendorn, ‘Das auBen- und 
sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, p.3 [<]; 
Haungs, ‘Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik’, p.37 [<]; Helms, ‘Das Amt des 
deutschen Bundeskanzlers’, p.702 [<]; Ismayr, ‘Parteien’, pp.400f. [<]; Jung, 
‘EinfluBfaktoren und Entscheidungsprozesse in der AuBen- und Europapolitik’, p. 187 [<]; 
Mayntz, ‘Executive Leadership’, p. 152 [<]; Murswieck, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie’, p. 163 [<]; 
Schreckenberger, ‘Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung’, p.331 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: Mayntz, ‘Executive Leadership’, p. 153 [<].
Power Relationship: <
Ministers - SPD, Griine, PDS 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, 
p .1141 [>], 1136 [>]; Werner, ‘Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition’, p.184 [>]; 
Wilker, ‘Foreign Policy in the Bundestag’, p.404 [>].
Power Relationship: >
Ministers - Bundesrat 
see Cabinet - Bundesrat
Ministers - Voters
Institutional Authority: GG, Art. 70-82 [>]; Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, p.312 
[<]•
Resource-Dependence: Mayntz, ‘Executive Leadership’, p. 153 [<].
Power Relationship: o
Ministers - Media 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Meyn, Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 174 
[>]; Ronneberger, ‘Rolle von Public Relations’, pp. 15If. [ o ] .
Power Relationship: o
Ministers - WEU, EU-CM, NATO-CM, OSCE
see WEU, EU-CM, NATO-CM, OSCE
Ministers - their counterparts in other countries
see Heads of state, ministers, ministries - their counterparts in other countries 
Ministries - Ministries
Institutional Authority: Haftendorn, ‘Das auBen- und sicherheitspolitische
Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, p.4 [|]; Jung, ‘EinfluBfaktoren und 
Entscheidungsprozesse in der AuBen- und Europapolitik’, p. 184 [<|>]; Muller-Rommel, 
‘Centre of Government’, p. 180 [<>].
Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, p.318 [ o ] .
Power Relationship: <|>
Ministries - Bundestag
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Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Miiller-Rommel, ‘Centre of Government’, p. 172 [>]; Werner, 
‘Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition’, p. 194 [>].
Power Relationship: >
Ministries - Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Haftendorn, ‘Das auBen- und sicherheitspolitische
Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, p. 13 [>]; Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung 
und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, p. 1133 [>], p. 1136 [>]; Schiittemeyer, ‘Offentliche 
Anhorungen’, p. 1153 [>]; Sturm, ‘Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse 
in der Haushaltspolitik’, p.251 [>], p.260 [>].
Power Relationship: >
Ministries - Coalition Meeting 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Rudzio, ‘Informelle Entscheidungsmuster’, p. 135 [>]; 
Schreckenberger, ‘Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung’, p.331 [>], p.335 
[>], p.340 [>].
Power Relationship: >
Ministries - CDU, CSU, FDP
Institutional Authority: Ismayr, ‘Parteien’, pp.401f. [<]; Renate Mayntz and Hans- 
Ulrich Derlien, ‘Party Patronage and Politicization of the West German Administrative 
Elite 1970-1987 - Toward Hybridization?’, Governance 2:4, 1989, pp.384-404, pp.387- 
404 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, 
pp. 1133-1141 [>]; Werner, ‘Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition’, p. 184 [>].
Power Relationship: o
Ministries - SPD, Griine, PDS 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, 
p. 1136 [>]; Sturm, ‘Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der 
Haushaltspolitik’, p.266 [>]; Werner, ‘Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition’, p. 199 [>]. 
Power Relationship: >
Defence and Economics Ministries - Industry and Unions
Institutional Authority: Rudolf Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, in 
Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., Parlamenisrecht undParlamentspraxis 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.217-258., p.234 [>]. 
Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, p. 172 [<]; Murswieck, 
‘Kanzlerdemokratie’, pp,162f. [<]; Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, 
p.234 [<], p.239 [<]; Wessels, ‘Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und 
Gesellschaft’, p.290 Footnote 17 [<].
Power Relationship: o
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Ministries - Media 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Meyn, Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 174 
[>]•
Power Relationship: o
Chancellor’s Office - Media 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Meyn, Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 174 
[>]; Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, p.244 [<].
Power Relationship: <>
Ministries - WEU, EU-CM, NATO-Org, OSCE, UN-Org
see WEU, EU-CM, NATO-Org, OSCE, UN-Org
Ministries - their counterparts in other countries
see Heads of state, ministers, ministries - their counterparts in other countries
Bundestag - Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees 
Institutional Authority: GOBT, § 64 Abs. 1 [>], §60 Abs. 1 [<]; R. Peter Dach, ‘Das 
Ausschussverfahren nach der Geschaftsordnung und in der Praxis’, in Hans-Peter 
Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis (Berlin: 
DeGruyer, 1989), pp. 1103-1130, pp. 1114f. [>]; Steffani, ‘Parties (Parliamentary Groups) 
and Committees’, p.278 [>].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: o
Bundestag - CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Griine, PDS
In s titu tio n a l A u th o rity : Jager, ‘Von der K anzlerdem okratie zur
Koordinationsdemokratie’, p. 14 [<]; Helms, ‘Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers’, 
p.708 [<]; Manfred Himer, ‘Der Deutsche Bundestag im Netzwerk organisierter 
Interessen’, in Dietrich Herzog, Hilke Rebenstorf and Bernhard Wessels, eds., Parlament 
und Gesellschaft (Opladen: WestdeutscherVerlag, 1993), pp.138-183, p.161 [<];Ismayr, 
‘Parteien’, p.386 [<]; Jurgen Jekewitz, ‘Politische Bedeutung, Rechtstellung und 
Verfahren der Bundestagsfraktionen’, in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., 
Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: 
DeGruyer, 1989), pp. 1021-1053, p. 1037 [<]; Steffani, ‘Parties (Parliamentary Groups) 
and Committees’, p.288 [<], p.291 [<]; Jager, ‘Eine Lanze fur den Kanzlerwahlverein!’, 
p. 103 [<]; Jekewitz, ‘Politische Bedeutung, Rechtstellung und Verfahren der 
Bundestagsfraktionen’, p. 1037 [<]; Ismayr, ‘Parteien’, p.385 [<]. 
R eso u rce-D ep en d en ce : Jager, ‘Von der K anzlerdem okra tie  zur
Koordinationsdemokratie’, p. 14 [<>]; Ismayr, ‘Parteien’, p.385 [<>]; Wilker, ‘Foreign 
Policy in the Bundestag’, p.408 [<].
Power Relationship: <>
Bundestag - Bundesrat
Institutional Authority: GG, Art.53a, [<>], Art 59 [<], Art. 73 [<]; Ismayr, ‘Parteien’,
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p.406 [<]; Haftendorn, ‘Das auBen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, p. 12 [<]; Helms, ‘Parteienregierung’, p.638 [<]; Mayntz, 
‘Executive Leadership’, p. 141 [<]; Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der 
Ausschussarbeit’, p. 1135 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <>
Bundestag - Federal Constitutional Court
Institutional Authority: BVerfGG, §6 [>], §31 Abs.l[<]; Haungs, ‘Kanzlerprinzip und 
Regierungstechnik’, p.37 [<]; Helms, ‘Parteienregierung’, p.637 [<]; Jung,
‘EinfluBfaktoren und Entscheidungsprozesse in der AuBen- und Europapolitik’, p. 186 [<]; 
Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, pp.237f. [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <>
Bundestag - Industry, Unions
Institutional Authority: Wessels, ‘Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und 
Gesellschaft’, p.290 [>]; Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, pp.222-225 
[>]•
Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, pp.l71f. [<], Helms, 
‘Parteienregierung’, p.647 [<]; Hirner, ‘Bundestag imNetzwerkorganisierterInteressen’, 
pp. 140-2 [<]; Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, p.239 [<]; Wessels, 
‘Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft’, pp.287f. [<], p.298 
[<]•
Power Relationship: o
Bundestag - Voter
Institutional Authority: Bundeswahlgesetz (BwahlG) §12 [<]; Ellwein and Hesse, 
Regierungssystem, p. 171 [<]; Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, p.238 
[O]
Resource-Dependence: Wessels, ‘Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und 
Gesellschaft’, p.286 [<>].
Power Relationship: o
Bundestag - Media 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Ronneberger, ‘ Rolle von Public Relations’, p. 151 [ o ] ;  Werner, 
‘Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition’, p. 191 [<], Wessels, ‘Kommunikationspotentiale 
zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft’, p.286 [<].
Power Relationship: o
Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees - CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Griine, 
PDS
Institutional Authority: GOBI\ §12, 57 [<]; Dach, ‘Ausschussverfahren nach der 
Geschaftsordnung’, p. 1109 [<], p. 1122 [<]; Helms, ‘Das Amt des deutschen 
Bundeskanzlers’, p.708 [<]; Ismayr, ‘Parteien’, p.396 [<]; Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und
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Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, p. 1137 [<]; Steffani, ‘Parties (Parliamentary Groups) 
and Committees’, p.284 [<], 278 [<]; Sturm, ‘Entscheidungsstrukturen und 
Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik’, p.259 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, 
p. 1141 [<]; Schuttemeyer, ‘Offentliche Anhorungen’, p. 1153 [<]; Steffani, ‘Parties 
(Parliamentary Groups) and Committees’, p.288 [<]; Sturm, ‘Entscheidungsstrukturenund 
Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik’, p.251 [ o ] .
Power Relationship: <>
Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees - Industry, Unions 
Institutional Authority: Hirner, ‘ Bundestag imNetzwerkorganisierter Interessen’, p. 142 
[ o ] ;  Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, p.224 [>]. 
Resource-Dependence: GOBT, §70 Abs.l [>]; Dach, ‘Ausschussverfahren nach der 
Geschaftsordnung’, p. 1126 [<]; Melzer, ‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der
Ausschussarbeit’, p. 1143 [<]; Schuttemeyer, ‘Offentliche Anhorungen’, p. 1148 [<], 
p. 1155 [<]; Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, pp.224f. [<]; Sturm, 
‘Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik’, p.250 [<]; 
Wessels, ‘Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft’, p.290 [>], 
p.297 [<], p.309 [<].
Power Relationship: o
Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees - Voter
see Bundestag - Voter
Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees - Media 
see Bundestag - Media
Coalition Meeting - CDU, CSU, FDP
Institutional Authority: Murswieck, ‘Kanzlerdemokratie’, p. 159 [<]; Schreckenberger, 
‘Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung’, p.331 [<], p.336 [<]; Melzer, 
‘Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit’, p.l 134 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: Rudzio, ‘Informelle Entscheidungsmuster’, p. 135 [ o ] ;  
Schreckenberger, ‘Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung’, p.335 [<]. 
Power Relationship: <>
Coalition Meeting - Voters
see Bundestag - Voters
Coalition Meeting - Media
see Bundestag - Media
CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Grtine, PDS - Bundesrat 
Institutional Authority: GG, Art. 51 [>].
Resource-Dependence: GG, Art. 30 [<].
Power Relationship: <>
CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD - Industry, Unions
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Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, pp.l72f. [o ];  Himer, 
‘Bundestag im Netzwerk organisierter Interessen’, p. 154 [o ] ;  Jung, ‘EinfluBfaktoren und 
Entscheidungsprozesse in der AuBen- und Europapolitik’, p. 186 [<]; Steinberg, 
‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, p.237 [<]; Wessels, ‘Kommunikationspotentiale 
zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft’, pp.288f. [<].
Power Relationship: <>
CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Griine - Voters 
see Bundestag - Voters
CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Griine, PDS - Media 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Ronneberger, ‘Rolle von Public Relations’, pp.l50f. [<>]; 
Power Relationship: o
CDU, SPD - US Congress 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Johnson, America as a World Power, p.239 [o ] .
Power Relationship: o
Bundesrat - Industry, Unions, Voters, Media
see CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Griine - Industry, Unions, Voters, Media
Industry - Unions 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, Regierungssystem, p. 174 [o ];  Jurgen 
Weber, Die Interessengruppen im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1977), pp.86-169 [<>].
Power Relationship: o
Industry, Unions - Voters 
Institutional Authority: GG, Art.9 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Wessels, ‘Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und 
Gesellschaft’, p.288 [>]; Steinberg, ‘Parlament und organisierte Interessen’, p.239 [>]. 
Power Relationship: <>
Industry -EU-Commission 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Franco Algieri and Dietrich Rometsch, ‘EuropaischeKommission 
und organisierte Interessen’, in Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow, eds.,Europdische 
Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung (Marburg: Metropolis, 1994), 
pp. 131-149, p. 134 [>]; Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, ‘Policy-making and 
Institutions in the EC’, in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., Making Policy 
in Europe. The Eurofeication o f National Policy-Making (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 19- 
33, p.27 [>]; Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, ‘Complex Policy-Making: Lobbying 
the EC’, in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., Making Policy in Europe. Th
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e Eurofeication o f National Policy-Making (London: Sage, 1993), pp.35-53, p.39 [>]; 
John McCormick, The European Union. Politics and Policies {Boulder, Col.: Westview 
Press, 1996), p. 117 [>]; Wolfgang Schumann, ‘Das politische System der Europaischen 
Union als Rahmen fur Verbandsaktivitaten’, in Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow, 
eds., Europdische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung (Marburg: 
Metropolis, 1994), pp.71-108, p.83 [>]
Power Relationship: >
Industry - other countries 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, ‘Introduction: Society and 
Foreign Policy - Implications for Theory and Practice’, in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, 
eds., Britain and West Germany. Changing Societies and the Future o f Foreign Policy 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 1-15, p.3 [ o ] .
Power Relationship: <>
Voter - European Parliament
see European Parliament - Voter in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu
Media - Ind, Uns, Voter, WEU, EU-CM, EU-Co, EP, Nato-CM, OSCE, UN-SC, US 
Pre, US Nsa, US SS, US DS, US TR, US Wh, US Sd, US Pen, US Cd, US con, US 
vote, Ge, Fr, It, Ru, CA, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Sw, Au, Po, De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Kavanagh, British Politics, pp.207-223 [<>]; McCormick, 
European Union, p. 143 [>], p. 151 [>]; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, 
American Foreign Policy. Pattern and Process, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1996), p.347 [ o ] ;  Evan Luard, The United Nations. How it Works and What it Does 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp,16f. [ o ] .
Power Relationship: o
WEU - Heads of State, FS, DS, Fco and MoD of UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, G r 
(from 1995), Lu
Institutional Authority: Arie Bloed and Ramses A. Wessel, eds., The Changing 
Functions o f the Western European Union (WEU). Introduction and Basic Documents 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp.xix - xxiv [o * ] ;  Brussels Treaty - 
Treaty o f Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, 
Brussels, 17 March 1948, at http://www.wen.int/eng/index.html. Article VIII, 4 [<*], 
Article X [>]; http://www.weu.int/eng/info/members, htm [<*].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <>*
W E U - OSCE
Institutional Authority: WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 
June 1992, at http:/7www.weu. int/emi/index. html [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
357
WEU - UN Security Council
Institutional Authority: WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 
June 1992, at http: //www. •weu.»nt/en iz/i n dex. html [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
EU-Council of Ministers - Heads of State, FS, TS, Fco and Dti of UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, 
Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu
Institutional Authority: Andersen and Eliassen, ‘Policy-making and Institutions in the 
EC’, p.24 [>]; Adrian Budd, The EC and Foreign and Security Policy (London: 
University of North London Press, 1993), pp.2 If. [o*]; Treaty on European Union, 
M a a s t r i c h t ,  7 F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 2 ,  a t  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu cons treaty en.pdf. Title V ‘Provisionson 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy’ [o*]; McCormick, European Union, p. 124 [<], 
pp. 126-129 [<], p. 126 [*], p. 132 [>]; Milan Rai, Britain, Maastricht and the Bomb. The 
Foreign and Security Policy Implications o f the Treaty o f the European Union (London: 
Drava Papers, 1993), pp.6-9 [ o * ] .
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <>*
EU-Council of Ministers - EU Commission
Institutional Authority: Neil Nugent, Ihe Government and Politics o f the European 
Union, 3rd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), pp,176f. [ o ] ;  McCormick, 
European Union, pp.l 16f. [<>]; Andersen and Eliassen, ‘Policy-making and Institutions 
in the EC’, p.20 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Peter Ludlow, ‘The European Commission’, in Robert O. 
Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community. Decision Making 
and Institutional Change (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), pp.85-97, p.90 [<]; 
Power Relationship: <>
EU-Council of Ministers - European Parliament
Institutional Authority: Andersen and Eliassen, ‘Policy-making and Institutions in the 
EC’, p.25 [o ] ;  Nugent, Government and Politics o f the European Union, pp. 175 [o ];  
McCormick, European Union, p.143 [<>], pp.157-159 [ o ]
Resource-Dependence: Nugent, Government and Politics o f the European Union, p. 185 
[<]•
Power Relationship: o  
EU-Commission - European Parliament
Institutional Authority: Nugent, Government and Politics o f the European Union, 
pp. 174-177 [o ] ;  McCormick, European Union, pp,116f. [<>], p. 143 [ o ] ,  p. 157 [<] 
Resource-Dependence: Nugent, Government and Politics o f the European Union, p. 182
t<]
Power Relationship: o
EU-Commission - Heads of State and Cabinets in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, 
Gr, Ir, Lu
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Institutional Authority: Ludlow, ‘The European Commission’, p.89 [<], p.90 [<]; 
McCormick, European Union, p. 107 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
European Parliament - voter in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu 
Institutional Authority: McCormick, European Union, pp.l44f. [<], p.pl48-150 [<]; 
Nugent, Government and Politics o f the European Union, pp.l86f. [<]; Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, at http://europa.eu.int/. 
Article 138 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
Nato-Council of Ministers - Heads of State, FS, DS of UK, US, Ge, Fr, It, Ca, Sp, 
Tu, Ne, Be, Po, De, No, Gr, Lu, Ic
Institutional Authority: NATO, The NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 1998-99), 
pp.35-56 [o*].
Resource-Dependence: NATO, NATO Handbook, pp.37f. [>].
Power Relationship: o *
NATO-Council of Ministers - NATO-Organisation 
Institutional Authority: NATO, NATO Handbook, p.37 [>].
Resource-Dependence: NATO, NATO Handbook, pp.37f [<].
Power Relationship: o
NATO-Council of Ministers - OSCE
Institutional Authority: North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, Oslo, 4 June 1992, 
at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
NATO-Council of Ministers - UN Security Council
Institutional Authority: NATO, NATO Handbook, p.314 [<]; North Atlantic Council, 
F i n a l  C o m m u n i q u e ,  O s l o ,  4 J u n e  1 9 9 2 ,  a t  
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm [<]; Alexia Holstein, Das Verhaltnis 
des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen zu NA TO und OSZE (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 
1996), pp.111-121 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
Nato-Organisation - Fco and Mod of UK, US, Ger, It, Ca, Tu, Ne, Be, Po, De, No, 
Gr, Lu, Ic
Institutional Authority: NATO, NATO Handbook, pp.37f. [<>]. 
Resource-Dependence: NATO, NATO Handbook, pp.37f. [<>];Nailor, ‘Defence and 
Foreign Policy’, p.229 [<].
Power Relationship: <>
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OSCE - Heads of State, FS and Fco of Britain, Fr, Ger, It, Ru, Ca, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, 
Sw, Au, Po, De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic
Institutional Authority: http://www.osce.org/general/participating states/partstat.htm 
[<]; Helsinki Final Act, August 1975 [<*]; Prague Council, January 1992 [* - 1]; Fact 
Sheet ‘What is the OSCE’ at http:/7wwvv.osceprag.cz: Jens Bortloff, Die Organisationfur 
Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Eine volkerrechtliche Bestandsaufnahme 
(Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1996), p.405 [<];
Resource-Dependence: Charter o f Paris, November 1990, [ o ] ;  Miriam Shapiro, 
‘Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation’, 
American Journal o f International Law 89:3, 1995, pp.631-636.
Power Relationship: <>*
OSCE - UN Security Council
Institutional Authority: Budapest Summit, December 1994 [<]; Bortloff, Organisation 
fur Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, pp.414-425 [<]; Holstein, Das Verhaltnis 
des Sicherheitsrates, pp. 111 -121 [<].
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
UN Security Council - Heads of State, Foreign Ministers of UK, US, Fr, Ru 
Institutional Authority: Sally Morphet, ‘The Influence of States and Groups of States 
on and in the Security Council and General Assembly, 1980-94’, Review o f International 
Studies 21, 1995, pp.435-462, p.436 [<*]; Barry O’Neill, ‘Power and Satisfaction in the 
United Nations Security Council’, Journal o f Conflict Resolution 40:2,1996, pp.219-237 
[o * ] ; United Nations, Basic Facts About the United Nations (New York: United 
Nations, 1995), p.9 [<*], p. 10 [>].
Resource-Dependence: Adam Roberts, ‘The United Nations and International Security’, 
Survival 35:2, 1993, pp.3-30, p.5 [<>].
Power Relationship: <>*
UN Security Council - UN Organisation
Institutional Authority: United Nations, Basic Facts, p. 17 [>]; Peter R. Baehr and Leon 
Gordenker, The United Nations in the 1990s (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p.28 [>]. 
Resource-Dependence: United Nations, Basic Facts, p. 17 [<]; Baehr and Gordenker, 
United Nations, p.28 [<]
Power Relationship: <>
UN Organisation - Foreign Offices in all member countries 
Institutional Authority: United Nations, Basic Facts, p. 17 [|], 
Resource-Dependence: Baehr and Gordenker, United Nations, p.29 [<>].
Power Relationship: <i>
US President - Departmental Secretaries
Institutional Authority: John Dumbrell, The Making o f US Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp.92f. [>];Kegley and Wittkopf, 
American Foreign Policy, p.339 [>], p.343 [>]; Loch K. Johnson, America as a World 
Power. Foreign Policy in a Constitutional Framework (New York . McGraw-Hill, 1995),
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p.187 [>].
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making of US Foreign Policy, pp.88f. [<];Kegleyand 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.343 [<], p.348 [<], p.363 [<], p.387 [<], p.388 [<], 
p.412 [<], p.413 [<]; Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 185 [<].
Power Relationship: <>
US President - US White House
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p.92 [>]; Kegley and 
Wittkopf, Ajnerican Foreign Policy, p.345 [>], p.363 [>].
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p.91 [<]; Kegley and 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.346 [<], pp.386f. [<].
Power Relationship: o
US President - US Pentagon
Institutional Authority: Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.392 [>]. 
Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.393 [<]. 
Power Relationship: o
US President - US Congress
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, pp. 116f. [<], p. 121 
[ o ] ,  p. 132 [ o ] ,  p. 134 [ o ] ;  Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.341 [<]; 
Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 186 [>], p. 188 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p.l 16 [>]; Johnson, 
America as a World Power, p.200 [>].
Power Relationship: <>
US President - US voter
Institutional Authority: Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 188 [<], p.219 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <
US President - other heads of state
see Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries
US departmental secretaries - other US departmental secretaries 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.344 [ o ] ;  
Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 195 [<>].
Power Relationship: <>
US departmental secretaries - their departments
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, pp.93f. [>], p.97 [>]; 
Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.378 [>]; Johnson, America as a World 
Power, pp,190f. [>].
Resource-Dependence: Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 192 [<].
Power Relationship: o
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NSA - White House
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p.89 [>]; Johnson, 
America as a World Power, p. 190 [>].
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p.89 [<], p.91 [<]; 
Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 190 [<].
Power Relationship: o
US departmental secretaries - US Congress
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 138 [<]. 
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 121 [>]; Johnson, 
America as a World Power, p.200 [>].
Power Relationship: o
US Pentagon, US Commerce Department - Industry 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.416 [>]; 
Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 188 [>].
Power Relationship: >
US departments - other US departments 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 95 [ o ] ;  Kegley and 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.381 [<>]; Johnson, America as a World Power, 
p. 195 [ o ] .
Power Relationship: o
White House - Congress 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Johnson, America as a World Power, p. 188 [<], p.200 [>]. 
Power Relationship: o
US departments - US Congress 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 121 [>]; Kegley and 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.388 [>]; Johnson, America as a World Power,
p.200 [>].
Power Relationship: >
US Congress - US voter
Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 116 [<]; Johnson, 
America as a World Power, p. 188 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Johnson, America as a World Power, p.225 [<].
Power Relationship: <
Congress -Industry 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, Making o f US Foreign Policy, p. 138 [>]; Kegley and
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Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p.388 [>]; Johnson, America as a World Power,
p. 188 [>].
Power Relationship: >
Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries 
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Clarke, ‘Policy-Making Process’, p.88 [o],pp.90f. [ o ] ;  Burch 
and Holliday, British Cabinet System, p.88 [o ] ;  Johnson, America as a World Power, 
p. 184 [<], p. 195 [ o ] ;  Rose, ‘British Government’, p.34 [<>]; William Wallace, Britain's 
Bilateral Links within Western Europe (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p.2
[ o ] .
Power Relationship: o
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Appendix 3: Pressure for the Authorization of Air Strikes in Bosnia
1<t Phase: 15 May - 8 August 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters 
lib
US-NsaPM 39 7 18 NC
Cab 14 0 0 NC US-SS
US-Sd
GeFS 36 8 22 NC
DS 29 6 21 NC It
Tu
CE 11 / Po
Ne
BeTS 33 /
Fco 30 8 27 NC Au
Mod 21 6 29 NC
Tre 5 /
Dti 27 /
Par 10416 951 9 NC
Com 16 0 0 NC
con 12 0 0 NC
lab 12 0 0 NC
lib 9
vote 21 1 5 NC
Ind 29 /
end 4 /
Med 56 11 20 C
Weu 47 25 53 B
EU-CM 63 25 40 B
EU-Co 28 10 36 NC
EP 15 5 33 NC
Nato-CM 51 19 37 B
Nato-Org 29 13 45 NC
Osce 65 23 35 B
UN-SC 10 1 10 NC
UN-Org 22 8 36 NC
US-Pre 32 9 28 NC
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24 8 33 NC
US-TR 27 /
US-Wh 4 1 25 NC
US-Sd 27
US-Pen 19 7 37 NC
US-Cd 24 /
US-con 15 3 20 C
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2nd Phase: 8 -10  August 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
lib
MedPM 39 8 21 NC
Cab 14 1 7 NC US-Nsa
US-SS
US-SdFS 36 9 25 NC
DS 29 7 24 NC US-con
Ge
CE 11 it
Tu
PoTS 33
Fco 30 8 27 NC Ne
Be
AuMod 21 6 29 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 1582 15 NC
Com 16 1 6 NC
con 12 2 17 NC •
lab 12 2 17 NC
lib 9
vote 21 2 10 NC
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 26 55 B
EU-CM 63 26 41 B
EU-Co 28 11 39 C
EP 15 6 40 NC
Nato-CM 51 20 39 B
Nato-Org 29 13 45 NC
Osce 65 24 37 B
UN-SC 10 2 20 NC
UN-Org 22 8 36 NC
US-Pre 32 11 34 U
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24 10 42 NC
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4 2 50 NC
US-Sd 27
US-Pen 19 7 37 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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3rd Phase: 10 -16 August 1692
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
lib
Med
EU-Co
US-Nsa
US-SS
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 8 21 NC
Cab 14 1 7 NC
FS 36 9 25 NC
DS 29 7 24 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30 8 27 NC
Mod 21 6 29 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 1582 15 NC
Com 16 1 6 NC
con 12 2 17 NC
lab 12 2 17 NC
lib 9
vote 21 3 14 NC
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 26 55 B
EU-CM 63 27 43 B
EU-Co 28
EP 15 7 47 NC
Nato-CM 51 20 39 B
Nato-Org 29 13 45 NC
Osce 65 24 37 B
UN-SC 10 2 20 NC
UN-Org 22 8 36 NC
US-Pre 32 11 34 C
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24 10 42 NC
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4 3 75 NC
US-Sd 27
US-Pen 19 7 37 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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4th Phase: 16 August - 29 September 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
lib
Med
EU-Co
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-SS
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 9 23 NC
Cab 14 1 7 NC
FS 36 9 25 NC
DS 29 7 24 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30 8 27 NC
Mod 21 6 29 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 1582 15 NC
Com 16 1 6 NC
con 12 2 17 NC
lab 12 2 17 NC
lib 9
vote 21 3 14 NC
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 26 55 BB
EU-CM 63 27 43
EU-Co 28
EP 15 7 47 NC
Nato-CM 51 21 41 B
Nato-Org 29 13 45 NC
Osce 65 25 38 B
UN-SC 10 3 30 NC
UN-Org 22 8 36 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24 11 46 NC
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4 4 100 C
US-Sd 27
US-Pen 19 8 42 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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5th Phase: 29 September • 29 October 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
lib
Med
EU-Co
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-SS
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 9 23 NC
Cab 14. 1 7 NC
FS 36 9 25 NC
DS 29 7 24 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30 8 27 NC
Mod 21 6 29 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 1582 15 NC
Com 16 1 6 NC
con 12 2 17 NC
lab 12 2 17 NC
lib 9
vote 21 3 14 NC
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56 ,
Weu 47 26 55 B
EU-CM 63 27 43 B
EU-Co 28
EP 15 7 47 C
Nato-CM 51 21 41 B
Nato-Org 29 13 45 NC
Osce 65 25 38 B
UN-SC 10 3 30 NC
UN-Org 22 8 36 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24 11 46 NC
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 27
US-Pen 19 8 42 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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6» Phase: 26 October -1 December 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
lib
MedPM 39 9 23 NC
Cab 14 1 7 NC EU-Co
EP
US-PreFS 36 9 25 NC
DS 29 7 24 NC US-Nsa
US-SS
CE 11 US-Wh
US-Sd
US-conTS 33
Fco 30 8 27 C Ge
It
TuMod 21 6 L29 NC
Tre 5 Po
Ne
BeDti 27
Par 10416 1582 15 NC
Au
Com 16 1 6 NC
con 12 2 17 NC
lab 12 2 17 U
lib 9
vote 21 4 19 NC
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 26 55 B
EU-CM 63 28 44 B
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 21 41 B
Nato-Org 29 13 45 NC
Osce 65 25 38 B
UN-SC 10 3 30 NC
UN-Org 22 8 36 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24 11 46 NC
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19 8 42 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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7«. Phase: 1 - 3 December 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
Fco
lib
Med
EU-Co
EP
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-SS
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 10 26 NC
Cab 14 2 14 NC
FS 36 10 28 C
DS 29 7 24 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30
Mod 21 7 33 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 2213 15 NC
Com 16 2 13 NC
con 12 2 17 NC
lab 12 2 17 U
lib 9
vote 21 4 19 NC
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 27 57 B
EU-CM 63 29 46 B
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 21 41 B
Nato-Org 29 14 48 NC
Osce 65 26 40 B
UN-SC 10 3 30 NC
UN-Org 22 9 41 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24 11 46 NC
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19 8 42 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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8*h Phase: 3 • 4 December 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
FS
Fco
lib
Med
EU-Co
EP
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-SS
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 11 28 NC
Cab 14 3 21 NC
FS 36
DS 29 8 28 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30
Mod 21 7 33 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 2844 21 NC
Com 16 3 19 NC
con 12 3 25 NC
lab 12 3 25 C
lib 9
vote 21 5 24 NC
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 28 60 B
EU-CM 63 30 48 B
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 22 43 B
Nato-Org 29 14 48 NC
Osce 65 27 42 B
UN-SC 10 4 40 NC
UN-Org 22 9 41 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24 11 46 NC
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19 8 42 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
371
9iti Phase: 4 December 1992 • 19 January 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
FS
Fco
lib
lab
Med
EU-Co
EP
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-SS
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 11 28 NC
Cab 14 3 21 NC
FS 36
DS 29 8 28 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30
Mod 21 7 33 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 6096 59 U
Com 16 4 25 NC
con 12 3 25 U
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 6 29 U
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 28 60 B
EU-CM 63 30 48 B
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 22 43 B
Nato-Org 29 14 38 NC
Osce 65 27 42 B
UN-SC 10 4 40 NC
UN-Org 22 9 41 U
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24 11 46 C
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19 8 42 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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10m Phase: 19 January - 23 March 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
FS
Fco
lib
lab
Med
EU-Co
EP
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-DS
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 11 28 NC
Cab 14 3 21 NC
FS 36
DS 29 9 31 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30
Mod 21 7 33 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 6096 59 U
Com 16 4 25 NC
con 12 3 25 U
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 6 29 U
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 28 60 B
EU-CM 63 30 48 C
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 22 43 B
Nato-Org 29 14 48 NC
Osce 65 26 40 B
UN-SC 10 3 30 NC
UN-Org 22 9 41 U
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30 13 43 NC
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19 9 47 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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11» Phase: 23 March - 7 April 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
FS
Fco
lib
lab
Med
EU-CM
EU-Co
EP
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-DS
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 12 31 NC
Cab 14 3 21 NC
FS 36
DS 29 9 31 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30
Mod 21 7 33 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 6096 59 U
Com 16 4 25 U
con 12 3 25 U
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 7 33 C
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 28 60 B
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 22 43 B
Nato-Org 29 14 48 NC
Osce 65 26 40 B
UN-SC 10 3 30 NC
UN-Org 22 9 41 U
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30 13 43 NC
US-DS 24
US-TR
CM
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19 9 47 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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12ui Phase: 7 - 2 5  April 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
FS
Fco
lib
lab
vote
Med
EU-CM
EU-Co
EP
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-DS
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 13 33 NC
Cab 14 4 29 U
FS 36
DS 29 10 34 C
CE 11 3 27 NC
TS 33
Fco 30
Mod 21 7 33 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 6456 62 U
Com 16 5 31 U
con 12 4 33 U
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 28 60 B
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 22 43 B
Nato-Org 29 14 48 NC
Osce 65 26 40 B
UN-SC 10 3 30 NC
UN-Org 22 9 41 U
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30 13 43 NC
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19 9 47 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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13th Phase: 25 - 29 April 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
FS
DS
Fco
lib
lab
vote
Med
EU-CM
EU-Co
EP
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-DS
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
K
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39 14 36 C
Cab 14 5 36 U
FS 36
DS 29
CE 11 4 36 NC
TS 33
Fco 30
Mod 21 8 38 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 6816 65 U
Com 16 6 38 U
con 12 5 42 U
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 29 62 B
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 23 45 B
Nato-Org 29 14 48 NC
Osce 65 26 40 B
UN-SC 10 3 30 NC
UN-Org 22 9 41 U
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30 13 43 NC
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19 9 47 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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14®, Phase: 29 - 30 April 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Air Strike Supporters
PM
FS
DS
Fco
lib
lab
vote
Med
EU-CM
EU-Co
EP
US-Pre
US-Nsa
US-DS
US-Wh
US-Sd
US-con
Ge
It
Tu
Po
Ne
Be
Au
PM 39
Cab 14 6 43 C
FS 36
DS 29
CE 11 5 45 C
TS 33
Fco 30
Mod 21 9 43 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 7176 69 U
Com 16 7 44 U
con 12 6 50 U
lab 12
lib 9
vole 21
Ind 29
end 4
Med 56
Weu 47 30 64 B
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 24 47 B
Nato-Org 29 14 48 NC
Osce 65 27 42 B
UN-SC 10 4 40 NC
UN-Org 22 9 41 U
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30 13 43 NC
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19 9 47 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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Appendix 4: Pressure for the Abolition of the TASM Project
1m Phase: 4 May 1990 • 11 August 1991
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P«E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
TASM Opponents
lab
libPM 39 8 21 NC
Cab 14 0 0 NC end
Ge
ItFS 36 8 22 NC
DS 29 8 28 NC Ru
Ne
CE 11 Be
De
NoTS 33
Fco 30 8 27 NC Ic
Mod 21 7 33 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10400 4814 46 B
Com 16 1 6 NC
con 12 0 0 NC
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 3 14 U
Ind 30
end 4
Med 56 11 20 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 21 41 NC
Nato-Org 29 14 48 NC
Osce 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32 8 25 NC
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30 8 27 NC
US-DS 24 8 33 NC
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26 8 31 NC
US-Pen 19 7 37 NC
US-Cd 24
US-con 15 2 13 C
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2nd Phase: 11 August • 30 September 1991
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
TASM Opponents
lab
lib
end
US-con
Ge
It
Ru
Ne
Be
De
No
Ic
PM 39 8 21 NC
Cab 14 0 0 NC
FS 36 8 22 NC
DS 29 8 28 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30 8 27 NC
Mod 21 7. 33 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10400 4814 46 B
Com 16 1 6 NC
con 12 1 8 NC
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 3 14 U
Ind 30 1 3 NC
end 4
Med 56 12 21 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 21 41 NC
Nato-Org 29 14 48 NC
Osce 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32 9 28 NC
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30 9 30 NC
US-DS 24 9 38 NC
US-TR 27 ,
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26 8 31 NC
US-Pen 19 7 37 C
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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3rd Phase: 30 September - 3 October 1991
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
TASM Opponents
lab
lib
end
US-Pen
US-con
Ge
It
Ru
Ne
Be
De
No
Ic
PM 39 8 21 NC
Cab 14 0 0 NC
FS 36 8 22 NC
DS 29 8 28 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30 8 27 NC
Mod 21 8 38 NC
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10400 4814 46 B
Com 16 1 6 NC
con 12 1 8 NC
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 3 14 U
Ind 30 1 3 NC
end 4
Med 56 13 23 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 21 41 U
Nato-Org 29 15 52 U
Osce 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32 10 31 C
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30 9 30 C
US-DS 24 10 42 C
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26 9 35 C
US-Pen 19 7 37 C
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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4* Phase: 3 -12  October 1991
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
TASM Opponents
lab
lib
end
US-Pre
US-SS
US-DS
US-Sd
US-Pen
US-con
Ge
It
Ru
Ne
Be
De
No
Ic
PM 39 8 21 NC
Cab 14 0 0 NC
FS 36 8 22 NC
DS 29 8 28 NC
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30 8 27 NC
Mod 21 8 38 NC
Tre 5
Dli 27
Par 10400 4814 46 B
Com 16 1 6 NC
con 12 1 8 NC
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 3 14 U
Ind 30 1 3 NC
end 4
Med 56 17 30 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 21 41 C
Nato-Org 29 15 52 C
Osce 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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5#, Phase: 12 October 1991 - 8 July 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
TASM Opponents
lab
libPM 39 10 26 NC
Cab 14 0 0 NC end
Nato-CM
Nato-OrgFS 36 10 28 NC
DS 29 10 34 NC US-Pre
US-SS
CE 11 US-DS
US-Sd
US-PenTS 33
Fco 30 10 33 NC US-con
Ge
ItMod 21 9 43 C
Tre 5 Ru
Ne
BeDti 27
Par 10400 4814 46 B
De
No
Com 16 1 6 NC Ic
con 12 1 8 NC
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 3 14 U
Ind 30 1 3 NC
end 4
Med 56 19 34 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Osce 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
m
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6» Phase: 8 July • 9 October 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
TASM Opponents
Mod
labPM -39 11 28 NC
Cab 14 1 7 NC lib
end
Nato-CMFS 36 10 28 NC
DS 29 11 38 C Nato-Org
US-Pre
CE 11 US-SS
US-DS
US-SdTS 33
Fco 30 11 37 NC US-Pen
US-con
GeMod 21
Tre 5 It
Ru
Dti 27 Ne
Be
DePar 104161 5376 52 B
Com 16 2 13 NC No
Ic
con 12 1 8 NC
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 3 14 U
Ind 30 2 7 NC
end 4
Med 56 20 36 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co , 28 At M
EP 15
Nato-CM ” 51
Nato-Org 29
Osce 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
1 Following the April 1992 general elections the composition o f the House o f Commons changed to 651 
MPs, with 336 Conservatives. 271 Labour, 20 Liberal Democrats, and 24 other, thus, L= 16x651=10416.
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7» Phase: 9 October 1992 - 3 July 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
TASM Opponents
DS
Mod
lab
lib
end
Nato-CM
Nato-Org
US-Pre
US-SS
US-DS
US-Sd
US-Pen
US-con
Ge
It
Ru
Ne
Be
De
No
Ic
PM 39 12 31 NC
Cab 14 2 14 U
FS 36 12 33 NC
DS 29
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30 11 37 NC
Mod 21
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 5736 55 B
Com 16 3 19 C
con 12 2 17 NC
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 4 19 U
Ind 30 2 7 NC
end 4
Med 56 21 38 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co ; 28 ,t ,.r
EP 15
Nato-CM ~ 51
Nato-Org 29
O sce 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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8th Phase: 3 July • 30 September 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
TASM Opponents
DS
Mod
lab
lib
Com
end
Nato-CM
Nato-Org
US-Pre
US-SS
US-DS
US-Sd
US-Pen
US-con
Ge
It
Ru
Ne
Be
De
No
Ic
PM 39 13 33 C
Cab 14 3 21 C
FS 36 13 36 c
DS 29
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30 11 37 c
Mod 21
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 6096 59 B
Com 16
con 12 3 25 NC
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 5 24 u
Ind 30 3 10 NC
end 4
Med 56 22 39 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Osce 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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9th Phase: 30 September - 18 October 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
TASM Opponents
PM
Cab
FS
DS
Fco
Mod
lab
lib
Com
end
Nato-CM
Nato-Org
US-Pre
US-SS
US-DS
US-Sd
US-Pen
US-con
Ge
It
Ru
Ne
Be
De
No
Ic
PM 39
Cab 14
FS 36
DS 29
CE 11
TS 33
Fco 30
Mod 21
Tre 5
Dti 27
Par 10416 7536 72 C
Com 16
con 12 6 50 C
lab 12
lib 9
vote 21 8 38 u
Ind 30 3 10 NC
end 4
Med 56 26 46 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co ? 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Osce 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
386
Appendix 5: Pressure for the Despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia
1 at Phase: 1 January - 12 June 1994
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Despatch Supporters
Cha 42 7 17 NC DM
Dm
cdu/csuCab 20 3 15 NC
FM 38 5 13 NC Ind
Nato-Org
UN-OrgDM 32
FiM 14 US
Fr
UKEM 35
CM 13 2 15 NC Ne
Fm 33 8 24 NC
Dm 25
Fim 8
Em 31
COf 8 2 25 NC
BT 15888 9028 57 B
Com 20 4 20 U
Coa 15 3 20 NC
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19 3 16 U
spd 20 4 20 NC
gru 17 2 12 NC
pds 17 2 12 NC
BR 17 3 18 U
BVG 1 0 0 C
Ind 33
Uns 9 1 11 NC
vote 26 3 12 NC
Med 63 10 16 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 14 27 NC
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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2mi Phase: 12 June - 9 December 1994
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P*E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Despatch Supporters
Cha 42 11 26 NC DM
Dm
cdu/csuCab 20 4 20 NC
FM 38 9 24 NC BVG
Ind
Nato-OrgDM 32
FiM 14 UN-Org
US
Fr
EM 35
CM 13 2 15 NC UK
Fm 33 12 36 NC Ne
4 additional Nato members
Dm 25
Fim 8
Em 31
COf 8 2 25 NC
BT 15888 9371 59 U
Com 20 4 20 U
Coa 15 3 20 NC
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19 3 16 U
spd 20 4 20 NC
gro 17 2 12 NC
pds 17 2 12 NC
BR 17 3 18 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 1 11 NC
vote mm 3 12 NC
Med 63 15 24 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51 26 51 C
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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3rd Phase: 9- 11  December 1994
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Despatch Supporters
DM
Dm
cdu/csu
BVG
Ind
Nato-CM
Nato-Org
UN-Org
US
Fr
UK
Ne
4 additional Nato members
Cha 42 12 29 C
Cab 20 4 20 NC
FM 38 10 26 U
DM 32
FiM 14
EM 35
CM 13 2 15 NC
Fm 33 12 36 NC
Dm 25
Fim 8
Em 31
COf 8 2 25 NC
BT 16128* 8965 56 U
Com 20 4 20 U
Coa 15 3 20 U
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19 3 16 U
spd 20 4 20 u
gru 17 2 12 NC
pds 17 2 12 NC
BR 17 3 18 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 1 11 NC
vote 26 4 15 NC
Med 63 27 43 NC
Weu 47 ^  ■
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
* The distribution of party membership in the Bundestag changed after the 1994 general elections See Appendix 2
389
4th Phase: 11 - 1 3  December 1994
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Despatch Supporters
Cha
DM
Dm
cdu/csu
BVG
Ind
Nato-CM
Nato-Org
UN-Org
US
Fr
UK
Ne
4 additional Nato members
Cha 42
Cab 20 5 25 U
FM 38 11 29 C
DM 32
FiM 14
EM 35
CM 13 3 23 NC
Fm 33 12 36 NC
Dm 25
Fim 8
Em 31
COf 8 3 38 NC
BT 16128 9342 58 U
Com 20 5 25 U
Coa 15 4 27 U
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19 4 21 U
spd 20 5 25 U
gru 17 3 18 NC
pds 17 3 18 NC
BR 17 4 24 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 1 11 NC
vote 26 5 19 NC
Med 63 28 44 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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5ih Phase: 13 -16  December 1994
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Despatch Supporters
Cha
FM
DM
Dm
cdu/csu
BVG
Ind
Nato-CM
Nato-Org
UN-Org
US
Fr
UK
Ne
4 additional Nato members
Cha 42
Cab 20 6 30 U
FM 38
DM 32
FiM 14
EM 35
CM 13 4 31 NC
Fm 33 13 396 NC
Dm 25
Fim 8
Em 31
COf 8 3 38 NC
BT 16128 9719 60 U
Com 20 6 30 U
Coa 15 5 33 C
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19 5 26 C
spd 20 6 30 U
gru 17 4 24 NC
pds 17 4 24 NC
BR 17 5 29 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 1 11 NC
vote 26 5 23 u .....
Med 63 28 46 NC
Weu 47 -
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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6th Phase: 16 - 20 December 1994
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Despatch Supporters
Cha 42 Cha
FM
DMCab 20 8 40 C
FM 38 Dm
cdu/csu
fdpDM 32
FiM 14 Coa
BVG
Ind
EM 35
CM 13 5 38 C Nato-CM
Fm 33 14 42 NC Nato-Org
UN-Org
USDm 25
Fim 8 Fr
UK
NeEm 31
COf 8 3 38 NC 4 additional Nato members
BT 16128 10848 67 U
Com 20 7 35 U
Coa 15
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19
spd 20 6 30 U
gro 17 4 24 NC
pds 17 4 24 NC
BR 17 6 35 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 1 11 NC
vote 26 8 31 U
Med 63 31 49 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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7 th Phase: 20 December 1994 - 28 June 1995
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Despatch Supporters
Cha 42 Cha
Cab
FMCab 20
FM 38 DM
CM
DmDM 32
FiM 14 cdu/csu
EM 35 fdp
Coa
CM 13 BVG
Fm 33 14 42 NC Ind
Nato-CM
Nato-OrgDm 25
Fim 8 UN-Org
US
Fr
Em 31
COf 8 4 50 NC UK
BT 16128 11508 71 U Ne
4 additional Nato members
Com 20 8 40 C
Coa 15
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19
spd 20 8 40 U
gru 17 6 35 NC
pds 17 6 35 NC
BR 17 8 47 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 1 11 NC
vote 26 Mk- 10 38 U
Med 63 33 52 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
O cse 65
UN-SC 10
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
8#, Phase: 28 - 30 June 1995
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Despatch Supporters
Cha
Cab
FM
DM
CM
Dm
Com
cdu/csu
fdp
Coa
BVG
Ind
Nato-CM
Nato-Org
UN-Org
US
Fr
UK
Ne
4 additional Nato members
Cha
CM
Cab 20
FM 38
DM 32
FiM 14
EM 35
CM 13
Fm 33 14 42 NC
Dm 25
Fim 8
Em 31
COf 8 4 50 NC
BT 16128 11838 73 C
Com 20
Coa 15
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19
spd 20 9 45 U
gru 17 7 41 NC
pds 17 7 41 NC
BR 17 8 47 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 1 11 NC
vote 26 10 38 U
Med 63 34 54 NC
Weu 4 7 .,
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 1 0
UN-Org 22
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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Appendix 6: Pressure for a Reduction of German Dual-Use Export Controls
Phase: 14 February - 31 August 1992
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Cha 42 12 29 NC
Cab 20 0 0 NC
FM 38 12 32 NC
DM 32 10 31 NC
FiM 14
EM 35 12 34 NC
CM 13
Fm 33 11 33 NC
Dm 25 10 40 NC
Fim 8
Em 31 12 39 NC
COf 8
BT 15888 662 4 NC
Com 20 1 5 NC
Coa 15 0 0 NC
cdu/csu 21 1 5 NC
fdp 19 1 5 NC
spd 20 1 5 NC
gru 17 0 0 . NC
pds 17 0 0 NC
BR 17 1 6 NC
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 i. r 1 11 NC
vote 26 2 8 NC
Med 63 ,13 21 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28 23 82 C
EP 15 1 7 NC
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
O cse 65
UN-SC 10 4 40 U
UN-Org 22 2 9 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
Control Reduction Supporters 
Ind
EU-CM
Fr
UK
It
Sp
Ne
Be
Po
De
Gr
lr
Lu
395
2nd Phase: 31 August 1992 - 23 October 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Control Reduction Supporters
Cha 42 12 29 NC Ind
EU-CM
EU-CoCab 20 0 0 NC
FM 38 12 32 NC Fr
UK
ItDM 32 10 31 U
FiM 14 Sp
Ne
Be
EM 35 12 34 NC
CM 13 Po
Fm 33 11 33 NC De
Gr
IrDm 25 10 40 NC
Fim 8 Lu
Em 31 12 39 NC
COf 8
BT 15888 662 4 NC
Com 20 1 5 NC
Coa 15 0 0 NC
cdu/csu 21 1 5 C
ft* 19 1 5 C
spd 20 1 5 NC
gru 17 0 0 NC
pds 17 0 0 NC
BR 17 1 6 NC
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 1 11 NC
vote 26 3 12 NC
Med 63 14 22 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15 2 13 NC
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10 4 40 U
UN-Org 22 2 9 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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3ni Phase: 23 - 28 October 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Control Reduction Supporters
Cha 42 13 31 NC cdu/csu
fdp
IndCab 20 2 10 NC
FM 38 13 34 NC EU-CM
EU-Co
FrDM 32 11 34 U
FiM 14 UK
It
Sp
Ne
EM 35 13 37 NC
CM 13
Fm 33 13 39 NC Be
Po
DeDm 25 12 48 NC
Fim 8 Gr
Ir
LuEm 31 14 45 C
COf 8
BT 15888 10344 65 U
Com 20 3 15 U
Coa 15 2 13 NC
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19
spd 20 1 5 NC
gru 17 0 '0 NC
pds 17 0 0 NC
BR 17 3 18 NC
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 2 22 NC
vote 26 5 19 NC
Med 63 16 25 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15 2 13 NC
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10 4 40 U
UN-Org 22 2 9 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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4#. Phase: 28 October -12  November 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
In per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Control Reduction Supporters
Cha 42 14 33 NC Em
cdu/csu
fdpCab 20 3 15 NC
FM 38 13 34 NC Ind
EU-CM
EU-CoDM 32 11 34 U
FiM 14 Fr
UK
ItEM 35 14 40 C
CM 13 Sp
Fm 33 14 42 NC Ne
Be
PoDm 25 13 52 NC
Fim 8 De
Gr
IrEm
31
COf 8 Lu
BT 15888 10608 67 U
Com 20 4 20 U
Coa 15 3 20 NC
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19
spd 20 2 10 NC
gru 17 1 6 NC
pds 17 1 6 NC
BR 17 3 18 NC
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 3 33 NC
vote 26
Ilf
5 19 NC
Med 63 17 27 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15 2 13 NC
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
O cse 65
UN-SC 10 4 40 U
UN-Org 22 2 9 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
M
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5th Phase: 12 November - 5 December 1993
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted Pressure (P=E/L) Preference Control Reduction Supporters
Pressure (E) In per cent Behaviour
EM
Em
cdu/csu
Cha 42 15 36 NC
Cab 20 4 20 NC
FM 38 14 37 NC fdp
Ind
EU-CMDM 32 12 38 C
FiM 14 EU-Co
EM 35
Fr
UK
CM 13 It
Fm 33 14 42 NC Sp
Ne
BeDm 25 13 52 NC
Fim 8 Po
De
GrEm 31
COf 8 Ir
BT 15888 10872 68 U Lu
Com 20 5 25 U
Coa 15 4 27 NC
cdu/csu 21
fc£i 19
spd 20 3 15 NC
gru 17 2 12 NC
pds 17 2 12 NC
BR 17 4 24 NC
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 3 33 NC
vote 26 6 23 NC
Med 63 18 29 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15 2 13 NC
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10 4 40 U
UN-Org 22 2 9 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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6s, Phase: 5 December 1993 -14  April 1994
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Cha 42 18 43 NC
Cab 20 7 35 U
FM 38 16 42 NC
DM 32
FiM 14
EM 35
CM 13
Fm 33 15 45 NC
Dm 25 14 56 C
Fim 8
Em 31
COf 8
BT 15888 11664 73 U
Com 20 6 30 U
Coa 15 7 • 47 NC
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19
spd 20 6 30 NC
gru 17 5 29 NC
pds 17 5 29 NC
BR 17 6 35 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 3 33 U
VOiO 3P? 26 8 31 NC
Med 63 21 33 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15 2 13 NC
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
O cse 65
UN-SC 10 4 40 U
UN-Org 22 2 9 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
Control Reduction Supporters
DM
EM
CM*
Em
COP
cdu/csu
fdp
Ind
EU-CM
EU-Co
Fr
UK
It
Sp
Ne
Be
Po
De
Gr
Ir
Lu
' The Chancellor’s Office Minister and his staff did not express any preferences before April 1994
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7th Phase: 14 April - 5 December 1994
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Cha 42 18 43 NC
Cab 20 8 40 U
FM 38 16 42 NC
DM 32
FiM 14
EM 35
CM 13
Fm 33 16 48 NC
Dm 25
Fim 8
Em 31
COf 8
BT 16128* 11178 69 U
Com 20 7 35 U
Coa 15 8 53 C
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19
spd 20 7 35 NC
gro 17 6 35 NC
pds 17 6 35 NC
BR 17 6 35 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 3 33 U
vote 26 8 31 U
Med 63 22 35 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15 2 13 NC
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10 4 40 U
UN-Org 22 2 9 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
Control Reduction Supporters
DM
EM
CM
Em
COf
cdu/csu
fdp
Ind
EU-CM
EU-Co
Fr
UK
It
Sp
Ne
Be
Po
De
Gr
Ir
Lu
' The distribution of party membership in the Bundestag changed after the 1994 general election. See Appendix 2.
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8th Phase: 5 - 9 December 1994
Actor Linkages (L) Exerted 
Pressure (E)
Pressure (P=E/L) 
in per cent
Preference
Behaviour
Control Reduction Supporters
DM
EM
CM
Em
Cof
Coa
cdu/csu
fdp
Ind
EU-CM
EU-Co
Fr
UK
It
Sp
Ne
Be
Po
De
Gr
Ir
Lu
Cha 42 19 45 C
Cab 20 9 45 C
FM 38 17 45 c
DM 32
FiM 14
EM 35
CM 13
Fm 33 16 48 c
Dm 25
Fim 8
Em 31
COf 8
BT 16128 11178 69 u
Com 20 7 35 u
Coa 15
cdu/csu 21
fdp 19
spd 20 7 35 NC
gru 17 6 35 NC
pds 17 6 35 NC
BR 17 6 35 U
BVG 1
Ind 33
Uns 9 3 33 U
vote 26 9 35 U
Med 63 23 37 NC
Weu 47
EU-CM 63
EU-Co 28
EP 15 2 13 NC
Nato-CM 51
Nato-Org 29
Ocse 65
UN-SC 10 4 40 U
UN-Org 22 2 9 NC
US-Pre 32
US-Nsa 7
US-SS 30
US-DS 24
US-TR 27
US-Wh 4
US-Sd 26
US-Pen 19
US-Cd 24
US-con 15
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